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“Labour Relations and the Demise of London’s Upper Docks 1940-1981” 
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This thesis takes advantage of the greater volume of archive material now available 
about dock labour and the Port of London which, combined with other published 
materials, allows for a more holistic appreciation of industrial relations in the port in 
the four decades after 1940, leading up to the final closure of the Upper Docks in 
1980-81.  
 
The historical context is established by a review of the earlier published materials, 
and consideration of the genesis of the Port of London Authority (PLA) with the 
structural and financial constraints of its formation. The social and economic 
environment of the docks workforce are exemplified by considering two London 
boroughs as representative of the wider docklands communities. 
 
The impact of the second World War on the port and the communities is reviewed in 
terms of both enemy action and the effect of UK legislation leading to a statutory 
dock labour scheme. This is followed by a systematic review of strikes in the fifteen 
years after the War, in which a wider appreciation of industrial relations problems is 
developed. That encompasses the interactions between the workforce and 
employers, the complex structures for pay and conditions, the advantages and 
operational problems of the 1947 National Dock Labour Scheme, the involvement of 
the Government through official inquiries and ministerial pressure, and the role of 
trade unions and ‘unofficial’ activists.  
 
The final chapters consider the impact of technological and structural changes in 
1960-1981, with the formation of the National Ports Council and the implementation 
of decasualisation - seen to have a secondary effect of inhibiting effective workforce 
reductions. The growth of containerisation impacted on the Upper Docks by 
reducing conventional traffic and through collateral industrial disputes, but behind 
both of these the financial weaknesses of the PLA’s funding arrangements meant 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis is about the workers in the Upper Docks in London1 and their 
relationship with the port owner and the employers, leading up to the closure of the 
last of those docks in 1981. The Port of London is not dead: nearly 40 years after 
the departure of the last ship from the Upper Docks, part of the port still lives, and 
another part is growing so that in the twenty-first century a successor port is thriving 
on the Thames.2  Seen from a modern perspective the eventual demise of the 
Upper Docks was almost inevitable, and there can be no question that industrial 
disputes played a significant part in that demise, if only in impeding the ability of the 
port management to react to the challenges of change while competitor ports to 
developed ahead of London. But the closure of the docks was, essentially, a 
commercial decision, so the thesis also focuses on the financial and operational 
arrangements of the Port of London Authority (PLA) in addition to its roles and 
influences in relation to the workforce. This thesis thus considers both the reasons 
for the industrial problems in the docks and the commercial, financial, and 
operational difficulties that impacted on the Authority’s role as the lead employer 
and the owner of the dock estate, leading up to the docks closures.  
 
The estate that the Authority inherited upon its formation in 1909 had been 
developed piecemeal over the preceding century, and under conditions of intense 
commercial competition. Although there had been significant rationalisations and 
mergers of the old dock companies, nothing had been done to close loss-making or 
redundant facilities, so that by the end of the nineteenth century the docks were 
struggling to survive as commercial entities, and the establishment of the PLA was 
seen as the solution to the mutually competitive and commercially self-destructive 
structures. In contrast to its predecessors the Authority properly maintained the 
neglected docks but was for many years focused primarily on protecting its income 
by continually growing the port’s traffic. It failed also to develop the strategic focus 
 
1  That is, from St Katharine dock at Tower Bridge to the Royal Group of Docks in Newham.  
2   See http://www.londongateway.com. 
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that would allow it to confront the decreasing fitness for purpose of the smaller 
docks resulting from the continuing increase in ship sizes, and the associated need  
for greater mechanisation to handle the increasing volumes of cargo. Although 
owning the docks, the PLA paid little attention to the fundamental problems of 
industrial relations there or in the wider port. These were exacerbated by the huge 
number of employers (many small and with poor facilities) who showed little 
apparent regard for safety, or any investment in training or amenities for the 
workers; and the continuation of a massively complex system of piecework.3 The 
Authority had also a number of systemic defects that adversely affected its 
operations, finances and competitive position as a dock operator. It was perhaps the 
very size of the dock estate and its perceived value as an engine of London’s 
commerce that allowed some docks to operate for years beyond the point at which 
they were no longer commercially viable. Labour disputes were indeed an important 
contributor to the failure and eventual closure of the Upper Docks, but this thesis 
aims to put these problems and their part in the closure into the proper historical 
context. 
 
What Historians and others have said 
 
The ‘general’ London historians with a time horizon of millennia, and wide socio-
demographic and geographical perspectives have tended to view the causes of the 
demise of the docks in terms of the effect of containerisation, exacerbated by 
industrial disputes, with subsidiary impacts from the ending of Commonwealth 
preference and the greater access to State support enjoyed by Continental ports. 
Almost inevitably, there has been little in-depth analysis of these factors in those 
large-scale works: Inwood, reviewing almost 2,000 years of London’s history in 
around 1,000 pages devotes five pages to the post war docks and the dock 
closures,4 while Roy Porter uses only three paragraphs.5 Twenty-first century 
historians have tended to follow this pattern, with Jerry White’s almost surgical 
analysis from 2008 focusing more on the role played by industrial disputes as a 
malignancy within the docks body corporate.6 Updated around the same time as 
 
3    R.B. Oram, The Dockers’ Tragedy. (London: Hutchinson, 1970), p.109 states that “there 
are said to be over 40,000 scheduled piecework rates [in London]”, but I could not 
substantiate that figure in my researches. 
4    Stephen Inwood, A History of London. (London: Macmillan, 1998) pp. 840-1 and 900-
902. 
5    Roy Porter, London: a Social History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) pp. 348-349. 
6    Jerry White, London in the 20th Century (London: Vintage Books, 2008) pp.204-205. 
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White’s publication, Weightman and Humphries’s compendium volume has a little 
more space, but still uses only the equivalent of three pages to summarise the 
transition of the docks from a record throughput of 70 million tons in 1956 to the final 
closures in 1981,7 and Francis Sheppard uses only a couple of paragraphs.8 Those 
historians with a closer focus on London’s East End identify other factors, with John 
Marriott seeing the closures being more due to the poor transport and 
communications infrastructure, coupled with a lack of investment,9 and Alan Palmer 
demonstrating how the PLA struggled to maintain the upper river docks as the 
pattern of trade changed but was in the end forced to acknowledge the need to 
close and sell off the London and St Katharine docks.10 He then shows how the 
Authority attempted to preserve the other docks, but faced union intransigence, and 
struggled with a plethora of strategic proposals from the PLA and the Greater 
London Council (GLC) that were either not implemented or failed.11 In a similar vein, 
Fiona Rule’s analysis brings together the challenges of containerisation and the 
problems of industrial action but also focuses on the lack of clear strategies within 
the PLA on how these should best be confronted.12 
  
The views of the more specialised commentators on maritime trade and ports tend 
broadly to support the presumption that the key factors influencing the London 
closures were indeed containerisation and the problems of industrial relations, but 
each adds more texture. Marc Levinson’s review of the growth and development of 
the container trade conveys little doubt that although the problems of industrial 
relations might have impacted on the development of Tilbury and facilitated the 
expansion of Felixstowe, the river approaches to the enclosed docks in the Thames 
were “difficult even for conventional ships to navigate” and simply not suitable for 
container shipping13 - a view supported by el Sahli.14 Two works in the late 1970s, 
 
7    Gavin Weightman and Stephen Humphries, The Making of Modern London (London: 
Ebury Press, 2007) pp. 341-3 and 352. 
8    Francis Sheppard, London: a History, (Oxford: University Press,1998) p.343. 
9    John Marriott, Beyond the Tower: a History of East London (New Haven: Yale University, 
2011) pp. 343-345. 
10   Alan Palmer, The East End: Four Centuries of London Life (London: John Murray, 2000) 
pp. 159-161. 
11   Ibid., pp.162-3. 
12   Fiona Rule, London’s Docklands: a History of the Lost Quarter (London: Ian Allan, 2009) 
pp. 309-312. 
13   Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. (Princeton: University Press, 2006). p.209. 
14   Zouheir el Sahli, Estimating the Effects of Containerisation on World Trade 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2013) pp. 22-27. 
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by John Pudney,15 and Douglas Brown16 provide commentaries on how the PLA 
reacted to the challenges of containerisation through the closure of the older and 
smaller docks, greater mechanisation, and planning for the abortive Maplin seaport, 
while trying to resolve the problem of reducing the workforce without triggering 
potentially fatal industrial disputes. It is worth noting that London was not alone in 
facing these challenges, and Gordon Jackson shows how the docks in Liverpool, 
Hull and Glasgow all suffered closures along with many smaller docks and suggests 
that while “industrial relations may never have been very good…this had very little 
bearing on the long-term trend in which the militancy of the dockers….appear as 
very subsidiary influences.”17  
 
Alongside the historical analyses run the works of the sociologists and economists, 
and particularly the commentators on industrial relations, with extensive material on 
workplace disputes. This is particularly marked in the period after the Second World 
War, where the London docks had a very high profile because of the number of 
strikes and their importance to the national economy as the UK tried to regain its 
pre-war primacy as a trading nation.  Here it is possible to see a consistent and 
deep-rooted view of casual labour as the cause - and decasualisation as the cure - 
for industrial problems. As Phillips and Whiteside show, casual employment in the 
docks was recognised as both a social evil (from the mid-1800s onwards) and an 
economic inefficiency in the overall labour market through underemployment and 
“wasteful employment practices”.18 Its effects were famously condemned by the 
Shaw Report in 1920 as being “injurious to the interests of the workers, the ports, 
and the public, and…discreditable to society”, and thus recommended for 
abolition.19 William Beveridge also argued forcefully against casual employment on 
both social and economic grounds,20 although not all may agree with the remedy he 
proposed whereby any surplus labour after decasualisation might “have no choice 
but emigration”.21  The introduction of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in 
 
15   John Pudney, London’s Docks (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975) pp. 172-176.  
16   R. Douglas Brown, The Port of London (Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton, 1978) pp. 
178 -190. 
17   Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworth, Surrey: World’s 
Works, 1983) p.152. 
18   G.A. Phillips and N. Whiteside, Casual Labour: the Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) pp. 1-36. 
19  Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Transport Workers Wages and Conditions of 
Employment of Dock Labour (Shaw Report 1920, Cmd. 936), paragraph 17. 
20  W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (1909 and 1930) (London: 
Longmans Green, 1930) pp. 101-110, 204-207 and 315-323. 
21  Ibid., p. 205. 
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1947, which codified the wartime arrangements for compulsory registration of 
dockers and provided security of employment and a guaranteed minimum wage 
even when no work was available, may be seen as a halfway house towards 
decasualisation, even if its complicated birth brought total satisfaction to neither 
employers nor workers.22 Even with those developments, casual labour was still 
regarded as a core component of industrial disputes in some of the more general 
works on strikes in the late twentieth century, with Knowles seeing it as a “key 
feature of the docker’s industrial background” supporting his assertion that “dockers 
have of all sections been the most ready to strike”.23  
 
In the more analytical approach of the American authors Kerr and Siegel, the dock 
workers’ propensity to strike derived from a combination of toughness, 
independence and the vagaries of casual employment,24 a theme echoed by their 
countrymen Ross and Hartman whose international comparisons include the 
influences of communities and dissatisfaction with union hierarchies25 which Hugh 
Clegg underlines in seeing the failures of unions to recognise and adapt to the 
changing environment of work and social attitudes.26 Recognising the richness and 
variety of all of this material, Cronin has attempted to interpret these theories in the 
light of the “British Experience” but, arguably, the result has been to identify patterns 
rather than causes.27 In those terms the comprehensive study of post-War strikes by 
Durcan et al.28 is useful in its analysis of disputes in that period, and especially in its 
consideration of the impact of the reforms proposed in the Devlin report of 1965.29  
 
The period after the war up to Devlin’s recommendations on decasualisation in 
1965, also provides a rich vein of official enquiries and reports that identify a range 
 
22  See Michael Jackson, Labour Relations on the Docks (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1973) 
pp.25-36 for a narrative of the events. 
23  K. Knowles, Strikes, a Study in Industrial Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), p.174. 
24  Clerk Kerr and Abraham Siegel, ‘The Interindustry propensity to Strike – an International 
Comparison’ in Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur Ross (eds.) Industrial Conflict 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1954) pp. 189-212. 
25  A.M. Ross and P.T. Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (London: Wiley, 
1960) pp.39-44. 
26  H.A. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1979) pp.39-40. 
27  James E. Cronin, ‘Theories of Strikes: Why Can't They Explain the British Experience?’ 
Journal of Social History, 12, 2 (1978), pp. 194-220. 
28  J.W. Durcan, W.E.J. McCarthy, and G.P. Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 
29 Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1965, Cmnd.2734). 
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of factors including the disciplinary arrangements in the NDLS,30 and the vexed 
question of whether overtime was voluntary or compulsory under the Scheme.31 
They focus also on indirect factors such as perceived communist influences,32 
internal and inter-union tensions, and the role of the ‘unofficials’.33 There is almost a 
consistency of presentation for many of these – a ‘Civil Service’ style that attempts 
to define the reasons for the disputes and to identify faults that might then be fixed 
by rational actions on the part of the various parties. An (unpublished) internal report 
by a group of civil servants in 1950 epitomises this approach – the officials 
attempting to understand the psyche of the docker so that they might then 
comprehend why a scheme of employment devised by those same officials and 
endorsed by various eminent persons might still be a cause of unrest.34 The mass of 
official reports is almost matched by commentaries from authors with a specific 
focus on industrial relations in the docks. For example, Knowles’s review of strikes 
in the docks touches on many of the key tensions, but although his analyses and 
diagnoses reach to the heart of the problem, his suggested remedies are few.35 The 
works by Michael Jackson,36 Roy Mankelow 37 Jim Phillips,38 and some North 
American academics,39 have more contributions from individual primary sources, 
and so provide more richness – but with the challenge of how it might be possible to 
scale up the motivating factors that they identify from those sources to provide 
evidence of the sentiments of the labour force as a whole, and thus indicate a clear 
path for future remedial actions. In another publication Jim Phillips views dockers as 
 
30  London Docks Dispute 1945. Report of Committee of Inquiry (Ammon Report) (London: 
HMSO, 1945), paras 19 and 31. 
31  Interim Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks (Evershed 
Interim Report, Cmd 9302, 1954) and Final Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the 
London Docks (Evershed Final Report, Cmd 9310, 1954). 
32  Review of the British docks strikes 1949 (Isaacs report, Cmd 785, 1949) para 87. 
33  Unofficial Stoppages in the London docks. Report of a Committee of Inquiry (Leggett 
Report, Cmd 8236, 1951). 
34  National Archives file LAB 101/74. Report of a working party of officials from the 
Ministries of Labour and Transport chaired by C W K MacMullan, 1950  
35  Knowles, K., ‘The Post War Dock Strikes’ Political Quarterly 22, 3 (1951) pp. 266-290. 
36  M. Jackson, Labour Relations op.cit., 
37  Roy Mankelow, ‘The Port of London 1790-1970’.  In S. Davies (ed.) Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000) pp. 365-385. 
38   Jim Phillips, ‘Decasualisation and Disruption: Industrial Relations in the Docks 1945-79’. 
In Chris Wrigley (ed.) A History of British Industrial Relations 1939-79: Industrial Relations in 
a Declining Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,1996). 
39  Jean Trepp McKelvey, Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: a Study in the Persistence 
of Industrial Unrest. Booklet No.23. New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1953); Vernon Jensen, Hiring of Dock 
Workers (Harvard: University Press, 1964), and Vernon Jensen, Decasualisation and 
Modernisation of Dock Work in London. (ILR Paperback no. 9 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
1971). 
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almost a race apart, who “might be regarded as a distinctive group, characterised by 
peculiarities upon which broader conclusions about the position of manual workers 
cannot be drawn” where he suggests that “industrial and social relations after 1945 
[were] clearly shaped by arrangements, practices, and prejudices inherited from the 
1920s and 1930s”.40 
 
Linking to these are those publications that focus more on the dockers and their 
attitudes to the work and conditions of employment. Here, R.B. Oram has some 
special value in his long time-horizon reflecting his work in the docks as a clerk and 
a manager, showing the challenges for the PLA as an employer and in managing 
the docks. It provides some key nuggets – on the ‘deal porters’ who unloaded the 
softwood cargoes in the Surrey docks, and who were worn out at age 40, and the 
much reproduced comment that dockers in the West India docks could be brought 
out on strike by “anybody with a cap and a choker, on a bicycle…shouting ‘they’re 
all out in the Royals’”.41 The works by Colin J Davis (another North American 
author) and Stephen Hill give more detailed and penetrating appreciations of the 
dockers at work, with Davis’s comprehensive analysis of the London ‘Zinc Oxide’ 
strike of 1948 examining not only the reactions of Government and the unions, but 
also the role played by the ‘unofficials’.42  What is perhaps most interesting about 
Fred Lindop’s paper on unofficial militancy is that most of the impact of the 
unofficials was small-scale: a “direct reflection of the concern of the men – piece 
rates and other questions which rarely went beyond a section of the port”.43 
Arguably, then, the most high-profile and successful instance of unofficial power 
(the ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike) would have had only limited spread without the much wider 
and deeper sense of unfairness that the workers felt about the disciplinary penalties 
imposed. 
 
The biographical material from Jack Dash44 and Bill Hunter, while unashamedly 
partisan, gives a very good flavour of the experiences of the workers, and their 
perceptions of the threats posed by mechanisation and containerisation with Hunter, 
especially, showing how the Communist Party was focused on attacking both 
 
40  J. Phillips, ‘Class and Industrial Relations in Britain: the ‘long’ Mid-century and the case 
of Port Transport c.1920-70’. Twentieth century British History 16, 1 (2005) pp. 52-73, p.56. 
41  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit, p.21 and 42. 
42  Colin J. Davis, Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers 1946-1961 
(Chicago: Illinois University Press, 2003) pp. 108-140. 
43  F. Lindop, ‘Unofficial Militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67’ Oral History and 
Labour History 11, 2 (1983) pp.21-33. 
44  Jack Dash, Good Morning Brothers.  (London: Mayflower, 1970). 
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management and the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU).45 There have 
been significant additions to those personal memoires in recent years, including 
books by A. E. Smith and Henry Bradford and the material collected by al Naib, all 
of which add greatly to an understanding of the people involved, working conditions 
in the docks, and the levels of skills and expertise required.46  David F. Wilson’s 
book adds yet more to the canon of knowledge: written by a former labour 
correspondent of The Observer, it includes significant material from newspapers 
and court reports as well as the standard range of published works, and so provides 
a UK-wide perspective and close-up analysis of the problems of industrial relations 
as a continuing theme in the post-war docks. He also focuses on the inherent 
defects of the NDLS, the inter-union tensions, the problems associated with 
mechanisation,47 and the difficulties in implementing decasualisation following the 
Devlin reports.48  Stephen Hill provides perhaps the closest observation of London 
dockers in the literature, showing the extent and value of the relationships and 
interactions between workmen and foremen, the problems of mechanisation in the 
smaller and older docks, and the reaction to decasualisation, albeit coloured by his 
comment on the attitude of the PLA where, after his completing preparatory and 
pre-interview work with PLA foremen, “the PLA management decided that it no 
longer wished to provide me with research facilities”.49 On the other hand the study 
by Liverpool University seems less relevant to London both in its initial limited 
observations in the Liverpool docks and then its detailed studies in the port of 
Manchester, which had a very different organisational and management structure to 
London and where, in contrast to the PLA, the dock owners engaged positively with 
the study teams.50 
 
The material on trade unions provides another rich resource, and feeds into the 
story of industrial relations in the docks: Llewellyn Smith cites the “waterside porters 
 
45  Bill Hunter, They Knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and the Leadership on 
the Docks 1945-1989 (London: Index Books, 1994). 
46  A.E. Smith, London’s Royal Docks in the 1950’s: a Memory of Dock Work (Amazon, 
Privately published 2008), Henry Bradford, Tales of London’s Docklands (Thrupp, 
Gloucestershire, Sutton Publishing, 2007), and S.K. al Naib, (ed.) Dockland: An Illustrated 
Historical Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 
1988).  
47  Devlin Report 1965, op.cit. 
48  David F Wilson, Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana Books, 
1972). 
49  Stephen Hill, The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1979) 
p.10. 
50  Liverpool University, The Dock Worker: an Analysis of Conditions of Employment and 
Industrial Relations in the Port of Manchester. (Liverpool: University Press, 1956) p.15. 
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who performed in former times the work now carried on by the dock labourers“ as 
far back as 1302,51 and the emergence of the two main groups of Tacklehouse and 
Ticket porters in the seventeenth century – the former being employers, the latter 
being greater in number but “having no voice in the management” – in effect, 
prototype master stevedores and labourers.52 He notes the emergence of a system 
of employing casual workers, and the use of piecework and the “overplus” system, 
which would be an important feature of the ‘Great’ dock strike of 1889.53 That strike 
is often seen as a seismic event in the history of trade unionism for the masses (as 
opposed to the organised craft societies and guilds), and Terry McCarthy’s work on 
this provides a useful synopsis of the history of the docks with a strong social 
perspective.54  He focuses on the significance of the change in the public perception 
of the dock workers, where Oram also provides an important context, showing that 
“dockers’ wages that in 1802 had been 5½d [i.e. less than 2.5p] an hour never rose 
beyond this figure until the titanic struggle of 1889…[and that] from 1828 until the 
prosperous 1870s wages were steady at 4d [2p]”.55 John Lovell’s analysis of 
unionisation around the turn of the nineteenth century and, in particular the 
industrial unrest in the docks in 1911 and 1912 introduces the problems of industrial 
relations as a leitmotif for any narrative about the London docks after this time until 
their closure.56 The extent to which the events of 1889 truly frame the story of trade 
unionism is incidental to this thesis but an important feature is that the mass of 
workers was able for the first time to demonstrate their power and gain the support 
of the middle classes, and presages the increasing recognition of the dock workers 
as sentient beings by the Shaw enquiry and by commentators such as Phillips,57 
rather than the lumpen proletariat (despised even by Marx as “the social scum, that 
passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society”).58 As 
Bullock and then Hill show, the history of the trades union movement in the docks in 
the twentieth century is complex, marked by the creation of the Transport Workers’ 
Federation by Tillett in 1911 and the subsequent welding of the Federation and 
 
51  H. Llewellyn Smith, ‘Chapters in the History of London Waterside Labour’ The Economic 
Journal, 2, 8 (1892), pp. 593-607, p.600. 
52  Ibid., p.600. 
53  Ibid., p.601. 
54  Terry McCarthy, The Great Dock Strike 1889 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1988). 
55  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit., p.94. 
56  John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers. (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
57  J. Phillips, ‘Class’, op.cit., pp. 52-53. 
58  Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party 1848, p.20. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf 
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other unions and societies into the TGWU under Bevin in 1922.59 Almost 
immediately, however, a breakaway union was formed, which also attracted some 
of the stevedores and dockers, and the story is then of continuing tension and 
discord between the TGWU and the National Amalgamated Stevedores and 
Dockers (NASD), which at one point resulted in the expulsion of the NASD from the 
Trades Union Congress for poaching members from the TGWU.60 
Peter Turnbull (with or without his collaborators) has been one of the most prolific 
authors on dockworkers and industrial disputes, and in one paper has analysed 
strike activity in the period covered by this thesis.61  His purview has extended to the 
wider UK docks industry (and sometimes the international scene)62 as well as the 
London docks, with a focus on linking theoretical approaches to strikes with the 
factors such as the relationship with employers and the regulatory and employment 
structures in different ports. With David Sapsford he has argued that the absence of 
any permanent employment relationships (a core characteristic of the system of 
casual labour) militates against the resolution of emergent (chronic) disputes or the 
settlement of sporadic (acute) problems.63 It has to be noted, also, that some of 
Turnbull’s other analyses relate to the period after the closure of the Upper Docks in 
the Thames.64  Matching this material are the publications on the relationship 
between Government and the trades unions, with both Tomlinson65 and Allen66 
considering the tensions between the unions and the new Labour administration of 
1945, mediated to some degree by the emergence of the principle of tripartism, 
involving a partnership between the Government, employers and the unions to 
maintain high employment, low inflation and economic growth. The difficulties of 
sustaining that principle in periods of economic downturns for both the Labour 
 
59  A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Volume 1 (London: Heinemann, 1960) 
pp. 180-220 and Hill, Dockers, op.cit., pp. 127-129. 
60  J. Phillips, ‘The Postwar Political Consensus and Industrial Unrest in the Docks, 1945-
55’ Twentieth Century British History, 6,3 (1995), pp. 302-19, p.313.  
61  Peter Turnbull, Julia Morris and David Sapsford, ‘Persistent Militants and Quiescent 
Comrades: intra-industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89’ The Sociological Review 44, 
4 (1996) pp 710-745. 
62  Peter Turnbull, ‘Contesting Globalization on the Waterfront’. Politics & Society, 28, 3, 
(2000) pp. 367-391. 
63  P. Turnbull, and D. Sapsford, ‘A Sea of Discontent: The Tides of Organised and 
“Unorganised” Conflict on the Docks’, Sociology, 26, 2 (1992), pp. 291-309 
64  P. Turnbull, and S. Weston, ‘The British Port Transport Industry: part 2. Employment, 
Working Practices and Productivity’.  Maritime Policy and Management 20, 3, (1993) pp. 
181-95 (and) P. Turnbull, P. and V. Wass, 'The Great Dock and Dole Swindle; Accounting 
for the Costs and Benefits of Port Transport Deregulation and the Dock Labour 
Compensation Scheme’. Public Administration, 73, 4 (1995), pp. 513-534. 
65 J.D. Tomlinson, ‘The Iron Quadrilateral: Political Obstacles to Economic Reform under the 
Attlee Government’ Journal of British Studies, 34, 1 (1995), pp. 90-111. 
66  V.L. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government. (London: Longmans, 1960) 
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Government in 1945-51 and the Conservatives in the early 1950s are well shown by 
Davis Smith,67 Keir Thorpe,68 and Nigel Harris.69 Matching this external discord are 
the internal and internecine difficulties faced by the unions: Goldstein presents an 
almost unique picture of the internal struggles of the TGWU in maintaining an 
effective link between its paid (unelected) officials and the realities of the docks as a 
workplace.70 The connection to the tensions between the TGWU and the NASD 
(and the systemic problems with the NASD’s ’over-democratic’ decision-making) 
have been well mapped and analysed elsewhere.71 Much of this material is linear: 
apart from Colin J Davis and Stephen Hill, many historians and, in particular, the 
official reports, have tended to follow earlier works, with other commentators 
focusing on casual labour as a major determinant in industrial disputes, although I 
have argued elsewhere that decasualisation was not the universal cure for labour 
problems in the docks.72  
 
Finally, there are commentators on the effects of the closures: where the demise of 
the London docks and the associated job losses have not been viewed in the same 
terms as the closure of coal mines in the United Kingdom and the impact on the 
mining communities, where the effects were more boundaried and visible, and 
where alternative employment was scarce.  So in Kerr and Gibson’s work we see 
only the sketchiest outline of the “great artificial docks”, from which “the freight ships 
disappear” – with no mention of the thousands who once worked there.73 But with 
the docks went not only the jobs of the dock labour force but those in the supporting 
industries such as ship repairing and provisioning together with the ancillary 
services such as shops, pubs, restaurants and other facilities supporting day to day 
living and recreation. That loss is difficult to quantify with any precision in a period 
when many other industries in East London were also closing, but on Rule’s 
 
67  Justin Davis Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest 1945-
55: A study in Consensus. (London: Pinter, 1990). 
68  Keir Thorpe, ‘“Rendering the Strike Innocuous” the British Government’s Response to 
Industrial Disputes in Essential Industries, 1953-1955’ Journal of Contemporary History 
35,4 (2000) pp.577-600. 
69  Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives the State and 
Industry 1945-1964 (London: Methuen, 1972). 
70  Joseph Goldstein, The Government of British Trade Unions (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1952) 
71  see, for example, Thorpe Rendering, op.cit., p.590, Wilson Dockers, op.cit., p.168 and M. 
Jackson, Labour Relations, op.cit., pp. 61-68 
72  Michael Barram, Was the Decasualisation of the London Docks after the Second World 
War the Holy Grail or a False God? (Unpublished MA dissertation, Birkbeck University of 
London, 2014) 
73  Joe Kerr, and Andrew Gibson, (eds.) London from Punk to Blair (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2003) p.15. 
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computation more than 150,000 jobs were lost “in the dock boroughs” between 
1966 and 1976.74 Weightman and Humphries suggest that there might have been 
three jobs lost outside for every job lost within the docks,75 but any effort to quantify 
that impact would be lost in the maelstrom of job losses in the wider London area 
from the mid-1960s onwards. As Marriott shows, this was exacerbated by “policies 
to encourage the movement of industries and people outside of London”, and by the 
fact that “the industries of East London, however, belonged to a different age and 
were in many respects living on borrowed time [so that] in the period 1965-75, East 
London lost 24,000 jobs in traditional manufacturing industries”.76 It was not only the 
docks and the East Enders that were affected since “between 1971 and 2001 
London lost a staggering 766,000 jobs in manufacturing as well as 55,000 in energy 
and utilities...and 67,000 in construction”.77 
 
The Port of London up to 1940 
The story of the London Docks and their workers between 1940 and 1981 is 
burdened with the history of the Port before that period. Indeed, the last 40 years 
cannot be understood without tracing out key elements of the Port’s history from the 
beginning of the 20th century. There is a caveat about some of the data and 
commentaries: as Konvitz notes “material from the interwar period illustrates the 
neglect of port studies and, by implication, calls attention to shortcomings in earlier 
decades”.78  The Port of London was seen and lauded as a successful enterprise in 
the period between the First and Second World Wars, and by 1939 seemed to 
epitomise a hugely important and financially successful undertaking handling more 
than 63 million tons of shipping year, and with a gross annual income of more than 
£6 million. At its inception in 1909 the PLA had assumed responsibility for 2,700 
acres of waterfront and dock estates and 69 miles of the river,79 and in the 
intervening period had added the massive new King George V (KGV) dock with 
“approximately three miles of unbroken quay”,80 had undertaken a remodelling of 
the Royal Victoria dock, and created extensive additional facilities at Tilbury, so that 
 
74  Rule, London’s Docklands, op.cit., p. 312. 
75  Weightman and Humphries, Modern London, op.cit., p.352. 
76  Marriott, Beyond the Tower, op.cit., pp.342-5. 
77  Weightman and Humphries, p.353. 
78  Josef W. Konvitz, ‘The Crises of Atlantic Port Cities 1880 to 1920 ’ Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, 36, 2 (1994), pp. 293-318, p.298n. 
79  Arthur Bryant, Liquid History: to Commemorate Fifty Years of the Port of London 
Authority (London: privately printed, 1960) p.43 
80  G. Jackson, Ports, op.cit., p.145. 
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it had an impressive and modern docks estate. The Port offered employment to 
more than 30,000 workers in the docks, warehouses and wharves,81 and to many 
others employed on the river craft, and in river conservation. To the outside 
observer, the Authority owned that success, but the continuing increase in the total 
tonnage of vessels using the port and the efficient and quiescent workforce 
concealed a series of problems and defects in the Authority, with fault lines in each 
aspect of the organisation and its operations, and in the docks estate, its facilities 
and most of the workforce.  
The PLA was the conception of the Royal Commission on the Port of London 
(RCPOL)82 and its rationale can be summarised as being primarily to preserve the 
docks while protecting the interests of the shareholders of the old dock companies. 
But the reasons for the commercial problems of the old dock companies lay to a 
large extent in the over-provision of dock space and the limitations of size, access, 
and layout of the smaller docks. In order to acquire those assets and to protect the 
interests of the former shareholders the PLA was saddled with nearly £22 million of 
long term debt.83  The Authority was a new venture “a self-governing public trust – 
an Edwardian and typically British compromise between the Regency and Victorian 
ideal of unrestricted private enterprise and the still untried twentieth-century 
Socialist ideal of untrammelled public ownership”.84 But the port was not one holistic 
body, it comprised hundreds of different employers in the docks and on the 
riverside, with thousands of workers including office staff, ‘permanent’ (but easily 
dismissible) labouring staff, warehouse workers, casual labourers and river workers 
including self-employed lightermen, with outmoded and restrictive practices (on both 
sides).  The new PLA directors came from competing commercial organisations and 
from public bodies, where too many different interests had to be brought into 
balance at the expense of proper commercial and strategic decision-making.  
 
The history of the London docks from the construction of the first (West India) dock 
in 1800 has been covered by many authors,85  with a consensus that the most 
 
81  Although the London County Council data shows that the daily number employed in the 
docks (excluding Tilbury) during 1938 never exceeded 12,619 (London County Council 
London Statistics Volume XLI (1936-38) (London: LCC, 1939) p. 329. 
82 See the Report of the Royal Commission on the Port of London (Hereafter RCPOL) (Cd. 
1151, 1902) 
83 Port of London Authority (Henceforth PLA) Annual Report for 1910 (HC paper 318) p.21 
84 Bryant, Liquid History p.42 
85 In addition to those already cited, the seminal work is that of J.G. Broodbank, History of 
the Port of London, Volumes I and II. (London: Daniel O’Connor, 1921)  
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profitable period was the first half of the nineteenth century, when the trading 
position of the docks was protected by monopolies. The pattern of construction is 
shown below: ignoring the complex of docks on the south (Surrey) side of the river, 
which had more specialised trades, primarily in softwoods, the larger docks 
downstream handled the long-distance trade for the East and West Indies, which 
generally meant bigger ships. The smaller docks (closer to the merchants in the City 
of London) were more suitable for smaller ships and vessels of the coastal trade.  
 
 
Figure 1: London’s Docks 1802-1830 
 
 
Taken from G. Jackson The History and Archaeology of Ports p.60 
 
 
Perhaps the most obvious questions from this presentation are around the reasons 
for the construction of the St Katharine dock in 1828, which attracted much 
controversy about the demolition of properties and public buildings required for its 
construction, while the size and location of the dock were clearly disadvantageous. 
As early as 1862 Capper had noted that the dock “labours under a great 
disadvantage, in regard both to its water space and warehousing accommodation 
and…(because of the surrounding buildings) has no prospect of ever being able to 
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extend”,86 while Jackson considers that the dock was “out of date before it was 
opened”.87   
 
By the mid-1800s the docks companies faced the challenges of falling profits from 
the ending of their monopolies and of increasing ship sizes causing problems of 
access to the older docks, and so built new larger docks on greenfield sites with 
lower acquisition and construction costs, equipped with more efficient methods for 
handling cargo, whose operations also supported the financial burden of the smaller 
docks. The first of these was the 100-acre Victoria dock in 1855 which, with much 
easier access for larger vessels from the wider stream at Gallions Reach, was also 
better equipped to meet the new technological challenges by taking advantage of 
developments in areas such as the use of hydraulic power and the electric telegraph 
to improve communications.  The next dock (the Millwall, 1864) was not a success: 
constrained operationally by being too far upstream, it “harassed existing 
companies without gaining much benefit itself”,88 but was then followed by the Albert 
dock (87 acres, completed in 1880), next to the Victoria, and then the Tilbury dock 
(56 acres, competed in 1892): 20 miles further downstream and with excellent deep-
water access. But, as Jackson shows, by the late 1890s London had too many 
docks, with fierce competition and price-cutting in the larger docks and with the 
older docks too small to handle the larger vessels that had come into service in the 
preceding decades,89 so that the story is one of continually falling profits (with the 
London and St Katharine docks being the worst performers).90  
 
At that time no moves seem to have been made to close or dispose of any of the 
smaller docks: this may have been because of the huge warehouses within the 
docks91 which “contributed half of the gross revenues” of the London and India 
Docks company92 and played an important part in storage for seasonal goods, or as 
a bonded facility for the entrepot function.93 The warehouses also represented a 
competitive disadvantage in that the newer docks tended not to have warehousing 
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(London: Smith Elder, 1862) pp. 161-2. 
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89  See G. Jackson, Ports, op.cit., p.73, and M. Ball and D. Sunderland, An Economic 
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91  G. Jackson, Ports, op.cit., p.180 cites the St Katharine Dock as having 1¼ million square 
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92  RCPOL Report, p.70, paragraph 146. 
93  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy op.cit., p.98. 
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facilities, so any goods unloaded there and requiring to be stored had to be taken 
(often in lighters owned by competitors) to the smaller docks. Alternatively, as Ball 
and Sunderland have suggested, the dock companies held onto their assets “more 
because of the sheer cost of converting the redundant dockland to any other urban 
use”.94  From a current perspective, and with modern accounting practice, the dock 
estate inherited by the PLA was so diverse and so widely scattered that the obvious 
move would have been to rationalise it by closures. But the PLA preferred to 
maintain and preserve those huge assets, with the financing costs falling as interest 
charges on the Authority and thus on all of the port users irrespective of whether 
they used the facilities.95 However, the Authority’s policy of investment in those 
facilities carried commensurate risks: the Tilbury dock extensions and passenger 
terminal cost nearly £3.8 million96 but, as Jackson shows, the transatlantic liners, 
whose dimensions had defined the size of the facility were already destined for 
Southampton.97  
 
There were other implications on ownership of assets:  as Bird noted “even where 
the PLA and the shipping company have a long-term agreement over the use of a 
particular berth… the PLA retains the right to let the berth to other ships when the 
tenant’s vessels are not on the quay because the berths must be in use as 
continuously as possible”.98 In addition, in the rare circumstances where the PLA 
leased facilities to the shipping companies this was generally on a (short) seven-
year lease thus inhibiting investment by the shippers. In contrast, major users of 
Rotterdam were given long term (25 - year) leases that encouraged investment in 
facilities and mechanisation.99 Nevertheless, prior to 1940 there had been some 
significant innovations in the London docks in the handling of specialised cargoes 
such as grain and frozen meat.100 But more widespread mechanisation was difficult 
because of the variety of interests involved and the difficulty of obtaining consensus 
approval from shipowners and master stevedores – let alone the workforce.101 
Before leaving the question of capital investment it is salutary to note the 
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construction of the PLA’s massive headquarters building, opened by the Prime 
Minister on 17 October 1922. The Times contains two items about this event,102 but 
neither has any reference to the cost of the new building, although later annual 
reports show the cost as being in excess of £1.3 million.103  
 
In order to take over the assets of the old companies, the PLA was saddled with 
over £22 million of debt (£9 million at 3% interest, £13 million at 4%, all repayable in 
90 years),104 and with government control over a significant proportion of its 
revenues.105 In considering how the new Authority should acquire the assets of the 
dock companies, the RCPOL had decided against raising capital to purchase 
them,106 and recommended that the takeover should be funded by the issue of Port 
Stock, with interest guaranteed at such a level as to equate to the average total of 
dividends paid out by the three remaining companies in 1899-1901 (i.e. 
£690,605).107 The stock would then be distributed to the shareholders of the dock 
companies so that “the pecuniary position of the present proprietors of the docks to 
be purchased should be rendered neither worse nor better”.108  At that time there 
were suggestions that the cost was far too high,109 and there is a strong argument 
for that premise: the dividends paid by the companies had only been afforded by 
minimising expenditure on maintenance and repairs,110 and by outsourcing labour 
costs.111 In addition, the total sum of around £22 million gave a quasi-commercial 
valuation to the docks estate as a viable undertaking – a ‘going concern’ - but from 
another perspective the companies were close to bankruptcy, in which case the 
valuation of assets would have been very different.  But whatever the true value of 
the docks, those interest payments would have a huge and continuing impact on the 
PLA’s finances for the future because the first call on the Authority’s income after 
payment of “working and establishment expenses”, together with salaries and 
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superannuation was the interest on that debt.112. In essence, the arrangements for 
financing the PLA provided a wonderful opportunity for investors to replace their 
holdings in company shares of very questionable long-term value, by an income 
stream that might offer a lower return – but at much lower risk. 
 
The PLA had four main sources of income: dock Dues in the form of tonnage 
charges for vessels using the docks and the river; stevedoring and warehousing 
charges for goods loaded and offloaded over their quays, licensing charges for the 
lighters and barge operators, and port Rates, applied to all imports and exports. 
These last two charges represented a compromise solution to the financial impact of 
the ‘free water clause’, which is considered in more detail below, and needed to be 
agreed with the Board of Trade, and Parliament113 – which of course allowed for any 
interested parliamentarian to intervene either on his own behalf or as representing 
some other interest – for example his constituents if he were one of the Members 
for the City of London.  
 
The PLA was thus constrained in terms of both financing and income and, lacking 
the facilities enjoyed by commercial companies to issue equity shares, could only 
fund new capital works from internal revenues or by the issue of more Stock. Its 
commercial strategy would perforce have to be to seek to minimise operating costs 
while maximising volume and it would face particular challenges during any 
downturn of trade. Following this strategy the gross traffic of the port grew from 40 
to 62 million tons between 1911 and 1938, although that ‘headline’ figure can be 
misleading in a number of ways, since it includes cargoes (including coal and, later, 
oil) which were not handled through the docks or (general) commercial wharves. A 
more relevant indicator is the tonnage handled in the docks, rivers and wharves, 
which (using PLA data) grew from 30 to 45 million tons in the same period.114 
Comparisons with national and international competitors are complicated by 
differences in the comparators: Bird, using data for ships arriving with cargo or in 
ballast, suggests that London handled about 31 million tons (mt) annually in 1936-
38.115  In contrast, Morgan’s table of international volumes in 1938, based upon data 
for imports and exports, show New York at 57 mt, followed by Rotterdam and 
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113  Ibid., Section 13 (2) and Schedule 4. 
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115 Bird, Major Seaports op.cit., p.24. 
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London at around 42 mt, significantly ahead of Hamburg (26mt) and Antwerp 
(25mt).116 
 
More significant for this study is the fact that although the docks handled about 60% 
of the traffic paying port dues in both 1911 and 1938 (with the remaining 40% 
handled by the (competitor) wharves), the volume handled by the PLA itself over its 
dock quays remained at around 3 million tons – i.e. decreasing from around 10% to 
6% of the traffic paying port dues. But while there is a plethora of data about the 
finances and operations of the PLA as the owner of the Port, the labour force that 
handled the cargoes (whether employed by the PLA or by others) has little visibility, 
although Pudney suggests that the main workforce of registered dock workers 
diminished in numbers from 52,000 in 1920 to 34,000 in 1937.117 At first reading this 
represents a significant increase in productivity, probably underpinned by some 
degree of mechanisation although there might also have been some benefit from a 
more quiescent workforce, bruised by the failure of the General Strike in 1926 and 
the depression of the early 1930s, which mustered only three industrial disputes in 
the decade.118  
 
The PLA’s financing arrangements were such that it had minimal capital reserves, 
so that funding works such as the KGV dock, its new Headquarters and the Tilbury 
extensions required the issue of more interest-bearing stock (reflected in increased 
charges to all the port users). In consequence, the lower costs that enabled the port 
to compete with its national and continental competitors necessitated continual 
downward pressure on the only other cost variable – that of labour. There was a 
further question of who would benefit from any capital works: if these were for 
general docks maintenance or improvement it would be appropriate for all users to 
meet the costs through the Port rates. But individual companies might argue that 
they would obtain no benefit from a specific project, a point that is particularly 
evident in relation to the lack of provision of toilets and washing facilities for workers 
that were so much criticised in later years.119 Nevertheless, the port provided a huge 
range of jobs and incomes: by the late 1930s more than 30,000 workers were 
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entered in the Register of dock workers, serving the docks and warehouses, 
working on the 350 tugs and nearly 9,000 barges and lighters, or employed in the 
hundreds of riverside wharves, from Brentford, 17½ miles above London Bridge to 
the huge oil jetties more than 30 miles downstream.120 The continual growth of 
traffic had allowed the PLA to maintain and develop its estate (and masked the 
subsidisation of the older docks) and that period represented a high point in the 
work of the Port, with major improvements to the Victoria dock and in mechanised 
systems for handling bulk cargoes in addition to further new works at Tilbury.121 
London still retained its supremacy among UK ports: the only real competitor being 
Liverpool, but with London continually widening the gap in terms of exports, imports, 
and value of trade.122 In addition, London also benefitted hugely from its functions 
as an entrepôt – that is where imported goods could be stored under bond and re-
exported - and as one of the major centres of the international wool trade and for 
the blending and re-export of tea.123   
 
The following table compares the main income streams for the PLA in 1911, 1925, 




120  Bird, Major Seaports, op.cit., pp. 393-398 and 422. 
121 See Pudney London’s Docks, op.cit., pp. 164-166, and Bryant Liquid History, op.cit., 
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122 G. Jackson, Ports, op.cit., p.167 
123 See Maizels. A., ‘The Sources and Nature of Statistical Information in Special Fields of 
Statistics: The Oversea Trade Statistics of the United Kingdom’ Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Srs A 112, (1949), pp. 207-223, p.210, and Douglas Brown, Port of 
London, op.cit., pp. 94-104 
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Table 1: Comparison of traffic and finances for the Port of London 1911-1939 
 
 1911 1925 1939 
Volumes of traffic (million tons)    
Total tonnage  39.5 45.4 62.1 
Tonnage paying port dues 29.4 34.6 45.7 
Shipping using river  11.3 12.6 19.4 
Shipping using docks 18.1 21.8 26.3 
Tonnage handled by PLA 2.9 3.0 2.8 
PLA financial data  (£000) (£000) (£000) 
Total Income 2,873 6,430 6,132 
Total Expenditure 1,878 4,936 4,439 
Surplus on operations  995 1,494 1,693 
Interest on Port Stock (810) (1,184) (1,210) 
Other adjustments (200) 214 (142) 
Net Income (15) 524 341 
Source: PLA Annual reports 1911,1925 and 1939 
 
It is not possible to apply even the simplest of modern commercial performance 
metrics, such as ‘Return on Investment’ to the data because the original capital 
assets were held on the books at 1909 valuations, with other assets being held at 
the values when acquired, and no provision being made for depreciation. But at the 
lowest level, the PLA made only a few hundred thousands of pounds of net profit in 
each year up to 1939, while the stock holders gained millions, and if provision had 
been made for the costs of depreciation, the PLA would have shown a loss in every 
year. 
 
In addition to the docks, the PLA’s responsibilities on the river included the licensing 
of the watermen, navigation and safety, including pilotage, dredging and pollution 
control, passenger transport and recreational usage. The initial reports of the 
Authority give no indication of how these facilities, people, organisations and 
responsibilities were to be brought together, although Oram’s appreciation is that 
little formal integration took place.124 Reflecting this wide spread of responsibilities, 
the governing body (the ‘Authority’ itself) originally comprised 28 members from two 
main groups –18 “elected” members representing the shipowners, wharfingers and 
 
124  Oram Dockers, op.cit., pp. 6-7 and 11. 
 28 
river users, and 10 “appointed” members from Government Departments, the 
London County Council (LCC) and the City Corporation, with one being a 
“representative of labour”.125 The most obvious question arising from this structure is 
about the extent to which these persons would be able to separate their roles and 
functions within the PLA from their own personal or business interests. This may all 
be seen in the context of the rather simplistic statement by the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Trade (later to become Lord Devonport and first Chairman 
of the PLA) in the debate on the Second Reading of the PLA Bill in the House of 
Commons: 
 
We do not want men to come and take a hand in the management and 
direction of the port merely as trade delegates and as representing sectional 
interests. We want them to come there imbued with the idea that it is their 
duty to contribute what they can in the way of management to the 
development of the port for the common good of all and in the interests of all 
trades.126 
 
Precisely how the Authority’s members might achieve that aspiration is unclear, and 
in February 1920, in his evidence to the Shaw Enquiry, Ernest Bevin, the Assistant 
General Secretary of the Transport Workers’ Federation, was to use the example of 
the Chairman of the Authority to pick up on the question of separation of interests: 
 
I am glad to have found a super-man who can abstract himself from his 
280,000 shares in Kearley and Tonge and the International Tea Stores, and 
all that that means in money and in goods going to those firms passing 
through these ports—who can abstract himself from any of those influences 
and look after the interests of the great public.127 
 
The minutes of the Authority’s meetings show how power was concentrated within 
such a large Board: the management of the organisation was undertaken through a 
set of Committees covering, for example, Works, Docks and Warehouses, and 
Finance,128 whose recommendations were often approved by the Authority without 
recorded discussion.  In 1911 a much more powerful committee – the General 
Purposes Committee (GPC) - was set up “to deal with broad questions of policy 
affecting the working of the undertaking, the development of facilities in the Port, the 
appointment of chief officers, and matters not specially delegated to other 
 
125  Port of London Act 1908, S.1 (5) and (6). 
126  House of Commons Hansard, 6 May 1908, col 268-270. 
127  Shaw Report, pp. 30-31. 
128   PLA Annual Report for 1910, p.5. 
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committees”.129 The members of the GPC were the chairmen of all the other 
Committees, making it by far the most powerful group within the management 
structure, and the Chairman of the Authority was the Chairman of the GPC.  
 
The PLA Archives provide little actual evidence of how the Authority functioned as a 
business, but do indicate one area of concern to the financial managers, and why 
the PLA chased volume: a briefing note prepared for the Vice Chairman (apparently 
by the Chief Accountant) ahead of the meeting of the Finance Committee on 27th 
June 1938 reads:  
 
the time is imminent when some consideration should be given to the long-
term financial position of the Authority…. The current accounts show a debt 
service charge of £1,450,000 which is more than 25% of the total annual 
revenue and is, of course, considerably higher than one would expect in a 
commercial or trade undertaking. The ability to earn this large sum and its 
effect on the charges for handling goods and ships is to some extent offset 
by the revenue which the Authority receives from Port Rates130, but if the 
trade of the Port does suffer any decline this form of support (which is 
practically all net revenue) will likewise decline.131  
 
There is no evidence in the minutes of either the Finance Committee or the General 
Purposes Committee that any action was taken on this note. 
 
Watson notes that “the PLA was for decades a highly structured and hierarchical 
organisation [which] inherited many working practices and traditions from the old 
dock companies as well as the Thames Conservancy”, where former company 
loyalties and cultures still prevailed.132 R B Oram, who worked in the PLA from 1912 
to 1956, shows the PLA to have been an amalgam – i.e. a combination of diverse 
elements - rather than a merger of the dock companies, and asserts that “not until 
the Second World War were the traditional methods of the old Dock Companies 
finally eradicated”.133 It would appear that the attitude of some staff towards 
modernisation almost mirrored that of the more obdurate dockers where: 
“modernisation of one major dock was apparently delayed for several years until the 
retirement of the incumbent dock superintendent, who was known to have little 
 
129   PLA Annual Report for 1911, P.11. 
130  Estimated at that time as £810,000 p.a. (PLA Annual Report for 1938, Accounts, p.8) 
131  Folder in the copy of PLA Annual Report for 1938 in MLD archives 
132  Watson, Port of London Authority op.cit., pp. 164-171. 
133  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit., pp. 6-7. 
 30 
appetite for it”.134 It is also possible to visualise the Authority acting almost in the 
manner of a traditional country landowner: Hill noted that the PLA “was a large 
bureaucracy which was only partly concerned with operational work in the docks. Its 
main tasks were to maintain the river and dock infrastructures”.135 And as Oram 
stated “I could count on the fingers of one hand the occasions when top 
management ever visited the docks to watch the activities over which they wrangled 
for so many hours in Leadenhall street”.136  One example may encapsulate the 
problem: the PLA’s Annual Report for 1960 records the retirement of Captain Ion 
Hamilton Benn from the Authority. This is the same Hamilton Benn who was first 
appointed to the Authority in1909, as evidenced by the statement that he had 
served for 52 years137. Benn was appointed by the Board of Trade as a person 
“having knowledge or experience of trade or shipping in the Port of London”. He 
died at the age of 98 a few months after leaving the PLA.  
 
There was a further systemic problem from the Act, the continuation of the “free 
water clause” that had been included in all of the nineteenth century statutes 
authorising the construction of docks in London. This guaranteed the rights of 
lightermen to “convey, deliver, discharge, or receive...goods to, or from on board of, 
any Ship or Ships, Vessel or Vessels”  free from any rates or duties when in the 
docks138 – and of course they paid no charges for using the river. This ‘free water 
clause’ was not seen as onerous in the early years of operation of the docks, but by 
the turn of the century was seen by the dock companies as a huge drain on their 
income. In evidence to the RCPOL the dock companies estimated the costs of the 
free water clause as £234,083 p.a., based upon £50,000 for locking in and out, and 
£184,083 for the loss of quay dues.139 A second and larger impact derived from a 
corollary of the Free Water clause: ships in the docks could load or unload overside 
into lighters which transported goods to or from the river wharves, rather than over 
the dock companies’ quays. These riverside wharves, both the long standing Legal 
Quays140 and the Sufferance Wharves established in the later centuries, multiplied 
in the second half of the nineteenth century with the relaxation of customs duties.141 
 
134  Watson, Port of London Authority op.cit., p.53. 
135  Hill, Dockers, op.cit., p.10. 
136  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit., p.188. 
137  PLA Annual Report for 1960 (London: PLA, 1960). 
138  e.g. 39 Geo. 3 Cap.69, An Act for Rendering more Commodious, and for Better 
Regulating, the Port of London (1799) Clause CXXXVIII. 
139 RCPOL Minutes of evidence p.313, Question 5785. 
140 Established following 1 Elizabeth c.11, An Act Limiting the Times for Laying on Land 
Merchandize from Beyond the Seas, and touching Customs for Sweet Wines. 
141  Following 16 and 17 Vic c. 107 Customs Consolidation Act (1853). 
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Being mostly land warehouses, few had required anything approaching the huge 
capital expenditure for construction of the docks, and were able to charge much 
lower rates. Although the RCPOL had no published data for this commerce, one 
witness estimated that the value of the wharves would be £13,141,233, and on the 
assumption that the wharves yielded a 5% return on that capital value he derived a 
figure for earnings of £657,051.142 On a simple computation (and bearing in mind 
the uncertainty around both of those estimates) the potential loss of business to the 
PLA from the lighters and the wharves after its establishment would be around 
£900,000 p.a.  
 
The RCPOL found itself unable to recommend the abolition of the Free Water 
clause, but the Port of London Act went some way to meeting the complaints of the 
dock companies in allowing the Authority to impose Port Rates on all exports and 
imports handled in the docks or on the river (subject to Parliamentary approval of 
the charges), and it was given control of the licensing of the barges used by the 
watermen so that they might “henceforth make a moderate contribution towards the 
revenue of the port…(and) the Authority might without undue pressure upon trade 
levy upon those barges a not inconsiderable sum”.143 In the Authority’s Annual 
report for the year ended 31st March 1914, Port Rates yielded £343,550, and the 
licensing £13,026,144 so that if the earlier estimate of the gross losses of revenue to 
the wharfingers and lightermen as around £900,000 p.a. was correct, there would 
be a significant hidden on-going subsidy, initially in excess of £500,000 p.a., to the 
PLA’s competitors. 
 
The figure given most prominence in the PLA’s reports for many years was of the 
total tonnage of vessels through the Port, with frequent comparisons to the traffic of 
its international competitors, perhaps representing what would now be termed a key 
performance indicator. Part of the problem in attempting to establish valid 
international comparisons is the complexity of the data,145 but using Morgan’s 
computations of sea-borne trade in 1938 noted above, London and Rotterdam were 
more or less equal at around 42 million tons.146  Bearing those complexities in mind, 
a comparison with the data in the RCPOL report from 1902 appears to show that 
 
142  RCPOL Minutes of Evidence, p.123, Question 2591 and Appendices to Minutes of 
Evidence p. 217. 
143 RCPOL Report, paragraph 303. 
144 PLA Annual Report for 1914. p.19. 
145 Morgan, ‘Rotterdam’ op.cit., p.3. 
146 Ibid., 
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Rotterdam was handling approximately five times as much traffic in 1938 as in 
1899, while London was handling less than three times as much.147 The reasons for 
such a divergence are complex and manifold, in some respects reflecting the 
attractiveness to shipping of better access – the transit time from the North Sea to 
Rotterdam being less than two hours along a waterway with a minimum depth of 33 
feet, together with a tidal rise of less than 6 feet148 (compared to the twenty-mile 
transit from Tilbury and a mean tidal range for the Thames of 18 feet at London 
Bridge149) which removed any need for the locked wet docks necessary in the 
Thames. Other factors include the better cargo handling facilities constructed by 
shipowners on quay areas provided on long leases from the port Authority, and the 
transit trade to the developing Benelux and German domestic and industrial 
hinterlands via much larger barges (up to 3,000 tonnes)150 compared to the Thames 
lighters’ pre-war average of 112 tons and maximum of 400 tons).151 In addition, as 
Kreukels and Wever point out, there was a perceived coincidence of interests in 
Holland between the port, the municipality and the nation that enabled a faster 
response to changes in shipping trends where “measures based on these trends 
were implemented fast…and were mostly supported by national government”.152 
 
Industrial Relations  
 
Oram notes that “the [industrial relations] climate in the decade preceding the 
Second World War was favourable to discussion and compromise…[and] casual 
labour was in a more reasonable state of mind than that of the ten years 
immediately following the First War”,153 a picture borne out by official data.154  It is 
possible that there was indeed some degree of “discussion and compromise” but, 
as Wilson shows, the Depression of the mid-1920s had brought dockers’ earnings 
back to the levels prevailing before the Shaw enquiry,155 and the unions were facing 
 
147 RCPOL Report, pp.18-19. 
148 Morgan, ‘Rotterdam’ op.cit., p.4. 
149 Bird, Major Seaports op.cit., p.352. 
150 Frans Posthuma, ‘Rotterdam Europort’ Ekistics, 28, 168, (1969), pp. 345-347, p.345. 
151 Bird, Major Seaports, op.cit., p.393 and John Jupp, ‘Some personal reflections in 
London’s lighterage Industry’ in S.K. al Naib, (ed.) Dockland: An Illustrated Historical Survey 
of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 1988), pp. 177-
186, p.181. 
152  Ton Kreukels, and Egbert Wever, ‘Dealing with Competition: the Port of Rotterdam’ in 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie: 87, 4 (1996) pp. 293-309, p.299 
153  Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit., p.134. 
154  Ministry of Labour Gazette Vols. 43, (1935) p.168; 44, (1936) p.161; 45, (1937) p.214; 
46, (1938) p.214, and 47, (1939) p.160 
155  Wilson, Dockers, op.cit., p.79. 
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challenges of amalgamation (TGWU) and splintering (NASD and the Scottish 
TGWU).156 The quietude of the workforce may also have reflected the consequence 
of the introduction of State-funded unemployment pay following the National 
Insurance Act of 1911, and the relaxation of the stringent conditions of entitlement in 
1928 that would have contributed to the reduction of hardship for casual workers 
unable to gain full time employment.157  
 
The PLA was apparently more concerned with its real estate and with traffic 
volumes than its human capital, this being more or less a continuation of the 
management philosophy of some of the old dock companies. For example, in his 
evidence to the RCPOL, the Chairman of the London and India Docks Company, 
had explained that the reason why the company’s wages costs had fallen compared 
to 10 years previously was that: 
 
Up to the year 1890, we did all our discharging in the docks, and…worked 
the cargo out of every ship that came into the dock, [but then] we came to an 
arrangement with the steamship owners, under which we gave up all that 
work. We immediately threw over an enormous amount of labour, which we 
no longer paid.158 
 
That “enormous amount of labour” was then (if lucky) employed either by the 
shipowners or by Master Stevedores – but almost entirely as casual labour. It is 
important to recognise that this was by a commercial choice rather than an 
inevitability: as Henderson and Palmer and then Makepeace have shown, it was 
possible for nineteenth century employers of labourers in the docks and 
warehouses to adopt employment practices that were paternalistic yet combined 
efficiency and discipline, and a concern for employee welfare.159 Perhaps the real 
reason does lie elsewhere, for example in Ben Tillett’s evidence to the Select 
Committee on Sweating in 1888, he asserted that responsibility for almost all of the 
docks work had been handed over to sub-contractors to avoid the liabilities of 
 
156  Ibid., pp. 79-81. 
157  Sam Davies, ‘“Three on the Hook and Three on the Book”: Dock Labourers and 
Unemployment Insurance between the Wars’ Labour History Review 59, 3 (1994) pp. 34-43. 
158  RCPOL Minutes of Evidence, page 314, Question 5823   
159 Anthony Henderson and Sarah Palmer, ‘The Early Nineteenth Century Port of London: 
Management and Labour in Three Dock Companies 1800-1825’, in Ville, Simon, and 
Williams, David, (eds.) ‘Management, Finance and Industrial Relations in Maritime Histories: 
Essays in International Maritime and Business History’ Research in Maritime History 6 
(1994) pp.31-50 and Margaret Makepeace The East India Company's London Workers: 
Management of the Warehouse Labourers, 1800-1858 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2010). 
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employers under the Employers’ Liability Act,160 because, in effect, sub-contractors 
were men of straw and could not be sued or prosecuted.161  
 
Broodbank had shown prescience in regard to this fragmentation of responsibilities: 
“there will be no final solution of the dock labour problem until the Port of London 
Authority reverses the decision of the Joint Committee and again undertakes all 
operations in the docks, including the stevedoring work of loading ships as well as 
discharging ships.”162 But the PLA did not reverse that decision (until forced to do so 
when the stevedoring companies collapsed in the 1970s), and for decades was 
responsible for managing a port with hundreds of large and small operators 
employing thousands of workers. But different employers had different interests – 
the major shipowners might want investment in new berths or in automated 
handling, the warehouse owners might be concerned with security, transport or 
other “shore based” issues, and the smallest master stevedores would have only 
the limited horizon of a few jobs. This last group might also lack any form of 
personnel management skills or training, and perhaps be unfamiliar with emerging 
technologies. The key factor for them was that the system gave the absolute 
minimum of overheads – no costs for engagement or termination, training, 
administration or personnel management, and, finally, no pensions or sick pay. 
Indeed, as the Maclean committee showed, the costs of sick pay for casual dock 
workers had been handed over to the taxpayer,163 and although in part this was 
seen as open to abuse by the dockers themselves,164 it was also a means for the 
employers to maintain a reserve of casual labour at no cost.165  
 
As the owner of the dock estate the PLA had a de facto lead responsibility within the 
docks in industrial relations. Although it employed only part of the London dock 
labour force, its stance as both a large employer and the owner of the dock estate 
made it the leader in industrial relations: a position exemplified in Lord Devonport’s 
statement to the Shaw enquiry that “the whole of the employers of the port…have 
 
160 43 & 44 Vict. c.42 An Act to Extend and Regulate the Liability of Employers to make 
Compensation for Personal Injuries suffered by Workmen in their Service (1880). 
161 Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System, 
together with Minutes of Evidence 1888, House of Commons Paper 448, p.117, 
Question12600. 
162 Broodbank, Port of London Volume II op.cit., p.259.  
163  Report of the Committee on Port Labour, (Maclean Report) (London: HMSO, 1931). 
164  Davies, ‘Three on the Hook’, op.cit., p.36. 
165  Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance: Final Report, (Cmd 4185, 1932), 
paragraph 143. 
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always looked to us as…the heavy father of the port”.166 But that was not 
necessarily a good paternalistic model: the Authority had inherited 5,314 permanent 
labourers from the old dock companies at its formation,167 and an obligation under 
the 1908 Act to “take such steps as they think best calculated to diminish the evils of 
casual employment, and to promote the more convenient and regular engagement 
of such workmen or any class thereof”.168 The PLA’s reaction was to implement a 
scheme in 1914 to meet that obligation by reducing the number of permanent 
workers to 3,000 plus an unspecified number of ‘preference’ labourers, and 
terminating any existing pension rights.169 Those changes “would reduce casual 
employment to a minimum so far as the Authority are concerned, But further than 
that nothing beyond what is possible from the force of example can be done by the 
Authority [i.e. in respect of other employers] with their present limited powers”.170  
 
By 1927 the PLA’s total labour force had grown to 5,820 out of a registered 
workforce of 52,000 in the docks, but with “the majority being on the Permanent List 
and employed in the Warehouses”,171 so that the port owner employed only about 
one-tenth of the dock workforce, and yet when those workers struck in 1924 over 
the proposal to reduce wages by two cuts each of 1s (5p) per day, “a meeting with 
representatives of the Union took place …with Lord Devonport as President of the 
National Council of Port Employers in the Chair”.172 The PLA’s attitude towards the 
labour force is also exemplified in the way that Lord Devonport (chairman from 1909 
to 1925) “talked right up to his retirement in 1925 of having starved the dockers into 
submission (in 1911/12)”.173 That approach seems not to have changed much over 
time, so that in May 1939 “benevolent allowances” were “granted during pleasure” 
to 14 weekly paid employees – mainly permanent labourers – “who, by reason of 
old age or infirmity, are unfit for work”, all in the sum of 7s 6d (37½p) per week.174 
This compares to the simultaneous awards to four Constables of the Royal Docks 
Police with average ages of 52, and length of service of 26¾ years, who were to 
receive an average pension of 32s 6d (£1.62½ p) per week.175 The reluctance of 
 
166  Shaw Report, Minutes of Evidence, p. 343.  
167  PLA Annual Report for 1911. 
168  Port of London Act 1908 Section 28 (1). 
169  The benefit for the PLA being that any allowances granted on retirement would be 
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170  PLA Annual Report for 1914, (HC paper 422) pp.3-4. 
171  PLA Annual Report for 1927, (London: PLA, 1927) p.9. 
172  PLA Annual Report for 1924, (London: PLA, 1924) p.5. 
173  G. Jackson, Ports, op.cit., p.164. 
174  PLA Archives Minutes of the Port of London Authority 11 May 1939, p.40. 
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older dock workers to give up any chance of a day’s work (as seen in later years in 
the ‘ineffectives’ strike)176 might well have derived from this treatment.177 
 
The context of the problem of industrial relations in the London docks is thus 
emerging: there were indeed some difficulties with the workforce both from history 
and culture, particularly in terms of the system of casual employment. But there was 
no evidence of any attempts to invest in the workforce, with real problems of casual 
management, and little to show the even the PLA regarded its own docker 
workforce as meriting investment or care.178 Compounding these were problems 
with the system of piecework and its manifold separate rates, so that with these 
conditions, it would be likely – as in fact transpired – that although the PLA was both 
the custodian and main influence in the docks, it would fail to take any leadership 
role in developing strategies to counter the continuing problems of industrial 
relations after the War. 
 
Summary: The Port of London in 1940 
 
In 1940 the Port of London appeared to be a successful and profitable organisation 
with extensive modern assets and a flexible, compliant, and effective work force. 
But the success was illusory in almost every respect, and the weaknesses would 
become very apparent when the port was faced with the challenges of the post-war 
era and, in particular, the industrial disputes that would erupt among the hitherto 
quiescent workforce. Some of those weaknesses were part of the very kernel of the 
port’s owner: the PLA’s governing body was large and unwieldy and the Directors 
were not picked for their skills in business but were elected by outside interests 
(often in competition with the PLA’s interests), or appointed by Government or other 
bodies.  
 
The Authority’s funding arrangements were restrictive, with the requirement to meet 
interest payments on the Port Stock being paramount. The need to issue more 
Stock to fund major capital works involved increased interest costs, requiring an 
 
176  Leggett Report, 1951, p.37. 
177  Colin J. Davis, Waterfront Revolts, op.cit., pp.180-183. 
178  In considering the reasons for industrial disputes it is salutary to compare the PLA’s 
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uplift in charges (unless more traffic could be brought in) and a bearing down on 
labour costs.  Alongside all of this the Free Water clause and the existence of the 
wharves ensured the commercial viability and continued existence of competitors 
within the port.  The PLA’s operational strategy focused on maintaining the size of 
the dock estate and chasing volume to increase revenue. But in protecting its fixed 
assets it failed to properly accommodate the developments in the shipping industry 
that had already shown how long-life structures were ill-adapted to such changes, 
and so resisted the closure of unprofitable areas. In part, this inertia may be 
attributed to the fact that the PLA lacked a dynamic Main Board that was tightly 
focused on commercial requirements and able to address the fundamental fact that 
London was over-docked and could only become efficient by reducing the dock 
estate.  
 
In spite of its implied leadership role in industrial relations, the PLA gave little 
attention to the wider workforce where the employment structure was hugely 
complex and volatile: in particular its response to the statutory requirement to 
address the problem of casual labour may be seen as less that optimal for the 
workforce. It failed also to consider any of the difficulties arising from the surplus of 
registered workers resulting in endemic underemployment showing almost no 
interest in personnel management functions (evidenced by the abysmal provision 
for toilets, canteens, and washing facilities in the docks)179 increasing the likelihood 
that the workforce would become and remain alienated from the core values of the 
business.  London dockers and stevedores thus worked in a port where the 
organisation that owned many of the facilities, and which set the policies for the 
dock operations paid little overt attention to their needs and was controlled by Board 
members with conflicting interests and little strategic vision. That organisation was 
hampered by inefficient and restrictive financing, a focus on maintaining fixed assets 
and increasing income by growing its business. Against that background, problems 
in industrial relations were almost inevitable in a workforce with hundreds of small 




179 Leggett Report, paras 83-89. 
180 The Leggett Report shows (para 8) that in 1950 there were 470 different employers in 
London and that “almost all dock work is paid by the piece” (para.16).  
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Research Methodology and Structure of this Thesis 
 
Research methodology  
 
Peter Turnbull has argued181 that any consideration of industrial disputes in the 
docks should involve a wide spectrum analysis, covering both “macro-economic” 
factors (such as the level of trade) and “micro-economic” factors (such as labour 
demand). It would also need to take account of “institutional” factors such as the 
systems for collective bargaining and concepts such as the perceived “traditional 
culture” of the dock workers. I then extended that broad contextual approach to a 
consideration of the role and functions of the Port of London Authority (PLA) over 
the period of this review and leading up to the docks closures. In particular I 
considered the organisational structure and financial constraints of the Authority, 
and the impact of the introduction and growth in the use of containers. In the wider 
environment I also considered the statutory framework for the Authority, the dock 
workers and the parts played by civil servants in HM Treasury and the Ministries of 
Labour and Transport.  
 
My initial research involved a wide-ranging review of the material from both general 
(London) historians and from those with a specialised focus on the docks, to 
establish their appreciation of the docks environment and whether there was 
general agreement on the reasons for the industrial disputes and the relationship 
between these and the dock closures. This was then extended to a review of 
publications from sociologists and economists, and from contemporary 
commentators and the news media.  
 
From that background I was then able define those areas that I wanted to consider 
in more detail, and how I might undertake that consideration. A key factor has been 
the increased availability of primary source material in the National and Trade Union 
Archives, and (to a lesser extent) in the PLA archives.  This enabled me to test, 
contextualise, and expand the views of the contemporary and later commentators, 
but it also enabled me to suggest new perspectives – for example the calculations 
of working days lost in strikes. In some respects the research produced conflicting 
views – for example the criticism by civil servants of the PLA’s financial forecasting 
 
181 Turnbull, Peter, Morris, Julia, and Sapsford, David, ‘Persistent Militants and Quiescent 
Comrades: intra-industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89’ The Sociological Review 44, 
4 (1996) pp 710-745 
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that are usefully exposed but cannot be substantiated objectively. In other areas it 
has been possible to move outside the strict historical review to consider (for 
example) the financial pressures upon the PLA, and to bring those aspects into my 
consideration of the reasons for the dock closures. Finally, as the use of containers 
has become established as the dominant feature of maritime transport, I have been 
able to assess the longer-term impact of those developments  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
In my initial definition, the environment of this work comprised four main 
components: the port, the workforce, the industrial disputes, and then the 
challenges of legislative and technological change. I debated whether I should 
review each area in depth as a separate entity, and then bring these together for 
analysis and synthesis, but given the extent and complexity of the material, I 
believed that a more cohesive picture would emerge from a chronological narrative. 
 
Each of the four main components was multi-layered and inter-related so that, for 
example, the definition of the port environment needed to be rooted in the history of 
the PLA, extended to identify the difficulties it faced as a quasi-commercial 
undertaking, and then linked to the challenges of technological change and the 
impact of legislative developments. Alongside each chronological element would be 
influences from the labour force – for example the Authority’s role in its early years, 
the introduction of port Registers in the 1920s, living conditions in the 1930s, the 
problems of the post (Second World) War strikes and the effect of decasualisation 
and the introduction of containers. Matching these would need to be the 
relationships with hundreds of different employers and employment practices, the 
unions, and the statutory and regulatory environment. 
 
The first chapter focuses on the PLA, which played a key role in industrial relations 
in the port, and eventually closed the Upper Docks.  The historic literature and 
commentaries on those areas are reviewed, followed by a summary of the 
development of docks in London, leading up to the formation of the Authority to 
rescue the docks after the failure of the private dock companies. It describes the 
problems deriving from the PLA’s structure, financing, and governance, with a 
business strategy focused on growth of traffic. And, while the PLA owned the docks 
estate, it was only one of a huge number of organisations employing registered 
dock workers (RDWs) in the Port.  
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Chapter 2 reviews the social and economic environment of the dockworkers from 
the late 1930s through to the end of the Second World War, focusing on two London 
boroughs, seen as representative of the docklands communities. It reviews the 
wartime legislation that prohibited official strikes and introduced compulsory 
registration and quasi-statutory employment schemes for dock workers. Many 
dockers would have joined the armed forces with very different experiences from 
their docks employments, and some families suffered financial hardship because of 
the poor wages paid to the lower ranks. The chapter closes with a review of the 
‘Control Point’ strike of March 1945, and an analysis of the official (Ammon) report 
that identified weaknesses in the Dock Labour Scheme and suggested political 
influences behind the strike. 
 
The third chapter covers the period between 1945 and 1960, first considering the 
working environment of the dockers to complement the earlier review of the social 
environments, and then the introduction of the 1947 NDLS that brought 
considerable benefits to the workers but was a flawed compromise with some 
problematical features from earlier schemes. The post-war years saw the 
development of a relationship between trade unions and the new Labour 
administration and the emergence of a consensus aimed at full employment linked 
to economic growth without excessive inflation. But in a worsening economic 
situation the unions’ agreement to a Government request for wage restraint was 
opposed by many workers and, with the continuation of wartime legislation 
prohibiting strikes, may have led to a growth in support for the ‘unofficial’ activists. 
The chapter then analyses the major dock strikes in the 1940s and 1950s, when the 
London docks became characterised as a place of endemic industrial disputes. It 
reviews the reasons for those disputes, noting the increasing influence of unofficial 
groups and others cited in the Leggett Report of 1951, and considers why little or no 
action was taken on that Report’s recommendations. It then looks at widespread 
(official) industrial disputes in the docks following the repeal of the wartime 
legislation banning official strikes in 1952, and the two major enquiries (Evershed 
1954 and Devlin 1956) that identified systemic problems with the 1947 Scheme and 
problems of inter-Union discord.  
 
Chapter 4 considers the period from 1960-1970, with major new challenges 
following the Rochdale review of UK ports in 1962 that identified a lack of 
investment, poor management, and chronically poor industrial relations in the docks. 
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The PLA was affected by both the accounting and organisational changes resulting 
from Rochdale and the wide-ranging recommendations of the Devlin reports of 
1964/5 that proposed decasualisation as the solution to industrial unrest. With these 
the PLA recognised the need to close redundant docks and facilities, to modernise 
the port and to devise an appropriate business strategy – but was not able (or 
prepared) to develop this with the unions. In partial consequence the new container 
port at Tilbury could not be used because of an industrial dispute between January 
1968 and April 1970.  
 
The period from 1970-1980, covered in chapter 5, saw further challenges for the 
Port, with the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 bringing out tensions that fuelled 
increasing discontent about the impact of containerisation on dockers’ jobs. 
Recognising that technological changes and the inexorable growth of ships sizes 
would have a massive impact on the traffic in the Upper Docks, the PLA focused on 
a proposal to develop a new seaport at Maplin on the Essex coast, but failed to 
secure the necessary funding for this. Meanwhile the other stevedoring companies 
in the Port were failing under the twin pressures of reduced traffic and a statutory 
Scheme that prevented them making workers redundant. Those surplus workers 
were transferred into the PLA which faced huge losses from the increased staff 
costs and the historic burden of interest charges but could not secure Government 
backing for the vital financial restructuring, leading eventually to the closure of the 
Upper Docks. 
 
The final chapter concludes that the closure of the docks could be attributed in part 
to industrial relations difficulties, but that a closer analysis shows a wide range of 
other contributory factors. With this, and crippled by the financial constraints of its 
genesis, a focus on chasing volume, and employing only part of the workforce, the 
Authority failed to devise strategies for the development of the Upper Docks, or to 
secure funding for the major redevelopment necessary for handling containers.  Nor 
was it able in the mid 1970s to implement its proposals for a seaport at Maplin. At 
the same time, the effects of a statutory Scheme (with no facility for making workers 
redundant) and the financial consequences of decasualisation led to extensive 
employer failures and transferred massive manpower costs to the Authority. Facing 




Chapter 2:  DOCKLAND COMMUNITIES 1939 -1945  
 
 
The historic sufferings of the dockers before the Second World War have been 
referenced in official reports as factors that influenced docker attitudes and 
underpinned industrial disputes in the post-war period.1 This chapter considers the 
data that is available on the social and economic conditions of two dockland 
boroughs in the pre-war period and the effect of under-employment on earnings in 
order to provide some evidence of these sufferings.  It then extends this to 
considering the ways in which the Second World War and its consequences 
affected those workers and their attitudes and expectations.  
 
 
The Dockland Communities before the Second World War  
 
Industrial disputes often affected all of the Port of London, but neither the port 
facilities nor their supporting communities were homogenous groups. The port 
comprised a huge complex of docks, warehouses and wharves, with hundreds of 
companies employing thousands of workers.  Although the Port of London Authority 
(PLA) owned the docks and many facilities therein, and the National Dock Labour 
Board (NDLB) was the notional employer of the registered dock workers (RDWs) 
after 1947, there was no single body with overarching responsibility for the port and 
the workforce.  In particular, there are few data on the riverside wharves and their 
workforces, because some were an integral part of manufacturing or processing, 
and thus outside the general dock environment.2 But the wharves employed 
thousands of dockers,3 and in some cases were the sources of port-wide industrial 
disputes.  
 
1 For example, the Leggett report of 1950 (Cmd 8236, para 19) refers to the legacy of 
“suspicion and distrust” resulting from the pre-war conditions of employment in the docks, 
Evershed (Cmd 9310, para 15) connects the overtime dispute of 1953 with the pre-war 
“obligation to work overtime”, and in 1956 Devlin (Cmd 9813, para 29 (1)) noted that the 
dockers’ “sufferings before 1939 were more severe than most” and that “bitter memories 
have not gone”. 
2  I could find no single authoritative statement of the number of wharves. Frank Bowen’s 
The Port of London, 1949, (London: Dryden, 1949) pp.118-176 lists 193 wharves in all. The 
NA file BK16/1 NDLB Survey of Dock Amenities 1949 lists 139 (Schedule 2, appendices VI 
to VIII).  
3  See for example Hays Wharf  at http://www.exploringsouthwark.co.uk/hays-




The first part of this chapter focuses on two dockland boroughs north of the Thames 
- Poplar and West Ham - that are taken as representatives of the wider docklands 
community. As the map below shows, there were nine boroughs close to the docks, 
but of the two I have chosen Poplar lay within the London County Council (LCC) 
boundaries, and enclosed the India and Millwall docks, while West Ham was outside 
the LCC boundaries and next to the Royal group of docks. In essence,  
both were contiguous to the Upper Docks that are the secondary element in the 
theme of this thesis. While Poplar had not been directly affected by the “half a 
century of phenomenal industrial and slum development” experienced by West 
Ham,4 it also suffered from overcrowded housing and extreme poverty,5 
exacerbated by the disruption caused by the building of the docks. 
 








The sources that help to define the social and economic environments of those 
boroughs are the reports of the Medical Officers of Health (and in some respects, in 
 
4   E Doreen Idle. War Over West Ham (London: Faber and Faber, 1943) p.13 
5   H Llewellyn Smith The New Survey of London Life and Labour (hereafter NSOL) Volume 










relation to Poplar, the reports of the Medical Officer of Health for the LCC), and 
Llewellyn Smith’s New Survey of London Life and Labour based on data from 
around 1930.6 In 1937 the population of West Ham was estimated to be some 
259,500 persons, having risen more than 13-fold from 18,817 in 1851,7  and they 
lived in 50,247 houses, giving an overall population density of 5.2 persons per 
house.8  In contrast Poplar’s population increased from 28,342 in 1851 to 134,400 in 
1938,9 living in 23,958 houses, and yielding a density of 5.7 persons per house.10  
Although some authors have commented on the poor standard of construction of 
many houses in West Ham,11 the comparative figures for the number of houses 
condemned as unfit for human habitation show that Poplar, with 188 houses 
condemned had 14 times the percentage rate of those condemned in West Ham at 
28 houses – that is 0.78%, compared to 0.05%.12 Another indicator is the number of 
houses recorded as “overcrowded”,13 which for Poplar was shown as 3,367 (i.e. 
14% of the housing stock), housing some 21,490 persons,14 and for West Ham 
5,698 dwellings (11.3% of the stock) housing some 32,049 people.15 The health 
data for West Ham show that the incidence of the main notifiable diseases such as 
scarlet fever, diphtheria, acute pneumonia, and erysipelas, was much higher in the 
southern Wards of the borough near the docks,16 with a similar pattern for 
tuberculosis.17 It is not possible to see such an impact in the dockland Wards of the 
Poplar (Poplar East and West, Millwall, and Cubitt Town), partly because the returns 
are separated into those for “Residents of Wards” and those in “Public Institutions” 
(such as hospitals) in the borough.18 
 
6  See also earlier material in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and 
Relief of Distress (Hereafter RCOPL)  (Cd 4499, 1909) and in E G Howarth and M King 
West Ham: a study of Industrial Problems; being the Report of the Outer London Survey 
Inquiry (London: J M Dent, 1907). 
7  London Borough of Newham Archives: Report of the Medical Officer of Health for West 
Ham for 1937 (hereafter RMOHWH), p.23 
8  RMOHWH p.23 
9  Wellcome Library:  Report of the Medical Officer of Health for Poplar for 1938 (hereafter 
RMOHP), http://wellcomelibrary.org/moh/report/b18246102#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0, p.9 
10  RMOHP, p.46 
11  See Howarth and King, West Ham, pp. 9-15, and Idle, War p.17 
12  RMOHP, p. 52 Table II 
13  Under Section 58 (a) of Part IV of the Housing Act 1936, (26 Geo 5 and 1 Edw 8, Ch. 51) 
overcrowding occurs where “two persons ten years old or more of opposite sexes and 
not being persons living together as husband and wife must sleep in the same room”, or 
under Schedule 5 where the number of persons per room exceeds the stated maxima 
(e.g. 2 for 1 room and 10 for 5 rooms). 
14  RMOHP, p. 48 
15  RMOHWH, p.339 
16  RMOHWH, p.122, Table III 
17  RMOHWH, p.184, Table IV 
18  RMOHP, p.11, Table II 
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The West Ham medical report also provides information on areas that might be 
considered important in relation to dock workers, such as deaths from cancers 
(perhaps caused by handling materials such as asbestos or other carcinogenics), or 
from heart disease (perhaps indicating overwork), but does not separately record 
deaths by accident.19 As before, the separation of data for deaths in public 
institutions confuses the picture for Poplar, where the number of “deaths from 
violence” other than suicide in those locations (totalling 53),20 might have been 
significant. There are other gaps where information about the docks might be 
expected to have been found: although the Albert Dock Hospital in the heart of the 
Royal Group of Docks is mentioned on two occasions in the West Ham report,21 
there is little data on any of the treatments given. While the reports for England and 
Wales from the Registrar General do give more details of accidental deaths,  those 
occurring in “Docks etc” are shown only nationally.22 Finally, and perhaps again 
reflecting the PLA’s focus on traffic, the reports from the Medical Officer of Health 
for the Authority show only matters related to vessels and their crews, detailing, for 
example, the number of rats caught infected with plague, and the cases of 
communicable diseases among the crews.23  
 
The New Survey of London Life and Labour contains maps that provide graphic 
illustrations of the poverty and overcrowding for these boroughs with, for example, 
the map of “Overcrowding in the London Survey Area” showing four blocks of 
streets in West Ham near the Royal Docks coloured dark red to show where there 
were 1.75 people or more per room (i.e. the highest density of overcrowding 
measured), and with a similar area in Poplar north of the West India dock:  
 
 
19  RMOHWH, p.82 Table XXI 
20  RMOHP, p.11, Table II 
21  RMOHWH pp. 41-42 
22  Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England and Wales for the year 1937 (HMSO, 
London, 1937) Tables 1: Medical, pp.331-337 Table 25 Violent Deaths 1937: England 
and Wales 




Figure 3: Detail of Poplar and the West Ham (South) area from Llewellyn 






Similarly, the map of “London Social Conditions” shows significant areas coloured 
black (“degraded or semi-criminal population”) and dark blue (“living below Charles 
Booth’s poverty line”) just to the north of the Victoria Docks with a marginally better 
profile for the houses in Poplar to the west of the East India Dock: 
 
Figure 4: Detail of Poplar and West Ham (north of Victoria Dock) from 




24  London School of Economics Archive (hereafter LSEA) NSOL 3/1 Survey Maps: Eastern 
Area, 1931. 
25   From NSOL 3/1 Survey Maps: Overcrowding, Map 7, 1931. 
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Taken together, these maps give an indication of the living conditions within the two 
boroughs: for West Ham Marriott also shows how extensive industrial development 
(and pollution) was facilitated by the Borough’s location outside the London 
Metropolitan area and thus not subject to the “legislation to restrict the operation of 
noxious and offensive trades”.26 And yet, as he shows, there were paradoxically 
high levels of unemployment because of the endemic usage of casual labour.27  
 
Wages and Earnings  
 
Apart from Llewellyn Smith’s Survey, there are few published data on the earnings 
of London dock labourers in the inter-War period, but more detailed material can be 
found in the background papers of the survey in the London School of Economics 
archives, and in the individual record cards.  The published volumes give a number 
of examples of the general levels of pay in the docks, noting firstly that “the 
minimum day wage for the lowest-paid dock labourer at the present time is 12s”28 
(which would equate to £3 6s for a five and a half-day week),29 with an assertion 
that the PLA “and certain of the labour contractors in the port” employed permanent 
labourers on that basic wage of £3 6s per week, although “their average earnings, 
with piecework and overtime additions, are probably round about £5 per week”.30  
His second indicator was based on the earnings of 256 workers, representing 
roughly 25% of those employed on “one of the South Bank wharves” whom, he 
calculates, earned 15s 10d for a day’s work31  – i.e. £4 6s 0d per week. Taking data 
for 126 of those workers,32 he later calculates that the “mean earnings of the 
preference men at the wharf were about £3 per week and that those of the first 
preference men were about £4”.33 In addition, he describes how specialist workers 
such as meat and coal porters, “corn porters” and “deal [softwood] porters” could 
 
26  J. Marriott, ‘West Ham: London’s Industrial Centre and Gateway to the World Part I: 
Industrialisation, 1840-1910.’The London Journal, 13, 2 (1988) pp. 122-142. As Marriot 
shows, (p.125) the 1844 Metropolis Building Act (7 & 8 Vict. cap 84) that restricted the siting 
and operation of offensive trades such as bone, tripe and blood boilers, and 
slaughterhouses did not apply in West Ham. 
27  J. Marriott, ‘West Ham: London's Industrial Centre and Gateway to the World Part II 
Stabilization and Decline 1910-1939.’ London Journal 14, 1 (1989) pp.43-58 
28 All monetary values for earnings are shown at historic £sd (pounds, shillings and pence) 
rates: these can be converted to approximate decimal (£p) values at 2.4d = 1p and 1s = 
5p. 
29   Llewellyn Smith, H., The New Survey of London Life and Labour Volume II: London 
Industries (London: P S King, 1931) p.404  
30   Ibid., p.405 
31   Ibid., p.403 
32  Note that the selection of these workers was based on the alphabetical series of 
surnames, rather than any statistical randomness criteria. 
33   Ibid., p.409 and p.424, Table VIII 
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earn much higher wages and “the factor which had the greatest influence in bringing 
about the wide difference in earnings is piecework”.34  The following table compares 
piecework and hourly pay:  
 
Table 2: Numbers of workers and wage rates for selected groups of Port of 
London Authority Workers for the year ended 31 March 1930 
 
 
Basis of pay\type of 
worker 
No of men Total wages 
(£) 
Average yearly  
wages (£) 
Piecework     
Permanent 2,513 675,998 269 
‘B’ list workers35 284 76,614 270 
Daily rates    
Permanent 569 115,891 204 
‘B’ list workers 87 18,257 210 
Total 3,453 886,760 256 
 
 
Source: LSEA file NSOL 1/4/8 Dock Labour – Employment and Earnings 
 
From this table, it will be seen that the average earnings for PLA workers at £256 
p.a. were indeed around £5 per week, with those on piecework generally earning 
around one-third more than those paid hourly. However, there are some 
qualifications for these data in the wider picture of earnings: they apply to PLA 
workers, who might expect to be employed regularly throughout the year 
(compared, say, to a smaller specialist firm handling seasonal produce), and they 
do not differentiate between workers at the wharves, on board ship, or on the 
quayside who would be paid at various rates. In addition, these are averages: as the 
table shows, of the 3,453 men in the sample, the 656 men (19%) paid a daily rate 
received an average of around £4 per week rather than the £5 “average”. None of 
these figures can necessarily be regarded as representative of the wider workforce: 
as the LSEA files show, the PLA had reduced the numbers of its “Permanent” 
labourers from 4,084 in 1922 to 3,090 in 1930, and its “B” workers from 4,599 in 
1920 to 1,900 in 1930.36 Even adding in the casual workers employed by the PLA 
 
34   Ibid., p.408 
35  As Broodbank shows (J G Broodbank, History of the Port of London, Volume II, London: 
Daniel O’Connor, 1921, pp. 447- 448), a system of classification was introduced by the 
London and India Docks Company after the 1889 London Docks strike whereby workers 
were classified into Permanent and ‘A’ list men (paid weekly), ‘B’ list men (numbered by 
seniority), who were to be given employment after the first two classes, and other casual 
workers (sometimes known as ‘C’ men) who would be employed after all workers in the 
preceding groups. E C P Lascelles, and S S Bullock, Dock Labour and Decasualisation 
(London: P S King, 1924), pp. 92-93 show that the PLA merged the first two categories 
and thus employed ‘Permanent’ men, and ‘B’ list men “entitled to preferential 
employment by the PLA when no permanent men are available”.   
36  NSOL 1/4/8 Dock Labour Employment and Earnings  
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(whose numbers ranged from a maximum of 1,124 per day to a minimum of 47 in 
the period June-November 1923) this represents less than 17% of the registered 
dock workers (RDWs),37 or 23.5% of the number usually working in the docks. Nor 
do the LSEA files or the published survey indicate how many were employed on the 
wharves, so we have no idea of how representative the samples of 256 (or 128) for 
those workers were.  
 
The survey data cards for individual households give another perspective: bearing 
in mind Simon Abernethy‘s discussion on the reliability of the survey’s data 
collectors in West Ham,38 my analysis of the data in the 800 “working class” survey 
cards for that borough identified 75 men who classified themselves as either 
dockers or stevedores, who received an average wage of £2 18s 1d for a “full 
week”, and £2 11s for their most recent week of work.39  
 
Figure 5: Example of an NSOL Card:  Number 1336 (serial 0321 in “Working 




37  Lascelles and Bullock show (pp 96-97) that a voluntary registration scheme was 
introduced in London in 1920 as a means of limiting the number of men who might work 
in the Port, but that even though “special precautions were taken to avoid registering men 
who had no claim…the number of men registered exceeded 61,000, a total far above any 
estimate that had ever been made of the numbers seeking work in the port”. By 1930 the 
number of men on the Register had been reduced to 36,000 (record of discussions 
between S K Ruck and the Secretary of the Port of London Registration Committee dated 
13 October 1930 on LSEA file NSOL 1/4/8).  
38  Simon T Abernethy ‘Deceptive data? The New Survey of London Life and Labour 1928 – 
31’ University of Cambridge: Working Papers in Economic and Social History, 16 (2013), p. 
4 and pp.8-9 
39  LSEA NSOL 2/45 Record Cards, West Ham. The 75 cards include 10 men classified as 
PLA employees: removing them from the table makes only a marginal difference (less 
than 1%) to the averages  
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For Poplar there were 600 such cards showing 79 dockers or stevedores who 
averaged £2 14s for a full week and £2 6s 3d for their most recent week.40  
However, both the reliability of the card data and their wider extension is open to 
challenge: Abernethy has questioned the capabilities of some of the interviewers,41 
and the card reproduced above shows that the data on earnings would only cover 
the previous week and a notional full-time week, so could have no resilience in 
terms of seasonality of work or trade cycles. In addition, that card data would often 
have been re-interpreted by the person calculating the tables - in this case showing 
a daily rate of 12s 6d and a pencilled figure of 50/- for a four-day week (ignoring 
also the fact that the man reckons to have worked two hours over the normal 44-
hour week). Notably also, from my analyses, 10 workers within the 75-card sample 
for West Ham had been paid less than the £2 a week (for Poplar 16 out of 79) which 
Llewellyn Smith noted as the weekly “poverty line for a man and wife and two 
children”.42 However, as Llewellyn Smith also points out, a married man not 
employed might also claim 4s a day and 4d per dependent child from the State.43 
 
All of the above allows a comparison of wages received by some dock workers in 
London in 1929/30: for more richness, the table below also includes the theoretical 
value of a dock labourer’s wages following the “dockers’ tanner” strike of 1889, 
uprated to 1930 values taking account of retail price inflation movements.44  
  
 
40  LSEA NSOL 2/33 Record Cards, Poplar. The total of 79 includes 21 classified as PLA 
employees: removing them from the table increases the amounts significantly (£2 16s 4d 
and £2 13s 0d).  
41  Abernethy, op.cit 
42  Llewellyn Smith appears to use two intersecting computations for his poverty line: firstly 
an update of "Charles Booth's income limit of 21s...for a moderate sized family....to about 
40s., or (say) 90 per cent above the level of 1890" (New Survey of London Life and Labour  
Volume I Forty Years of Change (London: P S King, 1930)  p.17), and secondly the level 
defined in Statutory Rules and Orders 1922 no 3 (The Metropolitan Common Poor Fund 
(Outdoor Relief) Regulations 1922) by the then Minister of Health (Sir Alfred Mond), and 
known as the "Mond Scale" which prescribed a weekly minimum income of 41s a week for a 
family with three children. (NSOL Volume I p.375) 
43  Ibid., 
44  Based on data in J. O’Donoghue, L. Goulding, and G. Allen. ‘Consumer Price Inflation 
Since 1750’ Economic Trends, 604, (2004) pp. 38-46  
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Table 3: Wage rates for different types of labourers in London Docks at 1930 
values 
 
Type of worker  Weekly wage at 
1930 values 
Labourer @ 6d per hour (48 hours) 1889 (£1 4s 0d) £2 9s 5d 
NSOL “lowest paid dock labourer” (12s/day – 5½ day week)45 £3 6s 0d 
NSOL “Probable average” for PLA ‘Permanents’46 £5 0s 0d 
NSOL Wharfside “Preference men” median for “Summer 
Quarter”47 
£3 0s 0d 
West Ham dock labourer (non-PLA) full week from LSEA 
NSOL cards 
£2 11s 0d 
Poplar dock labourer (non-PLA) full week from LSEA NSOL 
cards 




This is all “snapshot” data and can provide only an indication of income at one point 
in time, and thus only the most general appreciation of levels of earnings and 
employment. However, while Llewellyn Smith asserts that “the average weekly 
income earned by a male worker in London…suffices to purchase nearly a third 
more of the necessities of life than [in 1886]”, this is based upon a computation of a 
79% increase in the cost of living between 1886 and 1928 compared to a wage 
increase of 130% for non-dock industries.48 From the table data, this assertion of a 
130% increase would seem to hold good for few dock labourers, and indeed only 
the wages of PLA workers seem to have kept up with the increased cost of living. 
Llewellyn Smith further suggests that “only a tiny percentage of the 36,000 
registered dock labourers can now be regarded as living under conditions of 
poverty”.49 The West Ham data indicate that the percentage in that Borough might 
well be greater than “tiny” – perhaps even around 10% - which fits in with the 
percentage shown as “below minimum standard” for West Ham in the Borough 
summaries in the published volumes.50 For Poplar, Llewellyn Smith states that the 
borough had a higher percentage of persons living in poverty (at 24.1%) “than in 
 
45  NSOL Volume II, p.404 
46  NSOL Volume II, p.405 
47  NSOL Volume II, p.424 
48  Note that this is based upon “the four industries for which comparisons are possible” (i.e. 
Building, Engineering, Printing and Boot and Shoe trades) and for which Llewellyn Smith 
asserts that “the average increase of real earnings … [is] probably below the average for 
industries as a whole”. NSOL Volume I, p.20, and pp. 129-130  
49  NSOL Volume II p.411 
50  NSOL Volume III, p.412 
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any other borough of the Eastern Survey area”.51 From my data some 14% of the 
Poplar dock workers actually in employment would fall into this category. 
 
Regularity of Earnings 
 
The question that follows from any determination of wage rates is how regular a 
docker’s earnings might be in trade cycles and in the various seasons: as the Royal 
Commission on Unemployment Insurance noted:  
 
In some industrial employment and particularly in the dock industry, 
however, the fluctuations in the amount of work to be done are met by 
limiting the engagement of a proportion of the workers employed to a day or 
a half-day at a time, thus throwing on to society the burden of maintaining 
the reserve labour required.52 
 
This was a systemic issue in the docks, where the Royal Commission report 
showed a level of “normal unemployment” of 30%.53 As that report54 and the 
subsequent parliamentary debate55 show, there were still concerns about the level 
of payments and the burden this placed on the taxpayer – a concept underpinned, 
as Addison shows, by the Treasury orthodoxy of bearing down on public 
expenditure, which tended to dominate all other economic considerations in the 
1930s.56 Llewellyn Smith’s analysis is that the average unemployment in the “docks, 
harbours, and canals” in London in 1929 was 24%57 but, as he then demonstrates, 
there were various factors which served to confuse the picture, including the fact 
that there were still numbers of unregistered workers around the port who obtained 
work either on the premises of waterside manufacturers, or by holding a union card 
– perhaps as many as 4,000 in total.58 In attempting to provide more accuracy, he 
analysed a sample of dock workers claiming unemployment benefit, from which he 
calculated the number of dockers “not unemployed” as 30,000. By adjusting for 
 
51  NSOL Volume III, p.365 
52  Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance Final Report (Cmd. 4185, 1932), para. 
143 
53  Ibid., p.98, para. 167 
54  Ibid., paras. 468-471 
55  House of Commons Hansard, 16 June 1933, col 456 
56  Paul Addison The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: 
Quartet Books, 1977)  
57  NSOL Volume I: p.356 
58  NSOL Volume II: p,396 Llewellyn Smith suggests (p.397) that there might also be as 
many as 4,000 “unregistered men who sometimes engage in dock work”, although “at the 
beginning of 1931” it was possible to track only 368 of those as having “regularly 
attended calls”. 
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factors such as sickness and voluntary absenteeism he arrived at a computation 
that in 1929-30 the daily average number of men working in the port was 26,000 
against a Register of 36,00059– that is around 27.5% underemployment. However, 
two of his sources express reservations about the completeness and reliability of 
the data, with one pointing out that “a considerable number of unregistered men are 
employed daily but it is impossible to give any estimate of their numbers”. That 
source also noted that the Registration Scheme was voluntary and that while well 
over 90% of the employers were part of the Scheme, “most of those outside consist 
of very small employers”, and that also excluded were some larger manufacturers 
with their own wharves and permanent labour forces.60 The second noted the 
existence of “numerous small undertakings included in the area whose individual 
employment capacity is small but, in aggregate, may have a considerable impact 
[although these] are not included either in the register or in the employment 
returns”.61 
 
Again, these are computations of averages, and the reality of under-employment for 
the individual docklands family might well have been very different: descriptions of 
the workforce show that many highly skilled or otherwise favoured workers were 
able to pick both when they worked and also which higher-paid jobs they wanted.62 
The less favoured worker might be out of work for one week in four, a pattern that 
needs to be seen in contrast to Llewellyn Smith’s view (albeit from 1929): 
 
Finally, we have the cases where the man is in regular work (including dock 
labourers who are assumed in these families to have four days’ work in a 
normal [six-day] week) but his wages, together with those of his family, if any 
are in work, are insufficient for his responsibilities. In 7 per cent of all full-
time poverty cases in the eastern Survey area the earnings are insufficient to 
support three children…[and] a large proportion of unskilled men with 
families of four or more young children are in poverty.63 
 
Much of the data in the New Survey was collected in 1929-1930, so some note also 
needs to be taken of the economic Depression of 1931-33. However, for that, the 
 
59  Ibid., p.402 
60  Record of discussions between S K Ruck (of the Survey team) and the Secretary of the 
Port of London Registration Committee dated 13 October 1930 in NSOL 1/4/8 
61  Letter from L Bullock of the Ministry of Labour to S K Ruck dated 22 November 1930 in 
NSOL 1/4/10 Dock Labour - Tables 
62  See, for example, Stephen Hill, The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (London: 
Heinemann, 1979) p.26 
63  NSOL Volume III p.87 
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general focus of commentators has been at the national or industry-wide levels, so 
that it is not possible to determine the effect on the docks or dock labour. Equally, 
there is a lack of data on any reductions in hourly or piecework rates in the docks 
during the depression, although Beenstock and Warburton assert that the effect of 
maintaining wage rates would be a decrease in employment – which would 
presumably have been felt most strongly by the casual labourer.64  As noted in 
chapter 1, the PLA data on traffic volumes is not wholly consistent,65 but Watson 
shows that total tonnages passing through the Port of London fell from 36.7 million 
tons in 1930 to 34.5 million tons in 1932.66  It is not possible to estimate what the 
effect of a decrease of some 6% in traffic between 1930 and 1932 might have had 
on the workforce or wage rates – although it might be expected to have had a 
greater impact on those men who were not ‘Permanent’ workers.  
 
The PLA Annual Report for 193867 shows that the traffic through the port rose 
continually between 1933 and 1938, and while the PLA data is not wholly consistent 
in those reports, there was clearly a substantial increase (although that does not 
necessarily translate into higher levels of employment or earnings). Some indication 
of the actual levels of employment can be obtained from statistics published by the 
LCC, although the data exclude Tilbury and show only figures from those wharves 
“making returns”. The picture of the numbers working in the docks in 1938 appears 
considerably different from that in 1930, and a snapshot from the later year 
indicates that the average number of workers actually employed was 11,36668 
against a total number on the Register – that is with the right to work in the docks – 
of 33,774,69 and on this basis, around two-thirds of the registered dock workers 
might be unemployed at any one time, and a registered docker might thus work one 
 
64 See H. W. Richardson ‘The Economic Significance of the Depression in Britain’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 4, 4, (1969), pp. 3-19 and M. Beenstock and P Warburton ‘Wages 
and Unemployment in lnterwar Britain’ Explorations in Economic History, 23, (1986) pp.153-
172 
65 For example, the historical summary table on page 1 of the PLA Annual Report for 1935 
(London: PLA, 1935) shows traffic “from and to foreign countries and British possessions 
and coastwise” for 1931 as 56,074,556 tons, while the summary table in the PLA Annual 
Report for 1939 (London: PLA, 1939) shows traffic “from and to British Countries and 
Foreign countries and Coastwise” in 1931 as 57,526,870 tons.  
66  Nigel Watson, The Port of London Authority: a Century of Service 1909-2009, (London: 
PLA, 2009) p.224 
67  PLA Annual Report for the Year Ended 31st March 1938 (London: PLA, 1938) 
68  London County Council London Statistics 1936-1938 Volume XLI (London: LCC, 1939), 
p.328 
69  G.A. Phillips, and N. Whiteside, Casual Labour: the Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p.215 
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day in three in the docks.70 Assuming that the inclusion of Tilbury and other non-
returning wharves might increase the numbers employed by, say, 20%,71 this would 
give an average workforce of around 13,500 (compared to Llewellyn Smith’s 
average of 26,000 in 1929-30 noted above), in which case a registered dock worker 
might be employed for three days a week. This would tie in with the picture 
represented by Davies in which many dockers at that time did in fact work for such 
periods,72 but begs the question of whether this was voluntary or a reflection of the 
employers transferring costs to the state. 
 
Social conditions  
  
Many of the ‘general’ London historians cited in the previous chapter commented on 
poverty and unemployment in the docklands but, partly because of the high 
incidence of casual labour where there are few records of those actually employed, 
the data on real levels of employment, or of the wage rates and earnings of dock 
workers, are very poor for the pre-war years. In all of this uncertainty Llewellyn 
Smith’s figures have been used in a number of publications. For example, Philips 
and Whiteside show detailed figures for earnings in Liverpool, but simply repeat 
Llewellyn Smith’s estimate of earnings of £4 per week for “preference men on a 
London wharf”73 – with that lack of detail for London earnings shared also by 
Davies.74 The earlier standard work on dock and casual labour by Lascelles and 
Bullock is equally vague on London earnings,75 and this is matched in Beveridge.76 
But the picture is also of under-employment and commensurately lower incomes 
than those generally accepted figures. Matching this is the lack of direct 
observations of the actual living conditions of the people, or of what “poverty” 
 
70  Note that being a registered docker did not mean that the man had no other employment, 
but simply that he was included on the Register and thus eligible to work in the docks. 
71  A later return (1945) in NA File BK 2/1022 National Dock Labour Board: Head Office. 
Report of Inquiry into London Docks Dispute 1945 (Ammon Report) shows a total “Live 
register” for the workforce in Tilbury of 1,325 men. 
72  Sam Davies ‘“Three on the Hook and Three on the Book”: Dock Labourers and 
Unemployment Insurance between the wars’ Labour History Review  59, 3 (1994) pp. 34-
43 
73  Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour, p.212, although Llewellyn Smith actually used this 
rate only for “first preference men”, who comprised 18% of the sample. The average for 
all “preference men” was £3 (NSOL Volume II p.409 and table p.424) 
74  Davies, ‘Three on the Hook’ pp. 37-39 
75  Lascelles and Bullock, Dock Labour, p.49. Interestingly, as the LSE archives show, 
Lascelles and Bullock undertook much of the data collection and analysis for the New 
Survey: see, e.g., NSOL 1/4/10 
76  W H Beveridge, Unemployment: A problem of Industry (1909 and 1930) (London: 
Longmans Green, 1930) pp.94-95 
 56 
actually meant in the East End. What we do have is Titmuss’s graphic word pictures 
of the appalling deficiencies in clothing and hygiene of some of those who were 
evacuated from the poorer areas of other cities during the War,77 and an oblique 
reference in the fact that in 1938 the LCC’s school nurses in Poplar and Stepney 
assessed only 13 per cent of the clothing and footwear of elementary school 
children as “good” compared to the LCC average of 54.6%.78  Gillian Rose provides 
insight into both the direct effects of unemployment in Poplar and (more especially) 
into the role of women in supporting the families and their finances. She shows this 
contribution both in terms of “regular” work – for example employment in shops and 
light industries - and through incidental or part-time work, with which we might also 
associate the role of women in negotiating extended credit with local shopkeepers.79  
Other avenues would include the pawn shop or the money lender,80 (where again 
we might attribute a significant role to women) although these paths would be more 
usable in times of industrial disputes because in the end the cargoes had to be 
worked, and debts could be repaid.  In other times the main resort of those in 
distress might be to charities or churches, and then the Relieving Officer or (until 
their theoretical abolition in 1929) workhouses.81 Even when the workhouses 
themselves had been abolished, the Government attitudes of the 1930s towards the 
poor – in effect, as Miller demonstrates, the philosophy of Neville Chamberlain82 – 
were still dominated by Poor Law concepts, and the presence and influence of the 
Relieving Officer is presented in stark terms by the oral history evidence in Bundy 
and Healy,83 and in Turner.84 In the last resort an application would need to be 
made to the Public Assistance Committee, and the reports in 1937-39 from the 
West Ham Committee give some indications of the support provided to persons and 
families in dire need in the borough. In that period, there were at least 150 
applications in each month, with those from the southern districts generally 
numbering some 50% more than in the north (and in November 1937 there being 
 
77  Richard Titmuss, History of the Second World War: Problems of Social Policy (London: 
HMSO 1950) p.115 
78  Ibid., p.117 
79  Gillian Rose, ‘Locality-Studies and Waged Labour: An Historical Critique’ Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 14, 3 (1989), pp. 317-328, pp. 323-325 
80  Ibid., p.324 
81  Local Government Act 1929 (19 Geo V Ch.17) Part 1: 
82  Frederic R Miller ‘National Assistance or Unemployment Assistance? The British Cabinet 
and Relief Policy, 1932-33’ Journal of Contemporary History, 9, (1974) pp.163-184 
83  Colin Bundy and Dermot Healy ‘Aspects of Urban Poverty’ Oral History, 6,1 (1978), pp. 
79-97, p.94 
84  Robert Turner ‘The Contribution of Oral Evidence to Labour History’ Oral History, 4, 1 
(1976), pp. 23-40  
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170 cases in the south compared to 56 in the north).85 And, as Ford shows, a family 
seeking assistance in 1939 might be faced with applying to a score of separate 
agencies, each with their own methods of assessing means and entitlement.86 In all 
of this there can be little wonder, that (as noted in my previous chapter), the workers 
in the docks were “quiescent” in the 1930s.87 
 
With poverty might come ill-health, and one volume of the British Official History of 
the Second World War shows the constraints around access to healthcare:  
 
Before the war it was often believed by many people who did not use the 
statutory health service that provision was free of charge. This was not so; 
for local authorities had the power (and sometimes the duty) to recover what 
they could from people who were helped [or their families]. In consequence, 
there grew up a bewildering variety of means test covering a large range of 
services [and] at least twenty tests were in common use by health 
authorities.88 
 
The overall effect of this is shown particularly by Mowat,89 although he provides only 
a snapshot of a community that in many ways might have epitomised the worst 
aspects of poverty and deprivation. Mackay puts this into context by contrasting the 
position of those who benefitted from the increase in real incomes in the inter-war 
period, with the “feelings of bitterness and marginalisation” of the poor and 
unemployed, often leading to “a general resentment towards a society that not only 
denied them the dignity of work but compounded the offence by imposing on them a 
means test”.90 All this, then, needs to be borne in mind to inform the following 





85  Newham Archives, Minutes of the meetings of West Ham Borough Council and 
Committees 1937-39; Minutes of the Public Assistance Committee 
86  P. Ford, Incomes, Means Tests, and Personal Responsibility (London: P S King, 1939) 
87  See R.B.Oram The Dockers’ Tragedy. (London: Hutchinson, 1970) where he describes 
this as a period where “a healthy level of unemployment” ensured that “labour was in a 
more reasonable state of mind” (p.134). 
88  Titmuss, Social Policy, p.154 
89  C. L. Mowat, Britain between the Wars 1918-1940. (Chicago: University Press, 1955) pp. 
480-521 
90  Robert Mackay, The Test of War: Inside Britain 1939-1945 (London: Routledge, 1999)  
91  e.g. Unofficial Stoppages in the London docks. Report of a Committee of Inquiry (Leggett 
Report, Cmd 8236, 1951) paragraph 19. 
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The Second World War 
 
The War affected the dockland communities in many ways, but two key areas for 
this study are the effects of the Axis bombing raids and the consequences of the 
Government’s emergency powers legislation. The raids in 1940/41 damaged or 
destroyed huge areas of docklands, and the direct effect on the population was 
exacerbated by the failure of national and local governments to respond in a timely 
and effective manner to that onslaught: in addition, in the longer term the cohesion 
of the dockland communities was affected both by the impact of war and the post-
war dispersal of people to the New Towns. In the early years of the War powerful 
and wide-ranging legislation (mainly secondary and thus little debated) affected the 
conditions of employment of the dockers, the location of their jobs, their ability to 
strike, and the future structure of their employment.  
 
Marriott describes the effect of the bombing of East London by the Axis powers 
between September 1940 and May 1941 (“the Blitz”) as “massive”, noting that: 
 
figures are unreliable and estimates vary wildly, but in London roughly 
100,000 homes had been destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and about a 
million damaged….West Ham lost approximately a third of [its] housing stock 
either through outright destruction or severe damage; along the Beckton 
Road near the docks in Canning Town the proportion rose to nearly a half 
and reached an astonishing 85 per cent in Tidal Basin at the western end of 
the Victoria Dock.92  
 
The figures are indeed unreliable, and there appears to exist no single compendium 
that brings together the data from government Departments, Civil Defence, and 
Local Authorities – certainly for the initial period.  The central records in the Ministry 
of Home Security (MHS) files at the National Archives include reports (in the HO 
198 series) from the Ministry’s Liaison Officers that are initially of very varying 
quality and detail, clearly reflecting the widespread disruption in the early weeks of 
the main bombing assault. The returns often simply record that bombs fell on an 
area – for example, the report of 11 September 1940 showing 85 casualties from 
“minor bombing” in Canning Town.93 Another source, the MHS Research 
 
92  John Marriott, Beyond the Tower: a History of East London (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2011) p. 320. Note that these are precisely those areas, as my figure 3 shows, with 
the highest levels of overcrowding. 
93   NA file HO 198/273 Chief Regional Officer's daily confidential reports: air raid damage 
and casualty reports; London 11 September to 1 November 1940 
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Department’s tracings of bombs on the 1:25000 Ordnance Survey maps for London 
starts only from 7 October 1940 – i.e. a month after the main assault began.94  
The historic Local Authority records provide details that, even after more than 
seventy years, may be painful to assimilate: the street by street analysis for West 
Ham in the Newham Archives (which show both time and location of the individual 
bombs) show 177 high explosive or incendiary bombs as having fallen on the night 
of 7 September 1940 alone,95 and the impact on the population of that first night of 
terror can only be a matter of conjecture.96  A different perspective, no less 
harrowing is given by John Hock’s detailed analysis of fatalities from the bombing of 
Poplar on the night of 7/8 September 1940 that indicates some 92 deaths in the 
Borough.97 That latter review can be linked to both Mick Lemmerman’s monograph 
on the bombing of the Isle of Dogs98 and also to the detailed records of 
“occurrences” in the Tower Hamlets archives which contain extensive records from 
the Air Raid Precaution (later Civil Defence) service:  
 
94   NA file HO 193/1 Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Department. 
Bomb Census Maps, London Area 7 to 21 October 1940 
95   Newham Archives “West Ham World War II Bomb Incidents” 
96  Although Peter Stansky’s focus on the events of the day (Peter Stansky: The First Day of 
the Blitz (Yale: University Press, 2007) uses many first-hand accounts to provide some 
indication of that impact. 
97 John Hook. The Air Raids on the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1940-45: a 
chronological listing of the fatal casualties. Monograph in Tower Hamlets Local History 
Library and Archives 
98 Mick Lemmerman. The Isle of Dogs During World War II (Privately published, 2015). Copy 
in Tower Hamlets Library and Archives 
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Figure 6: ARP Record for the Bombing of Devas street, Poplar (for which 




The Civil Defence files in the London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) contain reports 
that are similarly sporadic and unstructured for the initial periods, but have a 
separate value in that they contain much more narrative (presumably derived from 
telephoned reports), and are thus close to contemporary eye-witness  accounts. For 
example, the report of 7 September 1940 records that Poplar was “savagely 
bombed” and that in West Ham “north of Victoria Dock there is about one square 
 
99  Tower Hamlets Archives, file L/PMB/CB/4/2, night of 7/8 September 1940, Occurrence 
number 54 out of 100 on that night. 
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mile of fires involving warehouses”.100 The level of detail in the LMA material 
improves for October and November, and by the turn of the year more data is 
available in the London Civil Defence Region reports, with the first consolidated 
report showing that between November 1940 and July 1941, 61,808kg (60.83 tons) 
of bombs fell on Poplar and 53,724kg (52.88 tons) on West Ham – in addition to 
whatever quantities had fallen in the two months before the summary period.101 
Collier, using data from German sources, shows that the aggregate weight of 
bombs dropped on London between 7 September and 13 November 1940 was 
some 13,651 tons (or 13 kilotons in the modern terminology of atomic weapon 
power):102  even if only 1% of that fell on Poplar and West Ham, that would have 
been equivalent to the tonnage of the following eight and a half months. The Civil 
Defence tables show that the assaults between November 1940 and July 1941 
resulted in 1,525 and 1,660 serious casualties in the two boroughs,103 and in the 
destruction of around 2,700 houses in Poplar and 7,300 in West Ham.104 The figures 
for houses “damaged but repairable” are given for Poplar as 48,228,105 making a 
total damaged or destroyed of 50,928, i.e. more than 75% of the pre-war housing 
stock. The data for “nine severely bombed boroughs” in one report (which included 
Poplar) gives an average of 2,328 houses demolished and 24,294 as damaged but 
repairable – i.e. a ratio of approximately 1:10, although those boroughs were all 
inner-city, so that it is not possible to extend that ratio to West Ham which had some 
areas with much lower density of housing. Similarly, the graphic representations of 
the effect of the bombing in the LCC bomb damage maps show only Poplar, so that 
while it is possible to see the widespread effects of bomb blast in that borough,106 no 
such representation is available for West Ham. Understandably, the picture is 
unclear, but the various files and publications provide an indication of the scale of 
the damage and number of casualties – although in the chaos it is possible that 
 
100  LMA file LCC/CL/CD/2/1 Civil Defence: Reports on Air Raids and War Damage covering 
the period from 25 August to 24 September 1940 
101  NA File HO 186/952 Ministry of Home Security: Air Raids: London region: Report 
Number 28 (28 January 1942), page 2 
102  Basil Collier, History of the Second World War: Defence of the United Kingdom. 
(London, HMSO, 1957), Appendices XXVI pp. 494-495, and L, p.528. Note that 
according to Daryl Kimbal (‘The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings in Pictures’, Arms 
Control Today, 35, 6 (2005) p.14, the Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on 6th August 
1945 had a yield of 15 kilotons.  
103  HO 186/952 Report Number 28, dated 28 January 1942 
104  Figures extrapolated from the numbers of houses demolished per 1000 houses recorded 
in report Number 28 dated 28 January 1942 in HO 186/952. 
105  HO 186/952, Report Number 31, dated 25 March 1942 
106  Ann L Saunders The London County Council Bomb Damage Maps 1939-1945 (London: 
London Topographical Society and London Metropolitan Archives, 2005) pp. 64-65 and 
77-78, p.64 
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whole families may have been killed either in their homes or in the shelters, and in 
some cases, all traces of the victims may have been destroyed.  
 
The history and social consequences of the Blitz have been covered by many 
authors: the contemporary accounts by Ritchie Calder107 and Doreen Idle108 overlap 
to some extent, but each contains trenchant criticisms of the failings of both national 
and local government and, particularly, West Ham Borough Council, overlaying the 
injuries and suffering caused directly by the bombs. While accepting that criticism, it 
is also clear from the archival material that the assault in the first phase was on 
such as scale as to have overwhelmed any rational plans or precautions – how 
might West Ham have devised a system to cope with 177 bombs on that first night? 
But that could not have given much comfort to those affected: writing much closer to 
the time of the events, Idle provides a vivid description of the chaos and confusion 
of the early days of the Blitz, where “it was …five or six months after raids began 
before public shelters were made decently habitable, and at the opening of the 
Blitz…no satisfactory system of coordinating services (e.g. transport, billeting, and 
information) had been prepared”.109 And whereas in East Ham the various local 
authority offices dealing with those who had been bombed out were grouped in one 
location; in West Ham, the residents of the southern part (the most heavily bombed 
area) were “very likely to have to travel a distance of several miles…in order to 
reach the essential departments concerned with billeting, replacement of ration 
cards, evacuation, etc.”.110 Among the post-war authors, Arthur Marwick111 
combines first-hand accounts and photographs to provide a vivid impression of the 
experiences of those who suffered. Marwick also lets his photographs of the plight 
of the evacuees, the people in the shelters and the bomb damage say as much or 
more than his prose.112 Backing these up, Geoff Dench, uses material from nearly 
800 inhabitants of Bethnal Green to highlight both the sufferings of those affected by 
the bombs and the strong sense within the community that their sufferings and their 
contributions to victory would be recognised: that “promises were being made that 
could be relied upon”.113 
 
107 Ritchie Calder. The Lessons of London (London: Secker and Warburg,1941) 
108 Idle, West Ham, op.cit. 
109 Ibid., p.62 
110 Ibid., p.67 
111 Arthur Marwick The Home Front: The British and the Second World War (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1976). Incidentally, Marwick’s illustration on page 48 shows just how 
poor was the quality of the construction of some houses in the East End. 
112  Ibid., pp. 45-68 
113 Geoff Dench, Kate Gavron, and Michael Young. The New East End: Kinship, Race and 
Conflict (London: Profile Books, 2006) pp189-196 
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This is not a history of the Blitz, and it is only possible to summarise some of the 
main failings that have been noted by Titmuss: these included both the paucity of 
central planning and the problems of implementation of such plans as had been 
drawn up – for example those relating to the (inaccurate and exaggerated) forecasts 
of the damage and likely casualties from bombing, and the evacuation of people 
from the cities,114 together with those areas where little or no planning had been 
undertaken, and where the authorities’ reactions were initially of paralysis. That 
having been said, it is difficult to imagine what planning might have been possible to 
prepare for the fact that between the middle of 1938 and mid-1941 more than 
155,000 persons had left West Ham (and more than one and a half million had left 
the LCC region).115 In some respects such failings can be seen as the consequence 
of sensitivities about the responsibilities and relationships between central and local 
government (and between local authorities), underlined by the Treasury’s 
parsimony.  Titmuss shows that the British learned and applied many lessons from 
the Blitz after the initial raids: but a different perspective can be adduced from 
Beck’s account of the massive preparations made by the German authorities prior to 
the War and in advance of the British bombing raids on Cologne on 30 May 1942, 
and the huge efforts made to repair the damage and support the population after the 
raid.116 Admittedly, such actions might be that much easier to undertake in a 
totalitarian state although (as shown below), huge powers of compulsion and 
direction were available to the UK government, but the extent of the work before 
and after the raids indicates the importance attached by the German leadership to 




Even before the Blitz began, legislation was being passed that would have a 
fundamental impact on the adult population of Britain and provided the basis for 
further statutes that directly affected the current and future employment of the 
dockers. The primary enabling legislation (the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts 
 
114 Titmuss, Social Policy, Chapter II (pp.12-22) and Chapters III, (pp. 23-44), XVIII (pp. 355-
369) and XXI (pp. 424-441)  
115 NA File HLG 7/608 Ministry of Health: Evacuation and Homeless: Population statistics for 
the London Region 
116  Earl R Beck. Under the Bombs: the German Home Front 1942-45 (Kentucky: The 
University Press, 1986)  
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passed in 1939117 and 1940118) provided a framework for the government to control 
both the property and actions of the people of the United Kingdom. The first of these 
allowed “for taking of possession or control…of any property or undertaking”,119 and 
the second permitted the requiring of “persons to place themselves, their services 
and their property at the disposal of His Majesty”.120 In effect, as Hancock and 
Gowing note, the latter legislation encompassed “something new and important - 
industrial conscription”.121 Apart from the specified purpose of the legislation, the 
most important feature was that both Acts allowed for delegated legislation in the 
form of Defence Regulations to be made by Orders in Council and then for Statutory 
Rules and Orders to be made under those Regulations.122 The primary legislation 
was so framed as to give the Executive almost limitless powers “notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act” 123 
subject only to the requirement that “every Order in Council containing Defence 
Regulations shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after it is made”, with 
the possibility of annulment by a Resolution of either “House of Parliament within 
the next twenty-eight days”.124 As Carr notes, the system of ‘children’ (Defence 
Regulations) and ‘grandchildren’ (Statutory Rules and Orders) of the primary 
legislation meant that powers entailed “in the copious orders, the grandchildren of 
the Act…were sometimes more important to the obedient citizen than the 
regulations that were the children of the Act”, while the Defence Regulations “played 
havoc with the statute-book, suspending, amending and restricting Acts of 
Parliament right and left”.125  
 
Some details of the progression of those Regulations and Orders, and their impact 
on both male and female workers in Britain during the War are covered in a report 
 
117  2 and 3 Geo VI, Ch. 62 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 (hereafter EPDA 39), 
commencing 24 August 1939 
118  3 and 4 Geo VI, Ch. 20 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940 (hereafter EPDA 40), 
commencing 22 May 1940 
119  EPDA 39, Section 1 (2) (b) 
120  EPDA 40, Section 1 (1)  
121  W.K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, History of the Second World War: The British War 
Economy (London: HMSO, 1949)  
122  In fact, 150 such Regulations were made on 25 August 1939 under Statutory Rules and 
Orders (henceforth SR&O)1939, no. 927 The Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 
123  EPDA 39, Section 1 (4) 
124  EPDA 39, Section 8 (1) and (2) 
125  Cecil T Carr ‘Crisis Legislation in Britain’ Columbia Law Review, 40, 8 (1940), pp.1309-
1325, pp.1322-1323 
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by the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) issued in 1947,126 and a 
number of these Instruments had a specific impact on the dock workers. The first of 
these was Defence Regulation 58A of 22 May 1940 (i.e. the same date as the 
passing of the ‘parent’ Act) giving the MLNS powers “to direct any person in the 
United Kingdom to perform such services as may be specified by that direction”.127 
Under this Regulation was then issued the Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) 
Order on June 18 1940, enforcing the introduction of dock labour Schemes under 
which ports were required to maintain Registers and confine employment “as far as 
possible to men registered under the Scheme”.128 Regulation 58A was followed by 
Regulation 58AA on 10 July 1940, prohibiting, inter alia, both strikes and lockouts 
and establishing tribunals “for the settlement of trade disputes”.129 This was in turn 
expanded into a comprehensive statement of practice and principles as the 
“Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940” – the much cited 
‘Order 1305’,130 which replicated the general prohibition on lock-outs and strikes and 
established a National Arbitration Tribunal to which disputes could be referred for 
resolution.131 Under this Order, official strikes (that is, strikes recognised and 
supported by trades unions) were banned – which was possible because the 
legislation could be used to prosecute the unions or their officials, but the corollary 
was that it was almost impossible to ban wildcat or unofficial strikes. The MLNS 
ledgers show that between 1941 and 1945 there were 178 strikes in the “Transport-
Docks” sector, with the loss of some 239,100 working days,132 although only three of 
these resulted in prosecutions.133 However, as Wigham notes, towards the end of 
1941 the Cabinet agreed to undertake what became “a classic example of the futility 
of mass prosecutions” at the Betteshanger colliery in Kent. The court case resulted 
in three union officials being sent to prison and more than 1,000 miners being fined 
– but within a few days the officials were released, and most of the fines were never 
paid.134 Although the power of prosecution was little used thereafter, the legislation 
 
126  MLNS Report for the Years 1939-1946 (Cmd. 7225, 1947). This notes (p.2) that “by mid-
1942 the total number of unemployed had been reduced to less than 100,000 and it did 
not rise above that figure until after the end of hostilities in Europe.” 
127  SR&O 1940/781, Defence Regulation 58A, section 3 
128  SR&O 1940/1013, The Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order, 1940 
129  SR&O 1940/1217, Defence Regulation 58AA section 6 
130  SR&O 1940/1305 The Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 
131  MLNS Report 1939-1946, p.278 
132  NA files LAB 34/56 to 34/60, MLNS: Trade Disputes Record Books, 1941-1945 
133  NA file LAB 10/173 MLNS: Prosecution of strikes under Order 1305 
134  Eric Wigham. Strikes and the Government 1893-1974 (London: Macmillan, 1976) pp. 91-
93 
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remained in effect until 1951, and provided a background for continuing suspicion 
and disaffection. 
 
Whilst Order 1305 applied to the whole of the British industrial sector, dock workers 
were also affected by a further Order dated 15 September 1941 – the Essential 
Work (Dock Labour) Order 1941 (EW(DL)O),135 which contained a number of 
provisions that would have both an immediate impact and, by providing the model 
for post-war dock labour legislation, would affect the working conditions of dockers 
for more than three decades. Under that Order, dock workers who were not in 
permanent employment136 by one of the shipping, stevedoring or wharfingers 
companies were to be employed by a new National Dock Labour Corporation 
(NDLC), which was to be responsible for the administration of all the new 
arrangements. The NDLC was “a Company limited by guarantee, and not having a 
share capital” set up by the National Joint Council for Dock Labour.137 This 
mechanism was presumably used to avoid the need for formal legislation to create 
such a body, but that process would also have avoided any possibilities of open 
discussion or consideration of the structure, powers, and responsibilities of the 
Corporation (the first mention of the NDLC in Hansard for either House is in May 
1942).138 The Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation is dated 15 September 1941, 
and its Memorandum and Articles of Association show that four union officials were 
among the Subscribers to the company upon its inception.139 Following the 
EW(DL)O, the NDLC became the employer of all Registered dock workers not in 
permanent employment, who would be allocated work by ‘operational employers’ 
and upon completion of that specific job would return to a ‘reserve pool’ in the 
employment of the NDLC. This meant that, for the first time, all registered dock 
workers would receive either wages or stand-by payments: in the words of the 
Explanatory Memorandum they would “cease to be casual workers and will always 
be in employment”140 – although, of course, that did not mean the end of casual 
 
135  SR&O 1941/1440 The Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order 1941 
136 Bearing in mind that ‘permanent’ – certainly for PLA labourers - meant only that men 
were employed on a weekly rather than daily basis, and had preference of work. They 
were dismissible without notice.  
137 MLNS Dock Labour Schemes: Explanatory Memorandum, (London: HMSO, 1941) p.1 
138 House of Lords Hansard, 13 May 1942 Col. 997 
139 These were: Arthur Deakin, the Acting General Secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU); David Large, the Acting General Secretary of the London 
Docks Group of the TGWU; Daniel Milford, the National Secretary of the TGWU; and Bill 
Turner, the General Secretary of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers 
(NASD). 
140  MLNS Dock Labour Schemes op.cit., para 14  
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labour - the workers were in effect on zero-hours contracts with a retainer, were 
required to sign-on at the docks twice daily and on Saturday mornings, and had no 
guarantee of actual work.  
 
A second consequence was that a dock worker became liable “to accept any work 
of which he was capable, and to transfer to other ports as required”.141 For a London 
docker this led to the possibility that he might have to work in small docks furthest 
upstream, the Royal group of docks or even Tilbury – 20 miles away – although in 
fact skill specialisation might inhibit his working in areas such as softwood handling. 
In the final resort, the NDLC could transfer a worker to a port in another town – 
Hodson quotes the example of London dockers being sent to work in Cardiff,142 and 
one London Dock Labour Board (LDLB) file records the transfer of 44 men to the 
Clyde in February 1942 following “similar arrangements to Bristol a year ago”.143 
Such arrangements might not be wholly seamless or trouble-free: the LDLB file 
notes that the 44 men sent to the Clyde should be kept together rather than being 




141  MLNS Report 1939-1946, p.50  
142  J L Hodson Home Front (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944) p.103 
143  NA file BK 32/14 London Dock Labour Board: Establishment and Administration of the 
Scheme 
144  Ibid., 
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The employment arrangements for dock workers in London are perhaps better seen 
diagrammatically: 
 




THE NATIONAL DOCK LABOUR CORPORATION (NDLC) 




THE LONDON DOCK LABOUR BOARD (LDLB) 
• Maintained the Register of dock workers in London 
• Managed the Call-on for workers not in “permanent” employment to 
provide labour to “operational employers” 
• Administered discipline within the Dock Labour Scheme for dockers in 
employment or on stand-by 
• Made stand-by payments to workers not offered employment, on a 
half-day basis 
| 










Labour Board  
Permanent workers, weekly paid, did not 
attend the call-on 
 
Called-on workers employed daily (subject to 
the continuity rule)145 often work for a 
particular employer, or in a particular gang. 





















There was a third factor that was also important in the longer term, as the Minister 
of Labour and National Service was to point out in 1949 in relation to another labour 
dispute:  
the [London] Dock Labour Board [that is, the local agent of the NDLC] are 
not themselves employers of labour. They are the suppliers of labour to the 
master stevedores, master porters and others, but they also provide the 
machinery by which payment is made both in respect of the work done and 
in respect of periods when no work is available.146 
 
 
145 The continuity rule ensured that once engaged for a specific job the man would be 
employed until that job finished 
146 NA file CAB 129/35/35 Cabinet Papers 1949 Cabinet Paper CP (49) 145 of 6 July 1949  
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The fundamental flaw in these arrangements was that since the NDLC was not the 
actual (‘operational’) employer for many of the men, there was no clear allocation of 
responsibility for areas such as training, health and safety, and toilet and washing 
facilities or for establishing systems for good industrial relations. This situation was 
exacerbated by the separation between the ‘holding employer’ (the NDLC) and the 
‘operational employer’, who might be one of the larger stevedoring companies, but 
could equally be a small – or even a one-man - firm. This, together with the 
continuation of the system of short-term engagements inhibited any development of 
good employment conditions or of any lasting relationship between the worker and 
the employer. For London dockers there was yet another complication, the fact that 
the docks (and most of the facilities and amenities) was owned by the PLA. This led 
to difficulties, for example, about the provision of amenities for washing and eating, 
because the shipping and stevedoring companies were not only not prepared to 
provide facilities for general use, but also objected to the provision of such facilities 
by the PLA where the cost would ultimately be reflected in increased Port Rates. 
Such impediments were not unique to London, however, and in 1941 the 
government intervened so that (in London) the PLA was required under section 3 of 
the Docks (Provision of Canteens) order,147 to provide canteens and suitable 
facilities for washing at all of its docks at a final cost of £84,078.148 
 
Disciplinary processes in the docks 
 
Overshadowing the wartime Scheme and its post-war successors were the 
disciplinary procedures defined in the Essential Work Order. These procedures, 
drafted in the context of a desperate struggle for national survival, became 
enshrined in many respects in post-war legislation and formed a source of 
continuing unrest for years. The main procedures were contained in Section 18 of 
the Dock Labour Scheme for London,149 covering the following aspects: 
 
18 (a) Any port transport worker whilst in the Reserve Pool [i.e. while not 
working for a specific employer], who fails without adequate cause [to attend 
the Call On, to accept any offer of suitable work, or to travel to any other port 
as directed] or fails to comply with any lawful order given to him by or on 
 
147 SR&O 1941/202 The Docks (Provision of Canteens) Order 1941,  
148 PLA Annual Report for 1947 (London: PLA, 1947), p.8 
149 There were various versions of these Orders for each Port. The quotations are from the 
Dock Labour Scheme for the Port of London shown as version 3/42 in NA file LAB 
10/567 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the London Dock Dispute of March 1945 
(Ammon Report) 
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behalf of the Corporation shall not be entitled to any payment in respect of 
his employment by the Corporation during that pay week. 
 
And; 
18 (b) Any port transport worker who, when in employment, fails without 
adequate cause [to carry out the rules of the ‘port or place’, and to work as 
and when required including overtime periods]150 or behaves in such a 
manner as to impede the work, or fails to comply with any lawful orders 
given to him, shall be returned by his employer to the Reserve Pool, and 
subject to a right of appeal, shall not be entitled to any payment in respect of 
his employment by the Corporation during that pay week. 
 
Section 18(c) specified the penalties for a breach of these procedures as 
suspension without pay (for an unspecified period), summary dismissal, or dismissal 
on seven days’ notice. The procedure for appealing against such penalties was 
defined in sections 18 (d) and (e), requiring the lodging of an appeal within 72 
hours, and allowing the appellant to appear in person before the Appeal Tribunal 
“whose decision if unanimous shall be final”.  
 
Section 18 (f) contained a provision for any employer (my emphasis) who failed “to 
carry out the conditions of the Dock Labour Scheme, or to make any payments 
which he is required to make to the Corporation” to be removed from the register of 
employers. This was little used: certainly, by March 1945 the Ammon Committee 
noted that there was “no evidence of any such cases” where this had been done.151 
 
In times of war, these procedures may not have seemed totally unreasonable, but 
even then they were shown to produce some problems in operation152 and, because 
the Scheme applied nationally, if a worker were dismissed in London he could not 
work in any other port under the control of the NDLC. Furthermore, any disciplinary 
issues arising between the worker and his operational employer could not be dealt 
with between the two parties and had to be resolved by the Labour Board because 
the disciplinary powers lay with the Scheme employer (the Board) rather than the 
effective employer (e.g. the master stevedore). 
 
 
150 The requirement to work overtime as required by the employer was to prove particularly 
contentious. 
151  London Docks Dispute 1945. Report of Committee of Inquiry (Ammon Report) (London: 
HMSO, 1945) paragraph 44 
152 NA file LAB 34/58 (Trade Disputes 1943) shows that two minor dock strikes in London (2 
September and 31 December 1943) were about stoppage of attendance pay. 
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Service in the Armed Forces 
 
Apart from the problems of survival during the Blitz and the new conditions of 
employment, those dockers who volunteered for, or were conscripted into, the 
Armed Forces will have encountered another difficulty: as Calder shows, the 
Government created “a new class of poor from the wives and dependants of 
servicemen. It paid a private’s wife seventeen shillings a week, plus five shillings for 
the first child, three shillings for the second, two shillings for the third, one shilling for 
any subsequent child”.153 These rates have to be seen in the context of the average 
rent from the NSOL West Ham data cards of 9s 2d per week and the amounts that 
parents of children who had been evacuated from danger areas were expected to 
pay for their children’s board and lodging - 10s 6d per week for the first child, and 8s 
6d a week for each child where two or more were billeted.154  Former dock workers 
in the armed forces would not all, of course, have been private soldiers: the Staff 
Supplement that the PLA issued to its monthly magazine notes the case of G W 
Eade, who rose from the rank of Corporal in the December 1939 edition to be 
shown as a Lieutenant in April 1946 upon demobilisation, and the issue of March 
1946 shows (inter alia) the details of twelve permanent labourers who had reached 
the rank of sergeant of above.155 Bill Hunter is one of the few who manages to 
provide some real flavour of the feelings of dockers who were in the Armed 
Services, quoting specifically the reactions of Joe Cubbin who became a Sergeant-
Major in the Royal Engineers, and the “desire for change after the War”.156 The PLA 
permanent labourers referred to above would have been a minority of those working 
in the docks, so that the actual numbers of non-commissioned (or even 
commissioned) Officers who were former dock workers could well have been 
higher. In any case, virtually all those returning from the War would have 
experienced very different conditions of engagement with regular pay, training, and 
rations.  
 
Along with these events was the disruption caused by the bombing and the 
evacuation programme to the routines of family and school life and the scattering of 
“family and kinship groups”, exemplified by higher levels of absenteeism from 
 
153 Angus Calder The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969) p.53 
154 Titmuss, Social Policy p.156 
155  PLA Archives: PLA Monthly Staff Supplement March 1946, Issue 231, p.4 
156  Bill Hunter. They knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and the Leadership on the 
Docks 1945-1989 (London, Index Books: 1994) pp. 10-21 
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schools and a commensurate impact on educational achievement and behaviour.157 
In his chapter on “Unfinished Business” Titmuss suggests that there was a 
paradigm shift in the public (and official) attitudes during the War, with a recognition 
that “it was a proper function” of Government to “ward off distress and strain 
among…almost all classes of society”, and an acceptance  that the sacrifices made 
by all peoples merited recompense.158 Marwick argues that British society - or 
rather, “the state of British society in the 1930s” - did change as a result of the 
War,159 and the Blitz and its repercussions must have had a huge impact on the 
social attitudes of the East Enders. However, there appears to be little hard 
evidence around this: apart from Dash (who entered the docks in June 1945), the 
commonly quoted “voices” of the period are from the Mass Observation survey 
respondents and diarists who tended to be “lower-middle-class [of whom] few had 
gone to university” and where the “typical occupations of men and women were 
clerk and schoolteacher”.160 At a wider level, Sibley suggests a range of possible 
factors for the shift in public attitudes represented by the outcome of the General 
Election in July 1945, both historical – the “unfulfilled pledges” from the First World 
War, and recollections of “the depression in the 1930s”– and the contemporary 
“common experiences of the war, with….the emergence of a new egalitarianism”. 
Coupled with this might be the contribution of Labour ministers in the coalition 
government of 1940-45 and their support of the Beveridge Report,161 and a 
“decreasing fear of government or state intervention”. Whatever the causes, “what 
was really fundamental was the long-term movement of opinion between 1940 and 
1945”,162 
 
Again, at the national level, McKibbin senses a change in the sentiments of the 
working classes who had been the Conservative party’s “largest single constituency 
by some way”,163 and a greater acceptance of Labour’s fitness for Government – 
and this would seem to have been reflected in the docklands. So, in the 
parliamentary constituency of Plaistow in West Ham, which included the docks, the 
 
157  Titmuss, Social Policy, Chapter XX Families in Trouble, pp. 404-423 
158  Titmuss Social Policy, pp. 506 -538 
159  Marwick Home Front, p.11 
160  Penny Summerfield ‘Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social Movement?’ Journal 
of Contemporary History 20, 3, (1985) pp.439-452 
161  Report by Sir William Henry Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services. (Cmd 6404, 
1942) 
162  Richard Sibley ‘The swing to Labour during the Second World War: When and Why?’ 
Labour History Review,55, l, (1990). Pp. 23-34 
163  Ross McKibbin Parties and People: England 1914-1951 (Oxford: University Press, 2010) 
p.122 
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Labour vote rose from 73.32% in 1935 to 87.57% in 1945, while the Conservative 
vote fell from 26.68% to 12.43%164 representing a swing of about 14%,165 compared 
to the national average of 12%.166 The swing was slightly greater in Poplar South 
where the Labour vote rose from 73.17% to 89.23%, and the Conservative vote fell 
from 26.83% to 10.77%,167 representing a swing of about 15%. In simple numbers 
of votes the change is even more dramatic: in 1945 only 1,403 people voted 
Conservative in Poplar South and 2,463 in Plaistow.  
 
The 1945 ‘Control Point’ dock strike 
 
Just before the end of the War in Europe a dispute occurred that seemed to indicate 
a return to pre-war attitudes on the part of management and which can also be seen 
as a warning of future problems for the operation of the Dock Labour Scheme. 
Unfortunately for the future of labour relations in the docks the warning was not 
heeded, and because this was so important for the later periods of this thesis I want 
to deal with it at some length. 
 
On 1 March 1945 the Control Point at the Royal Victoria Dock, where men attended 
for the daily Call-On was moved from outside the dock gates to a new location 
inside the dock perimeter, following a decision by the LDLB, after minimal formal 
consultation with the unions. Although dock workers who were members of the 
TGWU began to use the new Point on that day others, mainly members of the 
NASD, refused to accept the change and went on strike. The strike quickly spread 
among the docks, and eventually involved some 9,000 men with a computed loss of 
72,000 working days.168  It attracted wide publicity, and troops were called in to 
move essential supplies: but following a decision to set up a Committee of Inquiry 
on 8 March, the strike was called off, and there was a full resumption of work on 9 
March. The establishment of the Inquiry was announced by the Minister of Labour 
 
164 http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge35/i15.htm for 1935 and /ge45/ge45index.htm 
for 1945 
165 ‘Swing’ here calculated using David Butler’s methodology of adding the increase in the 
percentage of votes for one party to the decrease in the percentage for the other party, 
divided by two. (see, for example, S. J. Stray and M. S. Silver ‘The Measurement of Change 
in the Popularity of Governments in United Kingdom By-Elections’ Political Methodology 8, 4 
(1982), pp. 93-106) 
166  Sibley, ‘Swing’ p.23 
167  Politics Resources Op.cit.   
168  NA File LAB 101/35 MLNS: Docks Industry: Summary of Principal Stoppages 1945-58 
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and National Service (Ernest Bevin) in the House of Commons, wherein he stated 
that: 
 
The immediate cause of the dispute was the transfer of the place of proof of 
attendance to an office inside the Royal Docks. The existing huts used for 
this purpose were regarded as unsuitable. Another question which has 
caused grave anxiety throughout January was the increase of absenteeism 
at the Royal Docks and it became necessary for those responsible to deal 
with it.169 
 
If the passage is deconstructed there are two separate issues – the relocation of the 
Control Point, and the need to manage absenteeism - but as written, there is an 
inference that absenteeism had reached such a level in the Royal Group of docks 
(that is, the Victoria, Albert and King George V docks) that the Control Point needed 
to be relocated to tackle this. As will become clear, there were no obvious reasons 
why that relocation should have achieved any reduction in absenteeism, which had 
in fact decreased in the weeks before the new arrangements were implemented. 
There were certainly problems with the huts that were used as Call-On points – 
apart from anything else they were far too small for the dock managers to carry out 
their work effectively - and that reason formed the basis of the decision recorded in 
the minutes of the LDLB meeting on 19 February 1945: 
 
as the huts at the Connaught Road Royal Albert Dock170 control point are 
unsatisfactory for the purpose for which they are required, being too small 
and inconveniently planned, and as it has been found impossible for the 
Ministry of Works to get labour or material allocated to effect the necessary 
structural alterations it has been decided, following agreement with the 
TGWU and the NASD to close the huts after 28th February and that on and 
from 1 March 1945, proof of attendance would be taken at the Sector Office, 
Albert Dock, where arrangements could be made to deal with the men more 
expeditiously than at the huts.171 
 
In fact, agreement had been reached only with the TGWU by 19 February. The Port 
Manager had indeed written to both the TGWU and the NASD on 10 February 
informing them of the proposed closures and transfer, and the TGWU had replied 
on 12 February, suggesting a detailed variation in the Call-On arrangements, but 
 
169  House of Commons Hansard, 8 March 1945, Col 2197  
170  The Connaught Road cuts between the Victoria and Albert docks and there seems to be 
some confusion in the files about the precise locations of the huts. Presumably, dockers 
could sign on for either dock at the huts. 
171  NA file BK 1/239 National Dock Labour Corporation: Closure of Huts outside Royal 
Docks Minutes of LDLB meeting, Minute 1382 19 February 1945 
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otherwise not objecting to the change. No reply was received from the NASD until 
26 February because of the internal systems within the NASD (of which the Port 
Manager must have been well aware) under which the officers of the union had to 
clear any significant policy decisions with the union’s Executive Committee – and 
often with the wider membership. In their letter of 26 February the NASD said that 
“the Stevedores’ Executive Committee are of the opinion that the reasons you have 
submitted for the closure of the Port Hut at Connaught Road are not justified”.172 
The LDLB must have known that a similar proposal to move a control point in the 
Surrey Docks in November 1944 had resulted in a Stevedore’s strike.173 In the 
meantime, however, and following the LDLB Board meeting on 19 February, the 
Port Manager had written to all workers in Sector 4 (i.e. the Royal group) on 22 
February to notify them of the change, and to advise them that it would be 
implemented on 1 March.  
 
On 3 March, after the strike had been in progress for two days, the NDLC issued a 
press release, stating that the strike had resulted from the relocation of the huts that 
was seen as a “trivial incident” which had been “discussed and agreed with the 
unions long beforehand”.  The press release also stated that “around this incident 
has been focused other grievances” and gave a résumé of statistics about 
absences and penalties imposed, arguing that the unauthorised absences had 
seriously impeded the work of the docks, but had been dealt with by firm action on 
the part of the NDLC.  In any event, following the announcement of an Inquiry, the 
strike ended. The Chairman of the Inquiry was to be Lord Ammon, the Chairman of 
the NDLC (the parent body of the LDLB), and a former trade union official,174 and 
comprised two other members of the Corporation, with representatives of the Port 
Employers (one of whom was the Chairman of the PLA), and of the two unions. 
Both sides submitted evidence to the Committee, which also received a written 
submission from the NDLC, and it soon became apparent that the main areas of 
contention were absenteeism and the disciplinary procedures within the London 
docks Scheme.175 From the submissions it is clear that the unions and the NDLC 
 
172 This is at odds with the wording in the final paragraph of the NDLC Press Notice of 3 
March 1945 (copy on BK2/1022), which concluded with the words “this change of site of the 
office was discussed and agreed with the Unions long beforehand”.  
173 See The Times 30 November 1944 p. 2 ‘Inside the Gates or Outside’ 
174  ODNB: Ammon, Charles George, Baron Ammon (1873-1960) by Alan Clinton. A former 
Post Office union official, LCC member, and MP. He was appointed Chief (Government) 
Whip in the Lords in August 1945. 
175  Which was itself based upon a model scheme from the Essential Works (Dock Labour) 
Order, SR&O 1941/1440. 
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wanted to focus on the problems with the disciplinary arrangements within the 
Scheme, and how this might be improved, but the Civil Service advice to the 
Minister was that this would be resisted by the (London) employers who would 
“regard this as a very wide extension to the Inquiry to which they committed 
themselves”, and would also inhibit the speedy production of any report.176 
 
The ‘headline’ issues for the strike were thus the relocation of the Control Point and 
the problem of absenteeism. The proposed relocation of Control Points in London 
had long been contentious, as shown by Howarth and King,177 and central to 
disputes in 1911 and 1912.178 In those disputes, a significant objection had been 
that if the Point were outside the docks, trade union and other worker 
representatives could approach the men, and mass meetings could be organised or 
held. If the Point were inside, men would be subject to docks discipline inhibiting 
such mass meetings, and also prohibiting smoking and allowing the right of search 
by the docks police. In more practical terms, the NDLC had a good case for the 
change: the Corporation’s evidence shows that the old Control Point consisted of 
two huts each 12 by 8 feet in dimensions (3.65m x 2.43m) outside the Victoria Dock 
gate where “sometimes the [Local] Manager has had to deal with several hundred 
men at these huts which are capable of holding not more than five men at one 
time”.179 Even where everything flowed smoothly, and men were called-on 
expeditiously with few left waiting to ‘prove attendance’ there would have been 
pressures in those offices. On other occasions, several hundred men might be 
requiring their books to be stamped to prove attendance, and the press of persons 
is not hard to imagine. In such circumstances, the inadequate facilities and 
consequent delays might lead to men simply drifting away and failing to prove 
attendance – and thus be shown as “absent”, but this was a manageable problem 
rather than a systemic defect. In essence, the issue of the relocation must be seen 
as a trigger, rather than as a matter of substance: certainly, the limited analyses of 
the causes of absenteeism in the submissions and evidence provided to the 
Committee do not contain any clear indications of how the relocation of the Control 
Points might have improved matters.  
 
176  NA file LAB 10/580 Report of a strike at the London Docks involving the Transport and 
General Workers Union and the Stevedores Union. Letter of 9 March 1945 from the Chief 
Industrial Commissioner of the MLNS. 
177  Howarth and King, West Ham, p.202 
178  John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers: A Study of Trade Unionism in the Port of London 
1870-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 172-174 
179  BK2/1022, Statement submitted by the NDLC to the Committee of Inquiry into the 





The arguments around absenteeism comprised two main elements: the employers’ 
concern to reduce absenteeism, and the workers’ grievance about the form and 
application of the disciplinary procedures under the London Dock Labour Scheme. 
The latter revolved to some extent around the penalties imposed for absenteeism 
but related also to sanctions for other alleged misdemeanours. For ‘pure’ 
absenteeism, the evidence to the Inquiry shows that this was not to be seen as a 
simple matter, either in its representation or its cause. The NDLC’s presentation of 
the data on absences was in the form of a table detailing absences in the third week 
of February 1945 and summarising the first eight weeks of 1945.  The data for 
February 1945 show that absenteeism in the Royal group averaged 4.3% per turn 
(morning/afternoon shift), more or less in line with the whole port, but that for the 
first five weeks of 1945 the Royals averaged 11.96% per cent, with a peak in week 
5 of 13.5%. However, for the next three weeks (i.e. up to 24 February 1945), 
absenteeism averaged 5.6%, and in the final week of that period (as noted above), 
and before the relocation of the Control Point, the Royal group had a figure of 4.3%, 
the same as that for St Katharine dock and compared to a high figure of 5.1% for 
the Surrey docks and 2.0 % for Tilbury.180   
  
 
180  NDLC Statement, Appendix 2 “Unaccounted return for week ending 24th February 
1945”, serial 2 
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Source: NA file BK 2/1022181 
 
181 NDLC Statement “Absenteeism in London Area” 
 79 
The NDLC statement covers the causes of absenteeism in only three paragraphs, 
noting first (and subsequently reiterating) that one reason was the dockers’ 
resistance to the change to more structured employment that “deprived them of their 
freedom to work where and when they will”.182 In addition to these, the NDLC noted 
problems resulting from: 
 
• High earnings 
• The desire to hold back because of the knowledge of a good job in a few 
days’ time 
• The need for a rest after arduous work 
• The easing of war strain which makes work seem less imperative, 
 
And that “these, and countless domestic and private reasons, good, bad, and 
indifferent, contribute to absenteeism”.183 The NDLC’s views were not accepted 
wholeheartedly in the Inquiry: on the possible effect of high earnings, the TGWU 
representative pointed out that the workers at Tilbury had higher pay and less 
absenteeism than other London dockers.184 The suggestion that some men actively 
avoided work (and even left without proving attendance) was not easily 
determinable: as the TGWU evidence noted, different employers would have 
different ways of working, some men might want to work (or not want to work) for a 
particular company, some gangs wanted to keep together, and other men would 
follow a particular shipping line.185 Finally, the strongest or most able workers might 
well be willing to sacrifice one or two days stand-by pay if that would allow them to 
get a much better-paid job later in the week. There might thus be a number of 
reasons for intermittent absences, and the lack of any management initiatives on 
these may be seen as one of the disadvantages of the LDLB acting as a labour 
provider rather than an employer, inhibiting the development of the relationship that 
would normally be expected between employer and worker.  
 
The penultimate premise provided grounds for considerable discussion, wherein it 
became clear that the arrangements in London for granting time-off were less than 
optimal. Although not stated specifically in the Scheme rules: 
 
 
182  Ibid., paragraph 30 
183  Ibid., paragraph 31 
184  Evidence to the Ammon Committee Day 2 p.16 in BK 2/1022 
185  Ibid., Day 1 p.16  
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In the explanatory circular issued by the Corporation…it is laid down that ‘on 
completion of a job involving heavy work or long hours, the Manager may 
give the men time off without forfeiture of attendance money’.186 
 
The Committee saw “cases of undoubted hardship” in the operation of the 
procedures for granting such time off, and questioned whether “the existing 
machinery, even if it is fully used, is adequate or needs improving”.187 Clearly, these 
are indications of areas where the Local Board should have been able to apply 
some flexibility. In the strict application of the rule, a docker might be required to 
undertake heavy manual work for a seven-day week (with compulsory overtime) 
and would not automatically be allowed time off to recover, but would have to attend 
a Call-On and then apply for the time off. In reality, the man would surely see little 
logic in having to attend his place of work at 7.45 a.m. to ask for time off for that 
day.  Ammon clearly recognised the inequity here, commenting that “the onus for 
applying for leave…should not fall entirely on the men themselves…it should not be 
impossible for both sides…to establish satisfactory arrangements” to improve the 
situation.188 
 
The remaining NDLC points about the “easing of war strain” and other 
miscellaneous causes were not considered in much detail: arguably these were so 
general as not to be susceptible of proof or disproof, and as adding little of real 
value to the Committee’s deliberation. In any case, the NDLC submission concluded 
finally that:  
 
Facts should not be over-stated. Taking the port as a whole, absenteeism is 
probably no higher than in other industries, but in the Royal Docks it was 
serious, and however much the action of the manager may be resented – as 
was only to be expected – absenteeism has been reduced to reasonable 
proportions.  
 
This was all to some extent academic: in evidence to the Committee, the NDLC’s 
General Manager stated that: 
 
 the figure which is commonly referred to as absenteeism is in fact a 
balancing figure. We know the size of the Register each day; we get 
employers’ returns showing the number of men who are at work; we know 
the number of men who have proved attendance; we know the number of 
 
186  Ammon Report, para. 28 
187  Ibid., para. 29 
188  Ibid., para. 30 
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men we have excused attendance; and those three figures are added 
together, and the difference between the result of that calculation and the 
effective register becomes the unaccounted figure for that day. If the 
employers’ returns are incomplete or inaccurate, that will tend to boost the 
unaccounted figure and thereby produce a larger figure for absenteeism 
than in fact exists.189 
 
If there is added to this uncertainty the fact that the NDLC data shows that 12,605 
men were transferred between dock sectors in a 13-week period between 8 
December 1944 and 3 March 1945, and that a summary table for the fourth quarter 
of 1944 shows 4.9% of men in London as “unaccounted for” (i.e. not in employment, 
having proved attendance or been excused), there have to be real questions about 
the validity of the NDLC’s data190 – or the strength of its argument on absenteeism.  
With this, as the Inquiry report later noted, the NDLC’s figures also included “those 
who may be absent through sickness or other legitimate cause” where “owing to the 
very heavy nature of dock work and the conditions under which it is performed, the 
dock industry inevitably has a high incidence of sickness and accident”.191 However, 
given the nature of employment in the docks, nothing would be known of short-term 
sickness or injury until the man returned to work (although a man on longer-term 
sick absence would presumably have sent in a certificate by post). Finally, there 
must have existed the possibility that the attribution of absences to the Royals might 
have been necessary because the balancing figure for absences would have been 
too high to be absorbed in any other Sector. In essence, then, absenteeism might 
have been a significant problem – but one that could not be precisely quantified in 
the conditions of the time. 
 
The lack of clarity on either the numbers of men absent, or on the reasons for 
absence, is reflected in the NDLC press release, which noted that during February 
1945, there were at least one thousand cases in the Royal Group of “men who had 
been absent without permission on two or more days” which has to be seen in the 
context of a “live” register for the Royal Group of 4,004 men. Of these, action had 
been taken against only 81 men “who had been absent without reasonable cause 
during four consecutive weeks”: the inference must be that some significant level of 
absenteeism was routinely tolerated. The obvious question - not asked at the 
Inquiry - is how any organisation could have let that situation arise (or perhaps 
 
189  BK2/1022, Evidence, day 3, pp. 64-65  
190  It would also seem unlikely that returns had been submitted by all of the dozens of 
wharves and all of the lighters and barges.  
191  Ammon Report paragraph 27 
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continue) without examining the circumstances and reasons for those absences and 
developing a plan to manage the problem. If, however, it is remembered that the 
NDLC saw itself as a manpower provider rather than employer, it becomes clear 
that it would not have been able to devise any strategy to manage absenteeism (for 
example through ‘return to work’ interviews) and so could only resort to using its 
disciplinary powers to bear down on absences.  
 
Other problems in the Scheme 
 
Given the complexity and lack of clarity on absences, the trade union reaction was 
to focus on some of the other problems of the Scheme – perhaps accepting that the 
various Essential Works Orders constrained the Port’s freedom to confront the real 
difficulties facing both men and management. Certainly, in their written evidence the 
trades unions had reflected the concerns expressed by their members about the 
disciplinary procedures, and in particular the question of the ‘break in guarantee’:  
 
There is also severe criticism against the power of the Port Manager to 
break the man’s guarantee without right of appeal. This has been one of the 
weakest points of the Dock Labour Scheme since the first Scheme was 
introduced….in 1942.192 
 
The matter of automatic break of guarantee is perhaps one of the Scheme’s more 
arcane areas but was a matter of considerable importance to the men.  If a worker 
failed to turn up to a Call–On, to accept any offer of suitable work, or to travel to any 
other port if so directed, ‘without adequate cause’ he could be liable to suspension 
without pay – thus ‘automatically breaking the guarantee of employment’. In fact, as 
the disciplinary procedures show, more serious penalties were available; the man 
might be given seven days’ notice of termination of employment, or summarily 
dismissed.193 As Ammon pointed out, the requirement for the workers to prove 
“adequate cause…puts the men in the position of being regarded as prima facie 
guilty so they have to prove their innocence”.194 
 
 
192 BK2/1022: TGWU and NASD Statement of evidence submitted to the Court of Inquiry 
appointed to inquire into the causes of the recent stoppage at the London Docks which 
commenced on 1st March 1945. (Henceforth “TGWU and NASD statement”) paragraph 
15  
193  Dock Labour Scheme for the Port of London version 3/42 Clause 18 (c) op.cit 
194  Ammon Report, paragraph 34 
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So much, then for the “headline issues”: when the Inquiry Report was issued on 23 
April 1945 it confirmed that although the proximate cause of the strike was the 
relocation of the Control Point, the real causes of the unrest were a number of 
systemic and operational problems perceived by the workers in the operation of the 
Dock Labour Scheme. As an introductory paragraph notes: 
 
The strike originated in the men’s feelings of resentment against the alleged 
harsh exercise of discipline under the Port of London Dock Labour Scheme. 
It was brought to a head by the transference…of the Royal Docks Control 
Point…inside the Dock Gate.195 
 
On the first day of the Inquiry the two unions submitted a statement of evidence and 
notes on 20 cases comprising a selection from “letters and statements from a large 
number of men” – presumably those where the unions considered that there was a 
strong case for appeal. In their opening paragraph, the unions stated that: 
 
For some time, we have received complaints from the men in London, to the 
effect that the administrative machinery of the National Dock Labour 
Corporation was operating against them unfairly, particularly in connection 
with alleged offences arising out of their employment. 196 
 
The Committee interviewed a number of the complainants: many of the cases were 
complex with some relating to problems of communication between the workers and 
local managers, while others reflected the problems of administering a statutory 
scheme where the codified rules allowed little room for flexibility, and where the only 
recourse for the men was to appeal to a Tribunal.197 The written and oral evidence 
confirmed the difficulties of operating these systems: Appendix V (in the NA file 
BK2/1022, but not published) shows that in the five months between October 1944 
and February 1945, there were nearly 2,000 cases requiring action, of which 1,285 
were dealt with by a disciplinary interview and 694 resulted in either suspension 
(646) or dismissal (48). Nearly half the men penalised (330) appealed against the 
penalties imposed, and of those 79 appeals were allowed, while others had 
penalties reduced.198 One specific problem was identified in the evidence to the 
Inquiry where a union representative on the Tribunals stated that 
 
 
195  Ammon Report paragraph 9. 
196  TGWU and NASD Statement of evidence paragraph 1 
197  Membership of the Tribunals consisted of one representative from each side of the 
industry with a secretary from MLNS. 
198  BK2/1022 
 84 
 there is an impression in the minds of the Tribunal that it weakens the 
Manager altogether if they wipe out the penalty, and I am indicating that if 
the action was taken before the Manager had committed himself, then the 
Manager’s dignity would not be involved.199  
 
The difficulties here are echoed by the NDLC submission, which outlined the 
problems of operating the scheme and acknowledged that “under such conditions 
the Manager has little chance of administering the scheme fairly and some injustice 
is almost inevitable”.200 The issue of Indiscipline while in employment was seen to 
have many implications, for example raising the question of why the NDLC should 
be given the responsibility of adjudicating in a dispute between a worker and his 
operational employer and then imposing and administering any penalties, where the 
dispute might be about the interpretation of industrial agreements – for which there 
would often be agreed consultation procedures in the Industry. Here the Committee 
was clear: such cases were not suitable for review under the disciplinary 




The main themes of the Ammon report are of how the disciplinary procedures had 
been applied in managing absenteeism, and in particular the problems relating to 
the automatic break of guarantee, and indiscipline in employment.202  The report did 
not resolve the problems and difficulties: these had existed as a source of 
discontent in the London docks since the inception of the London Scheme, and 
(continued in the later National Scheme) remained a key issue in industrial unrest 
for years afterwards. In the introductory section to the report there is an 
acknowledgement that “there is often a feeling amongst men against whom 
disciplinary action has been taken that the Corporation’s Officers are acting 
arbitrarily, harshly and unsympathetically”203 and, as noted subsequently:  
 
It is clear from the evidence submitted to us that in London the Corporation 
is not really regarded – and perhaps may not regard itself – as an integral 
part of the Industry but as something apart. There is….a tendency for the 
Corporation to overlook the need for taking every opportunity to carry the 
 
199  Ibid., Evidence, day 2, p. 34  
200  NDLC Statement paragraph 11 
201  Ibid., paragraph 40 
202  Ibid., paragraphs 17-42  
203  Ibid., page 6 paragraph 19 
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industry with it…and to make sure that it can at no stage be said to be 
ignoring the industrial machinery or local or practical experience.204 
 
One person who might have set the tone for the poor relations between local 
managers and the workforce, and perhaps for the “undoubted hardships” in the 
applications of the rules noted in Ammon’s paragraph 29 was Mr M C Halliday, who 
was recruited as the Port Manager for London when the Dock Labour Scheme was 
introduced in 1942. Halliday had been for many years an employee, and latterly the 
Manager, of the major private stevedoring company of Scruttons Ltd.205 Halliday 
was no admirer of the new Schemes as is shown in a letter he wrote (as the LDLB’s 
port manager) about the extension of the Dock Labour Scheme to the Clyde in 
1942: 
 
The trouble with the men is the direct result of Government schemes and 
inclusion of the men in either Scheme will not solve the problem. The 
[present] conditions on which these men are employed place a premium on 
industry and a tax on indolence. The Government schemes do the 
opposite.206 
 
Given the fact that he was prepared to commit those feelings to paper on file as a 
matter of record, it is hardly surprising that the workings of the London Scheme 
were less than harmonious. Senior officials in the PLA also had concerns about Mr 
Halliday’s capabilities, as shown in a letter from the Chief Accountant to his 
Chairman: 
 
Whatever success Halliday may have had as an Administrator of a going 
concern, he is out of his depth as an Organiser of a new undertaking.207 
 
In spite of this, Halliday had been given free rein in establishing the new systems, 
as shown in the evidence to the Inquiry from Mr J K Swire, representing the Port of 
London Joint Committee: 
 
in the earlier stages…Mr Halliday was then our Port Manager [and] …there 
is no doubt that at that time Mr Halliday was left pretty much to 
 
204  Ibid., page 7 paragraph 21 
205  A.E. Jeffery, The History of Scruttons: Shipbrokers and Shipowners 1802-1926: 
Stevedores, Master Porters and Cargo Superintendents 1890-1967 (London: privately 
published, 1971) p.63 
206  BK 32/14, Letter from M C Halliday dated 16 February 1942 to F G Thomas, Assistant General 
Manager of the NDLC 
207  BK 32/14 Letter from T Haworth to Sir Douglas Ritchie, 21 February 1942  
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himself….The Head Office had not got established; it was not built up; they 
were leaving it to the Port [i.e. the Port Manager] to get on with the job.208 
 
Presumably, then, Halliday would have been able to appoint men of his own 
sentiments as local managers, and with this, it is not surprising that there were 
tensions between the workforce and both the Port authorities and the employers. 
The Ammon Committee also commented:  
 
It is, however, our unanimous view that the experience of working the 
Scheme for the past three years in London shows that there is a need to 
review some of the disciplinary and other related arrangements so as to 
make for smoother and more efficient running.209 
 
Two final matters were considered by Ammon. Firstly, the existence of a theoretical 
system for disciplining employers, which had never been used. The Committee 
accepted that in considering a question of indiscipline in employment there might be 
circumstances where the employer was at fault and suggested that improvements to 
the Scheme might be needed for this. 210 Secondly, the Committee noted the 
difficulties faced by the representatives of the NASD who “appear to have no power 
of entering into binding arrangements and have to go back to seek authority from 
their Executive, with the result that all agreements reached are conditional only”.211  
 
The report was published on 26 April 1945, and seems to have attracted little 
publicity (perhaps overshadowed by the imminent end of the war in Europe), 
meriting only 390 words in The Times,212 with no apparent further correspondence 
or comment thereon (and with no mention in Hansard for either House of Parliament 
in April or May). While noting that the committee was “unanimously of the opinion 
that the strike was wholly unwarranted and all the more regrettable because of the 
established machinery which is fully capable of considering and dealing with any 
matter in dispute”, the article in The Times notes that “some of the disciplinary and 
other arrangements need review”.213 Unfortunately, little immediate action appears 
to have been taken on the Ammon recommendations: the MLNS file shows that 
 
208   BK2/1022, Evidence, day 2, p. 28  
209   Ammon Report, para. 24. 
210  Ibid., paragraphs 44 and 45 
211  Ibid., paragraph 52. This ’over-democratic’ point was a problem that would recur in labour 
disputes in later years. The TGWU was hierarchical with paid officials, who were able to commit the 
union to a course of action, while the NASD executive was more directly answerable to its wider 
membership, with Officers’ negotiating position subject to overrule by its members 
212 The Times 27 April 1945, p. 2 ‘London Dock Strike Unwarranted’ 
213  The Times, op.cit. 
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officials in the Ministry did indeed note the need for follow-up action on the 
recommendations on “disciplinary and other related arrangements and to establish 
satisfactory arrangements for entitling men to leave of absence subject to the labour 
requirements of the port and completion of a job involving heavy work and long 
hours”, but also shows that these matters were all remitted to a new  Standing Joint 
Committee set up by the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry,214 – 
and then (presumably) overtaken by the proposal for new legislation in 1946. 
 
As a coda to this chapter, there is one final area that needs to be explored, which is 
the influence of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), a consistently 
recurring theme in official thinking about the causes of labour disputes in the docks. 
The first indications of this are in paragraph 20 of the Ammon report (on Discipline), 
which reads: 
 
Over and above these considerations there is the influence of a small 
subversive political section, most of whose supporters are new to the 
industry, who have tried to spread trouble by exploiting the real or alleged 
grievances…215 
 
There is little evidence in the NA files of the “influence” noted in the paragraph, 
although one NA file contains a note of a flyer from the “Progressive Committee 
Surrey Docks Sector” giving “The Case for the Port Worker” and criticising the 
NDLC for maladministration  - “the facts are that since its inception the NDLC has 
been disciplining and suspending hundreds of port workers for the most trivial 
offences”.216  The existence of the Progressive Committee was also noted in the 
evidence to the Inquiry from Jack Donovan of the TGWU docks group: 
 
It is not an official committee. My experience, Sir, in each of the dock strikes 
in the country during the past two or three years is that the moment it starts 
there is an unofficial committee thrown up. There are two political Parties 
which are interfering in each one of these strikes, the Communist Party and 
the Independent Labour Party….in every case there has been an attempt to 
take charge of the dispute and take it out of the hands of the officials of the 
 
214  LAB 10/567 
215  Ammon Report page 6, paragraph 20,  
216  BK 1/239 Note dated 5 March 1945 
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Union [and] my experience is that a fair number of [the members of the 
committee] are very new people to the industry.217 
 
In reality the influence of the CPGB in this dispute might well be seen to have been 
overstated, and it would seem that the Party played little, if any, part in either 
fomenting or supporting the 1945 docks dispute. As Nina Fishman shows, there had 
long been divisions within the party on whether the emphasis should be placed on 
increasing the CPGB’s influence inside the trades union movement, or on fostering 
activism amongst the rank and file workers.218 Given that “by 1945 [Henry] Pollitt 
and [Johnny] Campbell had achieved their ambition to make the Communist Party 
an important force inside the official trade union movement” it would seem unlikely 
that there could have been any formal Party support for the unofficials in the 1945 
dispute, although that is not to say that there would have been no informal 
encouragement from Party members.219 But the Party (certainly in England) appears 
to have developed its most active and significant branches among the London 
busmen and the coal miners, and in the electrical and mechanical engineering 
industry.220 The CPGB was in any case almost certainly deeply penetrated by the 
British Security Services, as may be seen from Cabinet Papers of 1942 and 1943,221 
and the lack of any comment in Cabinet Papers around March and April 1945 
further suggests that the CPGB was not a significant player in the dispute.222 It is 
perhaps easier to see that the Party was used as a scapegoat for internal trade 
union tensions, apathy, or inefficiencies (as Goldstein suggests),223 or as being seen 
by senior trades unionists as a threat to the power of organised labour.224 
  
 
217  BK2/1022 Evidence 5th day, pp.47-48  
218  Nina Fishman The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 1933-1945 (Aldershot, 
Hants, Scolar Press, 1995), Chapter 4: In Pursuit of the Real United Front, pp. 66-82 
219  Although as Hunter ‘They Knew’ shows, the position was markedly different in 1948  
220  See, for example, John Mcllroy ‘Reds at Work: Communist Factory Organisation in the 
Cold War, 1947-56’ Labour History Review 65, 2, pp.181-201 
221  NA file CAB 66/23/48, Cabinet memorandum 24 April 1942 contains reports of a “secret” 
Communist party meeting, and CAB 66/35/9, Cabinet memorandum 13 March 1943 
provides a detailed briefing of CPGB meetings and correspondence between the Party 
and the Comintern. 
222  i.e. in NA file series CAB 65 Cabinet Minutes 1939-1945 
223 Joseph Goldstein. The Government of British Trade Unions (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1952) pp. 61-62 
224 See, for example, A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Volume 1 (London: 





This chapter has brought together data from several sources to provide an 
indication of the experiences of dockers and their communities, prior to and during 
the Second World War, that have been seen as influencing docker actions in 
industrial disputes. It is no more than a qualitative indication of the factors and their 
possible effects, so no direct relationship with the disputes is attributed, but the 
material suggests that fear and anger about deprivation may well have conditioned 
the reactions of dockers to the port authorities and the employers, and played a 
significant part in the unrest.  
 
From a study of two dockland boroughs, the legacy of the 1930s can be seen as 
underemployment, poverty, industrial pollution, and poor housing; compounded by 
deprivation and poor health. Llewellyn Smith’s (1930) suggestion of real 
improvements in disposable income for “male workers” such that they would be able 
to purchase nearly a third more of the “necessaries of life” than in 1886 seems not 
to hold up in terms of the limited ‘hard’ data available from that time, and it would 
appear that even if the pay rates that some workers enjoyed around 1930 were 
sustained into the latter part of the decade, under-employment would have severely 
depressed real earnings in the docks. The evidence from the Medical Officers of 
Health also serves to underline, in part, that the overcrowding and social deprivation 
in the docklands areas shown in the New Survey maps led to a greater incidence of 
disease. 
 
The advent of war in 1939 may be seen to have further compounded the suffering of 
the docklands, with the terrors of the Blitz exacerbated by inefficiencies and 
incompetence of some of the authorities. The data on the early months of the 
Blitz is poor, but we might postulate that at least 1,000 bombs fell on the two 
boroughs in September-November 1940. The later reports record the huge weights 
of bombs that fell in the latter part of the assault, and the bomb damage maps for 
Poplar show that damage was massive and widespread, which must also have 
been the case for the West Ham Wards near the docks with both areas suffering 
huge numbers of casualties. 
 
Dockers were also affected by the series of statutory regulations that brought relief 
from casual underemployment at the expense of stringent controls on the dockers’ 
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conditions of employment. The introduction of the London dock labour Scheme and 
attendance pay ensured that all dock workers finally received a guaranteed income 
but had to accept a requirement to transfer to other ports, with disciplinary 
procedures that were wide-ranging and stringent.  In and around this time the 
workers conscripted or recruited to the armed forces will have experienced very 
different lifestyles, while their families will generally have suffered financially.  
 
The dockers were not unique in their suffering, in how they were affected by 
industrial and armed forces conscription, or in their contribution to the War effort, but 
the seemingly advantageous new employment arrangements imposed by the 
Essential Work orders had inherent defects that surfaced in the ‘Control Point’ dock 
strike of March 1945. That dispute exemplifies how some important aspects of 
responsibility for industrial relations in the port of London had moved from the PLA 
to the London Dock Labour Board, with the Board’s actions seemingly reflecting 
pre-war attitudes and treatments of dockers (particularly in the obfuscation about 
absenteeism), and this dispute being a precursor of many of the strikes over the 
following fifteen years.  
 
In parentheses, it can be seen that the official (Ammon) report on the strike 
represented a real opportunity for the consideration of problems in the operation of 
the Dock Labour Scheme in London and for its revision and improvement. The 
report made a number of recommendations that, if implemented, would have led to 
such improvements. The obvious conclusion would be that any rational employer of 
dock labour would have recognised the need to tackle these problems, and defined 
some longer-term solutions, but the NDLC did not see itself as the “employer” in 
such terms. In consequence, as will be seen from the next chapters, those defects 
lay as an infection within the body of the Scheme and provided a ready source for 
industrial disputes for some years.  
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Chapter 3: THE DOCKS AND INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 1945-60 
 
 
The period between 1945 and 1960 saw high levels of industrial unrest in the 
London docks reflected in strikes following workplace disputes, political agitation, 
inter-union rivalries and internal union discord. These were matched by (often 
uncoordinated) actions and reactions by the National and London Dock Labour 
Boards (NDLB and LDLB), as pseudo-employers,1 the ‘operational employers’ both 
collectively2 and as the hundreds of individual companies,3 and the PLA. There 
were also interventions by the Government in the use of troops to work ships, or by 
the appointment of courts of inquiry, with efforts also being made to analyse and 
understand the causes of the unrest. In this chapter I consider the work environment 
of the dockers and the factors that influenced the industrial disputes, with a 
particular focus on the statute-based National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) of 
1947, and the trade union environment. The last of these is also important because 
although the docks were not formally a ‘closed shop’, in reality no-one could work in 
the London docks without being a member of a trade union. 
 
 
The Environment and Work of the Docker 
 
No single publication considers the docks environment and dock work in full detail 
from the first encounter with the ship to the final clearance. This section provides a 
short review to give some background to the work and working conditions (although 
further compromised in focusing only on the work of unloading ships: the loading 
operations would have a different set of dynamics). Ship arrivals in London would 
be known in advance: information on ship movements would be available from a 
number of sources – the offices of the shipping companies, the importers,4 and the local 
 
1  The NDLB, although the nominal employer of all dockers, did not control any dock 
operations, and paid only those dockers not actually in work (see the Report of a Committee 
to inquire into the Operation of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) scheme, 1947 
(Devlin Report 1956, Cmd 9813, London: HMSO, 1956), paras 49-60). Nor did it set terms 
and conditions of employment, including rates of pay, which were agreed by the National 
Joint Committee for the Port Transport Industry (NJCPTI) (ibid., para 7).  
2  Through organisations such as the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE)  
3   Devlin report 1956, para.6 puts the number at 440. A return in NA file BK 5/30 NDLB 
Welfare Committee Agenda and Papers 1950-1952, paper NDLB/F/487 dated 13 May 
1948 shows a total of 773 employers in the port, indicating that there was a substantial 
number of other employers of non-registered workers in London 
4  “Inside clerks” working in shipping offices would have received a copy of the ship’s 
manifest before its arrival and would liaise with the importers to ensure that barges or 
road transport were available to receive the off-loaded cargoes. See A E Smith London’s 
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press,5 and under the Scheme “top line” workers6 might well decide to forego one or 
more day’s attendance (stand-by) pay to await the arrival of a ship where they knew 
the work would be highly rewarded. Ships docking in London ranged in size from a 
few hundred tons to perhaps 20,000 tons, exemplified by two ships central to strikes 
considered in this chapter: the Theems (557 Gross Registered Tons (GRT)), at the 
centre of the ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike of 1948 and the Beaverbrae (8,000 GRT) around 
which developed the ‘Canadian Seamen’s’ strike of 1949. Alan Pearsall’s 
illustrations of ship plans give some idea of what the layout of those vessels might 
have been: the cargo hold of a typical small coaster might be a single large box, 
perhaps 3-4 metres high and up to 30 metres long: 
 
Figure 9: Typical Coaster 1900-307 
 
  
and at the upper end of the scale might include ships such as the Provence:  
  
 
Royal Docks in the 1950s: a Memory of the Docks at Work. (Amazon: Privately 
Published, 2008), p.152 
5   A weekly list of known arrivals in the London docks would be published in the Stratford 
Express. The edition of 11 August 1939 shows details of ship arrivals in London over the 
next seven days in terms of the vessels, port of departure, and the destination dock – 
e.g. “Baghdad (New York) Millwall” 
6   The status and privileges of such men is explained in detail in Liverpool University, The 
Dock Worker: an Analysis of Conditions of Employment and Industrial Relations in the Port 
of Manchester. (Liverpool: University Press,1956), p.59. 
7 Taken from Alan Pearsall, ‘The Development of the Ship’ in S.K. al Naib (ed.) Dockland: 
An Illustrated Historical Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East 
London Polytechnic, 1988), p.128 
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Figure 10: SS Provence, 15,889 GRT 
 
Source: Tyne Built Ships http://www.tynebuiltships.co.uk/P-
Ships/provence1951.html 
 
This ship, like the Beaverbrae, was able to carry both passengers and cargo, with 
six holds and substantial storage areas in the multiple “tween decks” spaces. In 
general, as Pearsall shows, ships of up to 6,000 tons could berth in any of the docks 
– although it would be rare for larger ships to berth in the smaller docks, and 
vessels above that size would generally berth in the Royal group of docks8 or 
Tilbury.9 The illustration below shows the way in which a typical tramp steamer from 
South and East Africa might have been loaded: the cargoes for other ports such as 
Antwerp might be off-loaded to be re-shipped in smaller vessels or to allow 
unloading of the London cargoes. 
Figure 11: Cargo plan of MV Molfetta.10  
 
Access to the cargoes would be through hatches, covered by either wooden forms 
and tarpaulins, or mechanically operated steel shutters. The docker A.E. Smith 
provides vivid examples of the various problems that might be encountered where 
“a tall restricted hatchway opened out to a wide cavernous hold,” or where the 
 
8    The Royal Victoria and Royal Albert Docks and the King George V dock. 
9    Pearsall, ‘The Development of the Ship’ op.cit., 
10   R. B. Oram, The Dockers’ Tragedy. (London: Hutchinson, 1970) pp 101-102 
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hatchway had to cut through passenger accommodation11 and Colin J. Davis picks 
up on the dangers of working in the open hold as cargoes were swayed up.12  
Oram’s representation shows the holds neatly packed, but cargoes would usually be 
wedged in and covered by “dunnage” - pieces of wood in various sizes. As the 
cargoes were unloaded, the dunnage would accumulate in the holds, producing (at 
the very least) trip hazards.  
 
Dock workers were paid either on a time rate, or ‘by the piece’ – so much for each 
ton, or parcel of goods handled. By far the majority of work in London was 
piecework, and each class of goods would have its own rate: Michael Mellish notes 
that there were more than 5,000 different rates negotiated by the Ocean 
Shipowners Group Joint Committee,13 while Stephen Hill, records that there were 
more than 1,000 standard PLA piecework rates.14  The PLA Archives also contain 
details of “Contingency Payments” or “Cons” representing additional payments for 
24 different categories for specialist workers such as “Barge gunwale hands” or 
operations such as “rebanding packaged timber”,15 with more than 500 other folders 
showing the negotiations about new or varied rates for problems with access or 
damaged cargoes.16 A file in the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at Warwick records 
150 different rates for handling timber and more than 250 rates for handling wool.17  
The condition of the cargoes on arrival would be dependent upon the strength and 
integrity of the hatch closures, the weather conditions of the voyage, and the quality 
of the loading (since a badly stowed cargo might easily come adrift during a sea 
passage). Problems might also arise from the nature of the cargo: Leggett cites 
“cotton seed cake…in which flies and insects had bred”, “formaldehyde in drums, 
some of which had leaked during voyage, filling the hatch with fumes”, and “250 
tons of spelter” [crudely cast zinc], stored under “100 tons of peanut butter” which 
had melted and run onto the spelter.18 Another docker, Henry Bradford describes 
 
11    Smith, Royal Docks, op.cit., p.34 
12    Colin J. Davis, Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers 1946-1961 
(Chicago: Illinois University Press, 2003) pp.46-7 
13   Michael Mellish, The Docks after Devlin (London: Heinemann,1972) p.18 
14   Stephen Hill, The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1979), 
p. 118 
15   PLA Archives Box 172 Piecework rates 1946-1969, unindexed folder “Contingency 
Payments”. 
16   PLA Archives  Folder Q2378, contains 100 cases of negotiations on “awkward cargoes”  
17   Modern Records Centre (MRC) file MSS.126/TG/RES/D/27/2 TGWU London Docks 
(1928-1969) 
18   Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks. Report of a Committee of Inquiry (Leggett 
Report, Cmd 8236, 1951) p.5, paragraph 17. 
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unloading whale meal19 and the embedded population of rats in the foetid cargo.20 
Some cargoes were notoriously problematical: the PLA archives in the Museum of 
London Docklands contain a photograph of a roadway at the North Quay of the 
West India dock known as ‘Blood Alley' – “the nickname given to the roadway 
between the transit sheds and sugar warehouses because handling the sacks of 
sticky West Indian sugar badly chafed and cracked the dockers’ skin”.21 Smith’s 
bêtes noires were carbon black and flour: both of which stuck to clothes and skin.  
For unloading, cargoes would normally be moved from the various parts of the hold 
and brought into the “square of the hatch”, to be hoisted up in nets or slings by 
either the ship’s gear or by quayside cranes. Smith describes the unloading of bags 
of sugar22 and in this and other areas great care would be needed to ensure that the 
loads (‘sets’) being lifted were secure and properly balanced for hoisting – no easy 
job where, for example, the cargo was frozen carcasses or iron girders – before 
being lifted and deposited either onto the quays or into barges. For much of the 
initial period after the war no overalls or protective clothing were supplied, as the 
picture below shows, dockers worked in their everyday clothes. 
 
Figure 12: My father James Edward Barram (aged 49) in 1957 handling flour. 
 
 
19   That is, whale meat from which the oil has been extracted 
20   Henry T Bradford. Tales of London Docklands (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007) 
21   PLA Archives Photograph 000002 “Blood Alley c.1930” 
22   Smith, Royal Docks, op.cit., pp.26-28 
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Figure 13: Death certificate of J.E. Barram showing that he died from a 




Dock work has traditionally been seen as unskilled – work that anyone could drift 
into, called out of a crowd of feral men, but in reality many jobs needed handling 
skills or a dexterity that often took months to acquire, and even at the most basic 
level no job was altogether simple. In his seminal work on the Port of London Sir 
Joseph Broodbank notes that “to wheel a truck along a smooth quay is the simplest 
form of work until it is tried, and the experimenter will learn that even this elementary 
operation is not as mechanical a one as are multitudes of operations in factories”.23 
Anyone visiting the Museum of London Docklands in the old West India Dock will 
see that the “smooth quay” is in fact flagstones or cobblestones, and may perhaps 
imagine how difficult such wheeling of an iron-tyred truck might be for a worker 
wearing hobnailed boots in wet weather or icy conditions. In addition to dexterity, 
dockers would also need to know how to manage their work patterns:  as Maier 
shows, proper timing of manual effort significantly affects the onset of fatigue and 
the amount of work that can be done in a period. 24 
 
There are few comprehensive accounts of dock work in twentieth century literature: 
Oram’s ten pages25 are very much an overview, and the classic study of dock work 
 
23   J.G. Broodbank, History of the Port of London Vol II. (London: Daniel O’Connor, 1921) 
p.425 
24   N R Maier Psychology in Industry (3rd Edn.) (London: Harrap, 1965) pp. 489-505 
25   Oram, Dockers’ Tragedy, op.cit., pp. 95-104 
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by Liverpool University in 1950-5126 is based mainly upon interviews rather than 
direct observation of the work. Hill’s substantive work on dock labour was based on 
studies undertaken between 1969 and 1971 in a period of transition after the initial 
decasualisation of dock work, the closure of most of the upper river docks and 
“nearly all the riverside wharves”.27  His studies were mainly focused on Tilbury and 
the West India/Millwall docks, where he “spent three months with twelve foremen, 
watching and recording what happened during the working day”, and  “interviewed 
139 men”.28  Much of his analysis of actual work was seemingly structured to enable 
him to relate his observations to Martin Meissner’s study of work processes (in spite 
of the fact that Meissner’s work is primarily focused on processes in factories, and 
that his review of dock work comprises four paragraphs based on “fragments of 
information” taken from the Liverpool University study).29  To facilitate that link, Hill 
conflates dissimilar sets of dock labour activities, ranging from “unmechanised 
work”, through operations with fork-lift trucks and palletized cargoes and then to the 
work in container berths.30 He groups all of these as “transfer operations” which, in 
Meissner’s terminology, are less skilled than, for example, conversion operations.31  
Nevertheless, Hill’s detailed description of the way in which dock workers actually 
handled cargoes in the hold is illuminating, although the “much wider hatches” that 
he noted in the more modern ships which “greatly simplified and expedited cargo-
handling” would have not have been common in the years immediately after the 
war.32  Hill supports Meissner’s view that dock work requires no differentiation of 
tasks (i.e. any worker can do any task), to have low attention requirements, and to 
require no cooperation or mutual influence.33 More recent publications about dock 
work cast doubt upon that analysis: certainly in the days before wholesale 
mechanisation the various tasks were indeed differentiated, required different skill 
sets, demanded close attention in the operations and significant problem-solving 
skills with close team-work, so could not be undertaken by an unskilled worker. 
George Adams provides examples of the technical challenges of operating the 
 
26   Liverpool University, The Dock Worker, op.cit. 
27   Hill, Dockers op.cit, p.2 
28   Ibid., p.38 and p.8 
29   Martin Meissner, Technology and the Worker, Technical Demands and Social Processes 
in Industry (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp.54-55. Note that Meissner’s work was 
criticised in a number of reviews, for example Marshall W Meyer ‘Review of Meissner’s 
Technology and the Worker’ Social Forces 50, 2 (1971) pp. 272-273, and Joseph W 
McGuire, ‘Review of Meissner’s Technology and the Worker’ Administrative Science 
Quarterly 15 2 (1970) pp.265-266 
30   Hill, Dockers, pp.44-52 
31   Meissner, Technology, op.cit., pp. 16-18 
32   Hill, Dockers, op.cit., pp. 45-47 
33   Meissner, pp. 59-60 and pp. 204-206 
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complex systems for lifting and transporting cargoes,34 and an illustration of the 
work of the “deal porters” in handling softwood prior to the introduction of pallets.35 
Smith’s very personal accounts take us very much into the work, the environment, 
and the challenges of handling different cargoes,36 and of the problems of working 
in unlit holds strewn with dunnage.37   
 
Oram, writing in the late 1960s, shows the progress of mechanisation after the war, 
both in terms of the heuristic ways in which improvements were developed, the 
fortuitous availability of discarded machinery from the American forces, and the 
equally unstructured way in which the changes were implemented – often without 
any consultation with the workforce.38 And while the Working Party on Turn-round of 
Shipping in the UK (WPTRS) could see “many examples of successful 
mechanisation”, port authorities and other employers were reluctant “to invest 
capital in plant, on which they believe for various reasons they will not obtain a 
reasonable return”.39 A team from the Working Party examined the particular 
aspects of London and noted in relation to mechanisation that: 
 
The provision of…..mechanical aids such as mobile cranes, electric trucks, and 
tractors is at present regarded as the responsibility of individual employers who 
undertake the actual operations and there are wide differences in the practice 
of firms in this respect. Some have mechanised their operations to a large 
extent while others provide only hand trucks.40 
 
Health and Safety 
 
With or without mechanical aids, the work was hazardous, and Colin J. Davis 
describes the risks to workers through accidents or from handling hazardous 
cargoes.41 The NDLB annual reports show that in the 14 years between 1948 and 
1960 the NDLB’s medical centres provided 1,811,420 “treatments” for Registered 
 
34   See http://generalcargoship.com/cargo-handling-gears.html for translation of the 
technical terms 
35   George Adams ‘Cargo Handling’ in al Naib, S K. (ed.), Dockland: An Illustrated Historical 
Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 1988) 
pp.97-110 
36   Smith, Royal Docks, pp. 95-146 
37   Ibid., p.36 
38   Oram, Docker’s Tragedy, op.cit., pp 157-172 
39   NA file AN 13/1976 Working Party on Turn-round of Shipping: Port of London, 
paragraphs 43-46.  
40   Ibid., Interim report by the visiting team, para 20 
41   Davis, Waterfront, op.cit., pp. 44-50 
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Dock Workers (RDWs), an average of 129,387 per year, for an average workforce 
of 74,686 – nearly two incidents per RDW in each year.42  
 
Figure 14: Number of treatments in NDLB medical centres 1947-60 
 
Source: NA file BK 3/43 NDLB Annual Report for 1960  
 
More information is available in the NDLB Welfare Committee papers where the 
return for 1951 shows that London had 3,259 “accidents”, and thus 10.2% of its total 
workforce of 30,419 injured, so that, on average, about one in every ten dockers 
sustained an injury at work in London in that year.43 I could find no definition of what 
constituted an “accident” in the Committee papers: the preceding file44 shows that 
the returns were developed over a period of time after the Committee was 
established in 1947. A later survey of accidents to PLA workers in London in 1956 
by Dr W J Shaw 45 gives more data on that limited area. He shows that for around 
4,000 PLA workers, there were 1,909 accidents severe enough to be recorded on 
the Authority’s accident report form, 466 of which led to absences of more than 
three days.46  The NA file47 shows that the paper was seen by the NDLB officials but 
 
42   NA files BK 3/42 and BK3/43, NDLB Annual Reports 1947 to 1960 
43    NA File BK 5/31 NDLB Welfare Committee: Agenda and Papers. Paper NDLB/F/2464 
considered by the Committee on 29 January 1952.  Workforce numbers from NA File BK 
3/42 NDLB Annual Report 1951 
44  NA File BK 5/30 NDLB Welfare Committee: Agenda and Papers, 1947-1950 
45   W J Shaw ‘A survey of Dock Labour Accidents in the Port of London’ International Cargo 
Handling Coordination Association Symposium on Accident Incidence and Multiplicity of 
Markings, 28 October 1958. Based on ‘A survey of Dock Labour Accidents in the Port of 
London’ British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 13,1 (1956) pp. 59-69   
46   Ibid., p.60 tables 1 and 2. 
47   NA File BK2/119 Port Medical Services, Industrial Accidents, London. 
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given limited circulation because of a lack of copies. It seems not to have been 
circulated to the PLA or NDLB Boards, and there is no indication of any follow-up 
action on the file, although Shaw picks up on areas such as the large number of 
accidents through the use of the docker’s hook, the problems of fatigue, and the low 
number of accidents in mechanised operations. He cites other sources, including 
studies by Vernon48 that provide useful material for any consideration of managing 
manual work, but no action or follow-up is shown on any of those aspects.  
 
Under pressure from the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) the NDLB 
commissioned a survey of dock amenities in 1949 where, while many lavatories 
were found to be satisfactory, with seats and some degree of privacy, “the majority 
are historic. The ‘trough’ type is common… [and] may almost be regarded as the 
norm in some ports - it is modern compared to some other lavatories described in 
the Report”. Unsurprisingly, “some members of the survey committee…. were 
amazed and nauseated by what they saw and smelt on their own docks. It is not 
surprising that the men avoid the lavatories whenever possible and have a real fear 
of infection”.49 The maintenance and cleaning of lavatories was seen to be the most 
immediate problem: where the port authority provided the facilities, the 
arrangements for maintenance and cleaning were satisfactory, but “there are many 
other interests on the Estates which make little, if any, such arrangements”.  The 
facilities were often badly lit, and “artificial light is seldom provided”, and there were 
frequent references to “repairs that were urgently required such as broken pans, 
water pipes, windows, etc.”.50 As the Leggett report noted for London: “we could not 
find evidence of any provision of washing facilities for men working on dirty cargoes 
beyond the crude provision of buckets for which hot water can be obtained only 
from the ship”.51 The NDLB survey report also notes the comment from an officer of 
the Port of London Health Authority that “in his opinion 90% of the existing 
conveniences were obsolete and the general condition of the lavatories and urinals 
 
48   H.M. Vernon Accidents and Their Prevention, (Cambridge: University Press, 1936). p.91. 
If this is linked to Trist and Bamforth’s studies of work in coal mines:  (E. L. Trist and K. W. 
Bamforth ‘Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-
Getting’ Human Relations  4, 3 (1951), pp. 3-38) and contrasted with the lack of similar 
studies in the docks and of any follow-up on Shaw, the lack of engagement by the NDLB in 
the docks industry criticised in the Devlin Report of 1956, (paras 59-60) is emphasised.  
49   NA File BK 16/1 NDLB Surveys and Reports of Dock Amenities 1948-49 Tyne to the 
Medway Report, paras 16-18 
50   Ibid., paras 20-22 
51   Leggett Report, para. 88 
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was very unsatisfactory [and] there is approximately one cubicle for [every] 400 
men.”52  
 
Figure 15: Extract from a Return Showing Toilet Facilities in the Royal Victoria 
Dock 1949  
 
 
 Source:  BK 16/1, London Dock Amenities Schedule 1 Lavatory Amenities, p.3 
 
Note that “East of Bulk Grain Office” the lavatory provision was for an “8 seat trough 
lavatory partitioned – no doors – automatic flushing” but as the report notes: 
 
The condition of the troughs in most of the W.C.’s is bad. They are old and 
automatic flushing is not strong enough to clear the contents. The seats are 
fixed hardwood pads and many of the pads are missing.53  
 
From the returns on the file, out of a total of 94 sites in the London docks, 25 
contained trough-type lavatories,54  and throughout the London docks there were 
only 37 cold water wash basins and one drinking fountain.55 There are similar 
comments in the Report for the wharves where, again, examples of good and bad 
conditions are given, although for one area “most of these conveniences were in a 
poor condition, many were of an obsolete type with poor natural lighting. In one 
 
52   BK16/1 London Docks Report and Observations, p.2  
53   BK16/1, London Docks Report and Observations, p.3 
54   Ibid., London Docks Lavatory Amenities, Schedule 1 pp. 1-13.  
55   Ibid., London Docks Washing facilities Schedule 1 pp. 15-16. Of the 37 wash basins, 18 
were restricted to users of certain specified sheds in the Victoria dock.  
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case there were three latrines in a condemned building which was badly lighted”.56 
In considering the provision of canteens, the file shows that the canteens provided 
by the PLA catered for a total of 1,500 users for meals, with mobile facilities catering 
for another 500 for meals and provision for tea and sandwiches for 6,000 with other 
contractors providing for 1,650 meals (for a work force of more than 20,000), 57  
The former servicemen returning to work in the docks, and using those facilities 
would have been mainly ex-soldiers, (the Army being by far the largest of the Armed 
Forces) and, as Oram shows, some had been in the Docks Groups of the Royal 
Engineers.58 In writing about the challenges that the British Army faced in expanding 
from its pre-war “colonial policing” role to a force 3.8 million strong, Geoffrey Field 
notes the army’s adaptation to an enhanced political awareness and the 
development of a wider consciousness of the need for change.59 Such a 
development might well have been experienced by those returning soldiers,60 but 
there is little general literature about demobilisation, and almost nothing about the 
docks: as Alan Allport notes, “the demobilisation experience…has curiously 
vanished from our collective memory”.61 After their return, the ex-soldiers will have 
encountered food rationing, having perhaps “experienced a much better diet in the 
Forces than they had ever enjoyed in pre-war civilian days”,62 and may have 
struggled to re-integrate with families they had not seen for years.63 And while 
legislation specifically protected the rights of ex-servicemen to return to their former 
work,64 this was not always straightforward – Field cites the case of the man “who 
had left as a junior of eighteen and now returns as a man of twenty-two”65 – and it is 




56   Ibid., Report and Observations, p.10 
57   Ibid., London Docks Canteen facilities Schedule 1, pp.12-14. In addition, canteen 
facilities were provided by three large stevedoring companies for 1,500 men and by 
private contractors for 150.  
58   Oram, Docker’s Tragedy, op.cit., pp. 147-151 
59   Geoffrey Field, ‘“Civilians in Uniform": Class and Politics in the British Armed Forces, 
1939-1945’ International Labor and Working-Class History, 80 (2011), pp. 121-147 
60   Oram, Docker’s Tragedy, p.135, gives just one example of “a Company Serjeant-Major, 
an expert stevedore from a London wharf” and his forebodings about the conditions he 
would meet upon his return.  
61   Alan Allport, Demobbed: Coming Home after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009) 
62   Field, ‘Civilians’, op.cit., p.129 
63   Allport, Demobbed op.cit., p.65 
64   7 and 8 Geo VI c.15. The Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act of 1944  
65   Field, ‘Civilians’, p.137 
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Some other problems for the returning dockers are demonstrated by the report of an 
Inquiry chaired by Sir Charles Doughty in June 1946.66 At the end of the war there 
were three categories of men with a right to work in the London docks: those on the 
Main register who had worked in the docks before the commencement of hostilities, 
and were in current employment, those on the Dormant register who had been 
employed prior to September 1939, but had joined the Armed Forces, or had been 
posted to other ports, and retained the right to return to London, and those who had 
started work after September 1939, and been placed on a Supplementary register. 
In order to protect the rights of men on the Dormant register to return, it had been 
agreed that no man employed before 1939 could be considered for dismissal until 
all those on the Supplementary register had left.67  Coincident with this, following the 
inception of the Essential Works (Dock Labour) Order (EW (DL) O) in 1942,68 and 
the consequent introduction of the various dock labour Schemes, the previous 
system of voluntary registration had become formalised, so that (for example) the 
arrangements in London whereby registration books for Stevedores were handed 
on from a (deceased or retired) father to a son no longer applied. These 
developments led to a dispute in London between the TGWU and the NASD, with 
the latter arguing that a set number of places should be allocated to its members as 
the Register was re-built after the war.69 At that time the total number of places on 
the permanent Register was to be limited to 24,000 – covering both stevedores and 
dockers - but within this space had to be made for (Dormant register) workers 
returning to London. It was eventually agreed that 150 places would be allocated to 
stevedores and 450 to dockers. 70 
 
The post-war Management and Repair of the Port of London 
 
In January 1946 Sir John Anderson (later Viscount Waverley)71 was appointed 
Chairman of the PLA,72 and for the first time the PLA had a Chairman with no direct 
experience of commerce or the ports, (although Anderson was to be supported by a 
 
66   NA File BK 29/11 Inquiry into a claim by the National Amalgamated Stevedores and 
Dockers: recruitment (Doughty Inquiry) 
67   NA File BK 29/8, Report of a Fact-Finding Committee on the Dock Labour Force, 1946. 
Confirmed in a decision of the NDLC National Board recorded in Circular 1/126 
68   SR&O 1941/1440: The Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order 1941  
69   Although most stevedores were in the NASD, and most dockers in the TGWU, this was 
not an inviolable rule.  
70   BK29/11 
71   ODNB: John Anderson, Viscount Waverley (1882-1958) by G C Peden 
72   See, for example, The Times 4 January 1946 p.6 ‘PLA Appointments: Sir John Anderson 
as Chairman’ 
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Deputy Chairman who had been the Authority’s General Manager). However, the 
new Chairman was an eminently powerful politician: still a Member of Parliament, 
he had been Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer in the wartime 
Coalition and Interim Governments until June 1945. Characterised as “the greatest 
administrator of his age”,73 Anderson’s appointment might perhaps have been in 
recognition of the need for his organisational skills to get the port working again, but 
his earlier achievements were not in that arena. He had shown both courage and 
resolution in troubled times as a senior Civil Servant in Ireland prior to the creation 
of the Irish Free State in 1921 and as Governor of Bengal (1932-37), but there is 
little evidence of empathy with the populations of those areas or sympathy to or 
understanding of the working classes. In February 1946 he led for the 
(Conservative) Opposition on the second day of the debate in the House of 
Commons on the repeal of the 1927 Trades Dispute and Trades Unions Act, to 
which Ernest Bevin74 retorted: 
 
I can understand the depth of feeling and regret which the parent of the child 
experiences when he sees his child dying. I think that the right hon. 
Gentleman who has just spoken is the father of this [i.e. the 1927] Act. He 
designed it after the general strike of 1926 with the help of other 
Departments. I imagine how regretful he feels, at this late stage of his life 
and mine, that we are now to proceed to the funeral of what he thought 
might prove a healthy child.75 
 
 
John Wheeler Bennet’s76 description of Anderson as the PLA Chairman highlights 
his work in publicising the Authority, although his requirements for a salary of 
£7,500 and a chauffeur driven car, “a cuisine acknowledged to be one of the best in 
the City” and his extensive use of the PLA yacht for entertainment might well have 
been seen less favourably by the workforce.77 Irrespective of what the workforce’s 
feelings might have been, work on rebuilding the port continued: writing in 1959, 
Leslie Ford the PLA’s General Manager noted that: 
 
 
73   Peden, Anderson, ONDB,  
74  ODNB: Ernest Bevin, (1881-1951) by Chris Wrigley.  
75   House of Commons Hansard, 13 February 1946, col 399 
76  John Wheeler Bennet, John Anderson, Viscount Waverley, (London: Macmillan, 1962), 
pp. 354-361. 
77 In contrast, a table in the NDLC statement to the Ammon committee in NA file BK2/1022 
National Dock Labour Board: Head Office. Report of Inquiry into London Docks Dispute 
1945 (Ammon Report) shows the “Average weekly earnings of all men on the pay roll” in 
London for the three months ended 27 January 1945 to have been £7 13s 0d, i.e. just 
under £400 p.a.  
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The damage sustained from aerial attack, mines, flying bombs and rockets was 
heavy….the port was left with the task of replacing war damage assessed on a 
pre-war basis at £13,500,000, making good the lack of maintenance during the 
war, and then [having] to provide the facilities demanded by the new age that 
comes at the end of every successive war.78 
 
According to Douglas Brown, it took “five years after the end of the war” to clear “the 
wrecks and other obstacles …accumulated in or near the channels used by 
shipping”,79 and a Cabinet report shows that London had lost 3.75 million square 
feet of port warehousing (out of a total of 11 million) during the Blitz. But by 
September 1948 only some 666,650 square feet had been reinstated, with a further 
285,700 under construction, while projects totalling 801,469 square feet were being 
deferred for lack of steel.80  The WPTRS, while rehearsing the impact of the bomb 
damage and the steel shortages, also noted that: 
 
to this damage must also be added the accumulative arrears of maintenance. 
Where transit sheds are inadequate, deep-water berths insufficient, quay 
surfaces bad and equipment old or obsolescent, the working of ships is 




the port authorities are hampered in their efforts to overcome these defects and 
in new development work by the shortages of labour and materials which retard 
much of our post-war reconstruction…81,  
 
The needs of the port need to be seen in the context of the financial and economic 
difficulties facing Britain immediately after the War, and the IPC papers give a 
comprehensive picture of the difficulties of prioritising and allocating funds and materials to 
rebuild the manufacturing capacity and infrastructure of the UK, as well as meeting the need 
for construction and repair of public facilities and buildings. In addition, the new Labour 
Government’s massive programme of nationalisation, together with the costs of 
implementing the social reforms of healthcare, pensions, and education82 placed huge 
demands on the public finances.  In any event, even though the progress of reconstruction 
 
78   Leslie Ford ‘The Development of the Port of London’ Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 
107, 5040 (1959), pp. 821-835 
79   R. Douglas Brown. The Port of London. (Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton, 1978) 
p.118 
80  NA File CAB 134/448 Investment Programmes Committee Working Party, paper IPC 
(WP) (48) 198, dated 30 October 1948 
81  Report of the Working Party on Turn-Round of Shipping in UK ports. (London: HMSO, 
1948), paras 11-12 
82  Implemented through the National Insurance Act 1946 (9 & 10 Geo VI c.67), the National 
Health Service Act 1946 (9 and 10 Geo VI c.81), and the 1944 Education Act (7 & 8 Geo 
VI c. 31).  
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was slow, trade still grew: the WPTRS’s successor, the Ports Efficiency Committee recorded 
as late as 1952 that: 
 
…nearly seven years after the end of the war damage done to berths and to 
sheds has still not been repaired….the consequence is that where most 
damage has been done to the ports, and in particular London and Liverpool, 
those responsible for the administration of the ports have been faced with 
the problem of handling a greatly increased trade with insufficient berthage 
accommodation and decreased port facilities.83  
 
But with this there are few acknowledgements of the efforts of the workforce to 
handle that “greatly increased trade” with worn out equipment in damaged facilities.  
 
The National Dock Labour Scheme of 1947 
 
 
As the port owner, the PLA had for many years been a major player in relation to 
industrial relations in the London docks , but with the introduction of the wartime 
London Dock Labour Scheme, and its replacement by a national Scheme in 1947 
the PLA’s role was much diminished.84 The new Scheme was a requirement of the 
Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946,85 but the transition was not 
straightforward, and required a number of official inquiries before a compromise 
system was devised and accepted by both employers and workers. The first inquiry 
was undertaken by Sir John Forster, but his conclusions and recommendations86 
resulted in a draft Scheme that fully satisfied neither side: the first recommendation, 
the principle of joint control of the Scheme by both employers and workers, was a 
continuing source of irritation to the employers, and was to lead to yet another 
inquiry a decade later.87 After objections to Forster’s draft by both the employers 
and trade unions, another inquiry was held by Sir John Cameron.88 Following his 
report a revised draft Scheme was published on 31 May 1947, followed by yet 
another inquiry, into the calculation of the guaranteed wage (i.e. the attendance 
 
83  First and Second reports of the Ports Efficiency Committee (London: HMSO, 1952), 
paragraphs 1 and 2. But there is no indication of whether the handling of those higher 
volumes of traffic reflected increased productivity.   
84  Except that as an MP, Sir John Anderson, the PLA chairman, could contribute powerfully 
to any consideration of London docks or NDLB matters in the House of Commons. 
85  The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c.22 
86   Report of Inquiry held under Paragraph 1(4) of the Schedule to the Dock Workers 
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946 (Forster Report) (London: HMSO, 1946)  
87   Devlin Report 1956, op.cit   
88   Report of Inquiry held under paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the Dock Workers 
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946 (Cameron Report 1947) (London: HMSO, 1947) 
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payments under the Scheme when men had no work), by Sir Hector Hetherington,89 
but in any event, under the timetable in the 1946 Act, a substantive Scheme was 
promulgated in June 1947.90 Even then, the story was not complete: yet another 
inquiry was held under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Doughty on seven other 
areas of contention, starting in March 1946 but not finishing until June 1948.91  
It is not possible to make a direct comparison between the 1947 Scheme as finally 
defined in SR&O 1947/1189 and the earlier Schemes, because while the 1947 
Scheme applied across the whole of the UK, the Schemes implemented under the 
EW (DL) O in 1942 had local differences. But it is important to identify those aspects 
that led to tensions in the operation of the new Scheme.92 The first of these was the 
requirement in both Schemes to maintain the dock registers, but where the earlier 
Schemes allowed for removal from the register on the grounds of redundancy,93 the 
1947 Scheme allowed for a worker to be removed “in accordance with the 
provisions of the Scheme”94 – superficially a much wider facility, but in fact the 
wording was so imprecise that termination of employment was extremely difficult 
except in conjunction with the disciplinary procedures. In addition, the financing 
arrangements under the new scheme meant that the NDLB was under continual 
pressure from the employers’ representatives to reduce the size of the Registers.  
Important, also, was the failure to agree on a clear definition of “reasonable 
overtime”, so that while the earlier Schemes contained a provision for requiring 
workers “to work as and when required including overtime periods,”95 the 1947 
Scheme (as recommended by Cameron) contained a requirement for a man to 
“work for such periods as are reasonable in his particular case”.96 What is 
‘reasonable’ is, of course, a subjective consideration: Victor Allen outlines the 




89   Report of Committee of Inquiry into the amount and basis of calculation of the 
guaranteed wage to be made to Dock Workers under the Dock Workers (Regulation of 
Employment) Scheme 1947 (Hetherington Report, London: HMSO, 1947)  
90   SR&O 1947/1189, The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order 1947. 
91   Report of the Committee for the Review of Industrial Arrangements under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Charles Doughty KC (Doughty Report 1948) (NJCPTI: London, 
1948) The seven areas were: Mobility of Labour, Shift working, Port differentials, 
Commodity differentials, Overtime and Fresh Starts, Manning, and Piece working. 
92   The schemes are those as set out in Appendix B to the MLNS Explanatory Memorandum 
on Dock Labour Schemes (London: HMSO, 1941) – the “1941 Scheme”; and in SR&O 
1947/1189 – the “1947 Scheme”  
93   SR&O 1941/1440, op.cit., Appendix B, Clause 2 (e) 
94   SR&O 1947/1189, op.cit., Clause 1(e)  
95   SR&O 1941/1440, Appendix B, Clause 6 (5) (ii) 
96   SR&O 1947/1189, Clause 8 (5) (b)  
 108 
For the unions it was preferable to specifically mentioned compulsory 
overtime and for the employers an implicit mention of overtime was 
preferable to complete omission.97  
 
 
Doughty was unable to resolve this dichotomy, and so decided to refer the matter to 
the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry (NJCPTI) who decided that 
it should be left to “each port to determine what hours of work it requires”, and 
“should outline what constitutes reasonable overtime”.98 For London, given the 
position of the PLA, the fragmented nature of the various employers’ groups and the 
lack of unity amongst the trade unions, this could only have been a most ambitious 
aspiration, and so the seeds of later disputes were sown.99  
 
While the problems of the register and overtime were contributing factors in later 
disputes, a more contentious area in the early years of the Scheme was the 
question of discipline: fundamentally, the Scheme required workers to observe the 
“obligations of the Scheme”100 subject to the disciplinary sanctions. There were two 
main sets of circumstances in which the disciplinary code applied:  
 
(a) At the call-on where, if a worker failed to comply with the requirement to 
work by turning down a job offered or by absenting himself from the call-
on, he would forfeit any attendance payments for that pay week.101  
 
(b) Where a dock worker was working for an employer.  Under the 1941 
Scheme, a worker who failed either to “carry out his duties in accordance 
with the rules of the port or place” or “work as and when required 
including overtime periods” would face sanctions.102 But the 1947 
Scheme extended the catchment area to include a requirement to 
comply with “any lawful orders given to him by his employer”.103  
 
It will be appreciated that the “lawful orders” might be to instruct a striking worker to 
continue working, and so render him liable to a disciplinary penalty. 
 
There was an escalating scale of penalties for both areas (although the triggers for 
these were not specified) where the worker could be suspended without attendance 
 
97    V L Allen Trade Unions and the Government. (London: Longmans, 1960) p.194 
98    Doughty report 1948, paragraph 28 (iii) 
99    See below, the ‘Overtime’ strike in 1954 
100    SR&O 1947/1189, Clauses 8 and 9 
101   SR&O 1941/1440, Appendix B, Clause 9(1) and SR&O 1947/1189 Clause 15(1) 
102   SR&O 1941/1440, Appendix B, Clause 6 (5) (i) and (ii) 
103   SR&O 1947/1189 Clause 15 (2). In theory the last sentence meant that an employer 
could discipline a worker for withdrawing his labour – i.e. going on strike 
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pay for seven days, or dismissed summarily, or at seven days’ notice. In addition, 
dismissal from employment would be effective across the whole of the industry.  
 
The 1947 Scheme thus had weaknesses in three areas – discipline, overtime, and 
the register - and each led to major disputes in the first years of its operation.  Apart 
from those problems, the structure of management of the Scheme was extremely 
complex, as I have already shown in relation to the London docks, where the main 
players were the NDLB/LDLB as the holding employer and controller of the register 
of dock workers,104 the PLA (as the Port Authority, and the owner of the docks 
estate and some wharves and warehouses), and the shipowners, other wharfingers, 
stevedoring and lighterage companies (with the PLA) as the ‘operational 
employers’.  The membership of the NDLB comprised “an independent chairman 
and vice chairman appointed by the MLNS,105 and eight other members appointed 
on the nomination of the NJCPTI, four from each side of the industry”.106 When the 
Board was first established, two of the workpeople’s side places were allocated to 
the TGWU, one to the NASD, and one to the National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers, but following the ‘Ineffectives’ dispute of April 1949 (see below), 
where the NASD representative led the strike while still a member of the Board, the 
NASD representative was replaced on the NDLB by a representative from the 
Scottish TGWU. In overall terms of union representation for the docks this would not 
seem to be hugely significant, but the NASD was a key union in London, and in 
certain of the docks represented the majority of the RDWs so (as events showed) 
this lacuna was always likely to be a source of problems. The London Board 
comprised ten members nominated by the Port Labour Executive Committee 
(PLEC), with the union side comprising three representatives from the TGWU, one 
from the NASD, and one from the Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and Bargemen's 
Union (WLTBU). The Board elected its own chairman (usually a member of the 
employers’ side).  
 
The new Scheme affected all employers of registered dock workers (RDWs), and 
Devlin records that in 1956 there were 440 separate employers of dock labour in 
London, ranging from the PLA “which, with an average figure of over 6,000 is the 
 
104   Although the general wage rates for daily workers and for attendance pay were 
determined by the NJCPTI, and not the NDLB 
105  In practice, as the Devlin Report 1956, para 50, shows, these would normally be men of 
experience from the trade union and employers’ sides.  
106  Devlin Report 1956, para 15. The employers consistently opposed the principle of dual 
control - see also Forster Report 1946, op. cit., and Devlin Report 1956 paras 72-76  
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largest employer in the country” through a variety of dock-based companies 
including shipowners, stevedores and porters, the wharfingers handling a variety of 
goods and produce, or using a wharf as part of their main business such as timber 
importing, and then the lighter and barge operators. The smallest master stevedores 
might not be in continuous work and “active only when the ship for which they are 
employed comes in”.107 The Scheme laid down no formal requirements for the 
registration of employers, only that the Board should maintain a register “entering or 
re-entering therein the name of any person by whom dock workers are to be 
employed”.108 The duties of an employer are described in Clause 9109and the 
circumstances under which they might be removed from the register are set out in 
Clause 16(1). In 1945 Ammon recorded that no action had ever been taken against 
employers under the disciplinary arrangements in the earlier Scheme110 and, 
similarly, neither Leggett nor Devlin could see any evidence of penalties being 
imposed for infringements by employers under the Scheme.111  
 
Under the Scheme the Board was charged with “facilitating the rapid and economic 
turn-round of vessels and the speedy transit of goods through the port”.112 Arguably, this 
might have suggested greater mechanisation, but the attitudes of the employers to 
this are provided in the report of the Executive Committee of the NAPE for 1950 in 
the NA files:113  
 
considerable progress has been made in some ports, with reasonable 
cooperation from the workpeople, and in other cases the NJC [PTI] has been 
able to effect settlements satisfactory to the employers concerned. At the 
same time, it has become increasingly evident that opposition to 
mechanisation, insofar as it entailed any displacement of men, was 
hardening in certain labour quarters.114 
 
The NAPE’s proposal that the “displacement” resulting from mechanisation “should 
be taken care of by natural wastage allied by regulation of recruitment” was 
opposed by the trade unions at the NJCPTI, but the unions’ suggestion that a 
 
107   Devlin Report 1956, para 6 
108   SRO 1947/1189 Clause 3(1)(d)  
109   Essentially, the need to meet administrative requirements on matters such as record 
keeping and payments to the Board. 
110   London Docks Dispute 1945. Report of Committee of Inquiry (Ammon Report) (London: 
HMSO, 1945), paras. 44 and 45.  
111  Leggett Report, para. 58, and Devlin Report 1956, para. 113 
112 SRO 1947/1189 Clause 3 (1) (a) 
113  NA File LAB 101/73, National Association of Port Employers. Report of the Executive 
Committee for the year ended 31 December 1950. 
114 Ibid., para. 9 
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“solution to the problem might be found in the institution by the industry of a pension 
scheme” was “particularly deplored” by the NAPE.115 In spite of the Association’s 
apparent wishes for further mechanisation, the report of a joint visit to the USA 
sponsored by the MLNS to study the mechanisation of freight handling indicates a 
strong element of ambiguity. The (sole) NAPE representative had been unable to 
join the team until half way through the visit, and the report demonstrates a 
generally negative view of such studies where “incidentally it is likely that no further 
visits of this sort will be made after 1951”.116 
 
The Industry’s record on training may be similarly criticised: the number of injuries in 
1951 in London noted above must surely have indicated the need for better training 
of the workforce and indeed SR&O 1947/1189 required the NDLB to make 
“satisfactory provision for the training and welfare of dock workers, including port 
medical services…in so far as such provision does not exist apart from the 
scheme”.117  But the final words would have allowed the employers’ side to argue 
against the Board providing any training on its own account as long as there was 
even the most minimal of formal training by an employer, and the balance of 
representation on the Board meant that the employers could oppose any extension 
of its functions.  In addition, as Devlin showed in 1956, the NDLB (not deeming itself 
to have an active role in the management of the workforce)118 could easily argue 
that safety and training was a matter for the port authority (as owning the facilities) 
or the operational employers. So the NDLB annual accounts show only “payments 
during approved training courses” averaging £3,566 p.a. for the twelve years from 
1948 to 1960 (i.e. around 5 pence per year for each RDW in the UK).119 And it was 
not until 1961 that the PLA began “a pilot scheme to train new entrants to the 
industry”, and only in 1963 that it ran its first “Accident Prevention Course” 120 
 
The Dock Unions and their Relationship with Labour Government 1945-
50 
 
The unions faced a number of challenges under the new Scheme, including their 
relationships with the Government, their role on the NJCPTI and National and Local 
 
115 Ibid., para. 11 
116 Ibid., para. 15 
117  Ibid., Clause 3 (i) (g).  
118  Devlin Report 1956, paras 59-60 
119  NA files BK 3/42, 3/43 and 3/44, NDLB Annual Reports 1947 to 1966. It was not until 
after the Devlin report of 1965 that the figure rose to more than £100,000 a year. 
120   PLA Monthly, 38, (1963), pp 167-170), and 40, (1965) pp 288-290).  
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Boards, and the rise of the unofficial movements within the workforce.  In addition, 
although the nationalisation of the docks was included in Herbert Morrison’s121 
speech in the House of Commons in November 1945 outlining the Government’s 
legislative plans, it was not actually proceeded with.122 Taylor also emphasises the 
key role played in industrial relations behind the scenes by Bevin who had been 
appointed Foreign Secretary,123 with George Isaacs124 (as the Minister of Labour 
and National Service) and Arthur Deakin125 (as the Acting General Secretary of the 
TGWU) as his surrogates126 although the former “had neither the intellectual 
capacity nor the force of character to lead an important ministry”127 and the latter, 
while a hugely competent and forceful leader, initially lacked Bevin’s power to 
dominate and control the constituent factions of the TGWU – in particular the 
dockers -  as the events of the ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike, below, demonstrated.  The TUC 
had long campaigned for the repeal of the 1927 Trade Disputes Act,128 and this was 
achieved when the new Labour Government passed the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act in May 1946.129 However, a number of pieces of war-time legislation 
were to remain in effect including, in particular, ‘Order 1305’,130 which prohibited 
official strikes. As with much wartime legislation, this should have been repealed at 
the end of hostilities, but the power of prosecution of strikers was more honoured in 
the breach,131 and Allen asserts that one of the reasons that its continuation was not 
opposed was that some union leaders wanted to retain the provision for reference to 
arbitration, and that Deakin was a “most ardent supporter” of the Order.132 In more 
practical terms, while the new Government’s social legislative programme was 
welcomed by the TUC, it would present a series of challenges as to how best to 
 
121  ONDB: Herbert Morrison (Baron Morrison of Lambeth) (1888-1965) by David Howell 
122  House of Commons Hansard: 19 November 1945, Cols 34-39. Herbert Morrison stated 
that “Dock and harbour undertakings will be brought within the scope of the national 
scheme. The most suitable form of public ownership is under examination, as is also the 
question of including certain appropriate ancillary activities.” 
123  See Bevin’s paper on “Wages Policy” of 10 April 1946 in NA file CAB 128/8/48 Cabinet 
conclusions 8 July 1946 
124  ODNB: George Isaacs (1883-1979) by Hugh Pemberton 
125  ODNB Arthur Deakin (1890-1955) by V. L. Allen 
126   Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and Unions 
since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) pp. 38-39 
127   Eric Wigham. Strikes and the Government 1893-1974 (London: Macmillan, 1976) p.100 
128  17 and 18 Geo V c.22. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 
129  9 & 10 Geo. VI c. 52. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946  
130  SR&O 1940/1305 The Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 
(‘Order 1305’)  
131  In fact, the Labour Government’s use of ‘Order 1305’ to prosecute Gas workers (October 
1950) and Dock workers (February 1951) showed how difficult it was to make the Order 
work in legal practice, and it was replaced by SI 1951/1376, The Industrial Disputes Order 
1951 in August 1951. 
132   Allen, Trade Unions, op.cit., p.269 
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support (or seek to amend) that legislation and it transpired that there were practical 
difficulties with finding appropriately able union representatives for the nationalised 
industry Boards, with unions unwilling to lose their best officials to those roles.133 For 
its evolving industrial/economic policy, the new Labour administration embraced the 
concept of Tripartism,134 while also seeking to use some of the fabric of planning 
and controls that had seemed to operate so effectively during wartime.135 However, 
Tomlinson argues that the Government would still determine the agenda for any 
consultations with two main purposes: “on the one hand, to disseminate information 
about the economy and about their policies and intentions, and on the other hand, 
to get feedback on certain proposals that had been tentatively arrived at”.136 Hence, 
“the obstacles to more radical economic reform under the Attlee Government were 
not just ones of political doctrine and assumptions. The compelling macroeconomic 
problems forced attention onto short-run issues”.137  
 
Parallel to these problems ran the Government’s social reform legislation and the 
necessity to fund a nationalisation programme that, according to Chester, would 
cost some £2,639 million by the time that the final sector (iron and steel) was 
nationalised in1951.138 The Government’s management of the economy was 
disrupted by the extreme winter of 1947, and the worsening economic situation later 
in the year led to it asking the TUC to consider wage restraint. The failure of the 
TUC to agree led to Attlee’s public call for restraint, published as a White Paper in 
February 1948,139 which the TUC endorsed on the condition that the Government 
took action to reduce profits and prices.140 As McKelvey points out, the combined 
effect of the White Paper and the union concurrence resulted in an apparent 
moderation of pay increases, and was “a remarkable example of the way in which 
union leaders could adopt policies which took national rather than sectional interests 
into account”.141 But those policies became increasingly under strain with the 
devaluation of the pound in September 1949 and the associated increase in the 
 
133   Ibid., p.273 
134  This required that unions, employers, and Government should work together to achieve 
economic growth with full employment and low inflation. 
135   J. D. Tomlinson ‘The Iron Quadrilateral: Political Obstacles to Economic Reform under 
the Attlee Government’ Journal of British Studies, 34, 1 (1995), pp. 90 -111, p.97 
136   Tomlinson, p.98 
137   Tomlinson, p.110 
138   Norman Chester. The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-51 (London: HMSO, 
1975), p.1017 
139   White Paper: Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices (Cmd 7321, 1948) 
140   Allen, Trade Unions, op.cit., p.286 
141   McKelvey, Jean Trepp ‘Trade Union Wage Policy in Post-war Britain’ Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 6,1 (1952) pp. 3-19, p.8 
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price of imports, and the TUC finally voted against wage restraint in the autumn of 
1950. In reviewing those events it is possible to see two interpretations: McKelvey 
would salute the success of a policy where the unions were able to make sacrifices 
in the national interest, while Weiler would argue that the interests being protected 
by those sacrifices were those of “a revived British capitalism…[with] very specific 
institutional and ideological structures”,142 and that the dock strikes described later 
in this chapter were a recognition of that reality.  Allen neatly summarises the 
dilemma facing UK unions, as represented by the TUC, in their support of the 
Government: while possessing status and (theoretical) influence on policy as part of 
Tripartism, and enjoying the twin benefits of high levels of union membership and 
full employment, they had an internal vulnerability arising from the attitudes of “rank 
and file members who saw all problems in their local context”.143 This is seen also by 
Dorey as a fundamental weakness of British trade unions in that “while trade unions 
were almost universally portrayed as being too powerful…in one crucial respect 
British trade unionism was too weak….characterised by considerable 
decentralisation, with bargaining over terms often conducted at local level”.144 For 
the London docks, these structural weaknesses were compounded by factors such 
as inter-union rivalries, the multiplicity of docks and wharves in London, (many with 
their own customs and practices), hundreds of different employers, a lack of 
coherent or cohesive leadership from the NDLB, and with the piecework system 
providing daily opportunities for disputes.  
 
The main union protagonists in the London docks were the TGWU and the NASD, 
with the WLTBU tending to follow the lead of the NASD.145  The TGWU had 
problems deriving from its genesis, and Bullock shows how hard Bevin had to work 
to create the combined union in 1921/22,146  Furthermore, as Francis Williams 
notes, Bevin was an absolute adherent to the principle of “the democracy of the 
trade union in which the line of authority runs clear….from the branches up through 
 
142  Peter Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War: the London Dock Strike of 1949’. In 
James E Cronin and Jonathan Schneer (eds.) Social Conflict and the Modern Order in 
Britain. (London: Croon Helm, 1982) pp. 171-172 
143  Allen, Trade Unions, p.281 
144  Peter Dorey, Wage Politics in Britain: the Rise and Fall of Incomes Policies since 1945 
(Sussex: Academic Press, 2001) p.4 
145  Devlin Report 1956 (para.7) gives the respective memberships as 17,000, 7,000, and 
4,000.  
146  Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Vol. 1 (London: Heinemann, 1960) pp. 
183-190 
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every level of the organisation to the executive”.147 Although Phillips senses that the 
TGWU was constructed upon “foundations that were historically flimsy”,148 there can 
be little argument that, while Bevin was its General Secretary and later, while 
Minister of Labour and National Service in the Churchill Coalition Government, the 
organisation he had constructed on those foundations stood strong. The real 
weaknesses only came to light when Deakin was unable to dominate the union as 
had Bevin. In addition to the pressure from the activists, the union’s position on the 
NDLB and the local boards could be characterised as its being allied with 
management rather than the workforce, where “many union members could not 
understand how a trade union could ‘gang up’ with employers, the traditional 
enemy, to discipline dock workers”.149 The fact that TGWU officers were appointed 
rather than elected can only have increased that sense of separation, and Leggett’s 
illustration of structure of the London TGWU Docks Group provides an indication of 
how difficult it might be for any one worker to feel any sense of influence of purpose: 
Figure 16: Organisation of the TGWU Docks Group in London  
 
Source: Leggett Report, p.44, Appendix III 
 
 
Joseph Goldstein also analyses the tensions within a London branch of the TGWU, 
where the sheer size of the branch membership meant that if all members attended, 
“effective participation would be impossible”. But in fact only a minority of activists 
attended, who “assume apparent control…and undermine the representative 
 
147  Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin: a Portrait of a Great Englishman. (London; Hutchinson, 
1952) 92 
148  Jim Phillips, The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems of Power, 1945-
1951 (London: Pluto Press, 1996) p.58 
149  M. Jackson, Labour Relations on the Docks. (Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 1973) 
p.68 
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character of constitutional bodies at all higher levels of organization”. In 
consequence the paid official (“the union civil servant”) undertook the “policy-
determining functions assigned in theory to elected representatives”.150   
 
The NASD had different difficulties deriving from its ‘over democratic’ method of 
working. Hill links this to the roots of the union in the Stevedores League, whose 
members “practised a skilled and dangerous trade and typically worked in very 
small firms”.151 In 1923 the stevedores union had also attracted some dockers - 
perhaps those who preferred a smaller union, or were antipathetic to the 
bureaucratic structure of the much larger TGWU.152 Historically, stevedores had 
been responsible for loading cargoes, dockers for unloading, with the stevedores 
believing that their work required more skill. However, over time the differences had 
diminished, and in some London docks dockers also loaded vessels, and indeed 
worked alongside stevedores – although with minor differences in working 
arrangements. The key differentiator of the NASD was that its model of ‘union 
democracy’ differed from that of the TGWU, in that all of its officers were elected, 
while Bevin believed that the TGWU model by which officers were appointed was 
far preferable to a system of election where “popularity and vote-catching would 
count far more than ability”.153 Irrespective of that, the NASD model meant that in 
negotiations the union officers might only be able to agree matters in principle, 
subject to ratification by the membership. This had been criticised in the Ammon 
report of 1945154 noting that the union’s officers might be forced to retract an 
apparent agreement after leaving the negotiating table. It was exemplified in 1949 
when the union’s General Secretary was forced into the impossible position of 
leading a strike (the ‘Ineffectives’ strike, considered below) while opposing it as a 
member of the NDLB, and the union’s place on the NDLB was given to the Scottish 
TGWU. A second example arose in the ‘Overtime’ dispute of 1954 (see below), 
where a mass meeting of the union members decided to ban overtime working, and 
this became a binding decision on all NASD members but, as Evershed showed, 
was in breach of formal agreements that such disputes should be referred for 
 
150  Joseph Goldstein. The Government of British Trade Unions: a Study of Apathy and the 
Democratic Processes in the Transport and General Workers Union (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1952) p.269 
151  Hill, Dockers, op.cit., p. 130 
152  And in 1954 led to accusations of poaching (see Jackson, Labour Relations, pp.62-63)  
153  Bullock, Bevin, op.cit., p.226 
154  Ammon Report, para. 52 
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conciliation before any strike action. 155 The tensions between individuality and 
democracy surfaced in other ways: given the relatively small size of the union, any 
powerful group of activists might easily sway the mood of a dock-gates meeting, or 
in voting at branch meetings.156  
 
Although members of the two main unions were often doing the same range of jobs, 
there were still some differences in working arrangements: the TGWU men adhered 
(at least in principle) to the continuity rule – a local (London) arrangement under 
which a gang that had started a job were both able and required to continue it to 
completion. In one sense this protected a gang from being replaced, but also 
prevented them from leaving a job early (perhaps to get higher paid work on another 
ship).  The NASD men did not see themselves as being bound by this rule and 
insisted that each man be allowed to attend the morning call-on to be re-engaged.157 
In a wider context, Leggett recorded that there had been “recurrent strife and 
hostility between the unions since the breakaway in 1923…both among the leaders 
and among the rank and file” and attributed some industrial unrest to those tension 
although without specifying any examples.158   
 
Aside from any problems affecting the unions and their discords lay the influences 
of the ‘unofficials’ and the Communists that developed as important issues in the 
mid to late 1940s. Allan Bullock emphasises how Bevin (and through him, the 
TGWU) had a long antipathy to unofficial movements where he “broke up the 
dissident organisation [of the rank and file movement] inside the London Bus 
section”,159 and Williams notes his “implacable contempt” for Communism.160 Allen 
shows that Deakin was very much of the same mind, being “best known to the 
general public for his campaign against Communists in trade unions”.161 The rise to 
significance of the ‘unofficials’ may be seen as a collateral effect of ‘Order 1305’: 
 
155  Final Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks (Evershed Final 
Report, Cmd 9310, 1954) para. 39 
156 Although Penrose’s early work on this (L. S. Penrose ‘The Elementary Statistics of 
Majority Voting’ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 109, 1 (1946), pp. 53-57 ) has been 
modified – see for example, Andrew Gelman, Jonathan N. Katz and Joseph Bafumi, 
‘Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis’ British Journal of 
Political Science, 34, 4 (2004), pp. 657-674 ), there is clear evidence that well-focused 
voting has considerable leverage in larger undecided constituencies. 
157  Smith, Royal Docks, op.cit., p.56 
158  Leggett Report, para. 64 
159  Bullock, Bevin, op.cit., p. 525 
160  Williams, Bevin, op.cit., p.93  
161  V L Allen Trade Union Leadership Based on a Study of Arthur Deakin (London: 
Longman, Green, 1957) Chapter XVII: ‘A Campaign against Communist Trade Unionists’, 
pp 270-288, p. 270 
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although it was possible to prohibit official strikes by law, that prohibition would not 
automatically put an end to industrial disputes, so a vacuum came to exist that 
would be (partially) filled by unofficial action. As noted in chapter 2, there were some 
178 strikes in the docks/transport sector between 1941 and 1945, the majority being 
unofficial. It is therefore unsurprising that the unofficial movement increased its 
influence, and was certainly more visible in the ‘Control Point’ strike of March 1945, 
where Ammon commented on “the influence of a small subversive political 
section….who have tried to spread trouble by exploiting the real or alleged 
grievances of the men instead of encouraging them to proceed through the normal 
Trade Union channels”.162 By the time of the ‘Dockers’ Charter’ strike in November 
1945 the unofficial movement had much greater visibility, but the ‘official’ view 
seemed already to be developing that the movement was being led – or at least 
heavily influenced by - Communists. I have touched on how much the Communist 
influence can be validated from published material in chapter 2, and Phillips 
considers this in some detail in his chapter on “Communist conspiracies”,163 drawing 
on both TGWU and Government sources.164 He suggests that, in part, the official 
focus on external political influences was a useful way of concealing the real issues 
behind the strikes,165 and the ineffectiveness and remoteness of the TGWU 
officials.166 Lindop, using much oral material, gives a sense of the individual 
docker’s attitudes and the tensions implicit in the Scheme, rather than any overt 
political or Communist alignment. As a consequence, in many of the strikes in the 
“late1940s the union officials were unable to force their members to accept their 
advice or the decisions of local and national boards”.167  
 
The Dock Strikes 1945-1960 
 
There is no obvious pattern to these strikes and, interestingly, although neither 
Evans and Creigh168 nor Nicholson and Kelly169 see the docks disputes as hugely 
 
162  Ammon Report, para. 20. 
163  Phillips Great Alliance op.cit., Chapter 4: ‘Communist conspiracies, the allegations and 
reality’ pp. 78-104 
164  See also Allen, Deakin, op.cit. 
165  Phillips Great Alliance, p.85 
166  Ibid., p.95 
167  F. Lindop, ‘Unofficial militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67’ Oral History and 
Labour History 11, 2 (1983) pp. 21-33, p.22 
168  E. W. Evans and S. W. Creigh ‘The Natural History of the Strike in Britain’ Labour 
History, 39 (1980), pp. 47-61  
169  Nigel Nicholson and John Kelly. ‘The Psychology of Strikes’ Journal of Occupational 
Behaviour, 1, 4 (1980), pp. 275-284	 
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significant factors in the overall patterns of strikes in the UK, those in the docks 
seem to fit all of the various categories defined by the latter commentators (that is, 
as protest, warfare, as a group process, and as organizational change). 
 
The ‘Pay and Conditions’ strike, 1945  
 
 
The first dock strike after the final cessation of hostilities in World War II lasted from 
24 September until November 1945 and seems to have attracted little attention in 
the litany of dock strikes, although it resulted in the loss of more than 1,100,000 
working days.170 Possibly this was because it was a slow burn: as Phillips notes, it 
was “prefigured by a ten-week old pay and conditions dispute (in a number of 
docks) which the Labour Government inherited in July 1945”, where troops had 
been used to unload cargoes in all of the docks. The dispute arose following the 
TGWU National Docks Delegate Conference on 24 August 1945 which adopted a 
‘Dockers’ Charter’ seeking an increase in the daily minimum pay from 16s to 25s,171 
together with a number of other benefits such as two weeks paid holiday and a 
pension scheme. This was submitted to the NJCPTI but the employers stalled on 
this, and another pay dispute on Merseyside in September grew into a national 
strike for the Charter, so that by 24 October, 45,720 men were on strike.  Under 
‘Order 1305’ an official strike would have been illegal, and (formally) any disputes 
needed to be referred to the MLNS for consideration and possible reference to 
arbitration.  But (even if not initiated by them) this strike was promoted by unofficial 
groups: the NA file contains a copy of a leaflet from the “London Central Strike 
Committee” (LCSC) that summarises the Charter claims, “handed by Members of 
the London Strike Committee to Cardiff Dockers this morning [26 October 1945]”.172 
According to Lindop, the LCSC attacked the TGWU leadership who responded that 
there was “definite evidence” of political motivation.173 
 
The strike was discussed by the Cabinet on 15 October, and Isaacs got Cabinet 
agreement not to have an enquiry: 
 
As this was an unofficial strike it would be undesirable to offer to appoint a 
Committee of Enquiry, since this would tend to weaken the normal 
 
170  But note that I demonstrate later the unreliability of these ‘total days lost’ computations. 
171  The rate of 16s a day was that agreed by the Shaw Committee in 1920 (Report of the 
Transport Workers Court of Inquiry (Shaw report, Cmd 936,1920) para. 45 (i)) 
172  See NA File BK 1/105 National Dock Labour Corporation: Dock Strike, Dockers’ Charter 
173  Phillips Great Alliance, op.cit., pp. 53-59 
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procedure of negotiations between the duly accredited representatives of 
workers and employers. The position in this respect would, however, be 
different if the terms offered by the representatives of the employers were 
rejected. On the whole, he [Isaacs] thought that the right plan would be to 
watch the position for the next two or three days. 174 
 
In any case, greater events were happening, with Herbert Morrison’s adumbration 
on 19 November that the docks might be nationalised, and an enquiry was quickly 
set up under Mr Justice Evershed, which recommended an increase in the minimum 
wage to 19s per day from 28 November 1945, whereat the strike ended.175 
 
The ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike of 1948 
 
On 27 May 1948 a group of workers known as “Coe’s Gang” 176 was engaged by the 
Grand Union (Stevedoring and Wharfage) Company Ltd to load 100 tons of Zinc 
Oxide from canal barges into the SS Theems, berthed in the Regent’s Canal dock, 
at a rate of 3s 4d (16½p) per ton. After loading about 25 tons the men claimed the 
cargo was obnoxious177 and refused to continue unless the rate was increased to 5s 
(25p) per ton. Such claims were not unusual, and disputes about piecework rates 
were normally resolved by a View Committee which included representatives from a 
union (usually the TGWU) and the employers. The committee met on 28th May and 
concluded that the rate of 3s 4d per ton was correct:178 however, the men still 
refused to load the remainder of the cargo, and the ship sailed. The company 
notified the port Manager of the men’s refusal, and in accordance with the 
disciplinary procedures of the 1947 Scheme the men were penalised for failing to 
 
174  NA file CAB 128/1/24 Cabinet conclusions 15 October 1945.  
175  Report of a Committee of Investigation on a Difference Between Employers and 
Workpeople Regarding the National Minimum Wage and the Piece-workers’ Minimum 
Guarantee (Evershed Report 1945) (London: HMSO, 1945) 
176  Coe’s Gang consisted of 11 men who were all members of the TGWU. The NA files 
record little about the men, although there is some indication that one, Joe Bloomberg 
had a fiery temper, having been in trouble with the Police and summonsed to Court for 
threatening behaviour. Against that, Bloomberg’s autobiography (Joe Bloomberg. 
Looking Back: a Docker’s Life London: Stepney Books, 1979) reveals different sides of a 
complex character. 
177  Zinc Oxide is a white powder, inhalation of which can lead to nausea, fever, headaches, 
blurred vision and breathing difficulty, and some of the men complained of breathing 
problems while handling the cargo. The UK National Poisons information service indicts 
such inhalation as a cause of “metal fume fever” with known fatalities 
(www.inchem.org/documents/ukpids/ukpids/ukpid87.htm) 
178  Although according to Philips (Great Alliance, p.59) the TGWU Official had agreed the 
rate “from his office” without actually inspecting the cargo. 
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carry out their duties “in accordance with the rules of the port or place” where they 
were working.179 In those terms the ‘offences’ committed by the gang were that:  
 
(i) They had refused to finish the job after a view committee had agreed the 
rate. 
 
(ii) When the Theems returned on Saturday 5 June 1948 the gang again 
refused to complete the job.  
 
(iii) After another view committee had been set up on 8 June, and once more 
confirmed the rate the gang again refused to do the work. (Although the 
gang was later persuaded complete the job by their colleagues)  
 
In view of those three refusals to obey instructions from their employer, the LDLB 
suspended all the men on 9 June 1948 for 7 days without pay and suspended their 
right to attendance pay for 13 weeks.180 This second penalty was not as harsh as it 
might appear: the file shows that the men were high earners who usually had full 
employment, and little recourse to attendance pay: in the 13 weeks following the 
strike most of the gang averaged less than one day a week in the Reserve Pool.  
However, this was the first time that penalties of this magnitude had been imposed, 
and the action appeared harsh: this led to agitation at the Regent’s Canal dock and 
a strike started there on the morning of 14 June, spread to the London and St 
Katharine docks in the afternoon and, in spite of the TGWU’s efforts, to the other 
upper river docks by 16 June. Meanwhile, the men had appealed against the 
penalties, but the appeal tribunal on 15 June was unable to agree on the action to 
be taken.181 A second tribunal under Sir Robert Aske KC on 17 June agreed to 
reduce the suspension to two days and the disentitlement to attendance pay to two 
weeks. The agitators (known as the ‘unofficials’ or the ‘no name’ committee) seem 
to have come together or been formed with a common purpose to organise protests 
against the punishments on 12 June, but by 17 June had transformed into a strike 
committee. It contained some Communists and union activists, but also some men 
who were not known to be either.182  
 
 
179  SR&O 1947/1189, Clauses 8 (5) (a) and 14-17. 
180  NA file BK 2/72 NDLB Discipline, Strikes, London Dock. Circular letter from F P Hogger, 
Port Manager, dated 12 June 1948  
181 Appeals Tribunals usually comprised a representative from each side and a secretary 
from the MLNS 
182 NA file LAB 10/783 London Dock Labour Board and Transport and General Workers' 
Union: strike caused by disciplinary action taken against eleven men who refused to load 
zinc oxide. The identities of all of the Committee were known and recorded in the in a 
memorandum headed “Secret” of June 1948. None of Coe’s gang appeared on the list. 
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By 25 June 1948, 19,622 men were on strike in London, and troops were brought in 
to unload perishable cargoes: on 28 June the strike spread to the Liverpool docks, 
so that more than 9,000 men were on strike there. At that point the Government 
sought to have a State of Emergency declared, and the Prime Minister (Clement 
Attlee) broadcast to the nation on that evening. He spoke about the fact that the 
strike was unofficial, was affecting the UK’s needs for food and trade, and was 
taking place in spite of the availability of negotiating mechanisms.  He was able to 
cite his personal experience of the living and working conditions in docklands, and 
to remind the strikers of the benefits of the Dock Labour Scheme – primarily of 
continuity of employment - and that the dispute was over the handling a cargo “that 
was a little dirty”. The ‘unofficials’ apparently recognised that the effect of the 
broadcast and the declaration of a State of Emergency would be such that they 
could not continue the dispute and called a meeting at Victoria Park on 29 June 
where a resolution for a return to work was passed, and the men returned to work 
on 30 June. There were two aspects of this strike that are noteworthy: firstly, that it 
was not a dispute in the normal sense against the employer, but more an action in 
protest at the perceived unfairness of the penalties imposed. In addition, it 
presented specific challenges to the TGWU, because under ‘Order 1305’ it was not 
possible for the union to call an official strike and also in any case the TGWU had a 
formal role in the discipline and appeals procedures.  
 
Subsequent events and actions presented even more complexities and 
complications: the NA file contains a comprehensive note covering the legality of the 
penalties: in  summarising clauses 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the Dock Labour Scheme, 
the MNLS’ solicitor noted that the Board dealt (wrongly) with the matter under 
clause 16(2) (discipline) of the scheme rather than under Clause 15 (i.e. the men 
should have been returned to the reserve pool), and that the gang should have 
been allowed to work at a day rate when they refused to work at the piecework rate. 
In addition, it appeared that two penalties had been imposed under Clause 16(2) 
whereas only one was allowed, and it was also noted that there were issues around 
whether this was in fact a trade dispute with the NDLB under ‘Order 1305’, because 
the dock workers when in employment (and not in the reserve pool) were not 
employed by the NDLB.183 There must be little doubt that in a less deferential and 
more litigious age there would have been significant legal challenges to the Board’s 
 
183 LAB 10/783 Note by the MLNS solicitor dated 21 June 1948 
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actions and the penalties.184 As noted above, the identities of the ‘no name’ 
Committee were known, and the MLNS Regional Industrial Relations Officer (RIRO) 
commented that: 
 
The organisation is a very mixed bag indeed and includes, I am told, people 
who are not extremists. Whether there is enough organising ability to 
produce a breakaway union I am unable to say but Deakin has taken a very 
nasty knock over this business…185 
 
In reaction, the TGWU summoned the members of the ‘unofficial” group before a 
Special Committee on 24 August 1948. The Committee concluded that: 
 
“it is established, on their own admission, that the seventeen 
members…were members of the unofficial body that was set up in 
connection with the London Dock Strike of June 1948. By their action the 
Members were in breach of the rules and constitution of the Union. We have 
however taken note of the assurances given that the Unofficial Strike 
Committee is no longer in existence….[and] recommend that no action of a 
disciplinary nature be taken against the Members.186” 
 
The Committee did indeed no longer exist: it had been resurrected as the Port 
Workers Defence Committee. 
 
The ‘Zinc Oxide’ dispute brought together two combustible elements – the system of 
piecework payments and the way in which the National and Local Boards had to 
implement the disciplinary penalties of the Scheme.  In this particular case the cost 
of meeting the increase sought would not have been excessive (and obviously far 
below the consequential costs of the dispute to both sides and the nation), and 
many cargoes were classed as (and indeed were) “dirty”, and thus meriting 
increased payments.187 The problem was that of precedents and the knock-on 
 
184 NA file BK 3/11 NDLB Annual report for 1956 shows that there was such a challenge in 
1956 (see The Times, 6 December 1956, p. 2 ‘System of Dismissing Dock Labourers 
Illegal’) and where Lord Keith noted that  “I find it difficult to co-relate the provisions of 
Clauses 15,16,17, and 18 and to be satisfied in my mind on how they are intended to 
interact as between each other,”  
185 LAB 10/783 Letter from the RIRO to the MLNS Industrial Relations Department dated 23 
June 1948. 
186  MRC file MSS.126/TG/447/24/5 TGWU: Unofficial Disputes  
187  NA file LAB 101/6 NJCPTI agreements 1920-1964 Paragraph H (Differentials: ‘Dirty’ 
money) of the 1947 agreement shows that “the normal practice is that each port operates a 
list drawn up by the parties locally, specifying the particular commodities which carry a 
payment, usually on a time basis and as an addition to piecework earnings, because of their 
dirty or obnoxious character.” 
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effect, so the employers would be very concerned to avoid rate drift.188 The 
disciplinary code of the 1947 Scheme was also a key factor: in this instance, the 
imposition of the full penalties available under the Scheme triggered a strong 
reaction amongst the men. Along with this emerged dissatisfaction with the role of 
union officials on the NDLB, where they could be accused of being on the side of 
‘management’ rather than the workforce, and this, with the sheer size of the TGWU 
led to a feeling of alienation, resulting in the coalescence of groups to form the 
‘unofficials’ and the ‘no names’, and to challenge to the power of the union. Finally, 
the fact that the Prime Minister had been forced to intervene led to the matter being 
considered in Cabinet, where: 
 
The Cabinet were informed that in all sections of the London Docks that 
morning there had been signs that larger numbers of men were willing to 
resume work ….[but] there was evidence that in some sections of the 
London Docks the managements had not been prepared for this change in 
the situation and had not been ready to take on men who were willing to 
resume work. This confirmed the view, held by some Ministers, that the 
Dock Labour Corporation (sic) was not working effectively. The Foreign 
Secretory (Ernest Bevin) undertook to make enquiries and to discuss with 
the Ministers of Labour and Transport what changes were required.189 
 
This presented two problems, firstly that the NDLB was seen as a scapegoat for the 
failures of the Scheme (which was of course the progeny of Bevin’s original 
schemes of 1941), exacerbated by the fact that the Government could not change 
the composition of the Board in mid-term.190 Secondly, the fact that it was Bevin who 
was being given charge of any reformation, implied that no major revisions would 
take place. 
 
The “Ineffectives” strike of April 1949  
 
 
The NDLC/NDLB records show that the docks were continually pressing for more 
workers in 1943 as the war effort neared its peak, and by April 1945 the “revised 
 
188  As William Brown shows: Piecework Bargaining (London: Heinemann, 1973) pp.115-118 
piecework agreements are prone to “rate drift” over time as rates are amended and re-
negotiated.   
189  NA file CAB 128/13/5 Cabinet conclusions 29 June 1948  
190  Under Clause 4(3) of SR&O 1947/1189 the Minister could appoint (but not dismiss) 
members of the National Board, so any changes could only be made at the end of a 
member’s term of office.  Similarly, the National Board could appoint but not dismiss 
members of local Boards. 
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sanctioned strength” for London had been increased from 17,796 to 19,650.191 
However, by 1946, with the successful demobilisation of large numbers of men from 
the Armed Forces, the NDLC (and later the NDLB) was under pressure to reduce 
the size of the workforce, because “the continuing heavy surpluses…had resulted in 
an average deficit of £17,000”.192  This derived from the fact that the NDLB’s income 
from the port employers was based upon a percentage of the total wages paid by 
those employers: workers not in employment would receive attendance pay from 
the Board, so that any substantial surplus of workers receiving such pay would lead 
to a commensurate deficit in the Board’s finances. By September 1947 the LDLB 
had reached a position where “251 men with poor work records [had been] removed 
from the Register since November 1946”,193 but on 26 November 1948 the NDLB 
nevertheless directed local Boards to “examine critically the Workers’ register and 
remove therefrom” those men who for health or other reasons were “unable to meet 
the minimum requirements….or are not carrying out to the full their obligations 
under the Scheme”.194  
 
A table submitted to the NDLB on 8 February 1949 showed that 47 men from the 
London register (of 26,871) were regarded as falling within the Board’s 
categorisation for removal, but that a sub-committee appointed to consider these 
cases had been “unable to reach agreement”.195 The NASD then held a mass 
meeting on 9 March at which it rejected “the intention of the local board in this 
matter”, and the NDLB was notified of this.196 However, the NDLB persisted with its 
pressure, and following another review at which all 47 men were interviewed, it was 
decided that 33 were not capable of carrying out the obligations required of them 
under the Scheme. 21 men appealed against the decision, but only one appeal was 
allowed, and on 8 April notices were issued to 32 men, whereupon the NASD men 
struck.197 On 11 April 1949 the TGWU London Docks group issued a circular 
 
191  NA file BK 2/98 NDLC Transfers of Labour, Circular 1/107 23 April 1945 
192  BK 29/8, op.cit., Undated memorandum “submitted by the Chairman (Lord Ammon) to 
the Minister of Labour and National Service”,  
193  NA file BK 2/202. Size of the Work Force: Ineffectives. Note “Bad Work records” dated 
10 September 1947  
194  Ibid., Circular N.B. 19/2 dated 26 November 1948 
195  Ibid., The details of the sub-committee’s consideration are in a minute dated 8 March 
1949 on file  
196  NA file BK 2/1120 NDLB: Size of the Labour Force: Ineffectives. Letter from Barrett, 
NASD to Thomas of the NDLB dated 9 March 1949  
197  NA file LAB 10/831 MLNS: Dispute regarding discharge of Category ‘C’ dockers. Minute 
from the RIRO dated 11 April 1949 noting that the NASD Executive Committee had 
decided that the union should “resist any discharges of port workers until such time as a 
pension scheme was introduced. 
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summarising the events, and reiterating that the policy of the TGWU was to abide 
by the negotiating machinery set up under the Dock Labour Scheme, that each 
member had had the opportunity to present his case, and that the strike (which 
started on 11 April) was unwarranted: this was not a question of redundancy, but 
“whether a man was an effective port worker or not”.198  The NDLB issued a press 
notice on 12 April 1949 noting that the strike had been called by the NASD although 
“only a few [of the men under notice of dismissal] are members of the NASD”, 
adding that “this strike, inspired by the [NASD] and exploited by the communists, 
threatens the welfare and stability of the nation.”199  
 
On 13 April 1949 the MLNS Chief Industrial Commissioner (CIC) chaired a meeting 
with the NASD to examine the problems, in the course of which he pointed out that 
the strike was illegal under ‘Order 1305’. The question begged here is why the 
Ministry had not summoned both the employers and the union (for which there was 
in any case already a mechanism in the NJCPTI). The meeting may actually be 
seen as a de facto recognition that the employers were legion – the Port Authority, 
the shipping and stevedoring companies and wharfingers that were the operational 
employers, and the NDLB – who had no specific common purpose. Part of the 
answer presumably lies in the Cabinet Paper of 12 April 1948, indicating the level of 
Ministerial interest (and thus, presumably, pressure for some action by the ministry):  
 
This strike creates a precedent in the post war period - It is official in that it 
has been called by the Executive of the National Amalgamated Stevedores 
and Dockers, which we are informed is Communist controlled. Since the 
procedure laid down in the Conditions of Employment and National 
Arbitration Order [i.e. Order 1305] has not been followed it is illegal. We 
were informed that this is the first strike since the making of the Order which 
is both official and illegal. There might be a case for instituting criminal 
proceedings in respect of breach of the Order, but the [Emergencies] 
Committee do not consider such a step would be advisable, at any rate at 
the present stage. 200 
 
 
198  BK 2/202, TGWU Area No. 1 Docks Group Notice “To all Members” dated 11 April 1949  
199  NA file BK 2/1085 NDLB Discipline, Strikes, London, Ineffectives 
200  NA file CAB/129/34/18 Cabinet Paper CP (49) 88 Memorandum: The London Dock 
Strike by James Chuter Ede 
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Although the strike was officially opposed by the TGWU, many of its members 
joined the action, but following a broadcast by Isaacs, the strike ended on 14 April.  
At a further meeting with the MLNS on 21 April the NASD agreed to accept the 32 
dismissals but said that they would resist any further reductions in the register, and 
even if the dispute went to arbitration they would still go on strike. The key feature in 
all of this was the wish of the unions to institute some form of pension scheme for 
dock workers where, in the main, none existed. Even the mighty PLA was less than 
generous to its long-serving workers: in 1946, as the Authority minutes show, a 
Permanent Labourer with 54 years’ service was awarded a “Benevolent Allowance” 
of 20s per week, a Deal Porter with 40 years, 15s per week, and a Permanent 
Labourer with 26 years’ service 12s per week.201 One day’s attendance pay, even at 
a rate of 12s per day,202 would be more than their weekly pension for many ex-PLA 
dockers, and few (if any) other dock employers gave any form of pension to their 
workers. The actions of the NDLB are questionable from another aspect: given the 
huge amounts of work effort lost in London through sickness and injuries noted 
above, the pressures to get rid of some few men – far less than 1% of the 
workforce, and drawing minimal amounts of attendance pay - seems extreme, and 
any strategic analysis of the benefits and risks of such an initiative should surely 
have recommended a more cautious approach.  
 
The ‘Canadian Seamen’s’ strike of 1949  
 
The story of the strike is complex and is covered in a 47- page report from the 
MLNS.203 The fundamental cause was a dispute between members of the Canadian 
Seamen’s Union (CSU) and the (Canadian) Shipowners, which led to a strike (in 
Canada) that began on 31 March 1949 but had ended by 5 May. Action in support 
of the CSU began in Liverpool on 1 April, spreading to London on 4 April.204 In a 
broadcast on 11 June 1949, Isaacs unequivocally attributed the strike to Communist 
influence: “the plain fact is that this Canadian dispute is being used….by the 
Communists in this country to dislocate our trade and thus retard our economic 
recovery.”205 Following negotiations and various interventions, the strike in Liverpool 
ended on 13/14 June, and work resumed in London on 24 June, following a meeting 
 
201   PLA Archives: PLA Staff Committee Minutes. Minutes of 16 April, 6 June and 4 July 
1946.   
202   McKelvey, Jean Trepp. Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: a Study in the Persistence 
of Industrial Unrest. Booklet No. 23. New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1953) p.30 
203   Review of the British Docks Strikes1949 (Isaacs Report, Cmd 7851, 1949)  
204   Ibid., pp. 8-10 
205  The Times, 13 June 1949 p. 4 “Appeal to Strikers” 
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between the CSU and representatives of the (Canadian) employers at the offices of 
the Canadian High Commission. Work stopped again on 27 June following the issue 
of two pamphlets alleging inter alia that the employers had “repudiated their promise 
of settlement”.206 Shortly afterwards, an “unofficial ‘Lockout’ committee” was formed, 
and “by intensive propaganda…managed to persuade a number of dockers…to 
stop work”.207  Service personnel were brought into London on 7 July to unload 
some ships: Isaac’s line on the role of Communists was reiterated by the Attorney 
General and in slightly less specific terms by Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, 
on 9 July,208 followed by the proclamation of a State of Emergency on 11 July.  
On 19 July 1949 the NDLB issued a “statement to dock workers”: 
  
the National Board hereby orders all dock workers now on strike to resume 
work at 7.45 a.m. on Thursday 21 July 1949…failure to return to work will 
jeopardise the very existence of the Scheme which former Dock workers and 
many present Dock workers have struggled to achieve.209 
 
This was not a good move: as soon as the strike ended, the parliamentary 
Opposition used an adjournment debate to challenge the NDLB threat, during which 
the Home Secretary repudiated the notice,210 and this was followed by Lord 
Ammon’s resignation from his post as a Government Whip (but not from his 
chairmanship of the NDLB). Interestingly, this episode does not feature in the MLNS 
report on the strike which attributes the strike primarily to a plan by the CSU to 
involve British dockers, but also cites the role played by (CSU) members of the 
Communist party, in “lies, misrepresentation …propaganda [and] violence”.211 
 
There were no obvious causes for this strike:  the superficial reason for the 
stoppage was that it was in support of a dispute between the CSU and the 
Canadian Shipowners, and the generally received view was that it was fomented by 
Communists212 but, as Peter Weiler has pointed out, “such a charge cannot explain 
why 15,000 men stayed on the streets for a month in a dispute that would bring 
them no financial benefit”.213  A more cogent argument might be that the strike was 
a reflection of increasing dissatisfaction by the dockers with the operation of the 
 
206   Isaacs Report, p.44, Appendix XI,  
207   Ibid., p 21. 
208  The Times, 11 July 1949, p.2 ‘Communist Aim in Strikes’ and ‘Malignant Forces’: Bevan 
asserting that “the one enemy of Fascism and Communism is a strong Socialist 
democracy” 
209   NA file BK 2/76 NDLB Head Office: Canadian Seamen’s Dispute 
210   House of Commons Hansard, 26 July 1949, column 2279 
211   Isaacs Report, p.27  
212   Ibid., para 87 (3) 
213   Weiler ‘British Labour’, op.cit., p.149 
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Scheme, together with a growing disconnect between the rank and file and the 
union hierarchy, coupled with a failure by the NDLB (which, after all, was the only 
body with any authority in all of the affected ports) to intervene other than with 
threats. Weiler sees the genesis of the dispute in somewhat wider terms that are 
nevertheless valid: the increasingly authoritarian attitude of Ammon, the Chairman 
of the NDLB, the position of the TGWU on the NDLB which the dockers saw as the 
union now becoming the “enforcer of traditional work discipline, and a sense that the 
Labour Government was more concerned to recognise the position of the trade 
union leadership as the only recognised spokesmen for the working class”.214 In 
consequence, as both Weiler and Davis suggest, the unofficials/Communist 
interconnection grew stronger and – at least for a period at the end of the 1940s – 
they became an important force in the docks.215 
 
The ‘Expulsions’ strike of 1950 
 
This strike was a reaction against the action taken by the unions – primarily the 
TGWU - to punish the ‘unofficials’ who had been most active in the Canadian 
Seamen’s strike: one of the first documents in the NDLB file on the dispute is an 
analysis of “dock workers who were prominent during the Canadian Dispute”, 
identifying 20 “Members of the Strike or Lockout Committee”, and 12 “Others”.216 
With this is a copy of the TGWU “Report of the Special Committee” established on 
15 December 1949217 that recommended the expulsion of Messrs Dickens, 
Constable and Saunders (all labelled as Communists in the NDLB analysis),218 with 
Dickens “undoubtedly the big figure behind all this trouble”, Constable “to the 
forefront in every dispute” and Saunders as an “opponent of most things….always 
associated with unofficial movement in dockland”. Four others were debarred from 
holding union office, and the TGWU committee also recommended that the Port 
Workers Defence Committee (PWDC) be declared a subversive body created and 
fostered with the object of sabotaging the constitutional procedure and policy of the 
union.219 All of those sanctioned appealed against the penalties, with the appeals 
 
214  Ibid., pp.154-162 
215  Davis, Waterfront revolts, op.cit.,  p. 188 and Weiler, p.171  
216  NA file BK2/1086:  London Dock Strike 1950: Expulsion of Three Dockers from TGWU 
217 The Committee met on 26 and 27 January 1950 (MRC file MSS.126/TG/447/24/5 
Unofficial Disputes) The (77 page) transcript of the meetings shows the high levels of 
emotion and tensions, and the key role played by Deakin.  
218  BK 2/1086 table “Dock workers who were prominent during the Canadian Dispute”. The 
three recommended for expulsion had been among the group called before the Special 
Committee in 1948 after the ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike. 
219  NA file LAB 10/955 Stoppage at work at London Docks over expulsion of three members 
of the TGWU, notes that the PWDC was composed of “extremists, members of both the 
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scheduled to be heard on 12 April, but in the meantime the PWDC called a meeting 
(26 March) “attended by about 350 port workers” which resolved to demand the 
reinstatement of the three men, implementation of the Dockers charter, and an 
overtime ban. The ban was initially effective, with some 2,872 men refusing to work 
overtime, but support quickly fell off and full work resumed on 3 April.220  
The appeals were not upheld, and an all-out strike was called at a mass meeting on 
19 April. It was not a hugely effective: the NDLB files shows that on 20 April in the 
Royal group of docks – the most severely affected area - 65% (4,679 men) were on 
strike, but over the whole port the ratio was much lower, with a total of 6,118 men 
(22% of the total active Register) striking. But it is clear from the files that the 
NDLB’s attitude was hardening, although this was not necessarily fully supported by 
the MLNS: after the NDLB had issued a Press Notice warning that “men should 
make themselves available for work by a given date or they will be summarily 
dismissed”, the CIC wrote to the NDLB on 21 April to say that: 
 
The Minister feels sure that your Board will appreciate the necessity of 
avoiding any statement that might have the effect of embarrassing the 
Government in the steps that it considers necessary to safeguard the vital 
interests of the community.221 
 
Nevertheless, the reaction by both Government and the National and London 
Boards was robust: troops were sent into the docks on 24 April, and the LDLB’s 
appeal to the strikers contained the veiled threat that it had “decided against 
applying forthwith the disciplinary measures which could be put into place against 
those men on strike and who thus could be considered as failing to comply with the 
conditions of the Scheme” – i.e. could be dismissed. However, on the 27 April the 
NDLB authorised the LDLB to write to all workers to say: 
 
The London Dock Labour Board hereby informs you that unless you report 
for work at the usual call place on Monday morning next, 1st May, you will be 
deemed to have terminated your service with the Board, owing to your 
continued absence from work without authority. If you have not returned to 
work by the date indicated your registration will be cancelled accordingly.222 
 
 
NASD and the TGWU [and] became active following the unofficial stoppage in support of the 
Canadian Seamen. During this stoppage its members operated under the title of the London 
Central Lock-out Committee but following the collapse of the strike continued its subversive 
activities under the title of the Port Workers Defence Committee “. 
220  NA file LAB 10/940 Embargo on overtime in protest against the Unions summoning eight 
men before the Special Committee in connection with the Canadian Dock Strike of last 
May. 
221  BK 2/1086 
222  Ibid., 
 131 
The strike had peaked on 28 April, with 14,349 men out and 11,140 working, but the 
MLNS file notes that the PWDC had: 
 
failed to appreciate the signs of re-action revealed at their mass meeting on 
26th April.223 Hitherto they had been quick to appreciate when their influence 
was at its peak and had retained the initiative by calling off the strike at the 
psychological moment on apparently their own terms. On this occasion they 
realised the true situation too late, and the officials of the TGWU were quick 
to take the initiative.224 
 
The men returned to work on 1 May 1950, but it is clear from the Cabinet papers 
that Ministers had been struggling to define the most appropriate action to be taken 
during the strike, with both the Attorney General and the Home Secretary 
acknowledging the complexities of the situation and the difficulties of taking legal or 
disciplinary measures where the strike was not an industrial dispute but action 
against a union.225 This led to an almost farcical situation where, as the Conclusions 
of the Cabinet meeting held on 21 April show, the Cabinet: 
 
Agreed that the Government should not endeavour to influence the London 
Dock Labour Board in any decision it might reach later that day on applying 
the disciplinary provisions of the Dock Labour Scheme. 226 
 
Whereas at the meeting on 27 April the Cabinet:  
 
Invited the Minister of Labour to arrange for the London Dock Labour Board 
to be informed that, in the view of the Government, it would be untimely for 
them to approach the National Dock Labour Board for advice on the 
handling of the situation.227 
 
The best that can be said here, perhaps, is that this is an object lesson in how not to 





223  NA File HO 45/25539 Threatened Strike at the London Docks April 1950 contains a 
minute dated 26 April from K E Hughes, headed “Secret” with a report from the Special 
Branch of a mass meeting called by the PWDC where the men “showed no enthusiasm” 
and the resolution to continue the action “was not in accordance with the men’s wishes”.  
224  LAB 10/955 
225  NA files CAB 129/39/27 Cabinet Office: Memorandum by the Attorney General, and CAB 
129/39/34 Cabinet Office:  Memorandum by the Home Secretary 
226  NA file CAB 128/17/23 Cabinet conclusions 21 April 1950 
227  NA file CAB 128/17/26 Cabinet conclusions 27 April 1950 
 132 
The Question of Revising the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme 
 
It was clear now that whatever stance Bevin might take, the Scheme had to be 
reviewed, so that in Cabinet: 
 
There was general agreement with the view of the Emergencies Committee 
that there should be a thorough investigation into the underlying causes of 
the recurring labour trouble at London Docks, and that means should be 
devised to bring the unrest to an end. 228 
 
The necessity for this was underlined in by a debate in the House of Commons that 
confirmed that there were real problems with the structure and operations of the 
Dock Labour Scheme (and particularly the disciplinary procedures within it), and 
also with the role and functions of the NDLB.229 There was also continual pressure 
from the employers for the ending of the system of dual control where both 
employers and union officials were members of national and local dock labour 
Boards. The matter was considered in Cabinet in July 1949 with a paper from the 
Minister of Transport suggesting a comprehensive revision of the scheme ,230 and a 
rejoinder from Isaacs arguing for an internal review where: 
 
If these matters are examined I would suggest that they should be 
considered in the first place by officials of the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of Transport in consultation with officials of the National Dock 
Labour Board.231 
 
Phillips shows that this was, in essence, also Bevin’s view, a “refusal to 
countenance even minor changes to the scheme”232 – confirmed in a later note by 
the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Norman Brook).233 The resulting internal enquiry was led 
by C W K Macmullan of the Ministry of Transport, who (in his preliminary 
assessment of the case) noted that:  
 
 
228  NA Files CAB 128/15/27 Cabinet conclusions 13 April 1949, and PREM 8/1085 Prime 
Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers – material relating to the “Ineffectives” strike. 
229  House of Commons Hansard 26 July 1949 Cols 2263-2335 
230  NA file CAB 129/35/35, Cabinet Paper CP (49) 145: Memorandum: The Dock Labour 
Industry and the National Dock Labour Board. By Alfred Barnes 
231  NA file CAB 129/36/1 Cabinet Paper CP (49) 151 Memorandum: The Dock Labour 
Industry and the National Dock Labour Board by George Isaacs 
232  Phillips Great Alliance op.cit., p.100 
233  NA file PREM 8/1534 Prime Minister’s Office Reorganisation of National Dock Labour 
Board: proposal to appoint a working party to review Dock Labour Scheme; investigation into 
labour conditions in the docks; report of Committee of Inquiry contains a memorandum by 
Norman Brook dated 5 May 1950 noting that in July 1949 the Foreign Secretary “expressed 
strong opposition to the holding of any enquiry into the decasualisation scheme as such”. 
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I believe that the present Dock Labour Scheme is so full of defects and 
weaknesses that it is operating badly (at any rate in some areas) and may at 
any time create trouble, in which case further defects will become operative 
and make the trouble more difficult to deal with. 234 
 
In more detail, he noted the limitations of the internal structures within the scheme 
where there was “minimal power of the Minister over the NDLB, of the NDLB over 
local Boards, and local Boards over employers” and hence “a pretence of an 
organisation which is no organisation at all”. As a result, the Scheme could not be 
changed except by consensus and the making of a new Scheme and (perhaps 
more important politically) Ministers could not dismiss Board members (although 
they could choose not to re-appoint them) and “it was by sheer good luck that the 
[National] Board was only appointed for one year, with the result that it was possible 
to get rid of Mr Barrett [General Secretary of the NASD] who acted in a completely 
unconstitutional manner”. In addition, when the scheme had been drawn up, no 
consideration was given to what would happen in the case of industrial disputes. In 
such cases the Board was “bound to disintegrate because the dispute is between 
one side and the other”, and if the dispute was unofficial some of the workers’ 
representatives might choose to support the strike, others to oppose it. And if the 
employer then returned the men’s registration books to the Board (which was the 
usual practice) the Board then became the employer – at a point where it was 
disintegrating – and had to decide on and enforce any penalties. In any case, Local 
Boards consisted of equal numbers of both sides so “where the sides differ, no 
decision can be arrived at”, and in consequence “the Board is blamed for 
everything”. 235 Macmullan’s analysis is supported by McKelvey:   
 
The….feature which the disputes had in common was the way in which 
attention was shifted from the original grievance to an attack upon the 
disciplinary powers of the Board. As a result, dissatisfaction became 
focussed on the Board.236 
 
That the Scheme should have had such defects is not surprising, given the speed 
with which Bevin had moved to have the 1940 Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill 
debated and passed,237 and then to implement ‘Order 1305’ (July 1940), to conclude 
a National Dock Agreement and arrange for the laying of SR&O 1941/1440 in July 
1941 to implement the generic dock labour Schemes. The material for Macmullan’s 
 
234  NA file LAB 8/1707 MLNS: Informal inter-departmental enquiry into the provisions of the 
National Dock Labour Scheme. Memorandum from C W K Macmullan dated 23 August 1949 
235  Ibid.,  
236  McKelvey, Dock Labor, op.cit., p.40 
237  See Williams, Bevin, op.cit., pp. 219-220 
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enquiry included a study by R W Lynton and S D M King of the British Institute of 
Management that may be seen as a reflection in miniature of the way in which 
dockers were seen, with similarities to a social anthropological study: 
 
Our data consists of the descriptions and attitudes of the dock workers and 
people closely concerned with them, not as yet, of data derived from first-
hand study of the docks at work. The descriptions and attitudes may 
sometimes not really represent the facts of the situation to which they 
relate.238 
 
In essence, Lynton and King (and then Macmullan) were seeking to analyse and 
understand the problems from a dock worker’s perspective – but without any actual 
experience of the environment and working conditions of the dockers. In the event 
the report of Macmullan’s group239 was not published: Phillips records the 
negotiations and discussions following the Cabinet Secretary’s minute of 5th May 
1950 (and particularly Bevin’s fear that “any kind of inquiry would ill reward his 
beloved TGWU after its strenuous efforts to support the Government”),240 that led to 
the compromise solution of an inquiry under Sir Frederick Leggett.241 
 
The Leggett Report 
 
Leggett’s report, published in May 1951,242 can be seen as having been influenced 
to some extent by Macmullan in that his focus was primarily on the problems of 
dockers and the operation of the Dock Labour Scheme, which he saw as the main 
causes of the disputes, rather than any structural problems of the Scheme or the 
docks industry, or failings on the part of management. Although, for example, he 
noted the existence of “about 470 separate employers in the Port”,243 and the 
complexities of the piecework system,244 his conclusion was that there was “ample 
joint machinery for settling all differences without interruption of work” – even when 
he also acknowledged that there was often a need to resolve problems as a matter 
of urgency before a ship sailed.245 In his summary of Main Findings he criticises the 
 
238  NA files LAB 101/43 MLNS London Docks, a Framework for Study: Research in the 
London Docks by R P Lynton and S D M King  
239  NA File LAB 101/74 MLNS Report of a working party of officials from the Ministries of 
Labour and Transport 
240  Phillips Great Alliance op.cit., p.115 
241  ODNB: Sir Frederick Leggett, by Rodney Lowe 
242  Leggett Report 
243  Ibid., para 5 
244  Ibid., pp. 4-5 paras 16-18 
245  Ibid., p. 4 para15  
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“casual attitude” of the men, the activities of the “unofficials”, some aspects of the 
operation of the Dock Labour Scheme,246 and the trade unions.  But apart from 
some scathing comments on the lack of amenities in the port,247 for which his 
remedy was that “legal standards should be…..established” and control 
“concentrated under a single authority”,248 the report contains almost no criticism of 
the functions or performance of the NDLB/LDLB, the port employers, or the PLA. On 
the other hand, Leggett has 21 paragraphs of comment, criticism and advice for the 
trade unions,249 referring to the challenge represented by the ‘unofficials’, inter-union 
“friction”, and the position of union officials, followed by extensive consideration of 
the TGWU’s organisation, information and publicity, and its need to engage with 
“the men”.250 Issue should perhaps also be taken with a specific passage in Leggett 
where he refers to being: 
 
Given repeated instances of men stopping work automatically with little or no 
idea why they were stopping. In the words of one witness, himself a dock 
worker, all that was needed was for a man to go round the docks shouting 
‘all out’ and waving the man off the ships, and out they would come.251  
 
 
This has strong resonance with the passage in Oram:252 
 
In 1948, a period of intense stoppages, I was told by a union official of the 
TGWU that anybody with a cap and a choker, on a bicycle, could ride 
around the West India docks shouting ‘they’re all out in the Royals’. Men 
would come trooping off the ships with no questions asked, no regard to 
agreements or the current work.253 
 
These comments are not borne out by the evidence in the MLNS files: in 1948, the 
year cited by Oram, the only port-wide strike was the major ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike 
 
246  Although, as his report shows, the Inquiry took evidence from wide range of interests, his 
conclusion that “individuals who persistently show themselves unwilling to observe the 
conditions of the scheme…should be dismissed from the industry” flies in the face of the 
developing thinking that such penalties could not be applied en masse. 
247  Leggett Report, pp. 29-33 paras 83-89 
248  Ibid., p.2 
249  Ibid., paras 61-82. 
250 Arguably, vindicating the ODNB comment that in his role as CIC at the MLNS, “any 
lasting settlement had accordingly to be built up from below by the parties directly 
concerned”.  
251  Leggett Report, para 23. That passage is repeated in the Devlin report 1956, para 29 (2) 
252  Although Oram is not shown as having given evidence to the Committee in NA file LAB 
10/1041 Leggett Committee on Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks: correspondence 
with individuals and organisations who may give evidence. 
253  Oram, p.42 
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considered above.254 In the period from 1948 to 1953, out of a total of 68 strikes in 
London shown in the MLNS ledgers 50 strikes were single issues, generally 
resolved the same day, 12 involved more than 1,000 man-days, and only 6 were 
port-wide.255 To some extent the narrative in Leggett is self-contradictory, for he 
argues that if two or more men left a gang, it would be unable to continue its work, 
and if a gang stopped work, gangs working other holds of the ship would be unable 
to continue lest the ship became unstable.256 
 
There seems little evidence that Leggett’s report was recognised as the answer to 
the problems of unofficial strikes: The Times contains only one narrative article on 
the Report, and no further analysis or comment.257 The report itself was not the 
subject of any formal consideration in either House of Parliament, although 
reference was made to some of the findings in a debate on cargo handling in the 
Lords in March 1952 when (unsurprisingly) there were no voices to represent the 
workmen’s views.258 In line with his underlying thesis that the primary causes of 
industrial disputes lay in the attitudes and behaviour of the workforce, rather than 
any systemic problems within the industry,259 Leggett devotes seven paragraphs to 
the activities of the “unofficials”, arguing that their ultimate aim was the destruction 
of “the constitutional machinery which…has gained for the dock workers the 
substantial advantages which they now enjoy”.260  
 
The ‘Pay award/Seven dockers’ strike of 1951 
 
 
While Leggett was still deliberating another strike occurred, which is an example of 
a minor strike that might easily have been allowed to die a natural death, but where 
an over-reaction on the part of the authorities led to a much larger stoppage. The 
MLNS file shows that a minor strike began on Merseyside on 1 February 1951 as a 
protest against a pay award recommended by both sides of the NJCPTI.261 On 8 
February the London RIRO reported that “attempts have been made by unofficial 
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elements in the last two or three days to provoke a stoppage in the London docks in 
support of the strike action taken by Merseyside dockers, but in the main the 
attempts have been unsuccessful”, and subsequent memoranda on the file show 
that the strike was gradually losing support.262 However, on that day seven dockers 
were arrested263 and charged with “conspiring with others to take part in illegal 
strikes”.264 This apparently ill-timed intervention by the authorities had been 
foreshadowed in Cabinet a year earlier: in his paper of 21 April 1950 the Attorney 
General had noted that: 
 
I have hitherto refrained from proceeding under the Order [1305] owing to 
the fear that action might simply exacerbate the strike situation. I think it has 
to be recognised that the ordinary processes of the Criminal law are 
ineffective to stop large-scale strike action, but while this very explicit Order 
remains in existence I find it increasingly difficult to refrain from operating it, 
since it is impossible to allow the law to be consistently and contemptuously 
flouted. As at present advised I am inclined to direct prosecutions in the next 
suitable case…265 
 
The minutes of that meeting show considerable reservations on the part of the 
Cabinet about such a prosecution,266 but a year later these reservations seem not to 
have been of such importance, and the arrests went ahead. This immediately led to 
further industrial action, with large numbers of London dockers joining the 
Merseyside strikers.267 In the event the jury returned self-contradictory verdicts to 
the three counts within the indictment,268 and the Attorney-General was given leave 
to abandon the case.269  
 
The ‘Tally Clerks’ strike of 1951 
 
 
The Leggett report was followed within less than a month by a strike of Tally Clerks, 
the last major strike in the London docks before the General Election of October 
1951 that led to a Conservative administration. The strike affected a relatively small 
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group of key workers – tally clerks (a specialism unique to deep sea trade vessels in 
London) track the movement of cargoes, and without them ships can be neither 
loaded nor unloaded – and here the strike revealed problems with the operation 
(rather than the rules) of the Dock Labour Scheme. The strike ended after 
assurances were (apparently) given to the clerks, but the solution only provided a 
temporary fix: disputes with similar causes were to recur in 1957 and 1960. The 
primary cause of the dispute was a decision by the LDLB to recruit an additional 80 
tally clerks as part of an overall increase of 1,500 men for the London register.270 
For various technical reasons (including an objection by shipowners to the use of 
part-qualified dockers as relief clerks and some regulatory changes), the proportion 
of tally clerks to the overall register had increased significantly,271 and the proposal 
by the Board to further increase the number of clerks led to concerns that this might 
both dilute their earnings (which had become inflated with the increased work load 
and with overtime) and lead to redundancies if trade later dropped off. The clerks’ 
secondary concern was that they had little effective leverage in industrial 
negotiations because they were very small contingents within their “parent” unions 
(the TGWU and the NASD) and their interests would often be subsumed within or 
displaced by wider agreements.272 An indication of the extent to which this was a 
real issue is demonstrated by the notes on the NA files that NDLB officials had 
refused to meet a group of clerks on 10 May 1951 because it was not a formal 
TGWU/NASD delegation,273 and a similar response was given when the group 
approached the MLNS.274 The likelihood of a dispute was well signposted, with 
press reports in The Times, and other national newspapers,275 but neither the NDLB 
nor the MLNS appeared prepared to tackle the issue at that point: the MLNS view 
being that “the difficulty can be attributed to the Port Workers Committee (sic)”,276 
and it was also noted that the TGWU had set up an “advisory committee” of tally 
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clerks to consider the matter. With no notice being apparently taken of their 
concerns, the men did indeed go on strike on 4 June.  
 
At its peak the strike involved 1,470 clerks and rendered around 10,000 other men 
idle but because the clerks handled only the deep sea trade, other parts of the port 
worked as usual. Once again, an intervention by the MLNS was required to resolve 
the dispute by bringing both sides together: the record of a meeting between the 
Minister and representatives of both employers and unions is illuminating ,277 
showing that the Minister was looking to “allay the men’s fear and suspicions” while 
Deakin of the TGWU is reported as having said “that it would not be possible to 
maintain the normal course of industrial relations in the industry if recourse was 
continually made to the Minister”.278 In the event, “there was a full resumption of 
work on Wednesday 14 June [after] assurances given that there would be some 
form of consultation with the lay members of the ships clerks in advance of further 
future recruitment”.279 A leading article in The Times half-way through the strike was 
generally supportive of the clerks’ “genuine sense of grievance”, arguing that they 
called off the planned strike in May because “they believed there would be further 
discussion by the Board before any new clerks were engaged” – but that the Board 
went ahead with the recruitment. The leader further argues that the TGWU had 
failed in its responsibilities “both to speak for its members and to explain proposed 
innovations to them”.280 But irrespective of all of this, and in line with almost all of 
the previous disputes and reports, once the strike was settled, no follow-up action 
was taken.281  
 
Following the formation of a Conservative Government in October 1951, Churchill 
appointed Sir Walter Monckton282 as Minister of Labour and National Service. 
Alongside his abilities in other fields, Monckton was widely recognised as a skilled 
and effective conciliator,283 and proved to be most effective in that role. For the 
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docks, some idea of his emollient effect may be seen in the fact there were only 
some 20 disputes in the UK docks recorded in the MLNS ledgers in 1953, resulting 
in the loss of 33,163 man-days, compared to 26 disputes and 452,207 days lost in 
1951.284  The corollary of his focus on conciliation was, however, that there was little 
progress towards longer-term structural changes285 with the consequence that as 
wartime controls (and rationing) eased, and price rises led to increasing levels of 
industrial unrest, there were few other strategies to ease the strain on the tripartite 
systems. 
 
The ‘Overtime’ strike of October 1954  
 
This strike can be seen as the point at which Monckton’s ‘sticking plaster’ approach 
was beginning to fail. The strike, and its associated ‘constitutional issue’, was the 
subject of two reports by a committee under Sir Raymond Evershed286 that were 
considered in detail by Jim Phillips in 1996.287  I have noted earlier that the 1948 
Cameron committee had been unable to find a satisfactory form of words to define 
the conditions under which overtime should be worked as part of the negotiations 
following the introduction of the 1947 Scheme.  Allen also shows the difficulty faced 
by the unions in negotiating a compromise form of wording (for what was seen as a 
key issue by the employers), eventually agreed by the TGWU and supported by the 
NASD.288 Evershed reviewed the background and the nature of voluntary or 
compulsory overtime in ten paragraphs before concluding that:  
 
The question of the exact nature of the obligation imposed by clause 8 (5) 
(b) of the Scheme had equally been left undetermined by the PLEC and the 
NJC[PTI]289 
 
In the absence of a clearly agreed definition, both the TGWU and the NASD 
maintained that “in principle overtime is voluntary” and this had been the accepted 
working arrangement since the inception of the Scheme.290 In reality, however, the 
problem was a running sore, so that in the year ended 3 April 1954 London 
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285  See Davis Smith, Attlee and Churchill, op.cit.,  p.112 and John Ramsden, The Age of 
Churchill and Eden (London: Longman, 1995) p.259 
286 Interim Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks (Evershed Interim 
Report, Cmd 9302, 1954) and Evershed Final Report, Cmd 9310,1954) 
287  Jim Phillips ‘Inter-Union Conflict in the Docks, 1954-55’. Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations 1 (1996) pp. 107-130.  
288  Allen, Deakin op.cit., p.194  
289  Evershed Final Report, paras 19-30 
290  Evershed Interim Report, para 4(D).  
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employers had reported 813 men to the Board for refusing to work overtime,291 
although only 115 men had been penalised.292  All of these cases were dealt with 
under the disciplinary provisions of the Scheme, and penalties imposed by the 
LDLB, although the workers’ refusals, by definition, would have been in relation to 
the operational employer, rather than the Board. There had also been at least 17 
minor disputes and refusals to work overtime in ports throughout the UK between 
July 1947 and January 1955.293   
 
The London strike arose following the suspension of eight dockers in September 
1953 for one day, for failing to work overtime. One of the eight was an NASD official 
(J E Knight): his appeal (with three others) was disallowed on 8 January 1954, and 
the NASD began an overtime ban on 18 January.  ‘Constitutionally’ this ban should 
not have been implemented: the dispute had been referred for conciliation under an 
agreement between the NAPE and the unions, and one of the constituent working 
parties produced a compromise formula in early February.294 On 24 February the 
employers responded: while being prepared to “deal with the matters arising from 
day to day operations” they refused to discuss “matters of general policy” – i.e. the 
definition of overtime.295 The issue dragged on without any indication that either side 
would give way, with what must have been losses of income or profit for both sides: 
but it also highlighted another weakness in the Scheme: as the NA file shows, by 4 
October 1954 a total of 85,675 penalty notices had been issued to RDWs but 
because as early as 25 March the NDLB had decided  that no action should be 
taken “in respect of complaints lodged by employers”296 the notices had no punitive 
value, and simply demonstrated once again how the disciplinary procedures within 
the Scheme failed in mass applications.  Further complications arose in this already 
confused situation when a dispute arose about new arrangements for handling 
cargoes of meat after the end of rationing in July,297 and the employers (while 
agreeing new arrangements with the TGWU) refused to negotiate with the NASD.298  
 
291  Vernon Jensen Hiring of Dock Workers, (Harvard: University Press, 1964) pp 209-211 
explains the process in some detail, including the use of the form “D.8” to record alleged 
infringements of the Scheme 
292  Evershed Final Report, para 30. 
293  NA file BK 2/64 NDLB Discipline: refusal to work overtime 
294  NA file BK 2/83 NDLB: Ban on Overtime 1954. “Note for the File  4/20/50”  dated 3 
February 1954 records that the “PLA Group Joint Committee….had evolved a formula”  
295  Evershed Final Report, para 41 
296  BK 2/83; Minute 3141 of NDLB meeting 4 November 1954 
297  Note that the ending of rationing had been announced more than four months earlier 
(see The Times 18 February, p. 8, ‘Meat Rationing ends in July’), providing ample time 
for the negotiations. 
298  Evershed Final Report, paras 56-57 
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The situation once again required ministerial intervention, and Monckton set up the 
Evershed Court of Inquiry on 16 October: its final report on 28 October facilitated a 
return to work by the men on 1 November. As Phillips records: 
While asserting that the NASD’s actions had been unconstitutional, 
Evershed provided grounds for a settlement by asking employers to refrain 
from declaring overtime compulsory until the NJC [PTI] had settled a new 
and unambiguous formula.299 
 
Although nominally affecting only NASD members, the collateral impact on TGWU 
members was huge, and the strike resulted in the loss of more than half a million 
working days.300 While Evershed dealt only, as it were, with the evidence before 
him, Phillips locates this dispute and the subsequent conflict between the TGWU 
and the NASD on ‘poaching’ firmly in the “tradition of casual employment in the 
docks”.301 But it is also possible to see that the overlapping responsibilities of the 
port employers and the NDLB, together with the influence of the MLNS and the 
complex structure of organisations and committees noted earlier, militated against 
any clarity and cohesion to resolve the problem. The presumption would then be 
that one single body, responsible for the smooth operation and ongoing survival of 
the London docks could have resolved the overtime (and the meat handling issues) 
long before these got to the point of such huge losses of man days. As Evershed 
noted in relation to overtime: 
 
It is plain that the issue is a narrow one. It is moreover one which, according 
to the general view…is readily capable of settlement.302 
 
But, clearly, little had changed in the attitudes of both sides since the Cameron 
fudge. 
 
The ‘Stevedores recognition’ strike of 1954 
 
Even as those disputes were being settled, another difficulty was arising in a dispute 
between the TGWU and the NASD. In the course of an unofficial strike in Hull in 
September 1954, a number of TGWU members had applied to join the NASD 
although such a switch of unions was not allowed under the TUC’s ‘Bridlington’ 
 
299  Phillips, ‘Inter-Union Conflict’, p.111 
300  NA file LAB 34/70 Trade Disputes: Record Books, 1954 shows a loss of 530,230 working 
days. But as I show later, there should be some question as to the precision of these 
data. 
301  Phillips, ‘Inter-Union Conflict’, p.108 
302  Evershed Final Report, para. 36. 
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agreement.303 In spite of the fact that Barrett, the NASD General Secretary, 
opposed accepting those applications, the over-democratic model of the NASD 
meant that the union’s Executive could not prevent it, and the switch was followed 
by similar actions by men on Merseyside and in Manchester304 so that within six 
months the NASD in the northern ports claimed a membership of around 10,000.305 
Following complaints to the NJCPTI, the NASD had been expelled from that body in 
October although, as Phillips notes, the employers were not wholeheartedly behind 
the expulsion.306 In any event, the NASD members began a strike on 23 May 1955 
to achieve re-admission to the NJCPTI, and Barrett resigned on 21 June.307 
Although the strike ended on 4 July, the rancour and legal complications persisted 
for many months, culminating in the NASD’s suspension from the TUC in November 
1958, and expulsion at the 1959 Congress.  
 
The mid -1950s were a period of considerable change in politics and the dock 
environment: Anthony Eden308 had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister on 5 April 
1955 and Deakin had died in harness on 1 May.  Frank Cousins, Deakin’s eventual 
successor as General Secretary of the TGWU, although having worked with both 
Bevin and Deakin, was not in their mould in many respects, being a “left-wing 
radical” who “consistently resisted any form of state control over pay”.309 On the 
Conservative side Eden appointed the combative Iain Mcleod to replace Monckton 
in December 1955:310 Eden himself resigned in January 1957 and was replaced by 
Harold Macmillan.311  At this point in time, nearly ten years after its inception, it 
might well have been seen that problems in the structure and operation of the Dock 
Labour Scheme had been contributory factors to some of the strikes.312 However, as 
 
303 A set of rules adopted at the TUC congress in Bridlington in 1939 designed to minimise 
disputes between unions over membership questions. See “Historical notes on the TUC 
disputes principles and procedures” at 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/DPP_2016.pdf 
304 Bill Hunter, They Knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and the Leadership on the 
Docks 1945-1989 (London, Index Books: 1994) pp. 24-26 gives a good account of the 
events leading to this. 
305  Phillips ‘Inter-Union Conflict’, pp.113-114. 
306  Ibid., Coupled with the NASD’s expulsion from the NDLB in 1949, that union had no 
longer any formal position on any of the operational or policy-making bodies within the 
Dock Labour Scheme  
307  Barrett was already arguing for a more federal structure for a larger NASD – see Michael 
Kidron. ‘Interview with Dick Barrett’ Socialist Review 4 5 (1955) pp. 1-2 &4 
308  ODNB: (Robert) Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon) (1897-1977) by D R Thorpe 
309  ODNB: Frank Cousins (1904-1968) by Geoffrey Goodman 
310  ODNB: Iain Mcleod (1913-1970) by David Goldsworthy 
311  ODNB: (Maurice) Harold Macmillan (Earl of Stockton) (1894-1986) by H D C Matthew 
312  Although the Ammon Report did note some problems with the dock labour Scheme this 
was the 1942 London Scheme rather than the 1946/47 National Dock Labour Scheme. 
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both the Isaacs and Leggett reports313 had shown, the received view was that the 
disputes did not reflect such problems, but arose much more from the attitudes and 
behaviours of the workers.314 The same can be said about Evershed: his final report 
of 1954 has only a circumstantial reference to the structure of the Scheme.315  
Implicit in any of these reviews of the disputes ought surely to have been some 
recognition of the problems in the structure and operation of the Scheme, the failure 
of the NDLB to consider or propose changes to its role, and indecision at 
Government level about any reform. It is not that there were no voices expressing 
other views: after the publication of the Leggett report, one of the Committee 
members (Garrett) wrote to the Minister (Alf Robens) saying that: 
 
I was so struck with the absence of skilled advice throughout the docks on 
so many questions of practical modern labour relations that I seriously 
considered a short minority report on the point.316 
 
Eventually, the long-term discord in the docks led to pressure in both the Press and 
in Parliament for a more far-reaching inquiry onto the workings of the scheme,317 
and an inquiry was announced in April 1955,318 where Monckton asked Mr Justice 
(later Lord) Devlin: 
 
To inquire into the workings of the Dock Workers (Regulation of 
Employment) Scheme 1947 and to advise what alterations, if any, should be 
made in the terms of the Scheme. 319 
 
In his report Devlin swiftly concluded that the “main business” would be: 
 
to consider a proposal by the National Association of Port Employers…that 
the Scheme should be the subject of a major alteration.320 
 
With this, he saw “the big questions that we must try to answer” as being: 
 
(a) Whether the Scheme, because of its present character, has caused or 
contributed to unrest in the industry; and if so, 
 
313  Isaacs and Leggett Reports.  
314  Leggett devoted only four paragraphs (out of 90) to the NDLB’s role and functions, 
(Leggett Report, paragraphs 37 to 40): compare this to the seven paragraphs (83-89) on 
the amenities in the London docks ) 
315  Evershed Final Report para 37 
316  NA file LAB 10/1039 Leggett Committee on Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks: 
report. Letter from Sir Wilfrid Garrett to Robens 18 June 1951 
317  See, for example, House of Lords Hansard, 16 November 1954, cols 1550-1570 
318  House of Commons Hansard, 21 April 1955, col 15 
319  House of Commons Hansard, 28 July 1955, cols 218-9 
320  Devlin Report 1956, para 1 
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(b) Whether the alternative proposed by the Employers would remove or 
diminish this unrest.321 
Devlin considered the employers’ proposal in some detail, but effectively dismissed 
them,322 so that the major deliberative part of the report is about the Scheme and 
the role and functions of the NDLB. He noted that since the inception of the Scheme 
in 1947 there had been six major strikes, but that three323 “had manifestly nothing to 
do with the Scheme,” while the other three324 were not about the Scheme, but “the 
method of its application”.325   
 
He identified a number of “the underlying causes of industrial unrest”, identified in 
previous reports326 and then focused on two areas of the operation of the scheme – 
the use of the disciplinary procedures as means of countering strike action, seen in 
those terms as “mass indiscipline”,327 and then the role of the NDLB as an employer 
and provider of labour for the operational employers. For the first of these, Devlin 
noted that none of the Board’s actions had proven to be truly effective: if the most 
extreme option of suspending or abolishing the scheme were to be adopted, some 
other mechanism would need to be put into place to furnish the necessary labour for 
the docks. On the other hand, “the scheme cannot deal with offences by thousands 
of men” (as had been shown in the overtime ban), so that the only logical course of 
action would be to focus on persistent troublemakers who “persistently incited 
unconstitutional action”. In reality, however, if the men thought that the cause was 
just none would “allow their leader to be singled out and punished”.328  
Devlin then considered the character and actions of the NDLB: while noting that the 
Board had made good progress in areas - such as training and welfare and the 
provision of medical services – where it had a statutory responsibility, in terms of its 
functions as the “general employer” of dock labour the Board: 
 
321  Ibid., para 19 
322  Ibid., paras 21-23, and part IV (paras 72-89) 
323  The ‘Canadian seamen’s’ strike, the ‘pay/seven dockers’ strike, and the ‘Stevedores 
recognition’ strike.    
324  The other three were the ’Zinc Oxide’ strike, the ‘Ineffectives” strike, and the ‘Expulsions’ 
strike. 
325  Devlin Report 1956, para 28 
326  Ibid., para 29. These were: Past History, Solidarity, Large Ports, Communist Influence, 
Trade Union organisation, Inter-Union rivalry, Resistance to obligations under the 
Scheme, and Impersonality and remoteness  
327 Ibid., paras 30-36: note that Leggett had already recorded (Leggett Report, para 50) how 
difficult it was in practice to use the disciplinary code provisions when large numbers of 
men were involved.  
328 Ibid., para 35 
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 “[deals] only with matters on which fundamental policy is [already] 
agreed…and is strictly confined to the administration of the Scheme. The 
evidence is that all decisions of industrial policy are arrived at by the 
National Joint Council [for the Port Transport Industry] and no contentious 
issue is even discussed by the Board”329 
 
He suggested two areas where the Board could have been more active, first in the 
allocation of work, where it only became involved after the foremen had finished 
selecting their own gangs,330 and then in considering whether there was a real need 
for a second call-on in the afternoon, but noted that the Board considered these to 
be “industrial matters and thus outside its competence”. 331  
 
Devlin shows that the main interaction in terms of pay and conditions took place at 
the NJCPTI,332 but while the national pay rates would have been established there, 
negotiations on pay and piecework rates for the various ports took place locally: for 
example, the PLA Archives contain the minutes of the “Joint Piecework Sub-
Committee” meeting of 8 December 1969, covering the piecework rates for 
discharge of “bales and bundles”.333 Devlin saw the National Board “simply as a 
body in which both sides of the industry sit together…[and] never goes beyond what 
can be made common ground”, and it therefore dealt “only with matters on which 
fundamental policy is [already] agreed” [by the NJCPTI].334 To the ordinary docker, 
although the Board was “the general employer….most men will spend the greater 
part of their working lives with one, perhaps many, operational employers” and, in 
consequence this created “a doubt in the mind of the average worker as to who his 
employer really is”. His final comment points to a fundamental weakness in the 
Board’s attitude and indicates at least a probable reason for why there were so 
many disputes: 
 
the Board does not regard itself as at all concerned with the causes of 
industrial unrest. All of its present members believe that any contribution 
towards the solution of industrial problems would be unwelcome and think 
the Board has no role to play in the general affairs of the Industry…335 
 
329 Ibid., para 51 
330 Which could have been addressed under Clause 3 (i) of SR&O 1947/1189 where the 
Board had the statutory duty of “ensuring the full and proper utilisation of dock labour for 
the purpose of facilitating the rapid and economic turnround of vessels and the speedy 
transit of goods through the port” 
331  Ibid., paras 58-59 
332  Ibid., para 7 
333  PLA Archive Box 172 “Piecework Rates 1946-1949” 
334  Devlin Report 1956, para 51 
335  Ibid., para 60 
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Devlin was also critical of the protestations by the NAPE that their proposed model 
of a “National Dock Labour Employers’ Corporation” would be a better model for 
managing the docks, extending the beneficial works of the NDLB and “building an 
organisation which will command the loyalty of the men”. Devlin would have none of 
this: the Employers’ corporation (i.e. the NAPE) had “nothing to identify it except 
that it stands for employers in general…it cannot even consist of employers whose 
working lives are all bound up in the industry”, and would be just as remote and 
anonymous an employer as the NDLB.336  A leading article in the Times noted that 
Devlin had “concluded, not unreasonably, that the form of the scheme itself has 
contributed to the failure to improve relations and has even introduced new causes 
of disharmony”.337 The key structural (rather than operational) problem was seen by 
the leader writer as the interposition of the [National] Dock Labour Board as “a third 
party between employers and workers”, but the article criticised the report in 
recommending the continuation of the separation of “legal” and “operational” 
employers, and suggesting that “difficulties might be eased…through new initiatives 
by the Board” without considering other (more drastic) options.  
 
The NDLB saw itself, in effect, as an employment agency, but its powers to 
discipline the workforce and the employers meant that it had functions outside that 
limited role. The NDLB/LDLB could also, for example, prevent employers from 
taking on unregistered workers to break deadlocks,338 and by not actively 
disciplining workers refusing to do overtime might have had a calming effect in the 
overtime dispute. But generally, in regard to both employers and workers, the NDLB 
had only persuasive rather than mandatory powers. Moreover, as I have shown, 
both the National and London boards were also subject to Government influence 
and interference.  Although, for the first time, a major report had been able to take 
an holistic view of the industrial relations problems affecting the docks, the strategic 
outcomes of the report were very limited: given Devlin’s definition of the “big 
questions”, it is unsurprising that the Times article focused on the continuation of the 
principle of dual control.339 In any case, the report itself was very restrained, stating 
that: 
 
It is disappointing that the Board has not matured into a more positive force 
and has not been able to make a greater contribution towards curing the 
malady in the industry… 
 
But noting that: 
 
 
336  Ibid., paras 81-83 
337  The Times 27 July 1956, p.11 ‘Dock Labour’ 
338  SR&O 1947/1189 Clause 10 (1) 
339 The Times, 27 July 1956: p. 7 ‘Principle of Dual Control in the Docks Upheld’ 
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Both sides…regard themselves as competent to run [the Scheme] by 
themselves without interference…340 
 
Given that sentiment, and since the NDLB and the NJCPTI were the main 
influencers of Government and Civil Service opinion, no action was taken to follow 
up the report. As Lord Ammon noted in June 1957:  
 
considering that is two years since this Committee were appointed, and over 
twelve months since they reported, is it not time that the Government did 
something - either accept the Report or reject it, but at least make up their 
mind on the matter?341 
 
In fact, it was not until 18 December 1957 (two days before the House rose for the 
Christmas recess) that the Minister (Iain McLeod) informed MPs that: 
 
I have decided that, in the interests of the development of the work of the 
National Joint Council, the functions of the Board should not be extended, 
and the Board will continue as at present. This decision is in accordance 
with the views that have been expressed to me by the interests 
concerned.342 
 
The ‘interests concerned’ were primarily the NDLB and the NJCPTI.343 Plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose: the weakness of the NDLB had been recognised 
as early as 1949,344 but nothing had been done to change that situation: as the 
Cabinet minutes show that “there was general agreement that this was not an 
appropriate time at which to launch a formal enquiry into the operation of the Dock 
Labour Scheme”.345 The relationships and functional overlaps between the NDLB 
and the NJCPTI were replicated by the arrangements for negotiations within the 




340  Devlin Report 1956, paras 90 and 95 
341  House of Lords Hansard, 6 June 1957, col 233 
342  House of Commons Hansard 18 December 1957, cols 424-428 
343  LAB 101/73 Note also that the real discussions, negotiations, and (often disagreements) 
took place in the Executive Committee rather than the full Council. 
344  NA file CAB 128/16/3 Cabinet conclusions 18 July 1949, minute 6: “The Minister of 
Labour said that he was not satisfied that the troubles in the docks arose primarily from the 
operation of the Dock Labour Scheme. Admittedly, the Board had not imposed strict 
discipline, but the decision to rely on persuasion rather than discipline had been taken with 
the full agreement of the employers' representatives on the Board. Most of the unofficial 
strikes in the past year had related to disputes about pay and conditions of service and 
these were matters for the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry, rather than 
the National Dock Labour Board. “ 
345 Ibid., note (2) 
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(Taken from Leggett Report, Appendix I, p.34)  
 
The diagram shows only the local arrangements for London: in practice there would 
be some influence from the national negotiating body (the NJCPTI), but there is 
(once again) no indication of any involvement by the National or London Dock 
Labour Boards. In general, within this structure, “employers and workpeople are in 
practice represented equally”,346  but it is difficult to see who among the front line 
workforce (as opposed to a union official) might fully comprehend the complexity of 
 
346  Evershed Final Report, para 21 
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the management structure of the port, or of the organisations within which he or she 
worked, or which element of management might be responsible for resolving any 
difficulties. In terms of a system for industrial relations, there are simply too many 
possible points of failure.  
 
The ‘Covent Garden’ and ‘Smithfield’ sympathy strikes 1957-58 
 
Two substantial strikes in the following 18 months reflect back to Devlin’s criticisms 
of the NDLB’s reluctance to become involved in industrial disputes. Faced once 
again with strikes that, like the Canadian Seamen’s dispute, arose from events 
outside the docks, the NDLB seemed minded neither to intervene directly nor to 
develop solutions. The first strike was in support of workers in Covent Garden, 
where a strike began on 15 July 1957 when proposals by the market tenants for the 
rationalization of handling produce by unifying the labour force of pitchers 
(unloaders) and porters (loaders) were to be implemented. On 24 July workers in 
the West India dock began to refuse to handle produce destined for Covent Garden, 
but initially there was little direct conflict in the dock. However, by August 6 the 
NDLB attitude was hardening, and “eight men who refused to handle produce for 
Covent Garden were sent back to the labour pool”, and this resulted in “more than 
2,000 dockers…in wharves in the Tooley street area” stopping work. By 12 August 
the number on strike had risen to 4,932, but the intervention of Frank Cousins on 14 
August appeared to facilitate a resolution of the main dispute with effect from the 
following Monday (19 August) although the number of dockers on strike actually 
increased to 12,016 on 15 August.347 The LDLB was clearly placed in a difficult 
position again, with only a limited number of options for action, because it was clear 
that application of the disciplinary penalties was likely to exacerbate the dispute: in 
the circumstances, the early intervention of the TGWU had perhaps saved the 
Board’s face.  
 
However, a similar dispute in May of the following year in support of a strike by meat 
delivery drivers from Smithfield market in London proved more difficult although, as 
a subsequent report showed, that initial strike could almost certainly have been 
avoided (and ended much earlier).348 Once again, a key feature was the inability on 
the part of either the London or the National Boards to develop a clear plan of action 
to resolve the dispute. The actual strike began on 20 May 1958 in the wharves and 
 
347  The Times, 16 August 1957, p.8 ‘Over 12,000 dockers out and 100 ships idle’ 
348  The Times, 8 July 1958, p.8 ‘Smithfield stoppage ‘Flagrant Violation’ of Machinery’ 
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cold stores that had the closest connections with the Smithfield men. At first 
localised, the dispute spread when one of the wharfingers affected by the strike 
used unregistered men to unload meat so that by the afternoon of 22 May it affected 
the whole port.  The numbers on strike fell back over the next few days when the 
unregistered men were withdrawn, but when such men were again used on 29 May 
the whole port was once more affected. The NA file shows that the LDLB was under 
constant pressure from the wharfingers and other employers to formally approve the 
use of unregistered workers under Clause 10 of the Scheme (which allowed for the 
use of such labour where “dock work is urgently required to be done and it is not 
practicable to obtain a registered docker for that work”).349 The correspondence and 
copies of NDLB minutes in the files show clearly the inability of the local Board to 
reach a decision on this: the LDLB view was that “it was not the intention that [this 
Clause] should operate in circumstances such as now obtain”, and so referred the 
matter to the National Board. The NDLB considered this request on 31 May but was 
unable (or unwilling) to offer any constructive suggestions, so that: 
 
After a lengthy discussion it was decided to inform the London Board that 
agreement had not been reached on the application of the provisions of 
Clause 10(3) of the Scheme in the circumstances reported but that the 
National Board would continue to keep the situation under close review. 
 
In other words, neither Board could decide how to react to a sympathy strike.350 
Once again action by the TGWU helped the Boards: the union made strenuous 
efforts to have the strike called off, but the strike only ended on 23 June when the 
Smithfield dispute was settled following the setting up of inquiry under Professor D T 
Jack.351  
 
The Tally Clerks strike again- 1957 and 1960 
 
 Even though Devlin had given a sympathetic hearing to the Clerks in 1956,352 he 
had suggested no substantive changes in their conditions of employment or their 
representation, and two strikes by Tally Clerks in 1957 and 1960 show that the 
 
349  SR&O 1947/1189 Clause 10 (3) (a) (i) and (ii)  
350  NA file BK2/1091: Ministry of Labour: Supporting Smithfield strikers and use of non-
registered labour. Letter from LDLB to NDLB dated 30 May 1958  
351  The Times,19 June 1958, p.10 ‘Meat Drivers Vote to Go Back’ 
352  Devlin Report 1956, paras 69-71 
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tensions in that area were still unresolved.353  The 1957 strike, which involved the 
loss of more than 77,000 man days,354 began after work was transferred from the 
Upper Docks to Tilbury, and the Tilbury clerks objected to the use of office staff for 
some aspects of the clerking work that had apparently been acceptable in the Upper 
Docks. The strike began on 9 January and ended on the 15th when it was agreed 
that all future work would be handled by tally clerks, but the clerks struck again from 
25 March to 9 April, when the employers agreed to recruit more clerks. The 1960 
strike has very strong echoes of the 1951 strike: no additional clerks had been 
recruited since 1955 and the number of clerks had fallen from 1,748 to 1,522 by 
natural wastage. So when, as in 1951, the general dock labour force was being 
increased, a number of additional clerks were required. This was initially met by 
recruitment, but in September the LDLB decided to increase the workforce further 
and invited “volunteers from among those men who had been regularly performing 
docker-checker duties to fill 50 vacancies”, and the clerks went on strike.355  Their 
fears included the fact that significant additions in both 1951 and 1955 had resulted 
in redundancies as trade diminished in later years. Although the Minister of Labour 
announced on 4 October 1960 that a Court of Inquiry would be established under 
Mr Lloyd Williams, the strike dragged on until 17 October. Two aspects of the strike 
are worth noting: firstly, the NA files contain 17 letters from the public and certain 
organisations to MPs and Ministers indicating a strong public reaction, although it is 
not possible to say whether this was some form of orchestrated protest. 356 The 
Prime Ministerial files give an indication of a more realistic attitude, with the 
premier’s Private Secretary noting that: 
 
The position now is that Mr Cousins…has been leaning heavily on his Union 
officials to find a solution [and] they have been working on a formula with the 
TGWU element of the strikers357…which is roughly on the lines that the 
Board will see that this sort of thing doesn’t happen again. It is thought that 
the Board should be able to swallow this since they would not be so silly as 
to get themselves into a similar sort of mess again.358 
 
353  BK 2/1088 shows that there had also been a strike threat in 1954, where the Board 
wished to recruit more Clerks at Tilbury.  
354 LAB 34/73 records a loss of 77,730 man-days 
355 Ocean Shipowners’ Tally Clerks. Report of a Committee appointed by the Minister of 
Labour to consider the difficulties which have arisen in the Port of London. (Lloyd 
Williams Report)  (London: HMSO, 1960) pp. 4-5 
356 NA file LAB 43/355 MLNS Private Office Papers: Selected Case files:  Strike of Tally 
Clerks at London Docks 1960 
357 Bearing of course in mind that a significant number of clerks were NASD members 
358 NA file PREM 11/4001 Prime Minister’s Office: correspondence and papers 1951-64. 
Strikes and Industrial disputes unofficial strike of Tally Clerks in Port of London. AJ 
Phelps to Prime Minister 13 October 1960 
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That sense of realism in Downing Street seems not, however, to have permeated 
beyond the Board, because the employers demanded punitive action against the 
returning strikers, causing this reaction from Macmillan: 
 
It is an old dispute: most of the employers are reasonable and would take 
the men back on the same terms as before. Lord Sanderson and one or two 
others wish to alter the terms, substituting a daily employment for a weekly 
(one) unless they apply in writing. This is merely a foolish, old fashioned and 
petulant attempt to score off them” 359 
 
The NA files also reveal the long-established feelings among the clerks that 
because they were in a non-dockers section of the TGWU (the Clerical Workers 
Group) their views were ill-represented in discussion on LDLB or NDLB.360 The 
Lloyd Williams report changed very little for the longer term: it listed but then 
dismissed the clerks’ complaints: 
 
At this stage all we would wish to say about these contentions is that the 
LDLB was well aware of all the factors enumerated…and had in addition 




we have been unable to see that the tally clerks had any valid or reasonable 
grounds for grievance.362  
 
The Strikes reviewed 
 
As a precursor to this section, it is worth noting that the Cameron report of 1958363 
provides a useful insight into the attitudes of the employers towards pay 
negotiations, and the extent to which they were aware of the probable 
consequences of their actions.  On 11 April 1958 the workpeople’s side of the 
NJCPTI submitted a claim for a ‘substantial increase’ in the daily wage rate with a 
proportional increase for piecework rates.364 This was formally rejected by the 
employers’ side on 6 May and again on 23 May after the workpeople’s side had 
 
359 PREM 11/4001 Letter from Macmillan to John Hare, Minister of Labour, 14 October 1960  
360 NA File LAB 101/99 Evidence by three Tally Clerks to Devlin Committee of Inquiry 1956. 
361 Lloyd Williams report, p.6  
362 Ibid., p.14 
363 Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute between employers who are members of the 
employers’ side and workpeople who are represented on the workpeople’s side of the 
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry (Cameron Report 1958, Cmnd 510, 
1958)  
364  Ibid., para. 12 
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convened a delegate meeting that gave its representatives “wide authority to take 
such steps as was necessary to pursue the claim to its conclusion”. Senior MLNS 
officials met both sides separately, but “no mutually acceptable way of resolving the 
deadlock was found”, and the Court of Inquiry was set up on 24 July. The report (12 
August) recommended an increase of 7s 6d365 and was reported without comment 
in the Times.366 There are two important points from this report (which received far 
less coverage than earlier reports):  it summarised succinctly the division of 
responsibilities between the NDLB and the NJCPTI; and concluded that: 
 
The possible case for the Workers’ Side received less consideration than it 
deserved at the meetings of the National Joint Council, while the completely 
negative attitude of the Employers was not fully justified either by the 
arguments which they used at the Council or in any additional contentions 
which they put before us….[and] we feel also that an opportunity may have 
been lost in the interest of good labour relations between employers and 
employed….in the failure to explore, in the National Joint Council, the 
possible introduction or improvement of those benefits or amenities which 




we think that the negative attitude adopted by the Employers was taken up 
by them with a full sense of the responsibility they might incur and of the 
probable consequence of their attitude...[and] that these consequences 
might be very serious indeed.368  
 
In those few words Cameron encapsulated two factors that had not hitherto been 
highlighted in relation to the industrial disputes: the intransigence of the employers 
and their wilful use of ‘brinkmanship’ – in the (presumed) knowledge that the 
dockers were commonly seen as at fault, and would be blamed for any strikes. In 
the same vein, and almost by definition, strikes that did not happen or spread 
attracted minimal (positive) publicity, and it is thus worth noting an occasion where a 
strike did not occur. This was in relation to mechanisation: the NDLB file contains 
two newspaper reports that in May 1958 the TGWU had agreed to the use of 
stacker trucks, “where three men could do the work previously done by eight”, and 
even though an “unofficial dock leader” addressed a meeting of some 1,000 men 
(out of 8,000) from the Royal group on 24 May, the men then returned to work.369  
 
365 In the recognition that average wages had fallen by 6s per week in the previous year, and 
that the consumer price index had risen by 6% (Cameron Report 1958, para. 46) 
366 The Times 20 August 1958, p.8 ‘Court suggests 7s 6d rise for Dockers’ 
367  Cameron Report 1958, para. 46 
368  Ibid., para. 43 
369 NA file BK 2/1084 NDLB Head Office Strikes: London. General  
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The major strikes (costing more than 40,000 man-days) between 1948 and 1960 
(i.e. in the currency of the 1947 Scheme) were as follows: 
 
Table 4:  Major Strikes in the London docks 1948-1960 
 
 
Year Strike Number of working  
days lost 
1948 Zinc Oxide 64,500 
1949 Ineffectives 49,000 
1949 Canadian Seamen 264,000 
1950 Expulsions 103,000 
1951  Pay dispute 227,000*  
1951 Tally Clerks 70,000 
1954 Overtime ban and meat sorting 530,230 
1955 NASD recognition 208,747 
1957 Tally Clerks 77,730 
1957 Alleged return of workers to pool who 
refused to handle ‘black’ cargo 
69,900 
1958 Support for Smithfield workers 110,000 
1960 Tally Clerks 210,300 
*(National figure) Source: MLNS ledgers in LAB 34/64 to LAB 34/ 
 
A graph gives some wider context:370  
 




Data from NA Files LAB 8/2614 and LAB 34/63 to 34/77,371 and Smith et al.372  
 
370 This graph has a logarithmic scale for the x-axis, so the values can be compared in terms 
of patterns.  
371 NA File LAB 8/2614 Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order 
1961: Appendix III of submission to Rochdale Inquiry May 1961; and LAB 34/63 to 34/77,  
372 CTB Smith, Richard Clifton, Peter Makeham, S W Creigh and R V Burn Strikes in Britain: 
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The graph demonstrates the way in which London dock strikes dominated the 
number and cost (in man-days lost) of UK-wide dock disputes. The UK-wide picture 
for all industries seems to reflect the same variability in the period 1955-1957, but all 
data show a steady increase in the number of strikes both in the docks and across 
the UK over the period. In terms of the Leggett assertion about the way dock strikes 
spread,373 the MLNS data shows that between 1948 and 1960, out of a total of 348 
strikes in the London docks, 168 (or 42%) lasted for one day or less – i.e. did not 
spread throughout the docks. In general these represented a failure to agree an 
increased rate for handling dirty or awkward cargoes, or for higher manning levels 
for a specific cargo. It is again arguable that a major employing organisation should 
have reviewed these and put more flexible and efficient systems in place to facilitate 
agreements and avoid recurrence – if only there were not more than 400 different 
employers. 
 
There is also the question of whether the strikes can be related to social or 
economic changes: James Cronin considered whether there might be any 
underlying features or patterns in UK strikes, noting that: 
 
British strikes tend to fluctuate together in all industries, to cluster and bunch 




“between 1950 and 1967 workers struck when their wage expectations were 
disappointed, that is, when the pace of real wage increases slowed down”375  
 
I would argue that although that might be the case in overall terms (and indeed the 
graph shows that there was a gradual increase in the number of dock strikes 
through the 1950s), the main feature is the number of ‘one-off’ strikes (and the 
recurring Tally Clerks’ strikes) that would have provided clear signals to any 
involved employer of the need for a systematic review of the problems and 
consideration of what improvements might be made.  
 
Underneath (but germane to all of this) is the question of the reliability of the data: 
the strikes in 1949-1960 seemed to involve huge losses of man-days, but on 
examination of the underlying material, the basis of calculation of the number of 
man days is questionable, both from the MLNS ledger and the NDLB data sheets. 
 
373  Leggett Report, para 23 
374 James E. Cronin ‘The Peculiar Pattern of British Strikes since 1888’ Journal of British 
Studies, 18, 2 (1979), pp. 118-141 
375 Ibid., p.126 
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The MLNS ledger identifies the number of men involved, and the duration of the 
strike, multiplies one by the other to show the number of man-days lost. But taking 
the example of the ‘overtime ban and meat sorting’ strike between 28 September 
and 30 October 1954 considered by Evershed, the MLNS ledger376 recorded a loss 
of 530,230 man-days for London, for a dispute lasting four weeks. This is based on 
a total of 26,475 men in the workforce multiplied by four weeks (= 20 days) 
(although the precise arithmetic would make a total of 529,500 working days lost in 
the 20 days). A note in the MLNS ledger shows that “the number of workers 
originally involved was about 200 but increased to about 26,500 by 18 October”, so 
the total man days lost cannot have been the 530,230 or 529,500, since both would 
be based on the whole workforce being on strike from the first day. Assuming some 
form of exponential (rather than linear) growth from the initial number of 200, and 
supposing the number of men on strike doubled each day, the MLNS figure of 
26,500 would be reached on the eighth day, and the total man days lost would be 
318,000. Furthermore, as the Evershed report shows, the average number of men 
“on the payroll” 377 in the London docks in the last two quarters of 1953 was 15,600. 
So the MLNS figure of 530,230 is an unachievable absolute for a 20-day strike. 
Using the ‘Evershed average’, the maximum number of days lost would be 312,000 
if the whole port was on strike from day one. Applying the growth calculations that I 
have postulated, the ‘Evershed average’ workforce total is reached between the 
seventh and eighth days, and the number of days lost would be 238,200 – i.e. less 
than half the published total.  
 
As has been shown above, the LDLB/NDLB calculations of absenteeism were not 
based upon specific returns but by a much more generalised review of the nominal 
totals of persons working in the various docks, and the same general approach was 
used for strikes.  The position in 1955 was set out in a letter from Haddock of the 
NDLB to the secretary of the Devlin inquiry of 1955/56, relating to the numbers of 
strikers:  
 
My comments have dealt only with daily workers, and it will be seen that 
even here we are dependent on the accuracy of information received from 
individual employers of the number of men in employment at the time; 
particularly in a port like London or Liverpool the large number of employers 
gives added scope for inaccuracy in this respect. Turning to the position with 
regard to weekly workers it will be appreciated that we are almost entirely 
dependent upon information obtained from employers. Quite apart from 
 
376 LAB 34/70 
377  Bearing in mind that the NDLB was the paying agent for all RDWs.  
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these considerations, there is scope for wide variation arising from the first 
day of a dispute when it cannot be stated with accuracy at what stage 
individual men have withdrawn their labour.378 
 
The data sheet for 7 June 1958 (the ‘Smithfield’ strike) shows the picture in more 
detail, indicating that a total of 6,444 men were in work or had proved attendance, 
550 were excused and 3,070 were on the dormant register – on long-term absence 
or working in other ports, making a total of 10,064. This was then subtracted from 
the nominal Register of 29,538 to give a total of 19,474 men on strike.379  
 
Figure 19: NDLB Strike data, 7 June 1958 
 
 
Source: NA File BK 2/1091 
 
There are two important points in relation to this presentation. Firstly, the figures 
include data from some wharves (shown under “Pool”) but the wharves extended for 
miles above and below the Pool of London and, secondly, in almost all 
circumstances there would never be a case where every man on the Register would 
have been employed: the basis of the system was that sufficient men would always 
be available to work the maximum number of ships, and Devlin noted that in 1954 
“the maximum daily requirement was twice the minimum” – although without giving 
any indication of the frequency distribution for those requirements. Evershed 
 
378  NA File BK 2/1252 NDLB: Strikes: statistics, 1947-61, letter from Haddock to 
Treganowan dated 8 December 1955 
379  BK 2/1091  
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indicates that on a national basis the average time when a docker worker attended 
a call but no work was available was 5.6 hours per week in a 42.74 working week380 
– i.e. 13%. So in any week in London, some 13% of the register (be that 26,475 or 
31,045) would be idle –so that between 17,208 and 20,180 man days would be lost, 
giving annual totals of between 894,816 and 1,049,321 days lost:  such is the 
arithmetic of underemployment in the Port of London.  At a different level, the data 
in the MLNS ledgers has also inconsistencies in other respects: as already noted, 
the totals for ‘man days lost’ are approximations when the numbers on strike and 
affected by the strikes increases or decreases during the dispute. But there are also 
significant omissions from the data for strikes by tally clerks, where the industrial 
classification is not Transport/Docks – because the clerks are regarded as clerical 
workers - and so the number of strike days for the clerks themselves is absent from 
the larger totals for the docks.381 
 
The End of the Period 
 
The turn of the decade did not mark a watershed in the affairs of the dockers and 
the NDLB, although in theory Devlin’s report of 1956 had provided just that 
opportunity, and the NA files allow us to trace the reaction to the report and 
subsequent discussions to show why no substantive changes were made to the 
1947 Scheme. Iain Mcleod’s announcement in the House of Commons on 18 
December 1957 gave the quietus to Devlin’s aspirations for greater involvement by 
the NDLB, and the Board’s submission to the Minister of July 1957 focuses very 
much on the details regarding discipline and omits to include any suggestion for 
greater involvement or action.382 After a number of meetings to frame the proposed 
amendments, these were submitted to the NDLB in September 383 and shared with 
the industry.  In October 1959 rumours of the proposed amendments began to 
circulate, with newspaper articles and unofficial leaflets, and a formal statement was 
issued by the NJCPTI on 22 October summarising the proposed amendments, 
including the retention of the principle of dual control. The NA file shows (generally 
favourable) comments from workers in various ports, including one from a London 
worker: “about time that some official notice was given out”. 384 
 
380  Evershed Final Report 1954, p.6, para.17  
381  See MLNS ledgers for 1951 (LAB 34/67), 1957 (LAB 34/73), and 1960 (LAB 34/76). 
382  NA file BK 2/362, NDLB Head Office: Dock Labour Schemes. Amendments. Paper 
NDLB/FG/5486, dated 19 July 1957, (Board paper 619) 
383  BK 2/362 NDLB Board paper 743 dated 11 September 1958. 
384  NA file BK 2/363 NDLB Head Office: Dock Labour Schemes. Amendments, further 
inquiry 
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The draft Statutory Instrument (SI) amending the 1947 Scheme was put out for 
comment in February 1961.385 Lord Forster of Harraby reviewed the comments 
received, and in his report386 recommended inter alia that the system of dual control 
should continue, and the revised scheme387 came into effect on 1 December 
1961.388The Explanatory Note to the SI summarises the changes as being to include 
new provisions empowering local Boards to delegate certain functions (delegations 
which, under the 1947 Scheme had been wrongly used and overturned by the 
Courts), and revising the provisions as to the constitution of a majority vote on the 
Boards, on the use of unregistered dock workers and as to the ports included under 
the Scheme. So the revised Scheme improved some areas where the original 




This chapter first builds on the review in Chapter 2 of the social and economic 
conditions of the London docklands and the workers that was seen as the backdrop 
to industrial unrest in the port. It describes the working environment of the dockers 
and the nature of work on ships together with the problems of health and safety and 
abysmal amenities. In the wider context it notes the physical conditions of the port of 
London at the end of the Second World War and the implications for the docks of 
absorbing returning servicemen and others. In parallel to these, the narrative notes 
the problems around the definition and implementation of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme of 1947, identifying weaknesses in three areas of the Scheme (discipline, 
overtime, and the register of dock workers) that are seen to have contributed to 
industrial unrest in its early stages. It considers also the difficulties in the structure 
and organisations of the major dock unions, the changing relationship of trade 
unions with the Labour Governments of 1945-51, and the emergent influence of the 
‘unofficials’.  
 
These factors define the background against which the strikes of 1945 to 1960 are 
reviewed and, as part of this review, I consider commonalities or themes that were 
 
385  The draft Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961 
386  Port Transport Industry. Objections made to the Draft Dock Workers (Regulation of 
Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961. Report of inquiry held under paragraph 5 of the 
Schedule to the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. (Forster Report 
1961) (London, HMSO, 1961)  
387  SI 1961/2107, The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961 
388  Note that an earlier Statutory Instrument (SI 1960/2029) introduced a pension scheme 
for dock workers with effect from 7 November 1960. 
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not brought out in the various official reports, and which might have indicated 
possible courses of action on the part of government, employers, or the docks 
owner to reduce industrial conflicts. It is clear that certain defects in the 1947 
Scheme were a significant factor in some early disputes, even though problems with 
their earlier manifestations had been identified by the Ammon report of 1945. For 
example, Ammon’s criticism that “in London the (National Dock Labour) Corporation 
is not really regarded – and perhaps does not regard itself – as an integral part of 
the Industry” foreshadows almost exactly Devlin’s criticisms in 1956389  highlighting 
the lack of any single body that might have been able to take an holistic view of 
London’s hugely complex port transport industry and its industrial relations. Equally, 
the problems with the structure and application of the disciplinary system of the 
earlier scheme390 were replicated in the ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike.  Other defects, such as 
the failure to agree a satisfactory definition for overtime working provided flashpoints 
for unrest and contributed to a sense of unfairness that partially overrode the 
perceived benefits of the Scheme. But, as has been shown, there was strong 
opposition to any early revision of the Scheme 
 
There were also problems with both of the major trade unions: again, Ammon had 
been prescient about the difficulties that could arise from the over-democratic model 
of the NASD (which was borne out by the actions of union members in the 
‘Overtime’ and ‘Stevedores Recognition’ strikes of 1954/55). As well as its part in 
the inter-union rivalry with the NASD, the TGWU had its own weaknesses and 
difficulties: complex structures, the advantages and disadvantages of size, and the 
continuing activities of ‘unofficials’ within its membership. Further difficulties may 
have arisen from the sense of remoteness and lack of recognition of identity 
occasioned by the labyrinthine structures of organisation and representation, and 
the lack of clarity in lines of responsibility which are demonstrated by the structural 
diagrams.391  
 
While this chapter has an initial focus on the docks environment to provide a 
background to the analysis of the docks strikes between 1945 and 1960, it is clear 
that reasons for industrial disputes in the London docks were far more complex than 
the attitudes and behaviours of the dock workers and the working conditions: 
account needs also to be taken of the defects in the structure and operation of the 
 
389 Ammon Report para. 21, and Devlin Report 1956 paras 57-59 
390 Ammon Report, paras 36 and 40 
391 Chapter 2, p.68 and pp. 115 and 149, above. 
 162 
Scheme, the hugely complex and dispersed nature of the port operations, and the 
actions of the employers, the unions, and the port authority.  In some areas 
remedial action such as less punitive disciplinary procedures, and the clarification 
and agreement of the arrangements for overtime might have led to significant 
improvements in industrial relations.  Against this, it is possible to see the recurring 
problems of the ‘tally clerks’ disputes, with the complexities of union representation 
and multi-employer working arrangements as epitomising the reasons for the 
continuing unrest in the docks.  
 
Fundamentally, in spite of the various inquiries and reports, there seems to be little 
evidence of any determination on the part of employers, workers, unions, or the port 
authority (or the dock labour Boards) to come together to identify, agree, and 
implement measures that would produce a satisfactory and lasting solution to the 
problems of industrial relations in the London docks. From that perspective, poor 
industrial relations and intermittent and costly disputes seem to have been an 













[Dock employers] have for decades found it convenient and profitable to pay only 
for work done, and to accept little or no responsibility for the dignity or for the 
welfare and security of the families of the men on whom they relied…[and did not] 
foresee the predictable changes in cargo handling methods and the equally 
predictable social changes which were to expose the casual system of employment 




This chapter deals with the period from 1960 to 1970, primarily covering the major 
structural changes in conditions of employment and working methods in the docks, 
known as Devlin Phases I and II, following the Devlin Report of 1965,2 which (for 
London) concluded with the signing of an agreement covering the London Enclosed 
Docks on 21 September 1970. The narrative also brings in the emergent challenges 
from containerisation and problems with the financial and organisational structure of 
the Port of London Authority (PLA).  
 
Searching for a Solution to the Problem of Industrial Unrest 
 
In the years before 1960 there had been an increasing public focus on industrial 
disputes: in 1957 some 8,412,000 working days had been lost as a result of strikes 
in the UK: the highest level in the 20 year period after the second World War,3 and 
with the resulting pressure upon the pound in the foreign exchange markets4 the 
Government began to question how this unrest was to be seen in the context of 
tripartism, which had been at the core of all UK Government economic policies 
since the late 1940s.  A Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes was 
 
1   Extract from a presentation by G H B (George) Cattell, Chairman of the National 
Modernisation Committee in January 1970, entitled: Devlin Stage II – a tragedy in the 
modern style. In National Archives (NA) File LAB 107/117 National Modernisation 
Committee for the Port Transport Industry: minutes of meetings and papers. 
2   Final report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1965, Cmnd. 2734, 1965) 
para 128 
3   Dwarfed by the disputes in the period 1970-1980, which averaged 12,788,000 days lost in 
each year (Internet: Office of National Statistics, History of Strikes in the UK) 
https://visual.ons.gov.uk/the-history-of-strikes-in-britain 





established under the chairmanship of Lord Cohen in 1957, effectively (in the words 
of the ODNB) “to devise an incomes policy”.5 
 
The underlying aim of tripartism (the Government, employers and unions working 
together) was defined in the Council’s terms of reference as: “the desirability of full 
employment and increasing standards of life based on expanding production and 
reasonable stability of prices”. The Council was charged “to keep under review 
changes in prices, productivity and the level of incomes (including wages, salaries 
and profits) and to report thereon from time to time”.6 While no formal legislative 
measures resulted from the Council’s reports, Harris’s contemporary perspective 
was that the Government’s underlying philosophy was that trade unions should 
themselves decide whether to accept that the price of excessive pay increases 
might be rising unemployment.7 It is not obvious that this message was in any 
sense communicated through the unions down to their members, but apart from two 
major strikes in 1960-61 (one by Tally Clerks, resulting in the loss of more than 
200,000 man-days, and the other a protest against the use of unregistered labour, 
costing 90,000 man-days) the first four years of the 1960s saw relatively little unrest 
in the London Docks: the average number of days lost in each year was 17,124 – 
i.e. less than one day per year for each registered worker.8  However, in his 1965 
report Devlin identified those two strikes as the point at which both sides of the 
docks industry accepted that the only lasting solution to the continuing problems of 
unrest would be the introduction of decasualisation. He then describes the events 
leading up to the issue of a policy directive by the National Joint Committee for the 
Port Transport Industry (NJCPTI) in October 1961,9 calling upon local joint 
committees to study and report by January 1962 on the practicability of introducing 
decasualisation in their ports.10  This very ambitious timetable was not met,11 but the 
Rochdale report of September 196212 roundly endorsed the proposal for 
decasualisation while identifying a number of potential problems. After noting that 
the timing of the introduction of the new arrangements was an important 
 
5   ODNB: Cohen, Lionel Leonard, Baron Cohen (1888-1973) (no author attribution) 
6   Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, First report, (London: HMSO, 1958) 
7   Nigel Harris. Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the State and 
Industry, 1945-1964 (London: Methuen, 1972) pp. 163-164 
8   Data from NA files LAB 34/76 to 34/81: Trade Disputes: Record Books 1960 to 1964  
9   Reproduced in Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of Great Britain 
(Rochdale Report, Cmnd 1824, 1962), pp. 262-265 (Appendix N). 
10   Devlin Report 1965, para 129 
11   In fact, decasualisation had been trialled in Liverpool in 1963-64, but had not worked 
(mainly because of inter-union tensions) – see Devlin Report 1965, paras 218-219 





consideration (a permanently engaged workforce was seen as advantageous to 
workers when trade was slack, and to employers when the ports were busiest), the 
report emphasised the need to reduce the number of employers, and to strengthen 
the controls on entry to the employers’ register.13  Rochdale also identified a factor 
that would contribute to the demise of the upriver docks in the 1980s, where he 
noted the increasing use of containers but also that there were “a number of 
difficulties to be overcome before the container system can be adopted more widely 
here”.14   
 
Devlin’s Inquiries  
 
 
Contemporaneously with the NJCPTI’s initiative there had been negotiations 
between employers and the unions about pay and conditions of service: in May 
1962 the employers had agreed to an increase in the hourly rates of pay, with 
corresponding adjustments to piece work rates, and a reduction in the working week 
from 44 hours to 42 from August 1962 (to be further reduced to 40 from July 1964). 
By 1964, in a period of regular wage increases in other industries the unions sought 
an increase in pay to coincide with that second reduction in hours.15 In response, 
the employers offered an interim increase, to be tied to changes in working 
practices, but this was rejected by TGWU members at a national delegate 
conference in October, which also authorised a national strike, deferred when an 
Inquiry under Lord Devlin was set up in November.  As Devlin noted, “there were 
about this time unofficial strikes at several of the big ports.  These arose to some 
extent over difficulties in the application and interpretation of the 40-hour week 
agreement”.16 The docker Jack Dash shows in some detail the work of the unofficial 
Liaison Committee in fomenting this unrest, and how this was tied in with the wider 
concept of an updated ‘Dockers’ Charter’.17 Arguably, the position and influence of 
the ‘unofficials’ was strengthened by the employers’ use of delay as a negotiating 
 
13   A key constraint in any consideration of decasualisation was that the smaller employers 
would have insufficient capital reserves to pay permanent workers in periods of reduced 
trade. A table in the NA file BK 2/1231 (Joint Special Committee on the Ports Industry 
(Jones/Aldington Committee): report, May 1974) shows that of the 73 London stevedoring 
firms that closed between September 1967 and June 1972, 32 had fewer than 10 
employees, with the smallest (F P Steward) consisting of only one person. 
14   Rochdale Report, paras 331-332 
15   See First Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Certain Matters Concerning the Port 
Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1964, Cmnd. 2523, 1964), para 13 notes that in the 
preceding two years “all the other great industries had received at least one pay 
increase, and many more than one”.  
16   Ibid., para 18 





tactic: given the structure of the casual system, there was no concept of “back pay”, 
so any delays in the award of a pay increase represented a saving for the 
employers and a loss for the workers – although in the event of a strike, dockers 
might regain some of their lost wages through working vessels that had been 
affected by the dispute. Devlin recommended a pay award that, in his computation, 
represented an increase of 6.5% in pay but which, with the effect of the reduction in 
the working week, represented an overall increase of more than 10% in the wages 
bill,18 and on this basis the claim was settled in November 1964. 
 
In addition to the pay and hours dispute, Devlin’s remit was to consider 
“decasualisation [and] causes of dissension in the industry and other matters 
affecting the efficiency of working”.19  His “final report” shows that he regarded these 
as two sides of the same coin, and considered the background in two main narrative 
sections; the first dealing with “Dissension and Inefficiency” 20 and the second with 
the “History of Negotiations”.21 Many of the 116 paragraphs in the first section of the 
Devlin report include some indication of either collusion on the part of management 
or at least shared responsibility for inefficiencies – for example the “continuity rule”22 
was introduced at the request of management in 1944,23 and “preferential 
treatment” 24 can only be implemented in collaboration with employers. Other 
problems were seen to arise from the existence of “casual management”, which 
was seen as  “a cause of both inefficiency and dissention”,25 and the lack of 
provision of welfare services and amenities where “not nearly enough has been 
done” but also where employers  “were reluctant to allow” the NDLB to make 
improvements.26 But, in all, these ‘other problems’, occupy only 18 paragraphs out 
of the 116,27 and almost all the remainder focuses on problems under headings 
such as “irresponsibility”, “time-wasting practices”, “excessive manning”, “overtime” 
 
18   Devlin Report 1964, para 36 
19   Devlin Report 1965., para 4 
20   Ibid., paras 6-122 
21   Ibid., para 123-238  
22   See Devlin Report 1965, paras 29-38, and Stephen Hill, The Dockers: Class and 
tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 20   
23  A copy of the original agreement dated 10 January 1944 in the Modern Records Centre 
(MRC) file MSS.126/TG/RES/D/27/2 (London Docks 1928-1969) shows that the Continuity 
Rule was agreed initially as a “War Measure”, and that the main intention was to ensure that 
men did not leave a job once started.  
24  See Devlin Report 1965, paras 13-15 on the preferential treatment of “regulars” and 
“blue-eyed boys”, and Hill Dockers, pp 18-24 
25  Devlin Report 1965., para 24 
26  Ibid., paras 23-26 and 83-87 





and “trade union difficulties”,28 so that the balance of the narrative is that the 
responsibility for dissention and inefficiency lay with the workers and trade unions. 
 
The second narrative section of Devlin’s 1965 report summarises the history of the 
Dock Labour Scheme but focuses mainly on the complexities and intricacies of the 
negotiations and discussions that had taken place in the industry’s attempts to 
implement the NJCPTI’s 1961 directive. Considering only the case of London, the 
narrative covers some 28 pages, with different approaches by separate groupings 
of workers (dockers, stevedores, lightermen, and tally clerks), three unions (the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), the National Amalgamated 
Stevedores and Dockers (NASD) and the Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and 
Bargemen’s Union (WLTBU)) and various organisations or individuals representing 
employers. In essence, there were positions of deadlock with the dockers in August 
1963, stalemate with the lightermen in December 1964,29 and on a point of 
absurdity with the Tally Clerks in February 1965.30  
 
 
Devlin attributed this lack of progress to the fact that NJCPTI’s directive: 
 
(1) …allowed for too little in the way of decasualisation and too much in the 
way of abolition of restrictive practices, 
[and that] 
 
(2)  Neither side had put itself in a position to negotiate and carry out the 
sort of reform that was needed, the employer’s side because they were 
still burdened by the dead weight of casual employers and the trade 
union side because they had not as a body done enough to prepare their 
membership for the reception of new ideas.31 
 
The text of the directive confirms the first of these criticisms: in only one sub-
paragraph is there any indication that employers might need to change – and that 
only related to a reduction in the number of firms.32 An alternative presentation 
 
28  Ibid, para 16-21, 28, 39-51, 68-80 and 88-122 
29  Ibid., pp 51-79, and paras 157 and 180 respectively 
30  Where Devlin notes that “there is no division of interest between the [TGWU and NASD] 
tally clerks…the distinction between the two bodies on this issue is no more significant 
than if 400 men wore blue suits…. and the other 1,100 wore grey; and the point now 
reached is absurd” (Devlin Report 1965, para 205)  
31   Ibid., p.125 





might have focused on the multiplicity of ports and employers - Rochdale notes the 
existence of more than 300 ports in the UK that handled cargo, and shows that the 
15 largest ports had 972 different employers33 - or how the employers might have 
become more ‘professional’ in their approach to management.34 However, the 
validity of Devlin’s second criticism would become only too apparent as the 
decasualisation initiative progressed.  
 
Devlin’s (1965) List of Actions required  
 
The core of Devlin’s proposals was a list of “things that will have to be done before 
there is peace and efficiency in the docks”.35 Devlin proposed decasualisation – 
based upon an update of the NJCPTI’s original directive - as the first part of a “new 
settlement”, with a package of measures to improve efficiency as the second part.36  
His list provided a framework for a ‘change programme’ that comprised short term 
actions, improvements to the working environment, and then a series of measures 
to improve efficiency, that in many ways replicates the spectrum of changes to 
management, working methods, and the work environment championed by 
Beckhard around that time for managing ‘organisational change’ throughout a 
company.37  
 
The introduction of decasualisation aimed to resolve two items of Devlin’s list of 
things to be done: the “introduction of a scheme of regular employment” and the 
 
33   Ibid., para 4 and Table 16, p.35 
34   See the criticisms in Unofficial Stoppages in the London docks. Report of a Committee of 
Inquiry (Leggett Report, Cmd 8236, 1951), paras 83-89, and Report of a Committee 
Appointed on 27th July 1955, to Inquire into the Operation of the Dock Workers 
(Regulation of Employment) Scheme, (Devlin Report 1956, Cmd 9813, 1956) paras 57-
59 
35   The Devlin Report 1965 (para 239) lists these as:  
(1) The elimination of the casual employer and of casual management. 
(2) The introduction of a scheme of regular employment. 
(3) Strong and effective trade union membership. 
(4) The obtaining of greater mobility of labour. 
(5) The improvement of welfare facilities. 
(6) The revision of the wage structure. 
(7) The abolition of time-wasting practices. 
(8) The acceptance of firmer discipline, particularly in the matter of time-keeping, 
and in respect for decisions of the board. 
(9) The review of manning scales to take into account increasing mechanisation 
and changing methods. 
36   Ibid., pp.125-126: the measures were the abolition of restrictive practices, the fullest 
possible use of mechanical aids, and the adoption of a shift system of working. 
37   Beckhard, R, Organization Development: Strategies and models. (Reading, 





“obtaining of greater mobility of labour”. Devlin produced a “Plan of Action”38 that 
was agreed by the NJCPTI, which on 2 September 1965 issued a national policy 
directive on the modernisation of the docks industry, to be implemented through a 
National Modernisation Committee (NMC), with membership from both sides of the 
industry, but with an independent chairman. The requirement for such a third 
national body, alongside the NJCPTI and the NDLB becomes apparent in the light 
of Devlin’s comments in an earlier report about the relationship between the 
NJCPTI and the NDLB.39 From this it is clear that Devlin would not have considered 
either the NJCPTI (with “many matters upon which the two sides do not agree”) nor 
the NDLB (which “never goes beyond what might be made common ground”) as the 
appropriate body to drive through such changes.40  The chairman of the new 
committee was to be Lord (William) Brown (1908-1985),41 an experienced 
industrialist whose knowledge of piecework and interest in human behaviour in the 
workplace42 would have appeared to make him eminently suitable for such a 
position. The first step was to be the introduction of permanent employment, with a 
number of subordinate elements neatly summarised by Wilson as being that: 
 
…modernisation would not lead to the discharge of men from the industry. 
Employers would be licensed, pensions reviewed, and sick pay introduced. 
Of the clauses relating to working practices, only those that were essentially 
a feature of casualism would be abolished, inter-company transfer was 
accepted as was work-sharing, in principle.43 
 
After (inevitably) yet another inquiry to allow for objections to the proposed 
changes,44 the necessary legislation to accomplish these was encapsulated in the 
Docks and Harbours Act 1966,45 which thus opened the way for decasualisation 
(and, inter alia, the licensing of employers).  The more immediate question to be 
settled was the level of the weekly wage to be offered to the workers upon 
decasualisation: given the huge variation in types and rates of payments across the 
 
38   Ibid., pp 125-129 
39   Devlin Report 1956, para 49 “the Board is a section of the NJC” 
40   Ibid., paras 49-51  
41   The Times March 27, 1985, p.18, obituary ‘Lord Brown’ 
42   See his works Piecework Bargaining (London: Heinemann, 1962) and Explorations in 
Management (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960)  
43   David F Wilson Dockers: the Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana, 1972) p.181 
44   Port Transport Industry - Report of Inquiry under paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the 
Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. (Honeyman Report 1966) London: 
HMSO, 1966)  





industry and, in London, between different employers and in different workplaces, 
this would not be simple to resolve. The NMC were unable to agree what this 
weekly wage should be and commissioned a survey by management consultants to 
assist them in this. In the words of a civil servant managing this process: 
 
In discussion the consultants were extremely critical of the chaotic wages 
structure and the general standard of management in the docks…. there 
was virtually no management supervision of operations on the dock 
side…[and] standards in the PLA were deplorable.46 
 
When the two sides of the NMC were still unable to agree, a further enquiry was set 
up under Devlin, which reported on 13 August 1966,47 suggesting that the new 
arrangements should lead to an increase in productivity but that “what is 
immediately to be considered is a payment on account for what has not yet been 
delivered”.48 The key recommendations were that all dockers would receive a basic 
rate of £11 1s 8d a week, with a special addition of £2 as a “modernisation 
payment”49 with a guaranteed minimum wage of £15, and an expectation of average 
earnings of £25 a week.50  
 
Devlin I – Decasualisation 
 
The way was now clear for decasualisation to proceed, but the general climate was 
not felicitous:  Wigham outlines the struggles of the Labour Government to control 
prices and incomes51 that resulted in five White Papers and three Acts in 1966-69,52 
matched by a significant increase in the number of industrial disputes noted by 
 
46   NA file LAB 10/2737 National Modernisation Committee: investigation into pay of dock 
workers by Management Consultants Association. Note for the file by C F Heron, dated 15 
December 1965. 
47   Report of the Committee of Inquiry under Lord Devlin into the Wage Structure and Level 
of Pay for Dock Workers (Devlin Report on Wages, Cmnd 3104, 1966). 
48   Ibid., para 22 
49   Ibid., para 33. The important point here was that the basic rate was the basis of 
calculations of overtime rates and holiday pay. The ‘modernisation payment’ was not 
consolidated into the basic rate, and thus did not affect overtime rates. 
50   Ibid., para 34 
51   Wigham, Strikes, pp.138-142 
52   White papers: Prices and Incomes Standstill (Cmnd 3073, 1966), Prices and Incomes 
Policy: Period of Severe Restraint (Cmnd 3150, 1966), Prices and Incomes Policy after June 
1967 (Cmnd 3235, 1967), Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969 (Cmnd 
3590, 1968) and Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy after 1969 (Cmnd 4237, 1969), and 
the Prices and Incomes Acts 1966 (Elizabeth II, Ch. 33), 1967 (Elizabeth II, Ch.53) and 1968 





Durcan et al,53 with the unrest regarded by Taylor as stemming “primarily from the 
decentralising tendencies inside Britain’s collective bargaining system”.54 Those 
tendencies might well be evidenced by the emergence of the ‘unofficials’ – 
represented by Jack Dash and his ‘Liaison Committee’ - as key players in the Port 
of London docks, primarily in Dash’s ability to mobilise support from his ‘home’ 
(Royal group) docks. But while Devlin attempted to analyse the ‘unofficials’’ political 
and social imperatives, and the interactions with the unions, he failed to consider 
the third leg of the tripus – the failure of either the employers or (more 
appropriately), the NDLB, to actively counter their propaganda. This is exemplified 
in the contrast between the way in which strikes were reported by the NDLB and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF): the MAF file includes much fuller narrative 
reports by teleprinter, with commentaries that show that the observers physically 
followed the workers around,55 whereas the NDLB file contains shorter typed or 
manuscript reports that appear to have arrived by post, and rarely show any events 
outside the docks.56  Dash’s autobiography also shows that much of the strength of 
his position lay in his focus on single issues such as the (still) contentious issue of 
overtime.57 For Dash and the ‘unofficials’ decasualisation was both an opportunity 
and a threat: it provided a single point focus against which his efforts and rhetoric 
could be directed, but the changes in the working arrangements and employer 
relationships threatened to reduce the opportunities for discord in the longer term. 
The final difficulty was the timing of the introduction of the new arrangements: as 
the NA file shows, the NMC was pressing for a common date,58 and Wilson records 
that “both sides of industry wanted to introduce Decasualisation quickly and risk a 
once and for all showdown with the militants”.59 The relevant Statutory Instrument 
was laid in August 1967,60 with an effective date of 18 September, and the 
‘unofficials’ duly reacted, with the Liverpool workers striking for six weeks, but with 
 
53  J.W. Durcan, W.E.J. McCarthy, and G.P. Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain. (London: 
George Allen &Unwin, 1983) p. 114 
54  Robert Taylor The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and Unions 
since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 
55  For example, there are 45 telexes dated 18 and 19 September 1967 in NA file MAF 394/4 
Docks decasualisation: unofficial strikes September 1967, reporting on strikes around the 
country, and accurately describing the meetings in the London docks, a mass meeting on 
Tower Hill and Dash’s procession to the Ministry of Labour and the TUC. There are no 
comparable reports in the Ministry of Labour or NDLB files. 
56  See NA file BK2/1535 NDLB: Dock Labour Schemes: further decasualisation. 
57  Dash, Brothers, pp. 82-83 and 100-102. The Dockers’ Charter (pp. 117-120) provided a 
menu of such individual foci.  
58  NA file LAB 10/2617 National Modernisation Committee for the Port Transport Industry: 
minutes and Committee papers.  
59  Wilson, Dockers, p.185  





only sporadic and short-lived strikes in London. However, as Wilson records, a 
conflict between post-decasualisation flexibility and the continuity rule61 provided 
Dash with just such a single issue that best suited his rhetoric,62 and on 4 October 
he was able to lead the Royal group dockers out for nearly eight weeks before his 
grip weakened with the approach of Christmas,63 and the men voted to return to 
work.64 
 
The unrest also reflected the tensions between the unions (in effect, the TGWU) 
working with Government and facing the realities of change, and the activities of the 
‘unofficials’, as shown in the Cabinet minutes of December 1967:  
 
…the T & GWU were determined to secure the increase because they 
believed that only by showing results on this issue could they reassert their 
precarious control over their membership in the face of threats by the 
unofficial elements in London to resume industrial action from 1st January if 
their demands were not met. 65 
 
 
The tensions within the unions in part reflected the wider problems of the lack of 
communication within and between all parties in the docks, which can be seen as a 
leitmotif in most of the official reports on industrial disputes as far back as Ammon in 
1945,66 and more than 20 years later Devlin was still reiterating the need for 
improvements, especially in the case of the TGWU needing to “convince the 
members” of the value of its policies and achievements.67 This was exacerbated by 
the NDLB’s reluctance to engage in industrial matters: as shown above, the reports 
from the MAF officials were much more informative and provided far more analysis 
than the reports from the NDLB ‘port managers’ – on which in any case no direct 
action was taken. Lord Brown, as chairman of the NMC appears to have been fully 
seized of the need to communicate with the workforce, but the difficult negotiations 
between the Ministry of Transport and the Treasury on how the ‘Docks Bulletin’ 
 
61  Wilson, Dockers, p.189 
62  The Times 17 November 1967 p. 8 ‘Dockland’s Trusted Orator without Fireworks’. 
63  There were no other obvious reasons for the strike to end, but one of the possible 
weaknesses of arguing against a single issue is that unless the target changes (for 
example, as with the Canadian Seamen’s strike in 1948), there are only so many 
arguments to be advanced before the audience tires of the approach. 
64  The Times 28 November 1967, p.2 ‘Dockers Vote to go Back to Work’  
65  NA file CAB 128/42/74 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 21 December 
1967  
66  See London Docks Dispute 1945. Report of Committee of Inquiry (Ammon Report) 
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(which informed workers on progress towards decasualisation) was to be funded 
provide a perfect example of how the penurious attitude of Treasury officials, with a 
deep-seated fear of establishing unfavourable precedents, militated against the 
provision of extra funds for this. Seen objectively, the costs of around £6,000 would 
surely have yielded good value if only one day’s strike had been avoided.68 Finally, 
given that yet another body (i.e. the NMC) had been introduced into the arena, there 
can be no doubt that communication should have been a major concern of the three 
bodies.  
 
The Working Environment Challenges after Decasualisation 
 
By December 1967 decasualisation per se could be regarded as complete, in that 
all workers were assigned to employers, or placed upon the temporarily unattached 
register, so that the Call-on no longer existed, but Devlin’s remaining list of “things 
that have to be done before there is peace and efficiency in the docks” presented 
huge challenges for progress towards, and completion of, the second phase of his 
proposals. This was predictable: for example, 48 local modernisation committees 
were needed to implement Phase I,69 and the agenda for Phase II was much more 
extensive.  
 
The Casual Employer 
 
Devlin also noted a series of more general actions required to complement the 
changes to pay and conditions. These were the elimination of the casual employer 
(and casual management), strong and effective trade union membership, and the 
improvement of welfare facilities. To these should be added technological changes: 
an area of which Devlin was well aware,70 but to which he gave little attention in his 
report.  As Devlin showed, even the first of those general actions was far from easy: 
for example, in proposing a reduction in the number of employers in London he 
cites firstly a total of 318 employers (in itself a decrease of 71 from the 389 shown in 
Rochdale), but then shows a total of only “76 employers in London” (35 in the 
enclosed docks and 41 employers of Tally Clerks) that are to be reduced to 10 and 
six respectively.71 The discrepancy is explained by one of the few analyses that 
 
68  NA file T224/1753 Docks National Modernisation Committee 
69  NA file BK2/1530 NDLB National Modernisation Committee, minute dated 30 June 1967. 
70  Devlin Report 1965, para 55-56 





actually lists the employers in the various locations in London, that is the review of 
welfare amenities by the Management Consultants Association in 1966.72 This 
shows that a majority of the employers in London were wharfingers (152), and 
lighterage companies (86) rather than companies in the enclosed docks. In 
considering “casual management” Devlin contented himself with making some 
general assertions about the deficiencies of the casual employer.73 He might well 
have produced a more comprehensive statement showing how the practices of 
casual employers encompassed a multitude of deficiencies – no concerns about 
recruitment or retention of workers, no provision for training74 (relying on workers 
learning skills from co-workers), failure to invest in mechanisation, appalling 
washing and toilet facilities, little concern for health and safety except where failings 
might lead to litigation or prosecution, and no sick pay or pension schemes. He 
might equally have repeated some of his earlier criticisms of the failings of the 
NDLB as an employer.75 In 1970, George Cattell, then Chairman of the NMC 
(Director of Manpower and Productivity Services at the Department of Employment, 
and formerly a senior executive in the motor car industry),  produced a coruscating 
criticism of the shortcomings of employers in January 1970,76  but all The Times 
report (of 40 words) noted was his forecast that the number of dock workers would 
need to be reduced. 77 
 
Effective Trade Unions 
 
The question of effective trade unions was equally problematical: Devlin had 
previously noted the problems of the TGWU being seen as “unwieldy [and] that its 
officials are out of touch”,78 and in his 1965 report (Cmnd 2734) focused strongly on 
the problems within the docks unions,79 recognising that modernisation of the 
 
72   NA Files BK16/19, Survey of Dock Amenities: Port of London, BK16/20 (Appendices), 
and BK16/21 (Schedules) 
73  Devlin Report 1965, para 24 
74  TUC archives at the London Metropolitan University, Folder HE 551-559 Harbours and 
Docks General to 1969, contains a report by the OECD European Productivity Agency, EPA 
project no 5/10-11 of 1961, comparing training programmes for dock workers in the USA, 
Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Norway. The only 
reference to the UK is to the details of training shown in the Liverpool University study 
(Liverpool University, Department of Social Science. The Dock Worker: an Analysis of 
Conditions of Employment and Industrial Relations in the Port of Manchester. (Liverpool: 
University Press, 1956)) 
75  See Devlin Report 1956, paras 57-59  
76  Cattell, Devlin, Op. Cit. 
77  The Times, 14 January 1970, p.189 ‘Cutback in Dock Labour Forecast’ 
78   Devlin Report 1956, paras 29 (5) and (6) 





unions was essential to the modernisation of dock labour. He criticised the TGWU 
as having “on too many issues failed to develop any clear cut policy of its own” and, 
where a policy had been developed, of making “too little effort to put it into practice 
or to convince the members of its virtues”.80 He then defined a series of both short 
and longer term actions for the unions, primarily the TGWU, including more full-time 
staff of higher quality, a much more active involvement in the modernisation 
process, and the appointment of shop stewards.81 Any reading of the references to 
the NASD in Cmnd 273482 indicates that Devlin had little belief in the ability of its 
Executive to formulate or implement any cohesive and consistent policies, and “the 
lack of firm Government within the Union enables a tiny group of astute men to use 
or abuse the democratic process to enforce their will”.83 Finally, he defined the other 
main need as either “a settlement between the two unions (TGWU and NASD) or 
the exclusion of the latter “from all areas of the docks other than…London”84. 
Perhaps in those respects he might have refreshed his Webster: 
 
As if a man should spit against the wind, 
The filth returns in's face.85 
 
Devlin stressed the urgency of these changes but, as Wilson points out, there were 
additional problems arising from the conflation of the proposed changes in the 
TGWU with the election of shop stewards, who were to act as a link with the union 
officers “not only for talking over problems which have arisen in the course of their 
work…but also for discussion of general union policy”.86 In 1952, Joseph Goldstein 
had noted the lack of engagement of TGWU members in branch business,87 
exacerbated, as Wilson notes, by the mismatch between branch structures and their 
geographical distribution as the docker communities dispersed.88 Given this, it was 
hardly surprising that, as Dash records, most of the Liaison Committee members 
were able to get themselves elected as shop stewards – reflecting once again the 
fleet-footedness of the activists. That opportunism brought some uncovenanted 
rewards: the TGWU was forced to modify its (1949) ban on Communists holding 
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“any office within the Union, either as a lay member or as a permanent or full-time 
officer”.89 Wilson spells out the impact of this on morale, and describes the efforts by 
the TGWU to adapt its structure and improve communications90 – and the extent to 
which it failed to achieve the latter aim, thus “losing the battle for decasualisation”.91  
But in the end, it would seem that the concept of shop stewards was a success: 
Dash closes his own narrative in 1968 by noting that “we” – that is, the liaison 





The problem of poor welfare facilities was by no means the least of the ‘working 
environment’ issues: Devlin had recorded that some of his Committee had been 
“appalled by some of the things they saw” when inspecting the amenities in London 
and Liverpool,93 and rehearsed the criticisms made by Leggett in 1951 and 
Rochdale in 1962,94 further describing some recent proposals for the provision of 
hot and cold running water as a “pitiable document”.95 While Devlin was, to some 
extent sympathetic to the complexities of the problem, he asserted that “if there had 
been a real will to do so, a way of cutting through” the problems would have been 
found.96 Given the Treasury’s parsimony in relation to finding some few thousand 
pounds for the Docks Bulletin, it is unlikely that they would have been prepared to 
provide additional taxpayers’ funds for what they would have seen as the industry’s 
own problem. In any event, the 1966 Docks and Harbours Act laid a duty on the 
NDLB to prepare a scheme of “such welfare amenities as the Board thinks ought to 
be provided” for each port in Schedule 1 of the Act, and to specify who should 
provide and maintain those amenities.97 The resulting survey by the Management 
Consultants’ Association did indeed show how little had been done in the first two 
decades of the 1947 Scheme, in spite of the statutory obligations laid upon the 
 
89   Ibid., p.198. See also V L Allen Trade Union Leadership Based on a Study of Arthur 
Deakin (London: Longman, Green, 1957) p.284 for the introduction of the ban 
90   It should be noted that in 1967 the PLA (which was at that point becoming much more 
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forward in communications with the workforce. 
91  Wilson, Dockers, pp 202-203 
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Board.98 The report aimed to provide a quantitative assessment of the adequacy of 
the facilities in terms of the expected usage, rather than a qualitative assessment of 
the condition, although it is particularly critical in relation to lack of information 




The final ‘working environment’ challenge was the progression of mechanisation 
and technological change: as the dock owner the PLA was the prime mover in any 
major developments, and articles in PLA Monthly track some of the progress of 
mechanisation between 1962 and 1966,100 but although significant investments 
were made, these had been mainly in areas such as frozen meat and grain where 
the Authority worked with a major shipowner or operator to develop an integrated 
cargo handling facility.101  As the diagram below shows, part of the problem was the 
fact that the London docks encompassed a complex mix of organisations and 





98  See BK16/19 (Survey of Dock Amenities), BK16/20 (Appendices), and BK16/21 
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99  BK 16/19 p.67 Medical services Para 322: “The analysis of medical and allied services in 
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101  As the Port Efficiency Committee noted - NA file BK2/1266, Reports of the Ports 
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August 1952, paragraph 21:  
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industrial establishments generally, it has been disappointingly slow at the ports.”  
Clearly, a small shipping or stevedoring company would be less likely to consider any 





Table 5: Cargo Handling in the Port London  




or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Port of London Authority 
Shipping companies or 
their stevedoring 
contractors*  
Tilbury Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Port of London Authority 
Shipping companies or 
their stevedoring 
contractors*  
Royal Group Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Port of London Authority 






Port of London 
Authority  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Port of London Authority  
Millwall Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors 
Port of London Authority  
East India Port of London 
Authority  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors  
Port of London Authority 
London and 
St Katharine 
Port of London 
Authority  
Shipping companies 
or their stevedoring 
contractors# 





§ Any goods received from land conveyance, sorted to ports of destination and stowed in 
transit sheds or in the open and tendered to the ship’s side over the quay were handled by 
the PLA, using its own labour for this work. 
 
* “Over-side” conditions and “Quay and Shed Space Agreements” apply. When working 
over-side a vessel could discharge cargo on to the quay, and incur appropriate PLA 
charges, with the Authority providing quay labour from its own labour force or under contract 
with a firm of Master Stevedores, or direct over-side to receivers’ craft. Under a Quay and 
Shed Space Agreement the ship-owner was entitled to land, sort and re- deliver to craft any 
goods properly claimed for over-side delivery ex-ship to barge without such goods incurring 
the Authority’s charges on goods (the shed being, in effect, regarded as an extension of the 
ship). The ship-owner or his contractors provided the labour in the vessel and also the quay 
labour to carry out the receiving, sorting and redelivery of over-side goods temporarily 
landed. All goods claimed from ships by the PLA and delivered to rail truck, regardless of the 
conditions under which ships discharge, were tallied by clerks supplied by the Authority. 
There were some exceptions to this arrangement for specific commodities. For example, the 
discharge of bananas in Royal Albert Dock was undertaken by the PLA (a comprehensive 
port model). Other commodities were handled under more complicated arrangements. Meat 
imports in the Royal Victoria Dock, for example, were discharged by a Master Stevedore 
(under subcontract with the ship- owner) and the PLA would subcontract quayside handling 
to the same Master Stevedore. The sole exception was Canary Wharf where a berth was 
leased to Fruit Lines in 1937, allowing the company to undertake its own work at this berth.  
♯ Exceptions applied for specific commodities. Wine in bulk, for example, was pumped direct 
from the ship, or from tanks discharged ex-ship, into storage vats in a quay installation, with 
the complete operation undertaken by PLA staff. 





But whereas some progress had been made on mechanisation,102 this was 
constrained by both dock layout and ship sizes, and the smaller London and St 
Katharine docks were unsuitable for large-scale mechanisation, so that although  
Rochdale had envisaged the closure of these docks in 1962,103 the actual decision 
was not taken until 1966.  While many of the changes proceeded smoothly, the 
Wilson report of 1966104 is an indication of the difficulties of implementing the new 
systems, where a new facility had been built at Millwall dock (a ‘Stevedoring’ 
(NASD) dock) to handle work previously undertaken in the West India Docks (a 
‘Docker’ (TGWU) dock).  Both unions claimed the right to work the new facility 
(although there was concurrently an initiative towards the formation of a ‘common 
register’, eliminating the distinction between the two categories),105 but an arbitration 
panel set up by the NJCPTI had ruled in favour of the TGWU, whereupon the NASD 
members went on strike.  Wilson recommended that progress towards the common 
register be expedited, but that the arbitration panel ruling should apply. In many 
ways this case is an exemplar of later problems: there were multiple layers of 
management involvement (the PLA, the Port Labour Executive Committee, the 
Executive Committee of the NJCPTI, as well as the companies directly concerned - 
i.e. Fred Olsen lines, and the stevedoring company of Smith Coggins); and failures 
of strategic vision and communication, as well as unwillingness to compromise on 
the part of the unions.  
 
The Organisational and Operational challenges for the PLA 
 
While Devlin had seen the need to embrace mechanisation as part of his 
proposals,106 he made little mention of the other challenges facing the port of 
London. At that time the management structure of the PLA was broadly flat, 
imposing a huge range of responsibilities on the Director General, and indicating 
also how difficult it might have been to achieve cross-company collaboration 
 
102  Some stevedoring companies, and in particular Scruttons, had used motorised trolleys 
and fork lift trucks for quay work, and Oram (R. B. Oram, The Dockers’ Tragedy. 
(London: Hutchinson, 1970, p.159) records the use of ex-US army fork lift trucks at 
Tilbury, but that mechanical aids could only be used on board larger vessels with suitable 
cargoes.  
103  Rochdale Report paras 501– 522 
104  Report of a Court of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of a Strike by Members 
of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers in the Port of London and into 
Practices Relevant thereto. (Wilson Report, Cmnd 3146, 1966). 
105  Although, as the Wilson Report shows (paras 61 and 89) this had not been considered at 
all by Devlin. 











A second omission was that Devlin did not consider the emerging challenge of 
containerisation that had been noted by Rochdale in 1962.107 But in 1966 the 
magazine PLA Monthly had carried an article by the director-general of the PLA on 
the challenges of containerisation,108 and the Authority’s 1967 PLA Business Plan109 
shows the Authority trying to plan ahead to meet the challenges of the new methods 
of handling cargoes. At this point in time the Authority had implemented roll-on/roll-
off systems at Tilbury and had handled some containers through the Royal docks.110 
For the future, the plan was that the London, St Katharine, East India and Surrey 
Commercial docks would be closed, that Tilbury would handle all container traffic, 
and that the India, Millwall and Royal group docks would be modified to increase 
throughput using high efficiency methods and absorb traffic from the closures.111 
But the plan also identified some significant obstacles in the form of opposition from 
the local authorities, concerned at the impact of the closures on local communities 
already affected by Government regional development initiatives that had 
encouraged industries to move out of London, and unwilling to cede land to provide 
the huge areas necessary for mechanised cargo handling. In any case, the 
modifications to the enclosed docks would have involved significant extra costs, and 
the PLA was already struggling with the constraints of its funding arrangements: 
between 1960 and 1970 its total debt increased from £37 million to £80 million, 
mainly to fund the expansion of Tilbury, and the interest payments over that period 
totalled just under £30 million, having risen to an annual rate of about £5 million.  
 
The way in which additional capital expenditure resulted in increased interest 




107 Rochdale Report, paras 331-333.To be fair to Devlin, this was just three paragraphs in 
661 in a report of 231 pages and 13 Appendices in a further 33 pages. 
108  PLA Monthly 41, (1966) pp. 232-239. ‘The Role of the Port Authority in the Container 
Age’. 
109  PLA Archives: PLA Business Plan 1967 
110 Wilson, Dockers, p.138 
111 PLA Monthly shows significant investments 1967 in ‘P’ berth at Millwall – ‘Modern 
methods at Millwall docks’ (42, (1967) p. 228), and ‘“M” shed at the West India docks’ 









Source: PLA Annual reports 1960-1971(London: PLA) 
 
A restructuring of the PLA governance in 1967112 replaced the former Authority (with 
its varied and often competing interests) by a much smaller Board that could at last 
focus on running the PLA as a business. Meanwhile, a report by the management 
consultants McKinsey and Co for the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) in 
1967113 outlined potential productivity gains from containerisation of 20 times – even 
at the most conservative calculations (only 40% labour utilisation, and each berth 
handling only 1,800 containers per week). Using that multiplier, London’s docker 
requirement would fall from around 25,000 to under 1,500, and although any such 
impact was far distant, the arrival of the American Lancer at Tilbury in June 1968 
must have sent a clear signal to both shipowners and the workforce, and in August  
a single traffic officer, one foreman, and 13 dockers unloaded 4,181 tons from that 
ship in under 12 hours. In a strange parallel, the report on the American Lancer in 
August was followed by an article noting the send-off of the 74 dockers who 
received the PLA’s first severance pay.114  London was not alone in encountering 
 
112  Following the passing of the PLA Constitution Revision Order 1967 (SI 1967/1197)  
113  Containerization: the key to low-cost transport; a report by McKinsey & Company, Inc. 
for the British Transport Docks Board, June 1967. 
114  PLA Monthly, 43, (1968) p. 232 ‘The First of Many’, p.362 ‘Container handling speeds 
boosted’ and p.365 ‘Dockland send-off for severance men’. The new developments 
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these challenges: Levinson shows how the development of containerisation in the 
USA proceeded apace between 1965 and 1970 with the impact on the New York’s 
waterside and workforce presaging the closure of the London docks and the effect 
on the local communities,115 but in this period the Port of New York Authority began 
to develop its new facility at Newark, New Jersey in effectively, greenfield sites.116  
 
In 1967-68 the Authority closed the East India, St Katharine and London docks. 
Although the first of these was actually downstream of the large India and Millwall 
docks, it was much smaller, had suffered huge damage from the wartime bombing, 
and was never fully reconstructed: it was closed with almost no publicity in 1967. 
The two other docks were also small, and further upstream: the economic case for 
maintaining them was that their operations had been mainly subsidised by their 
warehouses. But those warehouses had specialised markets and storage facilities – 
for example, tea, wines, and wool, as well as exotic goods such as ivory and 
mohair. As fashions and marketing systems changed the warehouses were 
becoming underused, and the case for closure of the two docks was 
incontrovertible: a later article in PLA Monthly noted that “the decision to close [the 
London and St Katharine docks] is not a sudden one. As long ago as 1965 it was 
known that all operations except those at the Bulk Wine berth were unprofitable”.117 
In fact, the proposal for closure had been in the public domain since 1966:118 the 
closure itself attracted little attention in the press119 and seems not to have resulted 
in any industrial action. 
 
Devlin II - Modernisation 
 
The ‘working environment’ challenges were huge and matched in complexity and in 
duration by the third element of Devlin’s list: the ‘modernisation’ initiative, outlined in 
the NJCPTI’s new policy statement of December 1968 (reproduced as Annex 2 to 
 
tonnage handled by lighters fell from just over 13 million tons a year to less than 6 million 
tons, and the number on the Lightermen’s register from 3,327 to 1,734. (Wilson, Dockers, 
p.244) 
115  Marc Levinson. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. (Princeton: The University Press, 2006). p.94 
116 The Rochdale Report noted (para 331) that “the Port of New York Authority is already 
spending some $275 million on container facilities”. 
117   PLA Monthly 43 (1968) pp 96-100 ‘History and Closure of London Dock’ 
118  The Times 26 September 1966, p.11 ‘Preservation difficulty over docks scheme’ 
119  The Times 23 January 1968 p.15 ‘PLA planning to close two docks’ gives no indication 
of union opposition. The Tower Hamlets Local History and Archive Press Cuttings folders 
964.5 (London dock) and 964.6 (St Katharine dock) have no material about those 





the Pearson report of 1970).120 The tasks were “the revision of the wage structure” 
and “the abolition of time-wasting practices”, coupled with the “acceptance of firmer 
discipline, particularly in the matter of time-keeping [and] in respect for decisions of 
the board”. These would accompany a “review of manning scales to take into 
account increasing mechanisation and changing methods”.121 
 
Wilson maintains that: 
 
the Decasualisation strikes marked the beginning of three years of 
increasing industrial strife in the docks…. the industry had been charged 
with the reform of its institutions, the identification and removal of important 
wasteful practices and the ultimate reform of the wages structure. However 
well these tasks were accomplished, the effects could not manifest 
themselves overnight….122 
 
The Ministry of Labour data does not bear this out for London: as the following table 
shows, although there was an increase in the number of man-days lost through 
disputes in London in 1969, the overall picture is one of relative calm in a period of 
some wider discord. 
 
Table 6: Man-days lost in industrial disputes for London and UK docks and 




Total Man Days Lost 
1968 1969 1970 
London Docks 26,510 65,092 9,053 
All UK Docks 112,335 417,060 201,848 
London as % of all  UK docks 23.6% 15.6% 4.4% 
All UK Industries 4,690,000 6,846,000 10,980,000 
Percentages: London docks vs all 
UK Industries 
0.56% 0.95% 0.08% 
 
There were in fact two major disputes in London – one lasting for more than two 
years that prevented the PLA from bringing new container berths at Tilbury into 
 
120  Report of a Court of Inquiry under The Rt. Hon. The Lord Pearson, C.B.E., into a dispute 
between the parties represented on the National Joint Council for the Port Transport 
Industry (Pearson Report, Cmnd 4429, 1970).  
121  Devlin Report 1965, para 239 
122  Wilson, Dockers, pp.189-190 
123  Data from NA files LAB 34/93, 34/95 and 34/97 Trade Disputes Record Books, for data 





operation124 (but did not cause any loss of man-days), and a national dock strike in 
1970.   In this period the Donovan report of 1968125 identified the tensions between 
“two systems of industrial relations”: formal, industry wide negotiations; and the 
informal systems of negotiations at factory or shop-floor level,126 noting that 
industrial disputes often arose when both systems converged and clashed – as was 
the case in the docks.127  The activities of the ‘unofficials’ clearly exemplify the 
increasing influence of the shop-floor, and were a significant factor in some areas of 
negotiations towards the Phase II agreement, but the two disputes also reflected 
local intransigence. The PLA’s construction of the major new container handling 
facilities at Tilbury was the Authority’s first major dock project for nearly 40 years,128 
and was heralded as having cost £30 million:129 the ban on the use of some of the 
new berths was imposed in January 1968 at the behest of the TGWU’s No 1 Docks 
Group130 and lasted until April 1970. The discussions at the NMC show that the 
Docks group were using the ban to try to address a wide range of concerns; 
primarily to register their fears about the growth in container usage, and to ensure 
that negotiations on modernisation agreements were not held up (as has been 
shown, the employers had in the past used delays as part of their negotiating 
tactics).131 But there were wider and longer term considerations, with the workers 
trying to prevent employers from removing ‘traditional’ dock work to premises 
outside the docks.132 The fact that the Tilbury ban was a refusal to use the new 
facility, rather than a strike, allowed the dispute to drag on, but the reputational 
damage to the port was huge, as was the economic impact of loss in business at a 
key point in container base development in the UK and Europe.133  
 
The Tilbury dispute reflected yet another weakness of the docks industry in London: 
the dockers, rightly or wrongly, were taking action to try to protect their future: and 
their actions primarily affected the PLA which, although powerful, was only one of 
 
124  See Wilson, Dockers, pp. 239-242 for a fuller analysis of these events. 
125  Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965-1968 (Donovan 
Report, Cmnd 3623, 1968) 
126  Ibid., para 143 
127  Ibid., para 1007 
128  After the construction of the King George V dock in the 1920s. The construction of the 
Tilbury Passenger terminal, although a major project was not a dock (and was not a 
commercial success) 
129  See PLA Monthly ‘The Tilbury Modernisation Plan Takes Shape’, 40, (1965) pp 414-419 
and ‘The Role of the Port Authority in the Container Age’ 41, (1966) pp 232-239 
130  That is, the 13 delegates from the six London Divisional Committees. 
131  See The Times, 9 January 1970, p.19 ‘Dockers will get fresh pay offer’ 
132  MRC file MSS/126/TG/447/G/4/1 NMC Minutes of 41st meeting on 24 April 1969, p.3 
statement by T O’Leary, TGWU National Docks Secretary  





the major employers. Much as the Authority might wring its hands at the ‘blacking’ 
of its huge investment, and loss of future business, the wharfingers and other 
stevedoring employers were not directly affected, and shipowners were still free to 
load and unload containers outside the port and to implement containerisation 
outside London, and were thus only partially affected by the ban. The denouement 
of the container ban was complex: Wilson shows that the ban was partially lifted 
after Fred Olsen134 himself talked to the dockers in late 1969 and explained the 
likely consequences of their actions, and this led to a gradual withdrawal of the ban 
– but not without a continuing loss of container trade to other ports.135 
 
Meanwhile, the use of containers was growing, and led to more conflicts over the 
definition of dock work and port areas. Although dockers recognised that containers 
might be loaded and unloaded (‘stuffed’ and ‘stripped’) at a manufacturer’s facility, 
they regarded ‘groupage’ stuffing and stripping (where a company assembled and 
packed or unpacked mixed container loads) as equivalent to dock work undertaken 
in ports, and held that these functions should be undertaken by registered dock 
workers. Under the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme, the definition of dock work and port 
areas had been the responsibility of the NDLB, which adjudicated upon any 
disputes, and against whose decisions there could be no appeal.136 This position 
was altered by Section 51 of the Docks and Harbours Act 1966,137 under which an 
NDLB decision could be appealed to an Industrial Tribunal – and then the High 
Court and ultimately to the House of Lords.  But the obvious problem was that 
whereas the NDLB had been able to ensure cohesion in its decisions,138 the various 
Industrial Tribunals could have different understandings of what constituted ‘dock 
work’. To resolve this problem, a committee with representatives from both sides of 
the industry was established in 1969 under the chairmanship of Peter Bristow QC, 
tasked with providing a clear definition of dock work, and of port boundaries for 
London. Although the committee’s report was not published, duplicated copies are 
 
134  Olsen’s were a major importer of softwood and had pioneered the use of palletisation in 
the port. 
135  Wilson, Dockers, pp. 239-248 
136  Under Clause 2(I) of The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order, 1947 (S&RO 
1947/1189) “Dock work means operations at places or premises to which the Scheme 
relates, ordinarily performed by dock workers of the classes or descriptions to which the 
Scheme relates” 
137   Elizabeth II 1966 Ch. 28, Section 51 “References of disputes about the meaning of 
‘dock work’ to a tribunal”. 
138  And, because of the strength of the union membership on the Board, could be expected 






to be found in the NA files.139 After summarising the position in law, and the views of 
each side, the Committee produced a definition of “dock work” and defined the 
boundaries of the Port of London to be within five miles of mean high water on the 
Thames, five miles upstream from Teddington lock and fifteen miles from 
Havengore on the seaward side. The recommendations encountered great 
opposition: there are 16 NA files with representations from trade bodies about the 
report,140 and the definition of dock work and the boundaries of its application 
remained an area of difficulty and industrial tension for some years.141  
 
 
The final ‘Modernisation’ agenda 
 
The remaining items on Devlin’s list are the final ‘modernisation’ agenda, i.e. the 
revision of the wages structure, the elimination of time-wasting practices, the 
acceptance of firmer discipline, and a review of manning scales. In practice, any 
analysis of progress against these aspirations could only be in very general terms 
over a longer time scale, although some specific instances and improvements can 
be noted. The first item on this ‘modernisation’ list was the revision of the wages 
structure – primarily the replacement of piecework by time rates. In theory, 
piecework and time rates can co-exist: a worker may be paid a basic rate, 
enhanced by payment related to output, but Devlin saw that piecework, in itself, had 
considerable disadvantages where mechanisation was being introduced, was 
difficult and administratively expensive to maintain, and was often a cause of 
dissension.142 William Brown, as Chairman of Glacier Metals, and before his 
appointment as the first Chairman of the NMC, had negotiated the abolition of 
piecework in that company, condemning the system as being one to “stimulate envy 
and greed, whereas equilibrium between personal capacity, level of work, and pay, 
stimulates co-operative behaviour”.143 There appears to be no comprehensive list of 
piecework rates across London, although the numbers were certainly in the 
thousands: this is understandable given that only the NDLB could be seen as 
having a true industry-wide perspective, and because rates for a particular class of 
 
139   NA file LAB 10/3514 Department of Employment. Definition of dock work: joint 
committee chaired by Peter Bristow 
140   NA files LAB 10/3515 Definition of Dock Work. (Representations by the timber trade) to 
3529 (Representations from individual freight forwarders and their association) 
141  The Times, 15 January 1970, p.18 ‘Industry to fight dockers’ preserve’ and leading 
article, 29 April 1972, p.15 ‘The Container Wrangle’. 
142  Devlin Report 1965, paras 58-62 





goods might vary from employer to employer, by location (dock, wharf, or lighter) 
and on whether the vessel was engaged on short seas or ocean trading. In addition, 
cargoes might be dirty or badly stowed, or need to be moved some extra distance 
and, as Devlin records, in 1963 there were more than 660 disputes requiring the 
presence of viewing committees mainly to arbitrate on rates.144 Devlin was not 
totally sanguine that the introduction of any substitute system would be 
straightforward, noting the difficulties that had been experienced in the Liverpool 
decasualisation trial,145 but in any case it was clear that there would need to be 
much broader discussion and agreements on a range of new systems – for example 
shiftwork and “flexible manning, if this was to be adopted”.146 
 
Devlin identified a set of time-wasting practices including the mis-use of the 
‘continuity rule’ in London, the practices of “spelling” (in Liverpool) and “the welt” (in 
Glasgow), together with “bad timekeeping” and “excessive manning”.147 Taking the 
continuity rule first, the wording of the original (1944) agreement indicates that its  
main purpose was to ensure continuity of work for employers, where: “every Port 
Transport Worker…is required to complete the work for which he is engaged”.148 
Devlin shows that application of the rule had evolved as a two-edged weapon, with 
(in his view) the opportunity for mis-use and as being “wasteful in terms of money 
time and efficiency”.149 But as he pointed out, the rule could be helpful in preventing 
abuses by employers, so any move to simply abolish the rule, as Devlin appears to 
suggest, without negotiation of safeguards would be likely to be resisted, and (as 
shown above) the proposed abolition of the rule provided a key weapon that the  
‘unofficials’ were able to use in fomenting a paralysing strike in London in the 
autumn of 1967. Similarly, as Mellish shows, addressing the problem of bad 
timekeeping required a port- and industry-wide approach: there was nothing to be 
gained in work flow or productivity, and no point in dockers turning up on time, if 
cargoes had not arrived, or if lighters or land transport were not ready to service 
their work.150  
 
 
144  Devlin Report 1965, para 61 
145  Ibid., para 58 
146  Ibid, para 307 
147  Ibid., Section 7, paras 27-57 
148  MSS.126/TG/RES/D/27/2 Continuity Rule, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
149  Devlin Report 1965, paras 29-38 
150  Michael Mellish The Docks after Devlin (London: Heinemann,1972) p.78. Mellish 
provides a detailed picture of the processes and problems in the implementation of 
modernisation in the Millwall and South West India Docks for PLA and two private 





It is difficult to see Devlin’s comments on “excessive manning”151 as being other 
than a series of generalisations, with no specific details and no firm 
recommendations. In broad terms he suggested that productivity had increased by 
nearly 100% between 1948 and 1963 “in the main” because of mechanisation and, 
while accepting that there was “a complete conflict of evidence” between employers 
and trade unions about the problems of implementing mechanisation, proposed that 
“the removal of the casual element would undoubtedly be of help”.  That might well 
have proven to be the case: but his comments should perhaps be seen in the light 
of the remarks by the Chairman of the NMC in 1970 that: 
 
The sad story of the prolonged delay in the operation of a new mechanical 
handling system in the London docks is typical. When asked why this 
expensive equipment had been installed without adequate trials, a 
spokesman is reported as saying “shipping companies are not in the 
business of trials”. Maybe not, but neither are car manufacturers, but they 
make it their business to cooperate in trials [of new products or techniques] 




In some ports practically nothing has been done in twelve months to quantify 
available man hours, to estimate work in man-hour terms or to set 
performance targets or manage results. Indeed, some large employers of 
dock labour still have no reliable records of hours or attendance, of overtime, 
or of work accomplished, let alone any capability for work measurement or 
method study. 152 
 
Mellish demonstrates that - at least in the PLA – mechanisation and revised 
manning levels were being well accepted, with such terms as “individual working”, 
and that “gangs of 3 or 6 had replaced gangs of 10”. But while he notes that one of 
the two stevedoring companies he examined made “extensive use of mechanical 
handling” and had “abolished piecework three years before the rest of the Port of 
London”, the other company’s operations were mainly in loading ships. This in itself 
militated against mechanisation, which is most applicable to unloading ships or 
quay work, so that in that firm “the final size of the gang is, therefore, much the 
same as before”.153 In general, Mellish’s verdict on Phase II is mixed: he notes that 
“the published figures show only that trade has declined in the conventional berths 
 
151  Devlin Report 1965, paras 54-57 
152  Cattell., Devlin, op.cit 





of London and that costs have risen”.154 To some extent that is an accounting 
inevitability: with the huge fixed costs represented by the vast docks estate, any 
decrease in volumes increased unit costs, but it would also reflect a consequence of 
decasualisation, where the costs of unused labour could not simply be transferred 
to the NDLB. And, as he points out, (reflecting Cattell’s comments above) there 
were no computations of productivity prior to Phase I.155  
 
The Management Challenges of Decasualisation 
 
Both Mellish and Wilson show a common theme emerging from Devlin’s 
modernisation agenda: the collateral need for better management of the workforce. 
In essence, the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme, and the use of casual labour and 
piecework absolved employers from any requirement to actively manage their 
workforce. Equally, prior to Devlin they had no need to expend any resources or 
effort on recruitment, retention, welfare or motivation. Mellish shows how huge 
efforts were made by both employers and unions to make Phase II of Devlin work, 
although they were sometimes unable to communicate the need for change in such 
a way as to immediately convince the workforce, but the eventual outcome was a 
significant increase in the efforts and resources devoted to managing the workforce 
and introduce more efficient working practices.156 Wilson provides a parallel 
analysis, showing that the employers were forced to address the operational 
inconsistencies in the PLA’s management of the port157 and to improve both the 
management structure and manager-worker relationships to facilitate better working 
methods and the elimination of artificial manning scales.158   
 
Nationally, however, problems in industrial relations were becoming of much greater 
political significance, resulting in the establishment of the Donovan Commission in 
1968159 set up, as Barbara Castle the then Minister of Labour160 later noted, 
following “a rash of unofficial strikes which were turning public opinion against the 
 
154  Ibid., p.135 
155  Ibid.,  
156  Ibid., pp. 136-138  
157  For example, so that handling operations could be integrated and streamlined  
158  Wilson, Dockers, pp 260-263 
159  Donovan Report, op.cit. 






trade unions”.161 It is possible to see some key passages from Donovan’s report that 
would define the industrial relations environment for the following years:  
 
We have no hesitation therefore in saying that the prevalence of unofficial 
strikes, and their tendency…to increase, have such serious implications that 
measures to deal with them are urgently necessary162 
 
Donovan’s prescription for dealing with unofficial strikes was the reform  of “the 
institutions of whose defects they are a symptom”,163 which (for the London docks) 
raises the question of whether the structure of the NJCPTI – or indeed the existence 
of any national negotiating body – was appropriate for the disparate body of the 
employers, the myriad places of employment, the intricacies of the union structure, 
and the complexity of the issues that were emerging.  Donovan further maintained 
that; 
 
Reform of the law governing industrial relations and trade unions and 
employers’ associations…. should no longer be delayed.164 
 
Castle’s narrative shows how her proposals for such a reform165 were supported by 
the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,166 and initially approved by the Cabinet,167 but 
later encountered strong opposition from back benchers and ministers (including, 
notably, the Cabinet Minister James Callaghan).168  However, after the TUC had 
issued its own Programme for Action, a further Cabinet meeting169 agreed that 
Wilson and Castle should meet the General Council of the TUC and “would seek to 
refrain from committing the Government to any precise form of statutory disciplinary 
provisions”. The outcome of the meeting is recorded in The Times as healing a 
“breach in the Labour movement”,170 although the limited effectiveness of the 
combined action by both Government and Congress may be seen in the way that 
the days lost through strike activity in the UK in 1969 reached a new peak of 
 
161  Barbara Castle Fighting all the Way (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
162  Donovan Report, para 415 
163  Ibid., para 454 
164  Ibid., para 755 
165  In the White Paper In Place of Strife (Cmnd 3888, 1969)  
166  ODNB (James) Harold Wilson (1916-1995) Baron Wilson of Rievaulx, article by Roy 
Jenkins 
167  See NA file CAB 128/44/3 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting held on 14 January 1969 
168  ODNB (Leonard) James Callaghan (1912-2005) Baron Callaghan of Cardiff, article by 
Roy Hattersley 
169  NA file CAB 128/44/28 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 17 June 1969: The record 
of discussions covers a remarkable seven pages. 
170 The Times 19 June 1969. p.1 ‘Anti-strike Bill abandoned by Wilson: agreement heals 





6,846,000, compared to the average of 3,189,000 per year for 1960-68.171 In 
contrast, only 65,092 man-days were lost in the London docks in 1969, compared to 
an average of 79,787 for the years 1960-68,172 possibly reflecting some initial 
success for decasualisation – or possibly the evolution of better operational and 
more professional human relations management systems.173   
 
The Ports Bill of 1969 
 
As the decade drew to an end, a major Government initiative emerged in the form of 
the Ports Bill, published on 26 November 1969, which had its Second Reading in 
the House of Commons on 18 December.174 The Bill proposed the implementation 
of the recommendations in the White Paper on the Reorganisation of the Ports,175 
for the nationalisation of major UK ports (including the Port of London) as part of  
which “the nationalised authorities should become the principal operators of port 
services and facilities within their ports, and, by virtue of this, the principal 
employers of port labour, [although excluding] services, for example of (sic) those, 
such as oil jetties and other private wharves, are integrated into another transport or 
industrial activity.”176 In effect, this would have led to the demise of the PLA’s Board, 
and the taking of riverside wharves into public ownership, leading to a far more 






By the early 1960s determined efforts were at last being made to improve 
employment and working practices in the docks as the key to improving industrial 
relations. Those efforts required engagements and compromises by both employers 
and workers and needed to recognise and address legacy problems while having 
the flexibility to cope with future developments.  Devlin envisaged that 
decasualisation would address many of those legacy issues, but the subsequent 
modernisation programme that he proposed also involved environmental 
 
171  Durcan et al., Strikes, p.174 
172  Source: NA files LAB 34/76, /78, /79-82, /88, /91 and /93 Ministry of Labour/Department 
of Employment Trade Disputes Record Books, 1960-68 
173  Mellish Docks after Devlin, pp 134-135 
174  House of Commons Hansard, 18 December 1969, cols 1568-1689 
175  Cmnd 3903, (London: HMSO, 1969)  





improvements to remedy earlier shortcomings, notably in respect of amenities in the 
docks.  
 
The implementation of Devlin’s prescriptions involved major investments and 
significant challenges with considerable industrial unrest in the early stages but 
generally led to significant improvements in handling conventional cargoes. 
However, the introduction and widespread development of the use of containers 
were to present much greater tests for the port, requiring radical new approaches to 
cargo handling by both workers and dock operators, leading to further disruptions to 
industrial relations. The unrest was exacerbated by the impact of containerisation 
on the traditional rights of dockers to handle loading and unloading of containers, 
and the effect of new legislation that removed some of the restrictions on the 
definition of dock work that had protected docker interests for many years.   
 
For the port of London and particularly the PLA, the Devlin changes had both direct 
and indirect impacts. In direct terms, Mellish demonstrates the difficulties that the 
Authority had in introducing the new working (and management) arrangements for 
its dockers at Millwall, and this will almost certainly have been replicated in other 
docks. Indirectly, the lack of uniformity of approach by other stevedoring companies 
will also have had an impact:  table 5, above, shows the various bodies concerned 
with cargo handling in the docks (ignoring the wharves or other river interests) and 
in the absence of any overarching or coordinating body, there would be significant 
problems in implementing and integrating the new systems. Further indirect impacts 
will have arisen from disputes about stuffing and stripping of containers, and the 
port was also affected by changes in the wider labour environment with a significant 
increase in strikes in the UK, and the growing influence of unofficials bringing more 
discord and uncertainty. While all of this will have impacted on the business and 
reputation of the port, the lack of any clear overall metrics (other than volume of 








Chapter 5:  THE END OF THINGS, 1970-1981 
 
It was not always so, but once, 
In days that no man thinks upon, 
Fair voices echoed from its stones, 
The light above it leaped and shone. 
Once there were multitudes of men 
That built that city in their pride 
Until its might was made, and then 
They withered, age by age, and died1 
 
 
In the Port of London 1970 was marked by the closure of the huge (400 acre) 
Surrey Commercial docks and 1981 ended with the departure of the last vessel 
from the Royal group of docks. The underlying narrative of this period is of the Port 
of London Authority (PLA) struggling with the downturn of traffic in its obsolescent 
Upper Docks and its increasingly onerous financial arrangements.  Less visible 
were the impacts of changes to the statutory and regulatory framework, 
employment and working practices, and technological advances that affected the 
employers, the workforce, and the trade unions.  
 
The Initial Docks Closures (1967- 1970) 
 
In Chapter 4 I noted that the PLA had begun to develop its strategic planning in the 
mid to late 1960s with the aim of reducing loss-making activities and enhancing its 
profitable operations, while maintaining its Conservancy and river management 
functions.  As part of its plan to reduce its financial losses, the Authority had 
managed the closure of the East India, London and St Katharine docks with little 
(apparent) opposition in 1967-68. But in August 1969 the PLA approached the 
Department of Transport about a proposal to close the Surrey Commercial docks, 
which was in many ways a more difficult issue than the earlier closures. Alongside 
significant conventional trade, the docks had specialised in handling both hardwood 
and softwood,2 and although the latter trade had diminished significantly, some 
1,383 registered dock workers (RDWs) and 736 other PLA staff were still employed 
 
1 Archibald Lampman ‘The City of the End of Things” in E C Stedman (ed.) A Victorian 
Anthology, 1837–1895 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1895) 
2 NA file MT 81/918 Ports Reorganisation Bill: consideration of proposal by Port of London 
Authority to close Surrey Commercial Docks; file note of 23 January 1970 (para 15) shows 






there. The involvement of the Government had a number of consequences, both in 
relation to its own role and the PLA’s subsequent actions. In the first place, the 
Government had no formal locus  in regard to the PLA’s decision, except in relation 
to its safeguarding role defined in the White Paper on the Reorganisation of the 
Ports,3  but officials felt that that “the PLA would almost certainly welcome the 
fortuitous opportunity to involve the Minister in an unpleasant decision”.4 In any 
event, the PLA’s approach provided the opportunity for a powerful intervention by 
the Department.5 The General Manager’s initial reluctance to accept that the PLA 
should engage in consultation with all the interested parties resulted in a letter from 
the Minister to the Chairman noting the “social, industrial, and economic 
implications” and reminding the Authority that “it will be most important to assess 
fully the possible consequences of the move….and for there to be consultations 
with the representatives of both the firms and of the men concerned”.6 The 
Department then asked the PLA to provide: 
 
(i) A full economic and financial appraisal showing the effects not just 
on the Surrey docks alone but also on the finances of the Authority 
overall. 
 
(ii) A detailed note about the way in which the Authority proposes to 
carry out consultations with the trade unions and other labour 
representatives, the other employers and users.  
 
(iii) The best assessment possible of the effects on employment 
generally in the Surrey docks area (both in respect of those 




The papers in the NA file show the extent to which the PLA endeavoured to meet 
these requirements. A comprehensive (but unsigned) briefing note dated 23 
January 1970 summarises the financial appraisal, showing that the Surrey docks 
were not meeting their direct operating costs, even before the attribution of 
overheads, so that the closures would present a direct financial benefit to the PLA.8 
The Authority had also convened formal meetings with the unions and employers, 
 
3   Cmnd 3903, 1969. Under paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex 6 the Government had a 
safeguarding role to relation to any “agreement or lease” entered into by a port authority 
after January 1969 to ensure that it was not unreasonably imprudent. 
4   MT 81/918 Ministerial submission file note by J Sanderson 25 September 1969.  
5   Ibid., Letter of 29 August 1969 from Dudley Perkins, the General Manager of the PLA. 
6   Ibid., Letter from Richard Marsh MP to Lord Simon, 11 September 1969.  
7   Ibid., Note by Sanderson, op.cit. 
8   Ibid., Briefing note of 23 January 1970, para 29. The note also comments on the PLA’s 
long-term plans to move its dock activities downstream (paras 6-7), and its forecast 





and the NA file contains a verbatim record of the points raised at a meeting with 
seven unions together with representatives from Scruttons (the largest stevedoring 
company) and the National Dock Labour Board (NDLB) on 3 October 1969 covering 
a wide range of financial, operational and social issues.9  The attitude of the local 
authorities is also recorded in the file: in contrast to the reactions to the proposals 
for more docks closures in the late 1970s, ministerial correspondence reported that: 
 
The attitude of the local authorities is ambivalent. In the longer term a large 
development site so near central London will have obvious advantages 
(mainly to the GLC [Greater London Council] and Southwark). But on the 
other hand the boroughs (particularly Southwark) are concerned about the 
short-term effects on employment, rate revenue and the prosperity of local 
shops and businesses.10 
 
The final requirement for an assessment of the effect on local jobs was not met by 
the PLA, but the letter mentions the “largely unpredictable extent” of the impact on 
other employment in the area.11 In contrast, it seems probable that RDWs (who 
could not, in any case be made redundant under the 1967 dock labour Scheme12 
that had replaced the 1947 Scheme), would have been reassigned to other Sectors 
in the Port, since the NDLB annual report for 1970 notes that 750 extra dockers 
were recruited in London in 1970, together with 234 Tally Clerks.13 The closure of 
the Surreys in early 1970 was thus a significant event, with the threat to many jobs 
in the docks,14 but there are no (national) press reports of industrial action in protest, 
nor are any stoppages with those causes recorded in the Ministry of Labour 
ledgers.15 Given the level of strike activity in the preceding decade this may seem 
remarkable, but it is possible that this was in recognition of the level of consultation 
and involvement. The absence of industrial disruption might also be attributed to the 
focus of the unions and workforce on the concurrent implementation of the ‘Devlin II’ 
 
9   The unions were the TGWU, NASD, WLTBU, and unions representing National and Local 
Government Officials, Electrical Trades, Merchant Navy Officers, and General and 
Municipal Workers). The file shows the measured response of the PLA to all of the points 
raised.  
10   MT 81/918 Letter from the Minister of State to the Secretary of State dated 9 March 
1970. 
11   Ibid. 
12   SI 1967/1252, The Docks Workers (Regulation of Employment ) (Amendment) Order, 
1967 
13   NA file BK3/25, p.2 
14   The Times 1 June 1970, p.20 ‘The first phase of the rundown of the Surrey Commercial 
docks’, notes that the PLA hoped that many of the workers would move with the trade to 
the other docks. 





modernisation arrangements16 and on a long-running pay claim that was to erupt as 
a major problem in the early Summer of 1970.  
 
The first strikes of the 1970s 
 
At that time, an overall improvement in the UK’s economic performance had 
encouraged the Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to call a General Election, 
which brought in a Conservative Government under Ted Heath.17 The new 
administration had to manage a national dock strike that in part reflected the earlier 
union pressure to extend the coverage of the (now lapsed) Ports Bill,18 but was 
mainly a result of delays by the employers in concluding pay negotiations. In simple 
terms, the wages of dockers after decasualisation comprised a theoretical ‘basic 
rate’ of a weekly wage of £11 1s 8d, which was never in fact paid, but used as the 
basis for calculation of overtime and holiday pay. All London dockers were 
guaranteed a minimum payment of £16 per week (increased to £17 per week from 
January 1968) but this would usually be increased by overtime and other additions. 
The TGWU asked for an increase in the basic rate in December 1967, and again in 
September 1968 and July 1969 at which point the request crystallised as a bid for 
the basic rate to be increased to the level of the guaranteed minimum payment. On 
each occasion the employers rejected the union’s request, and the claim was 
resubmitted and considered by the National Joint Council for the Port Transport 
Industry (NJCPTI) in September and November 1969, when the employers made 
some counter proposals, but were unable to concede the main claim.19 They were 
equally unresponsive when the claim was resubmitted to the NJCPTI in March 1970 
and then again in April, by which point the unions were now seeking an increase in 
the minimum guarantee to £20 per week. Following a national docks delegate 
conference in April, the unions gave notice of termination of the current Docks 
Agreement, but this did not produce an improved offer. Once again, the employers 
had been using delaying tactics, as a minute from an official of the of the 
Department of Employment and Productivity shows: 
 
 
16   See Final report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1965, Cmnd. 2734, 1965). 
17   ODNB Sir Edward Heath (1916-2005) article by Douglas Hurd. Accessed on 26 May 
2019  
18  The Times 17 March 1970, p.11 ‘When a strike IS an abuse’.  
19   By which time the employers had managed to defer granting any increase for almost 






[At the meeting of the NJCPTI on 12 June] the employers did not offer to 
increase the level of guarantee. Though privately prepared to do so, they 
apparently see some advantage in having it dragged out of them…20 
 
After the Minister of Labour intervened the employers agreed to increase the 
minimum guarantee to £20 (without conceding an adjustment to the basic rate), but 
this was not acceptable to a second delegate conference, which decided by 48 
votes to 32 to call for a national strike from 14 July. The Ministry intervened yet 
again on 17 July, by setting up a Court of Inquiry under Lord Pearson, which 
reported on 24 July.21 
 
 
Exactly what savings the employers might have made by these delays is not 
certain: in the evidence to the inquiry, the unions maintained that the full year cost 
of the increase would be 7% of the £78 million annual wages bill for the docks. The 
employers argued that an increase in the basic rate would be followed by an 
increase in piecework rates, such that the final costs would be some 50% of the 
wages bill,22 but whatever the final cost, considerable savings would have been 
made by their delaying any increase. In addition, their intransigence and the 
consequent delay in negotiations would largely be sub rosa, whereas a strike would 
be in the full blaze of publicity and bring odium on the workforce. And, as noted 
earlier, with no back-pay, any delay would represent a saving to the employers and 
a commensurate loss to the workers.  
 
In his report Pearson recommended that holiday pay should be based upon the rate 
of £20 per week, and that overtime should be based upon “a special overtime 
calculator” of 8s per hour compared to the existing rate of 5s 6½d – in effect setting 
the basic wage at £16 for the purpose of calculating overtime, but with no danger of 




20   NA file MT 81/718 Dock labour: weekly payments following decasualisation; 
negotiations. Minute from Brand dated 12 June 1970. 
21  Report of a Court of Inquiry under The Rt. Hon. The Lord Pearson, C.B.E., into a dispute 
between the parties represented on the National Joint Council for the Port Transport 
Industry (Pearson Report, Cmnd 4429, 1970)   
22  MT 81/718, Evidence to Pearson Inquiry, day 1, 21 July 1970. Those costs would then be 





in many cases the existing wage arrangements are so complex, irrational 
and varied that the task of sorting them out…would certainly be long and 
difficult and probably impossible.23  
 
The Pearson formula, reported in The Times as equating to a 7% increase,24 was 
accepted by another delegate conference on 30 July, and the strike was called off.25 
The new Conservative Government was focused on implementing its election 
manifesto commitment to “introduce a comprehensive Industrial Relations Bill in the 
first Session of the new Parliament”.26 The Bill was fiercely opposed both inside and 
outside Parliament, and its consideration “took up more hours of parliamentary time 
than any bill since 1945”,27 before the Industrial Relations Act (henceforth IR Act) 
received Royal assent on 5 August 1971.28 Irrespective of its qualities or defects, 
Andrew Thorpe asserts that one of the Act’s main achievements was “to restore a 
close relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions.”29 Hamish 
Sandison shows that the new legislation “was patterned closely after the American 
Labor Management Relations Act”,30 but with certain differences, in part recognising 
the British convention that industrial disputes should be “kept out of the ordinary 
courts so that settlement can be negotiated rather than imposed by law”.31 As noted 
earlier, this convention had tended to be observed even where wartime legislation32 
appeared to give the courts power to intervene.  
 
For the PLA itself, the first years of the 1970s were producing other pressures: in 
1970 the Authority estimated a loss of £750,000 from the ‘Pearson’ strike,33 and 
 
23  Pearson Report, para 56 
24  The Times 31 July 1970, p. 23 ‘Rising Pressure’ 
25  BK 3/25 (p.4) notes that the strike lasted from 14 July to 3 August, with an estimated loss 
of 496,000 man days nationally. 
26  1970 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: A Better Tomorrow (Internet, 
conservativemanifest.com) 
27  Hurd, Sir Edward Heath (ODNB) 
28  The Industrial Relations Act 1971 (Elizabeth II, Ch.72) The Act comprised 170 sections 
and 9 schedules, in 188 pages. Even accepting that the creation of a new Court (the 
National Industrial Relations Court) under Section 99 of the Act might moderate or limit the 
involvement of the judiciary, the existence of the Court of Appeal and the Law Lords must 
surely have entailed the possibility of judge-made extensions, revisions or re-interpretations 
of the legislation 
29 Andrew Thorpe ‘The Labour Party and the Trade Unions’ in John McIlroy, Nina Fishman 
and Alan Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Polices: the High Tide of 
Trade Unions, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) pp.133-150, p. 138 
30  Hamish R. Sandison ‘A Rejected Transplant: The British Industrial Relations Act (1971-
1974)’ Industrial Relations Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1979), pp. 247-320  
31  K. W. Wedderburn ‘Nuisance, Intimidation, Picketing in a Trade Dispute’ The Cambridge 
Law Journal, 18, 2 (1960), pp. 163-167, p.163 
32 e.g. Order 1305 vide supra  





although the satisfactory negotiations around the ‘Devlin II’ modernisation proposals 
had resulted in the lifting of the ban on the working of berths 39 and 48 at Tilbury in 
March 1970, the long term impact on trade was severe. The main users of the 
berths were to have been Overseas Containers Ltd (OCL) and Seaboard but, 
unable to use Tilbury, OCL had moved its main (Australian) trade to Antwerp and, 
as the PLA’s report had earlier noted:  
 
Not unnaturally, the consortium operating to the Far East has already 
decided to make their main base elsewhere, and it must be expected that 
the New Zealand lines will follow their example.34  
 
To some extent this demonstrated a new reality for industrial disputes in the docks: 
since container facilities were generic, rather than the dedicated berths required for 
specific conventional cargoes (such as frozen meat), movements to other ports was 
much simpler. But it must also be recognised that because the Tilbury ban was a 
refusal to operate a new facility, rather than a stoppage of work on an existing site, 
the dockers were not actually losing money. In addition, the ban was imposed both 
to increase the union’s bargaining powers in relation to its request for a general pay 
increase and as part of the drive to prevent the loss of dockers’ jobs to containers -  
but the PLA, while being the main sufferer, had very little power to influence either 
of those factors.  Moreover, the possibility of nationalisation of the UK ports 
proposed in the 1969 Ports Bill had affected lenders’ attitudes in the money market, 
and severely limited the Authority’s ability to raise long-dated funds, so that in 1970, 
the payment of more than £5 million of interest on its debt required a transfer of 
nearly £4 million from its reserves.35  
 
A False Dawn 
 
1971 can be seen, in many ways, as a good year for the Port of London, with little in 
the way of industrial disputes (although the  PLA’s annual report shows that the 
operating profit of £5,422,000 was virtually all absorbed by the interest charges of 
£5,253,000).36 The Authority also benefitted from the sale of its prestigious 
headquarters building, Trinity House, yielding £7.2 million, and of the (long-closed) 
East India Dock for £1.5 million. But there were underlying tensions, and two wide-
 
34  PLA Annual Report and Accounts for 1969 (London, PLA: 1970), p.3 
35  PLA Annual Report 1970, op.cit., p.5 





ranging reports in 1971 by a Department of Employment official37 reveal much about 
the problems of implementing the Devlin II recommendations on increasing 
productivity in London. In the first report the author, S V Horton, noted the pattern of 
divided responsibility: 
 
with the PLA responsible for work on the quay and in [the storage or 
warehouse] shed and with the stevedoring employer handling cargo 
between the ship and quay [this] not only limits the fullest possible use of 
labour but leads to constant friction between the PLA and the private 
employers.38 
 
He argued that the post-Devlin negotiations had also contained some fundamental 
defects where: 
  
the employers envisaged two parallel wage systems in the enclosed docks, 
with the PLA and the terminal berths paying a flat weekly wage and the 
LOTEA [London Ocean Trades Employers Association] retaining an 
incentive system at conventional berths. In the event, the TGWU insisted 
that the same flat rate system should apply throughout the enclosed 
docks…the pressures that they were able to apply in support of their policy - 
chiefly through the ban on new container operations - ensured that they had 
their own way.39 
 
But:  
What [the PLA] did not foresee was that the LOTEA employers would suffer 
such losses in their productivity that trade would be lost to the port and that 
this would affect their own operations.40 
 
The issue of productivity is complex: Mellish argues that one of the key factors was 
that the abolition of piecework (where docker gangs managed their own work rates) 
required much higher levels of supervision to manage the work processes, and that 
some stevedoring companies had failed to implement such changes, leading to a 
fall in output.41 In his second review Horton noted achievements in a number of 
 
37  NA file LAB 10/3629. Department of Employment: Port Transport Industry: Devlin 
agreement stage 2; follow-up with Port of London Authority. Reports by Mr S V Horton 
entitled “Problems in the Port of London” dated 31 December 1970 (henceforth Horton I) 
and “A survey of the operation of the Devlin II agreement in the London Enclosed docks” 
submitted on 10 February 1971 (henceforth Horton II).  
38   Horton I, para 3 
39   Ibid., para 7 
40   Ibid., para 8 
41   Michael Mellish The Docks after Devlin (London: Heinemann,1972, p.84).  The Devlin 
Report of 1965 recommended (paras 306-311) that piecework be abolished and a new 
guaranteed wage be paid that would (a) be “not too far below [a worker’s] regular 





areas, and that “the leading officials in the TGWU and the NASD in the port have 
both adopted a most responsible attitude”, but significantly also that “official TGWU 
policy is now determined by the rank and file”.42 Part of this transfer of power 
derived from the fact that many activists had achieved appointment as shop 
stewards, where “some…. have fostered more trouble than they have resolved, 
particularly in delaying the setting up of local review committees”.43 
 
In its 1971 annual report the PLA recorded that by the middle of the year services to 
port users had improved considerably: the new system of two-shift working at 
conventional berths was better understood, there was “round the clock working at 
container berths at Tilbury every day of the year… and additional vehicle booking 
schemes had eliminated congestion and delays to road transport”.44 In addition, 15 
berths at the India and Millwall docks had been closed and 822 employees had left. 
Against this, there had been difficulties arising from a dispute with mechanical 
equipment drivers,45 a shortage of stevedores, low productivity, and the inability of 
road hauliers to meet two-shift working, together with problems with the operations 
of the “other port employers who undertake about 90% of ship work”.46 The MLNS 
ledgers show that during 1971 there were only eight strikes in the London docks, 
resulting in the loss of 15,966 working days, with the majority of the lost days 
(9,039) resulting from the actions of tally clerks protesting against the transfer of 20 
workers to the Temporarily Unattached Register (TUR).47 
 
For the port operator and the stevedoring companies whose primary focus was on 
volumes and activity, it is astonishing that no systematic measures of the effects of 
any changes or improvements seem to have been made at that time, providing yet 
another example of the lack of engagement by the employers with the workforce. 
Mellish considers this in some detail, but concludes  that in the absence of any 
coordinated systems for measuring productivity in London “it is impossible to say 
whether the efforts of dockers dropped with the abolition of piecework”, while noting 
 
much improved management controls (para 324) – at a significant cost to the employers 
– to compensate for the fact that under the system of piecework working the docker 
gangs had managed their own work rates.  
42   Horton II, para 28 
43   Ibid., para 30.The file shows that the first of those review committees met on 24 October 
1972. 
44   PLA Annual Report for 1971, op.cit., p.4 
45   Although no details of strike action for these are recorded in NA file LAB 34/98 Trade 
Disputes Record Books, 1971 
46   PLA Annual Report for 1971 p.4  





that adverse publicity from some limited analyses of post-Devlin productivity “may 
well have discouraged shipping companies from using London”.48 For the external 
commentator, although some overall computation of productivity might be made (for 
example by comparing the volume of traffic handled against the number of men 
employed) there are too many variables49 to allow for any coordinated evaluation, 
but such an evaluation could and should have been made internally. Apart from 
Mellish, there appear to be few computations of productivity in the National Archives 
files, the main example being an estimate of times lost in dock operations (although 
it is not stated whether these are ship or quay work or, indeed, riverside wharves). 
The details are taken from a Press statement issued by ‘Frank O’Shannon 
associates’ on 6 January 1971, of a speech by Commander Dermod Jewitt of the 
LOTEA, showing delays (in minutes) in a typical 6½ hour shift:  
 
Late start    30 
Extension of Mealbreak  15 
Early finish    20 
Transport delays  30 
Weather   30 
Equipment delays  20 
 
These data are reproduced in Horton II, where he also noted (from Jewitt’s paper) 
that: 
 
Unfortunately, instead of an increase in output to make good the loss of 
work time, the speed of men when actually at work on ship loading has fallen 
by 20%: on ship discharge the figure is about 33%.50 
   
Horton does note that productivity on the dock quays had increased (mostly from 
mechanisation and reductions in manning levels), and attributed most of the 
problems to poor management with the private (i.e. non-PLA) employers having 
 
never really expected the Devlin II agreement to work and have done all too 
little to retrieve the situation. Certainly they have shown little management 
expertise and Mr Lewis, the Chairman of the London Port Employers, has 
publicly criticised them as bearing the prime responsibility for the failure of 
Devlin II.51   
 
 
48   Mellish, Docks, Chapter 15 “Productivity” pp. 95-102, p.101 
49   For example rivers and wharves versus docks trade, lighterage, mechanised and non-
mechanised locations, and seasonal trade 
50   Horton II paras 10 and 11 





In Horton’s view “more working time could be obtained by advance planning and by 
improving liaison with ancillary services such as the PLA, the road transport industry 
and lighterage.”52  
 
The only alternative to Jewitt’s computations in the NA files appears to be a paper 
by the National Ports Council (NPC) that analyses manpower, cargo traffic and 
productivity for the London docks.53 It concludes that when handling conventional 
cargo, dockers spent only between 40 and 52% of their time in active work. 
Between 28 and 40% was “not worked” or “not productive”, with the remainder (up 
to 14%) being holidays or sickness.54  The NPC staff’s estimate was that gains of up 
to 20% could be achieved by severance of ineffective staff and better management 
of the workforce. But in mid-1971, Horton was still not sanguine as to the 
employers’ aims or capabilities to achieve such improvements through negotiations, 
noting that:  
 
There is one immediate and urgent need which is fundamental to all aspects 
of the problem: the need radically to overhaul the employers’ negotiating 




Virtually none of the riverside employers was interested in shift working and 
had thus retained the 40-hour week…furthermore, in contrast to the fall in 
output which had been experienced in the enclosed docks, riverside 
employers were well satisfied with the productivity achieved.56 
 
This lack of engagement is more understandable in terms of the fact that the 
‘employers’ were simply a loose federation, with different interests, ranging from 
shipowner/stevedores (e.g. Furness Withy), and ‘pure’ stevedores (e.g. Maltby) to 
wharfingers, lighterage companies and the PLA. They were not themselves directly 
responsible for setting overall pay and conditions, which was the responsibility of 
the NJCPTI, while the NDLB was responsible for control of the register of port 
 
52   Ibid., para 20. 
53   NA file BK 2/1231 Joint Special Committee on the Ports Industry (Jones/Aldington 
Committee): Report, May 1974. Paper JSC/P5 (Annex A) submitted to the Committee dated 
12 June 1972 and considered at JSC on that date. 
54  It will thus be seen that Jewitt’s figures (which exclude holidays) equate to a loss of 
around 35%, which broadly matches the NPC figures (if holidays are excluded) of 
between 28 and 40% 
55  LAB 10/3629  





workers, discipline and (in London through the London Dock Labour Board) the 
allocation of workers to the various port Sectors. Although it was possible for a 
union official or representative of the employers to be on both the NJCPTI and the 
NDLB, there was no formal coordination mechanism to ensure commonality of 
purpose, and little evidence of any strategic approach to the problems of the 
industry. 
 
The PLA’s Developing Financial Problems 
In essence, then, 1971 was a period of consolidation after the Devlin report, with 
little in the way of direct industrial tensions, but 1972 was to bring a very different 
set of challenges to London and to the PLA. For much of early 1972 the story is of 
increasing tensions in the docks: an article in The Times in March noted that “the 
unofficial dock liaison committee of shop stewards” was threatening to call a strike 
over the return of 45 men to the TUR in addition to the 600 men that had by that 
time been placed thereon. The employers hoped that an increase in the amount of 
severance payments of a maximum of £2,330 would encourage up to 3,000 more 
dockers to leave the Scheme voluntarily over the following year, and thus defuse 
the tension.57 However, the situation had not improved by May where the TGWU 
gave formal notice of strike action “because employers have failed to give 
reassurances about redundancy created by the use of containers”. The article 
indicates a secondary objective, “an attempt by the [TGWU] union to discipline the 
[shop stewards] and bring them into the confines of national negotiations”.58  
 
Running alongside this dispute was the ‘Heaton’s’ case,59 which exemplified how 
the combination of tensions from the new industrial relations legislation and the 
impact of containerisation could produce huge difficulties. In April 1972 an unofficial 
committee of shop stewards from both docks and haulage companies in Liverpool 
drew up an agreement, to be signed by all the road haulage companies using the 
docks, imposing certain conditions relating to any container work. One transport 
company (Heaton’s) refused to sign the agreement, were blacked, and obtained an 
injunction under the IR Act against the TGWU, backed up by a fine of £50,000 
imposed when the unofficial committee refused to lift the blacking. The union 
 
57 The Times 17 March 1972, p.17 ‘Severance pay hope to stave off dock strike’ 
58 The Times 5 May 1972 p.1 ‘Docks unions give strike notice’ 






appealed, and was supported by the Court of Appeal, but the House of Lords 
overturned the appeal. In this, as the eminent industrial lawyer Otto Kahn Freund 
noted:   
 
The legal nature of the relation between the union as a collective entity…and 
the individual shop steward had never been discussed in or by any English 
court until the facts of the "container" dispute, coupled with the application of 
section 96 of the [Industrial Relations] Act, forced the courts to face it.  
 
And that the Law Lords then:  
 
considered the shop stewards of the largest British trade union as its 
"agents" in the legal sense, agents the scope of whose authority was not 
exclusively defined by the union's written constitution (the rule book), but 
also by its "custom and practice," unless it is expressly contradicted by a 
written rule.60 
 
And so, on 26 July 1972 the Law Lords, holding that the union was responsible for 
the actions of the shop stewards, upheld the fine.61 
 
Meanwhile, in London the ‘Port of London Joint Shop Stewards Committee’ had 
organised the picketing of a number of container bases and cold storage depots, in 
particular the container depot at Chobham Farm in east London, insisting that the 
work in the depot should be undertaken by RDWs. Some employees of the 
Chobham Farm operator62 applied to the Industrial Relations Court (IRC) for an 
injunction to end the picketing, which was granted but ignored, whereupon the Court 
committed three members of the Committee to gaol.63 Before the sentence could be 
carried out the Official Solicitor took the case to the Court of Appeal which found 
that the IRC had committed certain errors of procedure and allowed the appeal. 
Meanwhile, the dockers were also picketing the local Midland Cold Storage (MCS) 
depot, and on this occasion the company itself initiated an action, citing the 
Committee and naming seven of its members, which resulted in the IRC issuing an 
order restraining five of the members who were identified as having been on the 
 
60  Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘The Industrial Relations Act 1971-Some retrospective reflections.’ 
Industrial Law Journal 3 1, (1974): pp 186-200, pp.186-187 
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picket line64 and two others, the Chairman and Secretary of the Committee (Vic 
Turner and Bernie Steer). When the picketing continued, the company applied for 
the enforcement of the order, and three of the five picketers,65 together with Turner 
and Steer were jailed. Once again the Official Solicitor intervened and (following the 
decision in Heaton’s) the Court was able to rule that the union, not the men, were 
liable, and so the men were released,66 in Davies’s view, just saving “the tattered 
rags of the law’s self-respect”.67  
 
Fred Lindop argues that the ‘unofficials’ played a huge part in those events, 
exposing “the lack of correspondence between the view of industrial relations 
embodied in the Act and its reality in many important sectors of the economy”68 but 
the wider question is whether the enhanced visibility of the unofficials’ role is a 
reflection of the change in social attitudes in those years that allowed that visibility 
and for the voice of the workers to be heard much more clearly than in the earlier 
post-war decades. There is certainly more material generally available in print and 
on the Internet relating to these events than upon any of the earlier disputes.69 But 
both the demonstrations outside the courts and the picketing that attracted huge 
publicity could be undertaken by a relatively small group of men rather than the 
huge body of dockers involved in a major strike.  The release of the dockers was 
certainly seen – or at least presented – as a defeat for the Government, and the IR 
Act, but the subsequent acceptance of the Aldington-Jones proposals (see below) 
might also be seen as indicating that the militancy of the unofficials was not 
reflected by the corpus of the workforce.  And, as McIlroy asserts, although 
Communist Party members such as Turner and Steer had played a key part in the 
MCS events, “there can be no doubt as to the dockers’ dissatisfaction with the 
[Communist Party]” so that “in the aftermath of 1972 the [Communist Party] docks 
branch collapsed.”70 Arguably, this might indicate a continuing difficulty in mobilising 
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support for communism within the docks, reflecting the individuality of the dockers 
who would respond to rhetoric and emotional argument, but not to political dialectic. 
In addition, the Cabinet papers at this time show far less of an appetite for 
intervention than in the Betteshanger dispute of 1941 and ‘Zinc Oxide’ strike of 
1948.71 It would appear that the Government’s attention was focused far more on 
the question of the funding of severance payments,72 mitigating the impact of the 
strikes,73 and supporting the Aldington-Jones agreement74 than in any intervention 
in the courts.   
 
The Aldington-Jones Committee 
 
The situation was now both confused and problematical, but on 19 June, in a 
statement to the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Employment was 
able to announce that a further increased pay offer had been accepted by a TGWU 
national delegate conference on 14 June. He also stated that, in response to the 
conference’s demands that registered dockers should carry out the work of stuffing 
and stripping containers at groupage depots, the employers had proposed that “an 
authoritative joint committee should be established to examine and report” on the 
question of stuffing and stripping and on “other associated questions affecting the 
future employment of dock workers”.75 The joint chairmen of the committee were to 
be Lord Aldington, the chairman of the PLA, and Jack Jones, the General Secretary 
of the TGWU.76 The Aldington-Jones committee’s Interim Report of July 1972 
acknowledged that the pace of change in the docks industry had been such as to 
overwhelm the mechanisms that had been established to manage the reductions in 
numbers of dock workers, and that additional government funding was required to 
pay dockers to leave the Scheme. 77The interim report was rejected by a TGWU 
delegate conference, and a national strike began on 28 July, but after some minor 
changes the report was accepted at another delegate conference amidst some 
 
71  Although Lindop’s phraseology (Lindop, ‘Dockers’, p.80) that “there is no direct evidence” 
of government influence may be seen as indicating that he thought that there might 
indeed be such influence. 
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73  NA file CAB 128/50/39 (Cabinet conclusions 27 July 1972), pp.4-5 
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angry scenes,78 and the strike was called off. In the noise of the discord there 
appears little of analysis, but those outbursts might well have been reflecting the 
tensions from the huge changes that had taken place in the docks and in working 
practices79 - or perhaps more that the militants recognised (as did Government 
officials) that the new arrangements might prove detrimental to their power in the 
longer term.  
 
There was yet another more significant and long-lasting effect of Devlin’s 
recommendations where, in focusing on the changes from decasualisation he had 
stated that:  
 
reform must not lead to redundancy [and this] has in fact been accepted by 
the employers who are prepared to give a specific pledge in relation to it80 
 
which was codified in an NJCPTI statement that: 
 
The modernisation agreement will not lead to the discharge of men from the 
industry, either initially or as a result of increased efficiency. Any reduction in 
the labour force will be effected by natural wastage and/or control of 
recruitment.81 
 
The consequence of this guarantee was that if a dock company needed to reduce 
its workforce, the dockers would have to be allocated to other employers or, in the 
interim period, placed upon the TUR, until a vacancy arose.82 But under the  
Aldington-Jones agreement, the use of the TUR was to be abolished, and workforce 
reduction and re-alignment effected through the scheme of severance payments. In 
practice, however, such a reduction could not take place instantly and, as the 
largest employer of stevedores, the PLA had perforce to absorb the workers from 
the closure of other stevedoring companies in London.83  The first example of this 
 
78  The Times 17 August 1972, p.2 ‘Angry dockers shout down Mr Jack Jones and pursue 
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79  Ross, Death in the Docks, pp.151-153.  Ross’s presentation - and presumably the basis 
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80  Devlin Report 1965, para 244 
81  Reproduced in Pearson Report, Appendix 1, para 7  
82  A note dated 15 May 1972 in LAB 10/3629 shows there was anger amongst the workers 
at a wharfinger (Leetes) wanting to put men on to the TUR when work fell off, and then re-
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83  See NA file LAB 77/44, Private Office Papers: Employment in docks; dock labour 
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followed the failure of Southern Stevedores, which ceased to trade on 2 June 
1972,84 resulting in the transfer of 1,255 RDWs to the PLA, but by early October 
1972 The Times was able to comment on the success of the Aldington-Jones plan, 
with 4,700 men taking the enhanced severance pay of £4,000.85 The plan had a 
number of other significant aspects: for the first time the Government accepted that 
some of the costs of severance should be met by the taxpayer rather than the 
industry, that the TUR which had been used as a dumping ground for older and less 
fit workers should be eliminated, and that much greater efforts should be made to 
encourage container groupage companies to take on dock workers displaced by 
their activities. 
 
With the settlement of the dispute, and in an effort to help resolve the problem at 
MCS, the PLA also offered to take over the company’s  24-strong workforce, and to 
loan the men back to the company: then, when anyone left the PLA’s employment 
at MCS, he would be replaced by a registered dock worker.86  The Authority’s 
proposal to ameliorate the problems of MCS was portentous, and a further 
indication of the changing role of the Authority. In addition to managing the 
introduction and growth of containers, the PLA was now faced with new 
responsibilities and challenges relating to its core functions as the port owner. In 
this, and under Lord Aldington87 as chairman, the PLA partly replicated its role in the 
initial years of its formation as being the lead authority in the London docks, albeit 
without the towering presence of Lord Devonport. But now it would need to expand 
and modify its estate ownership functions as it became the major employer and 
service provider for the Port, to develop and implement corporate strategies and, 
above all, actively manage its workforce by absorbing, integrating, and then 
reducing its RDW numbers.  Associated with this would be the need to manage the 
huge financial challenges arising from the costs of servicing its working capital, and 
 
permanent employer must immediately be re-allocated to the remaining employers on full 
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the unpredictable consequences of any industrial disputes or downturns in the UK 
or world economies and trade.  
 
The fundamental structure of port operations in London was also being changed by 
the advent of containerisation, which required much larger working areas with 
higher degrees of mechanisation, and needed far fewer workers to handle cargoes.  
The model of independent or shipowner- controlled stevedoring companies simply 
engaging gangs of manual workers – whatever their levels of skills - was clearly 
incompatible with huge investment in mechanical handling systems required for 
containers, so that those companies could only survive as long as there was some 
significant residual conventional cargo handling. Containers also required no 
warehouses or dock storage facilities, nor did they require functions such as 
lighterage and wharfage, so that the companies providing those services came 
under pressure. And as the use of containers, with their specialised needs for vast 
service areas, deep water access and efficient transport links grew, the impact on 
the crowded inner-city docks that had none of those facilities put their future under 
greater threat.  By late 1972 the (apparently) beneficial effects of the Aldington-
Jones report were becoming more apparent, as a letter from Sutherland of the 
Department of Employment to Wilson of the Treasury indicates:  
 
The success of severance and the abolition of the TUR has taken away from 
the militant shop stewards committee much of the rank and file support that 
they had had during the dispute…[and] blacking has greatly diminished.88 
 
At the end of the year Aldington reported that some 2,458 RDWs had left London 
under the Special Severance Scheme.89  Although the PLA did not show the costs 
of the strikes in its annual report for that year the accounts show that this was a 
successful year which generated an operating surplus of £7,217,000 (albeit with 
interest charges of £4,881,000). At this point the Authority was becoming more 
focused on longer-term development plans in the Thames estuary, which it saw as 
key to its survival as a major port operator, so in the report Aldington chose to focus 
on the opportunities in the development of a new seaport at Maplin that he hoped 
would be open by 1976. 90 The site at Maplin Sands (or Foulness) had been 
selected as the site for the Third London airport following the report of the Roskill 
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Commission in 1971.91 The Commission had originally recommended that the 
airport should be at Cublington in Buckinghamshire, but powerful local influences92 
and the impossibility of getting the legislation through the House of Lords meant that 
this was not feasible and a location on the Essex coast at Foulness (the 
Commission’s fourth choice) was eventually selected. In considering the proposed 
development, concerns had been expressed about the financing of the new airport 
because of the long lead time for financial returns on the investment, and the formal 
proposal was therefore based upon an airport, seaport, and industrial development 
that was to be taken forward by a consortium known as the Thames Estuary 
Development Company (TEDCO),93 with significant private sector investment – 
within which one option would have been a development along the lines of 
Europoort at Rotterdam.94 However in June 1971 the PLA had withdrawn from 
TEDCO in order to focus on the seaport development,95  and in February 1972 the 
Secretary of State for the Environment announced that: 
 
There is no objection in principle to seaport development at Maplin, and we 
are informing the Port of London Authority that it is free to put forward firm 
proposals for detailed scrutiny under the Harbours Act, 1964.96 
 
For this, the PLA proposed an ambitious scheme (the “Thames Trumpet”) involving 
land reclamation and development of a major new facility at Maplin, costing at least 
£250m, but there was also opposition to the proposals by environmental 
campaigners,97 and the Treasury file shows that this option was not favoured.98  
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Thus ended 1972, a momentous year for the port and the PLA, and from an 
industrial relations perspective 1973 might have been seen in positive terms by the 
Authority: the Department of Employment ledgers show that there were only seven 
strikes in the London docks in that year, resulting in the loss of 18,608 working 
days, compared to 146 strikes and 142,597 days lost in UK dock strikes (i.e. 
London had only 5% of the number of strikes and 13% of the days lost),99 and more 
than 7 million working days lost nationally.100 The Authority again had a strong 
financial performance with an operating surplus of £7,368,000, albeit with interest 
charges of £4,366,000, and at this point the PLA’s (financial) reserves reached their 
highest level of more than £63 million. But once again the negative (commercial) 
impact of the Aldington-Jones agreement was apparent, with the PLA having to 
absorb more than 1,300 employees from two large stevedoring companies (Thames 
Stevedoring and Metropolitan Terminals) that were in trouble in that year.101 A 
further implication was now becoming apparent in the growth in the number of 
‘Category B’ workers on the Register102 for whom there was little work. But whereas 
under the old Scheme these workers would not have been called for work, and their 
wages paid by the NDLB (and thus spread over all employers), those costs now fell 
wholly upon the PLA.  
 
Given all these developments, it is hardly surprising that the Chairman should write 
in the 1973 annual report that: 
 
Looking to the future, there can be little doubt that the Thames estuary, and 
in particular the Maplin site, offers the best opportunity for the development 
of a new deep-water port for the most modern container and bulk cargo 
ships.103 
 
In terms of industrial disputes in the docks, 1974 was again a good year for London, 
but the capital could not be insulated from the wider national picture. So while 
London had only 11 disputes and 9,625 days lost against 199 disputes and 174,001 
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days lost in the UK docks industry,104 the port suffered from the imposition of the 
‘three-day working week’, introduced by the Conservative Government at the 
beginning of the year following industrial action by the National Union of 
Mineworkers. The restrictions, under which commercial users of electricity were 
limited to three consecutive days’ usage and prohibited from working longer hours 
on those days, continued until the formation of a (minority) Labour administration in 
March. The new Government was soon under pressure from the TGWU, deeply 
dissatisfied at the general direction of industrial tribunal rulings on the definition and 
location of dock work, and pushing for the Government to ratify the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning the Social Repercussions of New 
Methods of Cargo Handling in Docks which provided (inter alia) that “ Registers 
shall be established and maintained for all occupational categories of dockworkers, 
in a manner to be determined by national law or practice.” – in effect, providing an 
opportunity for union pressure for all UK ports to be brought within the Dock Labour 
Scheme.105 Since neither of these could be achieved without legislation, the minority 
Government was in a hugely difficult position. But in July the Secretary of State for 
Employment told the House of Commons that the Government was prepared to 
consider both the extension of the Scheme and the revision of the statutory 
definition of dock work.106 Without formally committing the Government to further 
action he noted that: 
 
Of course we do not think this proposal solves all the problems of the docks. 
For that we have to carry through the much fuller programme of 
nationalisation, if I may mention that horrific word to Conservative Members, 
which has been so well understood by those who know the dock 
problems.107 
 
The reservations of the civil servants about the practical realities of such legislation, 
especially in terms of the definition of ports and dock work, are well illustrated in the 
NA files108 but in the event the Secretary of State’s undertakings were not followed 
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through. This was largely because the General Election of October 1974 gave 
Labour only a three-seat majority – insufficient for such major legislation109 - and 
this linked in to a general dissatisfaction by the unions with a lack of progress on 
pay negotiations that would lead to problems in the following year.  While the 
financial impact of the three-day week was not separately identified in the 
Authority’s annual report for that year, it was noted that the constraints on working 
hours and a fall-off in international trade had reduced the PLA group’s profit for 
1974 to £533,000.110 Once again, however, it needs to be noted that this followed 
the allocation of interest charges of £4,665,000 against operating profits of 
£5,763,000. But in all of this the Chairman sounded a strong cautionary note in his 
report, noting that while the first half of the year had been profitable, an increase in 
the costs of supplies, services and payroll, together with a reduction in trade had 
produced a loss of around £500,000 in the latter half. This was not the only bad 
news: there was a continuing recession in world trade, the minority Labour 
Government had abandoned the Maplin project, and the newly formed National 
Ports Council had set “UK ports in competition with each other for investment 
approvals” and funding. Finally, Aldington noted that: 
 
productivity in some parts of the port is not as good as it ought to be and 
indeed is less good than it has been. Management knows what has to be 
done. It can only be done as a result of good industrial relations and 
sensible negotiations within them. There can be little doubt that a reason for 
the loss of traffic in 1974 was either the fact or the fear of poor productivity in 
our enclosed docks.111 
 
In addition, a slightly ominous note was included in the report, where it was stated 
that “the largest container ships cannot enter Tilbury enclosed docks”.112 The 
problems of the restricted access to Tilbury had been identified at an earlier 
stage,113 and given that all of the Upper Docks had smaller locks than Tilbury114 this 
was yet another portent of their demise.  
 
The Pay Strike of 1975 
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Aldington’s caution was well justified: a strike throughout the port, starting at the end 
of February 1975, lasted for five weeks with a huge impact on the PLA.115 As noted 
above, the dispute had been brewing for some time, with the unions also having 
been dissatisfied with the employers’ offer of a pay increase linked to some form of 
incentive bonus,116 and exacerbated by the long-standing dissatisfaction about ‘non-
scheme’ ports (which, not having been included in the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme 
were not required to employ RDWs), and the lack of employment opportunities for 
dock workers in container companies.117 The strike was “preceded by several 
weeks of interrupted work”,118 in support of the picketing of road haulage depots to 
persuade employers to take on registered dockers:  The Times report noted that 
“port employers said that because of the picketing there were no container ships in 
the port of London”.119 In some respects the 1975 strike matches many of the earlier 
disputes: it was fomented by the ‘unofficials’ after a period of unrest and apparent 
procrastination by the employers in failing to address the workers’ concerns,  and 
matched in some respects by internal and unresolved tensions within the unions.120 
Although the PLA had no direct involvement in the negotiations on either pay or 
containers, it would have had some (considerable) presence on the employers’ side 
in negotiations, which was linked to the ongoing pay negotiations, and resolved at 
the end of April when the dockers accepted a pay increase headlined as being 
“30%”.121 The Chairman was later able to report that: 
 
Shortly after the end of the strike a revised Port Agreement was reached, 
which included the introduction of a group bonus incentive scheme [which] 
helped to bring about improvements in productivity and ship service levels. 
However, the full benefits could not be achieved due to the downturn in 
trade.122 
 
The strike had a secondary impact on the PLA, in that it led (directly or indirectly) to 
the closure of three more stevedoring companies123 and the absorption of more than 
 
115  The Times 1 March 1975, p.1 ‘Port of London shut as Dockers strike’ 
116  Ibid., 7 January 1975, p.15 ‘London Dockers offered pay rises of 20%’ 
117  Ibid., 19 February 1975, p.21 ‘Perils in the Unresolved Conflict over Container Handling’. 
118  PLA Annual Report and Accounts for 1975 (London, PLA: 1976) p. 5 
119 The Times 1 March 1975 p.1 ‘Port shuts’ op. cit. 
120 Although on this occasion it was tensions within the TGWU, between transport workers 
and dockers, rather than between the TGWU and the NASD and dockers and 
stevedores.   
121  The Times 29 April 1975, p.1 ‘London dockers likely to accept 30% rise’. The strike was 
called off on that day. 
122  PLA Annual Report for 1975, op.cit., p.15 





3,000 extra workers (both RDWs and non-registered staff) from Scruttons, the last 
major private employer of stevedores, by the Authority.124 The addition of these staff 
once again affected the PLA’s own restructuring plans, under which it had reduced 
its non-RDW employees by 490, and RDWs by 859, so that it now had a surplus of 
around 1,250 workers, costing some £150,000 per week.125 But within that figure 
the PLA reckoned to have some 800 workers “restricted to light duties” (category B) 
in the Upper Docks126 and, given that cargoes in the Upper Docks were almost all of 
conventional traffic – i.e. requiring manual handling - that figure represented a 
continuing and growing drain upon the Authority’s resources. While it is not possible 
to define this as an ‘industrial dispute’ in traditional terms, the reality is that the 
PLA’s inability to manage the problem of its ‘Category B surplus’ imposed a 
continuing cost on its operations, with an effect commensurate with that of 
‘traditional’ disputes.  
 
The strike in February-April, coupled with a world trade recession,127 affected the 
port badly, with the PLA’s 1975 annual report noting that overall trade was down by 
11%, container traffic by 17% and general cargo by 32%. The traffic loss was to 
some extent exacerbated by the UK’s membership of the Common Market and the 
easing of Customs restrictions, so that some cargoes that might traditionally have 
come to London went first to other ports (for example 50,000 tons of tea that would 
normally have been unloaded in London was instead landed at Rotterdam and 
transported to the UK via Ro-ro ferries).128 In stark terms the PLA suffered a loss of 
its operations of £1.6 million, to which needed to be added the interest payments of 
£4,3 million, together with the costs incurred by the PLA in taking over the failed 
stevedoring companies, resulting in an overall loss of £8.4 million for 1975.   
 
The PLA’s financial position was also affected by the passing of the Community 
Land Act 1975129 which “required it to dispose of surplus docklands at prices that 
 
124  PLA Archives, Minutes of the PLA Board: the PLA group monthly financial statement 
submitted to the PLA Board on15 March 1976 notes (p.10) that “the acquisition of 
Scruttons business in April …increased PLA group manpower by nearly 3,000 people” 
125  PLA Annual Report for 1975, op.cit., p.5  
126  Ibid., p.13 
127  United Nations World Economic Survey, 1975: Fluctuations and Development in the 
World Economy (New York: United Nations, 1976), p.45 shows that UK Gross Domestic 
Product fell by 1.8% compared to 1974. 
128  PLA Annual Report for 1975 p.9  





reflected its existing use”.130 In consequence, the anticipated gains from its major 
proposed property disposals (and in particular the huge Cutler Street warehouse) 
needed to be revalued (downward), and the diminution reflected in the accounts, in 
effect costing the Authority £20 million.131 The immediate effect was that the PLA 
was critically short of cash, but because almost all of its operations and finances 
were governed by statute, it had to seek Government approval to exceed its (£12 
million) short-term borrowing limit. At that point “the Government took the view that 
they needed the advice of financial consultants and have appointed Price 
Waterhouse and Company [hereafter PW] to examine the Authority’s present 
financial position and their forecast for future years”.132 A further consequence for 
the PLA was that: 
 
“Soon after we began the action necessary to strengthen our financial 
position it seemed to us important that the PLA’s position should be known 
to, and examined by, the DoE [Department of the Environment] and the NPC 
[National Ports Council]. A joint working party was set up with both of these 
bodies in August [1975].”133 
 
These financial and supervisory pressures underlined the need for urgent action, 
and (possibly as a measure of self-protection), the Chairman noted that it was 
“timely to ask McKinsey and Co to do a review of our top management 
organisation”,134 adding that: 
 
We have to reduce costs and use that to increase our traffic. That is why we 
have put forward the proposal to transfer PLA general cargo to the Royals, 
and these proposals are now being discussed with the trade unions, the 
customers and the local authorities. These proposals do not include the 
closing of West India and Millwall docks: they are confined to the 
rationalisation of PLA cargo handling.135 
 
The caveat at the end of the quotation clearly signalled the Authority’s underlying 
fears about the attitudes of the unions to such closures, although the unions 
themselves seemed to be well seized of the need to support the PLA. There 
appeared also to be little real effort or impact from the ‘unofficials’: Colin Ross’s 
 
130  The Times 5 January 1976, p.13 ‘PLA wants limit on borrowing raised after a big loss 
last year’ 
131  PLA Annual Report for 1975 p.9  
132  Ibid., p.6. Price Waterhouse were formally appointed on 12 February 1976 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid., p.9 





perspective as a former member of the (unofficial) Liaison Committee is that [by 
1974/5] “we did not seem to be able to rekindle the movement to its previous 
heights….the severance pay had robbed us of many of our supporters”.136 But the 
PLA would also have been conscious of the growing concerns by local authorities 
about jobs losses in the docks areas,137  with the Greater London Council (GLC) 
and five dockland boroughs emphasising the need for a strategic approach to the 
possibility of much larger closures and estate disposals.138  
 
The McKinsey Review 
 
1976 presented a different set of challenges to the PLA, firstly in the recognition that 
the business of the Authority had changed from port ownership to an integrated port 
services provider¸ and that the old Authority with its elected and nominated 
members was no longer appropriate as a directive body. The changes had been 
presaged by the reformation of the Authority itself in the 1968 Port of London Act,139 
codified further in SI 1975/1890,140 and the message was reinforced by the 
McKinsey review,141 whose findings were summarised by the Chairman in a 
broadsheet publication for PLA staff as being that:  
 
The PLA can no longer survive as an administrative authority. We are now a 
major stevedoring contractor and have to become a fully competitive 
business offering the finest in port facilities and cargo-handling services.142 
 
The McKinsey recommendations are also summarised in an NA file as requiring: 
 
a. improvements in commercial performance 
 
136  Ross, Death in the Docks, pp.176-7 
137  The Times 22 January 1975 p.4 ‘Government blamed for decline in London industrial 
area’ 
138  The Times 23 January 1975, p.5 ‘Redeveloping docklands requires Government aid on 
scale of new town, councillors tell MPs’ 
139  Elizabeth II, Ch. 32 
140  SI 1975/1890 The Port of London Authority (Constitution) Revision Order, 1975 
141  The appointment of McKinsey and Co was agreed on 15 March 1976 (PLA Board minute 
43), and on 2 August a panel of all Board members was set up (minute 111) to consider the 
report, which was to be further considered at special Board meeting on 11 October. The 
relevant minute (shown in the index as minute 137) is missing. No copy of the McKinsey 
report could be found by the PLA archivist in February 2019, but the NA file T370/357 Port 
of London Authority: financial difficulties and arrangements contains a note of 5 November 
1976 summarising the report.  
142  In NA file T 370/359 Port of London Authority: financial difficulties and arrangements. 





b. increasing revenues and reducing costs 
c. organizational change 
d. strengthening management processes.143 
 
But such changes would take time to implement, and in the meantime the Authority 
was still facing both operational and financial pressures. In January 1976 the Board 
had discussed the transfer of conventional cargo handling from the India and 
Millwall docks to the Royals, proposing “in the meantime to reduce manning levels, 
streamline management and change the Quay and Shed arrangements”.144 The 
inefficient and costly “quay and shed space arrangements” dated back to 1889, and 
involved two sets of operations in some of the docks: unloading onto the quay, and 
then transferring from the quay to the shed – undertaken by two separate gangs. 
Although there were integrated operations known as the West India Dock 
arrangements, the use of the Quay and Shed system was widespread and deeply 
entrenched. As Tull shows, the PLA had considered how to change these 
arrangements at various times between 1947 and 1951, but in June 1951 a sub-
committee had advised against any change.145 An indication of the continuing 
difficulties around the worker attitudes – and lack of management action - was the 
note that “management is not now [in 1976] making [changes to] Quay and Shed 
conditions a pre-requisite” to the transfer of cargo handling to the Royals146 – and in 
fact such a change was never made in the lifetime of the Upper Docks.147  
 
A comparable lack of direction and clarity in relation to possible closures is also 
shown in the Board minutes of July 1976 where:  
 
Proposals had been circulated in February 1976 for closure of the India and 
Millwall docks, but the Director of Upper Docks argued for closing some 
berths in Royals and retaining the South-West India and Millwall docks148 
 
143 T370/357 Appendix A to a letter from the Secretary of State for Transport (William 
Rogers) to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Dennis Healey) dated 10 November 1976. The 
McKInsey report also suggested that the PLA’s 5,350 administrative staff should be reduced 
by 1,350 posts but (since it was only concerned with PLA’s administration) made no 
mentions of RDW numbers. 
144  Taken from T370/359 “Business conditions for handling imports within the enclosed 
docks”: undated note as Appendix 4 in meeting papers 22 June 1977.  
145  C.J.D. Tull The Port of London Authority 1909-1959 (London: PLA, printed for private 
circulation, 1959) pp. 291-293 
146  Minutes of the PLA Board, 19 Jan 1976, Minute 8 
147  PLA Board meeting 9 June 1980, Management Report, p.5 notes that Quay and Shed 
space conditions were still in operation “until we are able to offer a satisfactory alternative to 
Quay and Shed space conditions our marketing for additional import traffic for the Royal 
Docks will be severely restricted”   






That nervousness and indecision is to some extent understandable; the Board 
considered a detailed memorandum from the Managing Director that showed how 
other elements came into play in relation to rationalisation of the docks: some 
shipowners had said that they would leave London rather than move to the Royals, 
and the Local Authority (Tower Hamlets) had expressed concerns about the 
economic and social effects of closing the Millwall docks. It was also clear that dock 
workers were becoming more reluctant to take severance because employment 
opportunities were decreasing as the docks, wharves and warehouse closures 
affected other industries and employers in east London.149 In this the Managing 
Director noted that “ the Trade Unions….also said, in discussion, that they are 
prepared to cooperate in any measures necessary to keep the docks open”.150 
Thus, in its 1976 report, the PLA noted that “extensive discussions took place with 
all concerned on a scheme to rationalise PLA conventional cargo handling facilities 
at the Upper Docks”, but the only significant change was that the PLA mothballed 
three berths in the Millwall docks.151 
 
The problems facing the PLA, recognised in the McKinsey report, were confirmed in 
an environmental survey of the port’s problems by Frank Cousins, the former 
General Secretary of the TUC, who chaired a Joint Port Trade Development 
Committee in 1976. The Committee’s second report noted that the PLA, as a 
commercial organisation, was paying for the operation, maintenance and manning 
of obsolete facilities and carrying too much manpower. But external constraints 
were also significant: the PLA was required by statute to break even, but received 
little government support, and so was inevitably a high cost port. It was also 
affected by the de-industrialisation of east London through government regional 
development policies. The solution proposed was a coordinated approach through a 
new multi-agency body that would develop a fresh strategic approach for the future 
of the docklands, 152 but this was not taken forward by the Government. 
 
 
149  PLA Board meeting 5 July 1976, Item 7: Memorandum from the Managing Director 
‘Upper Docks -Proposals’ dated 29 June 1976 p.1. 
150  Ibid., p.2 
151  PLA Annual Report and Accounts for 1976 (London, PLA: 1977) p.6.  
152  NA file MT 81/847 Government emergency financial assistance to Port of London 
Authority: proposals for survival; risk of industrial action; Folder F/PSO/23019/79: second 





Following their appointment in February 1976, Price Waterhouse reported in July, 
their key findings being that: 
 
 London’s share of foreign trade has declined, particularly on conventional 
cargoes where volumes have not been replaced by container traffic. But with 
the growth in containers, cargo handling has become much less labour 
intensive and has moved down river, leaving PLA with underused up-river 
facilities and surplus workers. 153 
 
The problem of ‘surplus workers’ might also be seen in the context of an article in 
The Times which noted in 1975 that “productivity has also been rising rapidly to just 
over 50 tons a man”.154 In such circumstances the dockers’ action to increase 
productivity (so that fewer workers were needed) also increased the need for more 
severances. A paper by the Department of Industry in March 1976 estimated the 
costs of surplus RDWs at £5.3 million a year for 1976 (forecast to rise - almost 
astronomically - to £24.6 million p.a. in 1980),155 and in late 1976 a draft paper for 
the (Cabinet) Ministerial Committee on Economic and Industrial Policy noted that 
“the PLA have over 1,000 surplus RDWs and a similar number of surplus [office] 
staff [which] absorbs about £11 million p.a.”.156  
 
Following on from the problems of the Community Land Development Act in 1975, 
the PLA‘s aims of property disposals were affected by another statute, the 
Development Land Tax Act of 1976,157 which imposed penal charges on profits 
made from the sale of land or property for development. In April 1976 the Managing 
Director reported to the PLA Board his expectation that the PLA would in fact 
receive only £6.1 million from the sale of Cutler Street.158 In spite of all of these 
factors, the PLA accounts for 1976 showed an operating surplus of £3.9 million 
(compared to an operating loss of £1.6 million in 1975). But with interest payments 
 
153  T370/357. Note of 17 November 1976. Para 5 notes that “there are expected to be more 
than 1,00 surplus (RDWs) in London at the end of 1976 [and] about 1,300 of the RDWs are 
not fully fit. There are also more than1,000 surplus [non-RDW] staff”.   
154  The Times 29 April 1975, ‘30% rise’ op.cit 
155   NA file T 370/96 Treasury: Public Expenditure sector. Port of London Authority: financial 
difficulties and arrangements. 
156   T370/357 draft paper for EI committee dated 5 November 1976. (As has been shown, 
the PLA actually made an operating profit of £3.9 million in 1976 – although after 
providing for interest charges this became a loss of £1.7 million.)   
157  Elizabeth II Ch. 24 
158  PLA Board meeting 12 April 1976: note of a meeting to consider the draft annual report 
and accounts for 1975. In fact, as the PLA annual report for 1977 (p. 12) shows that even 





(at £5.7 million) now nearly 13% higher, and with restructuring and revaluation costs 
of £5 million, the overall loss was £6.7 million.159  
 
Aldington served for five years as Chairman in a hugely challenging period for the 
PLA, and he was replaced in October 1977 by John Cuckney,160 who had previously 
overseen the restructuring and rescue of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board,161 
on a two-year appointment.  Characterised as “one of the most astute industrial 
‘fixers’ of his time, the man to whom successive governments turned to resolve 
intractable and embarrassing problems”,162 he must very much have seemed the 
right appointment: the PLA certainly presented a set of formidable challenges. 
These were summarised in three pages of the (new) Chairman’s statement at the 
front of the 1977 annual report – significantly in a much less formal (spiral bound) 
format, contrasting strongly with the glossy publications of previous years.  Cuckney 
pulled few punches: in headline terms, the Authority’s loss on “continuing 
operations” – its day to day income versus expenditure – was £2.4 millions, but with 
the added costs of debt interest of £5.9 million this loss grew to more than £8 
million, and the reserves fell to £2 million, a reduction of “£52 million since 1974” – 
although, as has been noted, some of that reduction arose from the impact of 
legislation.163 While the move from conventional cargo to containers had also a 
substantial impact, the chairman focused on the “increasing number of dock 
workers who are restricted, in medical terms, from taking any part in cargo handling 
activities” and “ a high incidence of sick absence”.   
 
159   PLA Annual Report for 1976 op.cit., p.13 
160   ODNB John, Baron Cuckney (1925-2008). Article by Martin Adeney. Accessed on 26 
May 2019 
161   See Anthony Lynch. Weathering the Storm: the Mersey Docks Financial Crisis 1970-74. 
(Liverpool: University Press, 1994) p. 47 records Cuckney’s appointment to the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board in late 1970 and (p. 81) his retirement on 26 April 1972 “for 
business and health reasons”, having overseen the restructuring and reformation of the 
undertaking.  
162  Adeney John, Baron Cuckney ODNB,   






The PLA’s Managerial  and Financial Concerns 
 
The identification of those issues then begs the question of what the Authority – or 
at least the Board - was doing to drive forward the output and efficiencies of the 
business, and part of the answer lies in a letter from the departing Chairman to the 
Secretary of State for Transport which set out the PLA’s intentions for management 
action in six areas:  
 
(i) To introduce “overside conditions” for imports at the Tilbury and Royal 
Docks [to replace the costly Quay and Shed arrangements]. This will 
enable us to market these facilities on a wider basis. 
(ii) To achieve a balance in the location of manpower. This will provide a 
more sensible allocation of resources so that we can handle traffic at the 
correct location. [Under the existing arrangements, London RDWs were 
allocated to specific sectors (e.g. the Royals) and could only be 
transferred to other docks and work by employers once a dock was fully 
manned. The unions objected to such transfers, especially from the 
Royal docks, fearing that this presaged the running down of the docks. In 
addition, permanent transfers required approval by the London Dock 
Labour Board (LDLB).]164   
(iii) Integrate operational clerical services….the proper integration for all 
clerical services will ensure a more sensible distribution of resources 
thus avoiding the current shortages and surpluses. [Clerical work on 
loading and unloading was undertaken by both PLA clerical staff (Grade 
V) and Tally Clerks (often inherited from the failing stevedore 
companies), but only the latter were RDWs.]165 
(iv) Re-examine union representation and the role of various unions 
(including NASD) to provide for proper representation of all personnel 
and provide an improved basis for both consultation and negotiation. 
[The PLA had nine recognised unions for its RDWs and clerical and 
managerial staff.]166 
(v) To achieve registration under Government legislation. This will relate to 
both PLA Grade V staff and possible (sic) to Grade IV. [Presumably this 
was about the registration of these PLA clerical staff under the (1947 and 
1967) Dock Labour Schemes. That could not have been easily achieved 
 
164  Minutes of the PLA Board meeting of 26 September 1977 (p.69) shows that the LDLB 
had still not agreed to the transfer of 140 men from the Royal group to the Tilbury and 
India docks, 
165 But note that also that Tally Clerks were members of both TGWU and NASD, whereas 
PLA Grade Vs were TGWU, NASD, and NALGO (National and Local Government 
Officers Association).  
166 TGWU and NASD for its dock workers, NALGO and ACTSS for clerical and managerial 
staff, ETU/AEU for Electricians and engineers, the Police federation, Merchant Navy Officers 





because of different conditions of employment, pensions, and holiday 
pay.] 
(vi) To revise the operating structure. [The aim was to reduce this to three 
levels (ganger, foreman, shift manager) rather than the multiple levels of 
management (e.g. shed foreman, stevedoring foreman, labour 
coordinators, and clerical charge hands) that had been inherited as a 
result of company take-overs and mergers.]167 
 
The letter also noted that preliminary discussions had already been held with the 
trade unions on some of these areas – notably the integration of clerical services 
and extension of overside conditions.  It seems astonishing that these issues were 
still outstanding in 1977 – perhaps reflecting obduracy on the part of the workforce 
and the unions, but also underlining the ineffectiveness of the PLA management in 
its inability to make real progress. There is little in the NA files, the PLA annual 
reports or Board minutes at this time to show that these operational problems were 
being resolved: there were obvious pressures from Cuckney where “he drew 
[Board] members’ attention to the clear cut case for abolishing Quay and Shed 
Space conditions in favour of West India Dock  conditions and asked what progress 
had been made”, but “the Director of Manpower explained that proposals had been 
put to unions and employees and the central Manpower Manager was shortly going 
to give presentations of the proposals to groups of RDWs”.168  And so the 
Authority’s annual report for 1977 noted that: 
 
During 1977 management were discussing with employees and their union 
representatives the need for urgent improvements in the organisation of 
work at quay level and for introducing changes to working practices with the 
object of reducing costs, improving efficiency and raising productivity, 
particularly of general conventional cargo operation.  They have not been 
able to make the sort of progress towards implementing those changes that 
they and the Board would have wished.169 
 
But even with these short-term impediments, there is no evidence of PLA 
management devising a cohesive longer-term strategy to tackle the issues – so that 
for example discussions would be derailed by rumours of dock closures. Secondly, 
no computation of the possible costs or savings is shown in the NA or MLD files, 
although the PLA Board minutes note that the implementation of these would “result 
 
167  Letter dated on 1 August 1977 in T370/359, enclosing a memorandum from the 
Managing Director ‘Management Action Plans, Objective 1’ 
168  Minutes of the PLA Board meeting of 28 February 1977 (minute 25) 





in savings of 20% in manning levels”170, and there is also no evidence of any 
proposals to share efficiency savings with the work force. And once again the PLA 
had to absorb more staff from failing companies – this time, the business of Fred 
Olsen stevedoring with the transfer of 228 RDWs and 14 non-RDW staff.  
 
In this period some of the activities – or more especially the financial management 
processes - of the PLA are much more visible because of the existence of the joint 
interdepartmental/PLA working party.  For example, in relation to the PLA’s 
marketing and charging strategies: 
 
Some increased traffic has been attracted to London by cutting charges 
earlier in the year, though even at these cut rates the PLA had earned 
revenues ranging from 100% to 160% of their labour costs. The PLA have 
now moved away from this cut-rate approach since current traffic levels are 
well up, so much so that they have had to turn away more than 50 ships so 
far this year and surplus manpower is about 100 men per day. 171 
 
And on the PLA’s financial forecasting: 
 
 we appear to be back in the situation where PLA have two different sets of 
forecasts and we are not at all happy about those used in the recent 
documents since they do not appear to relate in any way to the earlier 
forecasts which were jointly agreed between ourselves and the PLA people 
concerned.172 
 
This is not to say that the whole problem was of the Authority’s making or that it 
reflected a lack of professionalism on the part of the staff: the situation was hugely 
complex and would have required operational and strategic management of the 
highest quality to reconcile all the conflicting pressures. But the PLA seemed not 
prepared to address that challenge, and preferred to take the simpler option of 
allowing traffic through the Upper Docks to diminish and concentrate on growth at 
Tilbury, and in public relations terms, the long history of industrial unrest in the 
docks provided an easy excuse. The PLA Board minutes show that the Director of 
Upper Docks “emphasised that fundamentally the problems in the Upper Docks 
were almost entirely related to industrial relations, and that until these matters were 
 
170  Minutes of PLA Board 8 December 1977  
171  DK1/218 Minute of 24 June 1977 from K L Guard of the NPC on the PLA monitoring 
meeting of 22 June 1977 
172 DK1/218 Letter from Eagle of NPC to Sanderson of the Department of the Environment 





resolved there were constraints on management”173 but, as one civil servant noted 
in 1977: 
 
Whatever the arguments….. PLA would ignore them when it suited them, 
pleading short-term operational necessity and industrial relations 
problems.174 
 
Parallel to these activities, as the NA files show, and following a request by the 
Secretary of State for Transport, the PLA and the unions were much involved with 
the docklands local authorities in trying to assess and ameliorate the problems of 
dock closures – especially in view of the already high unemployment in the 
docklands boroughs.175 
 
In all of this, there is little evidence of any industrial disputes in 1977, with the 
annual report noting only “minimal” stoppages,176 and the Ministry of Labour ledgers 
showing only eight disputes in London in that year, resulting in a total loss of 21,094 
man-days.177  However, at the PLA/Civil Service joint meeting of 14 November 1977 
the costs of a “recent strike” were estimated at £600,000, although the file notes 
that it was not possible to determine the real costs of the strike.178 The greater 
visibility afforded by the review meetings also shows that the port suffered a strike 
by engineering grades in December 1977, resulting in a “loss of revenue of 
£100,000”, and of a work-to rule by ACTSS (Association of Clerical Technical and 
Supervisory Staff) staff  resulting in a loss of revenue of £50,000.179 An interesting 
point about these two strikes is that they do not appear as ‘dock strikes’ in the 
MLNS ledgers which are industry specific (dock workers disputes being recorded 
under Sector 39, Port Transport Industry) because they were in the engineering and 
clerical sectors. Nevertheless these (and other similar disputes) will have directly 
affected the operations of the port.  
 
 
173  PLA Archives: PLA Board minutes, 24 October 1977 
174  DK1/218  Minute from A Holt, 26 September 1977, following the PLA working party 
meeting of 14 September 1977 
175  NA file AT 41/297. London Docklands Study: ports of London closures; manpower 
reductions; Port of London Authority discussions with unions.  
176 PLA Annual Report for 1977 op.cit., p.13 
177 NA file LAB 34/108 Trade Disputes Record Books 1977. Almost all of the time lost was 
due to one dispute about manning levels in August. 
178 T370/359. Meeting papers, the strike was probably the one shown in the MLNS ledgers 
in NA file LAB 34/108 as lasting from 24 to 31 August, with the loss of 19,515 man-days 
over the “rate for bad stowage”.    





With a lack of profits and almost no reserves, the PLA then faced problems in trying 
to redeem and re-issue some of its expiring loan stock, and it sought authority from 
the Government to raise a loan of £15 million from the City for “financing severance 
of non-registered staff…and…the repayment of short-term debt”.180 With this, and in 
view of the losses and reduction in reserves, the PLA’s auditors felt it necessary to 
qualify the 1977 Accounts to the effect that these had “been prepared on a basis 
which is dependent upon the successful conclusion of the discussions with the 
Department of Transport”.181 At the same time it was becoming clear that the joint 
monitoring meetings were proving of limited value: much as the civil servants might 
add useful commentary on the PLA’s actions or inactions, they had little leverage in 
the actual management of the Authority’s business, and Cuckney recognised this in 
a letter to the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Transport182 suggesting 
the ceasing of PLA monitoring group and replacement with “a small panel of the 
Board, of which I should be chairman, with probably two colleagues, meeting say, 
your top two civil servants on a quarterly basis”. This was referred to the Treasury 
and accepted by them in December 1977.183 
 
The Authority’s annual report for 1978 recorded an overall reduction in the cargoes 
handled by the port of 3% but a reduction of 20% in tonnages through the enclosed 
docks184 and that “a series of industrial disputes in the early part of the year caused 
some one hundred ships to be diverted to other ports”.185 However, because no 
further details are given (and traffic was always measured in volumes of cargo 
rather than ship numbers) it is not possible to estimate how significant this was to 
the PLA’s performance. The MLNS ledgers show only six disputes in the London 
docks during that year, resulting in the loss of 13,708 man days.186 The largest of 
these, from 18 to 30 January, with 1,567 men on strike is shown in the ledgers to 
have been a “refusal of pay increase within Government guidelines”.187 The PLA’s 
annual report reflected a continuing downturn in commercial performance that 
eclipsed any effects of industrial actions, with a loss on continuing operations of 
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182  T 370/359, letter dated 28 November 1977 
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£6.6 million, exacerbated by interest charges of £6.8 million, and net restructuring 
costs (after a Government grant) of £6.1 million. In April 1978 at a Special Board 
meeting the Authority considered proposals for “restoring viability”, and decided 
upon: 
 
the closure of both Upper Docks as quickly as is practicable: for planning 
purposes it is assumed that the India and Millwall docks are closed not later 
than December 1978 and the Royals by December 1979.188   
 
Outwith all of these considerations, the closure was an economic and operational 
certainty, as the PLA noted in June 1978:  
 
The Upper Docks are physically incapable of taking the large container ships 
and, due to the length of the river journey, the need to lock in and out and 
the costs involved, the smaller ships would not obtain either a satisfactory 
turn round time or a competitive price. A ship going to a berth in the docks 
has to pay the PLA dock charges plus dock pilot and dock tug charges over 
and above any charges payable at riverside berths.189 
 
The PLA’s Information Papers 
 
However, this detailed analysis was not shared with the stakeholders in the PLA’s 
two Information Papers of 4 May 1978 and 6 July 1978.190 The first warned that the 
PLA “if it stays on its present course will, in effect become bankrupt”, and that “the 
retention of the Upper Docks, both India and Royal can no longer be considered 
necessary on a commercial basis”.191 The paper, described as “an open and honest 
exploration of the hard facts in Docklands”,192 elicited strong responses from the 
Government, trade unions and Tower Hamlets and Newham Councils, but the 
second paper, noting that “no-one who has argued in the past few weeks that the 
Upper Docks can be revived has produced evidence to support their case”,193 
reproduced some costing from the Docklands Forum,194 and proposed the transfer 
of cargo handling from the India and Millwall docks to the Royals.  
 
188  PLA Archives:  Minute 2.1 of Special Board meeting, 17 April 1978 
189  NA file MT 81/839 Government emergency financial assistance to Port of London 
Authority. PLA note of 16 June 1978 
190  PLA Information Paper No.1 The challenge for the future (London, PLA:1978), and No 2. 
Your port of London: The Challenge of Decision now (London: PLA: 1978). 
191  PLA Information paper No 1, p.9 
192 The Times 2 June 1978 p.15 ‘Seeking reality in Dockland’ 
193  PLA Information paper No 2  
194  Ibid., p.6. The NA file AT 41/325 London Docklands Study: correspondence with the 
Docklands Forum: shows that the Docklands Forum was set up in 1975. It consisted of a 
wide range of interests – Trades Unions, Tenants associations, Trade Councils, and Church 






Although The Times suggested that the proposed closures might result in a national 
dock strike, it also noted that “the key could lie with the Prime Minister [Jim 
Callaghan] who in his only public statement so far appeared to take a hawkish 
line”.195 Instead of a strike there was  a joint conference of the PLA management 
and the unions on 27 July that: 
Set out the areas of common agreement between management and the 
trade unions and drew attention to the social and environmental effects of a 
dock closure on the East End of London.196 
 
The change in the PLA’s focus and the new (apparent) approach of openness that 
Cuckney brought was noted in an article in The Times as being: 
All the more remarkable because the PLA, in the 70 years since its 
foundation in Britain’s Edwardian heyday had acquired many of those 
characteristics, including the vast headquarters and the splendid yacht that 
seemed to proclaim that being in trade was beneath its dignity.197 
 
The realism reflected in Cuckney’s approach clearly carried through to the dockers: 
as The Times recorded, “an unofficial call [by the National Port Shop Stewards 
Committee] ran into opposition from port moderates and the main unions [including 
the General Secretary of the TGWU, Moss Evans] yesterday”.198  Once again Price 
Waterhouse had been asked to advise on the PLA’s plans, and to consider not only 
the option of a partial closure recommended in Information Paper no 2, but also the 
“radical option” of closing all of the Upper Docks. Their report, dated 21 July 
1978,199 reviewed the “main elements” of the PLA’s strategies, and noted that the 
PLA’s preference for concentrating conventional traffic at either the India and 
Millwall or the Royal group “does not appear to chart a course to viability for the 
PLA”, but also noted the PLA’s case for a capital restructuring.200 The coverage 
 
redundancy, £100 million for unemployment, £12 million for increased social services, £3-
3.5 million for loss of rates, giving a total social cost for the closure of £150- 200 million. 
195  The Times 4 July 1978 p.23 ‘Threat of National Dock strike as Unions resist port 
cutback’ 
196  PLA Annual Report for 1978 op.cit., p.8  
197  The Times 5 May 1978, p.19 ‘Turning the tide in London’s docklands’  
198  The Times 7 July 1978, p.15 ‘Union Leader resist dock strike call’ 
199   MT81/839 Price Waterhouse review of 'recommended strategy' forecasts. Henceforth 
PW report 1978 
200  Given that the PLA’s debts in 1977/78 were now some £80 million (PLA Annual Report 
for 1978, p.30), and the continuing losses in operations, this was unlikely to be met from 
public funds and would have been impossible to implement through a commercial 





within the report indicates that the problem of industrial disputes was by this time a 
very minor consideration for the PLA, in that the topic occupies only seven 
paragraphs (450-456) in the 620-paragraph report.  And while paragraph 452 noted 
that the PLA assumed that it would take five years to recover traffic lost through 
strikes, PW’s analysis of data from the 1975 strikes showed that such traffic losses 
were recovered in one year. The main requirement was the need for “a rapid and 
substantial reduction in manpower costs”201  and the “nub of the problem” for the 
PLA was seen to be costs of severance.202 
 
Following the report the Secretary of State for Transport announced on 31 July that 
the Government had asked the PLA to take “no steps…towards the closure of the 
Royal Docks [and that] there are no current proposals for the closure of the India 
and Millwall Docks”. He added that the Government was prepared to provide up to 
£35 million in grants to meet severance costs, plus up to £10 million to cushion the 
financial effect upon the PLA:  
 
on the understanding that the unions have promised active co-operation 
in an urgent examination of the size and structure of the work force, and 
of working practice and industrial agreements in all areas to achieve cost 
savings, improvements in productivity and greater flexibility in the use of 
the workforce.203 
There were clear signs of that co-operation at a policy level, with a joint committee 
being established to consider how to avoid, or at least lessen the impact of possible 
closures.204   But the writing was on the wall, with The Times noting that: 
 
The [Upper] docks are probably past saving. Expensive respites like that 
proposed…can do little to soften the consequences of eventual 
closure…and all they are doing is buying a little more time. 205 
 
Even with this, there were still some problems: the PLA Board minutes of January 
contain a note that “picketing [in opposition to the use of non-RDW labour on 
container work] at the Royal Docks and Tilbury was having a very serious impact on 
 
201  PW report 1978 para 9  
202  PW report 1978 paras 200-207 
203  House of Commons Hansard 31 July 1978, Written answers: cols 169-170 
204  See AT 41/297 





the Port by preventing the movement of cargoes in and out of dock premises” and 
was estimated to be costing the PLA £1 million per week. 206  
 
The PLA’s third Information Paper was issued on 21 February 1979 and, noting that 
the Government did not agree to the closure of the India and Millwall docks,207 
defined various possible traffic levels for the Upper Docks, the associated 
manpower reductions that would be required, and the likely operating losses. This 
was elaborated in the PLA’s Strategic Plan 1979-83 of June 1979208 which defined 
the Concentration Option of keeping both the Royal Docks and the India and 
Millwall open, but matching the services to traffic levels by reducing both groups to 
10 berths each,209 and the Transfer Option of moving the traffic from one set of 
Upper Docks to the other. But the plan also noted that “there is no realistic prospect 
of achieving commercial viability without capital reconstruction” – acknowledging 
that since the interest charges for 1979 amounted to more than £8.5 million, the 
Authority would need to make huge profits just to break even. Whether by 
coincidence or intention the publication of the paper followed swiftly upon the 
advent of a Conservative administration in May 1979, and the NA file shows some 
nervousness amongst officials and the Prime Minister’s office as to the likelihood of 
a national dock strike following the publication.210 The Minister of Transport asked 
Price Waterhouse to review the PLA’s plan, and the consultants reported on 20 
September 1979. While making a number of recommendations that would have 
improved the efficiency of the Authority, their main conclusions were that both 
‘transfer’ and ‘concentration’ options would result in losses, although the annual loss 
under the former (which would require fewer men to handle the same volume of 
traffic) would be £3.6 million compared to a computed loss of £ 6.3 million for the 
‘concentration’ option.211 But crucially the PW report noted that “PLA management 
do not believe that union cooperation would extend to improving working practices 
to the point where traffic could be handled by the reduced workforce”.212 It was also 
 
206  PLA Board Minute 4(1) 22 January 1979. 
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Authority (PLA): consideration of PLA corporate plan proposals 1979-1983; Price 
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possible to see a number of indicators of the commercial difficulties facing the 
Authority. For example:  
 
The port is generally thought of as being expensive. Many sundry charges 
are made on ships coming up the Thames [including PLA charges] of port 
rates, conservancy dues, dock dues and towage charges. [Other charges 
include] pilotage, light dues and towage outside docks.213 
 
And, in particular, the report supported the PLA’s view that it could only achieve 
commercial viability through a capital restructuring.214 Even ignoring any subsidies 
that might have been received by continental ports, the PLA faced difficulties 
especially (as noted above) from the enhanced flexibility of movement of goods 
within the Common Market. The report also contained a series of comments and 
recommendations in relation to the PLA’s staff management, for example on 
improvements in the assessment of the physical fitness of the workers and the 
problems of poor management practices inherited from failing companies.215  But all 
of these were peripheral to the main issues of the PLA’s immediate difficulties.  
 
The PW report also noted that: 
 
The PLA has 1000 surplus RDWs and 1500 surplus [office] staff. Unless 
PLA can reduce its manpower, the deficit will be much higher by 1980.216  
 
A systemic weakness of the dockers’ severance scheme was that it was based 
upon workers volunteering rather than employers being able to select workers for 
severance and, as the PW report shows, the effect was that category B workers 
(who were only able to perform a very restricted range of duties) would often not 
apply for severance because, with the decrease of traffic in the docks, many were 
being paid not to work, were unlikely to obtain employment outside the docks, and 
might also qualify for social security benefits.217 Moreover, because (as the report 
shows) the PLA had “inadequate procedures for medical examinations”218 there was 
 
213  Ibid, Appendix 1, para 105 
214  Ibid., para 116-117, but the report cautioned (para 116) that “the reconstruction would be 
relieving the PLA of the need to achieve an appropriate return on these productive 
assets”. 
215  Ibid., Appendix VI, paras 13 (2) and (3) and para 38 (3)  
216  T370/359 Op.cit 
217  PW Report 1979 Appendix VI, para 13 (3) Para 13 (2) notes “the lack of financial 
incentive for men to remain fit…[because there is] little wage differential between category A 
and B men, also category B men may qualify for social security benefit” (if they could show 
that they had previously been in category A and downgraded to B because of work-related 
disability).  





a continuing drift of workers into Category B. Finally, the severance scheme applied 
only to RDWs: as PW showed, the PLA needed to shed substantial numbers of 
administrative staff as the nature of docks traffic changed but had to meet those 
redundancy costs from its own resources. 
 
 
Outside of those factors, the Authority’s ability to manage its RDW workforce was 
constrained by the  1967Scheme in that it was unable to move workers permanently 
between sectors without the LDLB’s approval or (since the NDLB was the actual 
employer of RDWs) to make any registered workers redundant – and the NDLB 
would not do so.219  In all of this, given the PLA’s role as the employer of last resort, 
and the impossibility of compulsory redundancies, it is not surprising that PLA was 
unable to define and implement a clear action plan to manage its workforce 
surpluses.  With this, the PLA’s 1979 annual report painted a gloomy picture of a 
Group loss of £11.1 million at a time of “stagnation” of “overseas trade and the 
British economy”, together with the impact of “the many other disputes that affected 
British industry during that sad winter of discontent”.220 In fact, the Port of London 
was relatively immune from that wider malaise, with the NDLB files showing only 14 
disputes in 1979 with the loss of 10,043 man days,221 although the PLA had to 
absorb some 456 staff (including 405 RDWs) from the closure of the stevedores T. 
Wallis Smith Coggins. The PLA Board: 
 
concluded that the most positive and constructive way forward was to put an 
emphasis on improving working practices and progressively to concentrate 
cargo-handling facilities in each of the Upper docks. In this way we believe 
that we could secure the maximum cost reduction commensurate with 
providing an acceptable level of service, stem the loss of traffic to the port, 
and minimise the call on public funds.222  
 
The problem here was that this ‘concentration’ option had been forecast to have 
higher losses than the ‘transfer’ option of closing one set of the Upper Docks.223 But 
as the annual report noted, the basis of the Board’s choice was improvements in 
“working practices”, although the history of the preceding years indicated that this 
would be difficult to achieve, recognisably through a lack of engagement by both 
 
219  NA file T327/5 Port of London Authority: financial difficulties, file note: December 1975: 
“the NDLB are most unlikely to enforce compulsory severance given the 50% trade union 
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sides. The report can also be seen as a characterisation of many of the internal 
contradictions within the PLA: it submitted short-term plans based on a Board 
decision to keep both Upper Docks open with the “concentration” option, but this 
carried the risk “associated with possible failure to achieve the substantial 
improvements and cost reductions”.  
 
The final PLA Information paper No 4: a Port on Probation issued on 29 July 1979 
stated that the Board proposed “the transfer of the PLA cargo handling operations 
from the Royal Docks to Millwall and India and Tilbury during the first half of 
1979…reversing the decision of 1976”. The revised proposal was based upon 
“Customer preference of the India and Millwall docks, greater savings from the 
closure of the Royals (£2 million a year), and smaller possible traffic loss”.224 But, as 
The Times later noted, Cuckney’s proposals had been “regarded as far from safe by 
the Callaghan [Labour] Government which could not afford to antagonise the 
dockers’ unions and refused to accept the logic of closing the Royal Docks”.225  
 
The new Conservative Government, which came into power in May 1979,  
established “strict financial limits to Government assistance to enable the PLA to 
continue with the most rapid run-down of manpower  and plan for the quickest 
possible return to viability at least cost to the taxpayer” while also refusing to 
support the reconstruction that the Authority saw as “essential if the PLA is to return 
to commercial viability”.226 With the Authority reporting “little change in improving 
working practices” in its 1979 report,227 the open question is as to how serious the 
PLA management had been to address this as a general matter – or even the 
relatively discrete issue of the ‘six improvements’. Or was it simply focused on 
alternative long-term developments and looking to the closure of the Upper docks 
as a means of resolving an otherwise too difficult problem? Inevitably, the main 
focus was on the (financial) survival of the PLA, but the financial problems were 
matched by, and integral with, the challenges of structural change in the port 
operations, re-balancing the work force and improving productivity.228 In addition, as 
the NA files show, civil servants in the Treasury acknowledged that there could be 
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no question of the PLA failing completely – the waterways and river conservancy 
functions would need to continue, as would some form of cargo handling.229  
 
Cuckney’s departure at the end of 1979 was followed by the appointment of Victor 
Paige: as the Times obituary later noted: 
 
Paige [the son of a Millwall docker] was appointed chairman of the PLA in 
January 1980 [his] management style – that of team working - was in 
marked contrast to that of his predecessor Sir John Cuckney who some 
regarded as causing problems with his hard-nosed approach230 
 
But then, as the new Chairman wrote: 
 
The first two weeks of February 1980 dramatically changed our prospects of 
remaining with the concentration option. The annual negotiations on pay ran 
into difficulties early in the year and eventually there was a two-week strike. 
Including the loss during the strike the PLA had, by the end of February, lost 
over £3 million during 1980. As a consequence of that severe loss, the 
general level of trading and cash limits, it became necessary for the Board to 
announce that the India and Millwall docks would be closed as soon as 
possible. 
 
The closure of the Millwall and India docks was announced in March 1980, blamed 
(in The Times headline) on the “failure by port workers” to move faster on the 
elimination of restrictive practices, with the article noting losses in the past year of 
£4 million on the operation of the docks (including a loss of £2 million from a strike 
over pay).231  The Royals did not survive much longer: as the PLA’s 1981 annual 
report noted: 
 
against a background of severe financial constraint, the PLA decided to 
transfer conventional ship working arrangements from the Royal docks to 
Tilbury Docks, without industrial disruption and with no loss of traffic….the 
motor vessel “Xingfeng” was the last vessel to complete discharge at Royal 




One of the most significant factors which enabled the high level of 
reductions to be achieved was the transfer of conventional ship working 
operations from the Royal Group of docks to Tilbury in November. This was 
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the second transfer of cargo operations from the Upper Docks within two 
years and was again achieved with no industrial unrest.232 
 
The Survival and Growth of the Continental North Sea Ports  
 
Four major ports on the North Sea coast with similar historic constructions to that of 
London have managed to adapt, survive, and grow with the advent of containers. 
There are a series of considerations about the features that distinguish these from 
the Upper Docks and the port of London – for example Antwerp’s position as the 
only major Belgian port, and the complex infrastructure financing, and employment 
links between the port and city of Rotterdam that underpinned its advantages of 
location close to the sea.233  On the other hand, two of the major North Sea ports in 
Germany – Bremen and Hamburg – that, like the Upper Docks, were situated far 
upstream, were able to construct huge new facilities that handled both containers 
and conventional traffic.234 There appear to be no clear statements of the extent to 
which these were funded by national or regional subsidies is, and the lack of 




During the 1970s, the role and commercial performance of the PLA became 
dominant in the considerations around the future of the port and the docks, bringing 
a parallel with its position in the early years of the 20th century. A downturn in trade 
in the mid-1970s brought the underlying problems of the PLA’s finances and the 
challenges of restructuring and downsizing into sharper focus. With these, the 
growth of containerisation (with the decrease in conventional traffic) and the 
financial consequences of the Aldington-Jones agreement had a crippling impact on 
the other dock employers and transferred yet more financial burdens onto the PLA. 
While, apart from national strikes, the London docks had generally low levels of 
industrial disputes, the effect of containerisation on dockers’ jobs was a continuing 
source of unrest. With this came the resurgence of the ‘unofficials’: although this 
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was more in the context of ‘guerrilla-type’ activities in picketing rather than in 
fomenting major strikes, those activities attracted much publicity and the 
commercial impact of deterring port users was very significant. 
 
In the second half of the decade the focus was almost entirely on the financial 
challenges facing the PLA, the main causes of which were seen to be the costs of 
surplus staff linked to the losses from keeping the Upper Docks open as 
conventional traffic decreased. At that time Members of Parliament, local 
authorities, other community interests and the unions sought constructive 
engagement with the Government about the future developments of the docklands 
area directly and through the Dockland Forum but brought no (Government) action 
to ameliorate the Authority’s financial problems. Given the costs of surplus staff and 
of servicing the PLA’s debt, and without massive financial subsidies from the public 
purse the demise of the Upper Docks was inevitable: conventional traffic was 
diminishing, and the vast historic docks with their obsolescent and redundant 
facilities and huge operational costs were simply a commercial mismatch. The 
proposition that the port owner and the unions could save the docks by working 
together to redevelop the facilities, dramatically improve efficiency and market the 
new services aggressively could at best be seen as a short-term answer. The 
solution to similar challenges for the North Sea ports on the Continent was huge 
investments in the redevelopment of docks to adapt them for the container age, but 
with the failure of the Maplin proposal, such an option seems not to have been 






Chapter 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
There appears to be a general view that the main reason for the closure of the 
Upper Docks in the Port of London was a combination of industrial disputes and 
containerisation, corroborated by the public stance of the Port of London Authority 
(PLA) that the closure was largely due to problems with labour relations and an 
intransigent workforce. In this thesis I argue that the picture is much more complex 
than either presentation and look beyond the headlines of the day and the views of 
the contemporary and later commentators and consider if those premises can be 
substantiated. The extensive archive material now available from government, 
employers and unions has allowed me to analyse and demonstrate the much wider 
range of issues that led to the demise of the docks.  
 
The nature of dock work, the workers, and the organisations, limits the 
consideration of issues such as gender and ethnicity1 which are mostly absent from 
the material of the time. And, in general, industrial disputes are significant only 
where large numbers are involved, so that although there is some individual 
material from those that worked there, this is fundamentally a study of a huge port, 
with hundreds of employers, and thousands of workers. 
 
 
1 Women are largely invisible in the archive materials, apart from Patricia O’Driscoll, a 
bargewoman featured in two articles in PLA Monthly 43 (1968), pp 134-138 and 218-222, 
and recorded in the Museum of London Docklands oral history archive (MLDOHA), 
DK87.92.  I could only find three other mentions for ‘women’ in PLA Monthly, for ‘nurses’ (6, 
(1930-31), p.120), Victoria Drummond MBE, a ship’s engineer (19, (1944) p.26), and 
‘riveters’ (21,(1946) p.43); and women feature in less than 10% of the more than 300 
recordings in MLDOHA. Although some worked in the docks – for example Laura Evans 
(MLDOHA, DK87.42) a typist in the PLA offices in the Surrey docks, and Kathleen Ralphs 
(MLDOHA DK87.63) a typist in the Royals, with some hundreds as canteen workers and 
cleaners, only Patricia O’Driscoll was a dock worker in the literal sense. Women are not 
mentioned in the minutes of the Port of London Registration Committee between 1925 and 
1940 (in NA files LAB 100/1 to /5) nor in the annual report of the Committee for 1935 (in 
LAB100/5), but the LSEA file NSOL1/4/10 Dock Labour - Tables shows that there were 
some 840 women and 90 girls registered as dock workers in 1928 when there were 45,520 
men on the Register. There are some mentions of ethnicity in the material about Irish 
heritage in dockland communities and the workforce in Colin J. Davis, Waterfront Revolts: 
New York and London Dockworkers 1946-1961 (Chicago: Illinois University Press, 2003) 
pp.11-14), and John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers: a Study of Trade Unionism in the Port 
of London 1870-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp 57-8 and some prejudice noted in 
Stephen Hill, The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1979) p.19. 
Apart from that there appears only the neutral mention of the celebration of the Islamic 







The burden of history lies heavily upon the Port of London, and the PLA’s 
inheritance was a major determining factor on labour relations for 40, even 70, 
years later. But the Authority was not the only player: the legion of other employers, 
the workers, and (from 1947) the London and National Dock Labour Boards also 
played key roles, and this thesis identifies their parts in the story of industrial 
relations and the dock closures.  
 
The thesis touches only briefly on the history of the docks before the Authority’s 
formation in 1909, when the operating structure of the port and many aspects of the 
working conditions were determined. Essentially, the PLA was formed to rescue the 
London dock companies that were almost bankrupt at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, with many of the facilities being seen at the time as too small, inefficient, or 
outdated. The price of more than £22 million (around £2,600 million at 2019 prices) 
paid as compensation to the dock companies’ shareholders was met by loading the 
PLA with long-term debt that imposed on it a legally enforced burden of interest 
payments. The failure to provide any equity (share) capital meant that funds for 
expansion, modernisation, or new facilities could only be provided by adding to the 
Authority’s debt burden and increasing the interest charges. In addition, the PLA 
carried the hidden costs deriving from the ‘free water clause’ that allowed 
(commercially competitive) river craft to operate on the river at no cost – and equally 
freely to enter and operate within the docks. Nor, in its foundation, was the Authority 
given any involvement in, or control of, the many dozens of wharves and riverside 
facilities that competed with the docks. In consequence the main thrust of the PLA’s 
commercial strategy was to maintain and enhance its revenues by increasing the 
total volume of traffic through the port year upon year, a concept underlined by the 
headlining of those totals in its annual reports. 
 
The PLA was a public trust, and its founding legislation imposed governance 
arrangements that were intended to ensure a balance of power by placing 
representatives of other port interests and river users as members of its governing 
body,2 but which served to limit its capabilities to respond to changing commercial 
forces.  Although the PLA’s charges were subject to approval by the UK 
government, the Authority itself was not otherwise answerable to Parliament – or 
 
2  Under Sections 1(5)-(7) of the Port of London Act 1908 (8 Edw. VII c.68), the Authority 
was to consist of 28 members, 10 appointed (including two from the Board of Trade and four 
from the LCC), and 18 elected, where “seventeen shall be elected by payers of dues, 





indeed any other agency. Furthermore, the Authority did its business in private, and 
so could be held to no public account for its actions: Harry Gosling, a former 
Lighterman, prominent union leader and a member of the PLA,3 remarked upon an 
Authority “that always sits behind closed doors [and] publishes no minutes”.4     
 
The historic sufferings of the dockers before the Second World War have been cited 
as factors shaping industrial relations in the post-War period, and those sufferings 
can be seen in part as a consequence of the way in which the port relied upon 
casual labour, with manpower costs being held down also by piecework, zero-hours 
contracts, and minimal employee benefits. Downward pressure on labour costs by 
the maintenance of a surplus of registered workers was also a key feature of 
employment in the docks, with the impact on the docklands communities appearing 
to have been particularly severe in the inter-war years.  A striking example is given 
by Lascelles and Bullock showing that for the final week in January 1921, where the 
majority of employers considered the level of trade to be “normal”, a daily average 
of 31,498 men were employed in London against a register of 61,005.5 Apart from 
Llewellyn Smith’s major work from around 1930, the lack of comprehensive data on 
incomes between the World Wars forces us to rely on mainly circumstantial 
evidence such as the reports of Medical Officers of Health6 for some idea of the 
poverty and deprivation that affected their communities and probably conditioned 
docker attitudes in later years.  
 
The Second World War had a huge impact on the docklands communities that 
suffered directly from the bombing and indirectly through the evacuation of families 
from London. The workforce itself was then subject to legislation that prohibited 
official strikes and introduced compulsory registration and quasi-statutory 
employment schemes for the workers. In parallel, conscription or recruitment to the 
armed forces also impacted on the communities, their incomes, and their social and 
occupational attitudes.  At the end of the War the ‘Control Point’ strike of March 
1945 is seen as portentous where the Ammon report7 highlighted frictions with the 
dock authorities, problems with the NASD union’s structure and representation, and 
 
3  ODNB Harry Gosling (1861–1930) article by W. S. Sanders, revised by Marc Brodie 
4  Harry Gosling, Up and Down Stream (London: Methuen, 1927) p.112 
5  Lascelles and Bullock pp 175-6 
6  Chapter 4 of Alan Hutt’s polemic overview (Allen Hutt The Condition of the Working Class 
in Britain (London: Martin Lawrence, 1933)), pp. 123-177 draws heavily on these.  






faults in the operation of the prototype dock labour Scheme (in addition to trailing 
the suggestion of political influences behind the strike). 
 
The thesis draws a number of narrative threads from the period after the Second 
World War that add to the picture of earlier sufferings of the communities, with the 
workforce struggling to maintain output in the bomb-damaged docks while adapting 
to a new Dock Labour Scheme that provided significant benefits but yet had 
structural problems and operational difficulties. At the same time, within the new 
social contract of tripartism that saw full employment with low inflation as the most 
appropriate path for Britain’s economic development, there were tensions within the 
unions aiming to cooperate fully with a Labour government, with each facing the 
realities of rebuilding the economy of a country near to bankruptcy.   
 
The  operational environment of the port of London was also complex and largely 
unstructured:  while the PLA had specific functions for dock operations and much of 
the warehousing, most of the port operations were undertaken by the hundreds of 
companies employing labour in the docks, wharves and warehouses and on the 
lighters and barges. With no overarching management structure, and (because the 
fabric and facilities of the port were controlled by the PLA) other employers had little 
interest in any strategic operational or infrastructure developments. However, many 
of the disputes did in fact spread throughout the port, and thus had a collateral 
impact on the Authority and its income. In the early years of its existence the PLA 
had had a lead role on industrial relations in the port, and while this seems not to 
have been so apparent in later years, the very nature of its port ownership and the 
size of its workforce gave it a considerable presence in those matters in later years. 
But the setting up of the National Dock Labour Board in 1947 imposed a body 
outwith the PLA but with port-wide responsibilities for discipline and the 
maintenance of the register that had a major impact on industrial relations and must 
inevitably have diluted the Authority’s influence. 
 
These premises provide a context for the review of the strikes in the period between 
1945 and 1960 when the image of the docks as strike-ridden and inefficient became 
defined for many observers, with the early disputes being seen as key in their effect 
on food supplies and upon the nation’s (export-led) economic recovery. The 
analyses in Chapter 3 suggest that the initial difficulties and disputes arose primarily 
in the operation of the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme, noting that some of these had 





particularly the rigidity and perceived unfairness of the disciplinary procedures.8  
These were compounded by the failure of the 1947 Scheme to include a 
satisfactory definition of overtime and the conflicting policies of the London Board in 
managing the size of the Register. These might be seen as problems incidental to 
the implementation of a national Scheme, and capable of resolution by a Scheme 
revision, but given the difficulties of achieving any consensus among the different 
parties, and with the lack of political will for such a revision, the defects remained. 
 
Many of the major strikes were the subject of some form of official inquiry or report,9  
sometimes as a means of breaking a deadlock, or otherwise in an attempt to 
understand the causes of the dispute. But the early strikes can be seen to have a 
clear relationship to perceived defects in the Dock Labour Scheme, and at the same 
time demonstrated their importance to the Government and the economy. Other 
strikes had more varied causes: some were in sympathy with other strikers, and 
others arose from inter-union tensions. Underlying all of these were the complexities 
of the London docks industry, with hundreds of locations and employers, thousands 
of piecework rates, unions with different structures and agendas, and (seemingly) 
always a group of activists waiting to capitalise on any disputes. In the only cases 
where there was commonality of cause (the strikes involving the Tally Clerks) there 
was a complex set of interactions: both major unions were involved, as were the 
PLA, the other major stevedoring companies in London and the National Dock 
Labour Board, with the lack of any single coordinating body on either side ensuring 
that there could be no simple path to the resolution of the problem. 
 
In all of this it is difficult to assess the overall financial effect of the disputes on the 
port of London, or of its commercial reputation, but the position of the PLA can be 
taken as a surrogate for the port as a whole in two respects; in its role as an 
employer, and as a (quasi) commercial undertaking. For the first, although it was a 
major employer of labour in the port, it had no over-riding power in industrial 
relations, and could be affected as much as any of the hundreds of other employers 
when a dispute escalated into a major port-wide stoppage, and also by external 
factors such as a national dock strike. But in terms of the impact on the business, 
the PLA’s annual reports show that between 1960 and 1970 its gross annual 
 
8 Ammon Report, paragraph 53 (7) and (8)  
9  Beginning with the Ammon report and carrying through to the Lloyd Williams report in 
1960 (Ocean Shipowners’ Tally Clerks. Report of a Committee appointed by the Minister of 






income rose from just over £20 million to over £31 million, with an average annual 
operating surplus of £2.4 million, and in those terms the port was a profitable 
undertaking. 
 
Ultimately, it fell to Lord Devlin to sever the Gordian knot of industrial discord by 
recommending decasualisation with a reduction in the number of employers and a 
redefinition of the relationship between employers and workers.10 That initiative, with 
the linked programme of modernisation, could be seen as the best option for the 
future of the port – even with the difficulties of implementing such huge conceptual 
changes. But at the same time the business of the port of London was also 
changing: Hill neatly summarises the impact of improved road transport on the 
short-sea trades which had been the lifeblood of the smaller upper river docks,11 
with the parallel running down of the massive storage facilities, seen by Watson as 
the “warehouse of the world”,12 that had long contributed to the PLA’s income. With 
this came a series of further developments in mechanisation, not only in the 
traditional dock work – for example the increasing use of fork-lift trucks - but in 
areas such as palletised cargoes, and roll-on roll off ferries which reduced or even 
eliminated any docker involvement.   
 
By the early 1970s the port appeared transformed, with the closure and disposal of 
unprofitable assets (including a large part of the docks estate), modernisation in 
place, and with two years of relative industrial peace and solid profits: but its 
business was then affected by a downturn in trade and the secondary effect of 
Britain’s accession to the Common Market, where a competitive advantage was 
transferred to Continental ports, where goods could be unloaded and transported to 
London without having to clear Customs into the UK.  The PLA was especially 
affected by the consequences of the “no redundancy” agreement that formed part of 
the Devlin/decasualisation agreement of 1967. Within the constraints of the 
statutory Dock Labour Scheme, this undertaking meant that stevedoring companies 
could not reduce their workforces as conventional cargoes declined and led to the 
wholesale failures of those companies. The PLA’s role as the employer of last resort 
 
10  In the Final report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1965, Cmnd. 2734, 1965), 
Devlin put the “elimination of the casual employer” as the first item on his list of “things that 
will have to be done before there is peace in the docks” (para 239).  
11  Hill Dockers, p.3 
12  Nigel Watson, The Port of London: a Century of Service, 1909-2009, (London: PLA, 





meant that the workers (and their wage costs) were transferred to the PLA, leading 
to a situation where almost all of the Authority’s operating profits were taken up with 
the costs of its surplus staff and servicing the interest on its debts.  
 
Above all of these were the multiple effects of containerisation, with the need for 
huge new facilities requiring much greater working areas, the reduction of 
conventional cargoes, and the impact on industrial relations as the dockers fought 
to preserve their traditional functions in a new operating paradigm where loading 
and unloading of containers could be undertaken outside dock boundaries. The PLA 
had noted in 1978, the Docks were “physically incapable of taking the large 
container ships” and their (upstream) location imposed uneconomic costs on 
smaller vessels.13  But such constraints were common to other major ports on the 
Continent that had been constructed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and 
the huge investments required to meet the challenges of containers were indeed 
made there.14  
 
The question is then as to why London – or more precisely the PLA - was unable or 
unprepared to undertake such investments and developments. In some respects, 
the lesson of the PLA’s £30 million investment in Tilbury and the consequent 
increase in its interest payments provides an answer, while it may be that the 
funding for those Continental improvements was included in other major regional or 
urban development initiatives,15 but there is also the question of whether (given the  
long history of industrial unrest in London) the UK government would have decided 
to invest huge sums in redeveloping the Thames docks when so many other 
alternative ports were available.16 Finally (although it seems not to have been posed 
in such terms) there is the question of why public funds should have been used to 
expand and perpetuate a facility that had historically produced a huge income 
stream for outside investors and which, without comprehensive restructuring, would 
do so for the future 
 
13  NA file MT 81/839 Government emergency financial assistance to Port of London 
Authority. PLA note of 16 June 1978. 
14  See, for example, James Bird ‘Seaports and the European Economic Community’, The 
Geographical Journal, 133, 3 (1967), pp. 302-322   
15  As shown in J.H. Bird and E.E. Pollock, ‘The Future of Seaports in the European 
Communities’ The Geographical Journal 144,1 (1978) pp. 23-41, p.28. 
16 The abundance of UK ports provided many alternatives to investing in London, whereas 
there were few alternative ports in Belgium, Holland, or Germany offering access to the 





In summary, the prevailing impression that the reasons for the closure of the Upper 
Docks were the twin impacts of poor labour relations and containerisation has some 
validity. But this needs also to be modified for complexity and context – as suits a 
narrative about a major industry in a period of huge change. Certain factors 
dominate, with the port Authority having the legacy of its huge and costly docks 
estate, with burdensome and restrictive financial arrangements. Matching this was 
the heritage of suffering and deprivation in docklands communities, with difficult and 
often dangerous working conditions. The operations of cargo handling were further 
constrained by the systems of piecework and multiplicity of employers and 
locations, so that the port industry had a long tradition of poor industrial relations 
that can also be attributed to employers, unions, and the workers.  The result was a 
fragmented industry that was apparently not conducive to strategic management or 
major investment, with an inflexible Dock Labour Scheme, all combining in a failure 
of ambition or intent to meet the challenges of a revolution in cargo handling and to 










National Archives Files: 
 
AN 13/1976 British Transport Commission Working Party on Turn-round of Shipping: Port of 
London 
 
AT 41/297. Department of the Environment. London Docklands Study: ports of London 
closures; manpower reductions; Port of London Authority (PLA) 
 
AT 41/325 Department of the Environment. London Docklands Study: correspondence with 
the Docklands Forum  
 
AT 56/72 Department of the Environment. Thames Estuary Development Company 
(TEDCO) scheme for the development of Maplin Sands for an airport, seaport and industrial 
complex: 
 
BK 1/105 National Dock Labour Corporation: Dock Strike, Dockers’ Charter  
 
BK 1/239 National Dock Labour Corporation: Closure of Huts outside Royal Docks  
 
BK 2/64 National Dock Labour Board Discipline: refusal to work overtime  
 
BK 2/72 National Dock Labour Board Discipline, Strike London Dock 
 
BK 2/76 National Dock Labour Board Head Office: Canadian Seamen’s Dispute  
 
BK 2/83 National Dock Labour Board: Ban on Overtime 1954.  
 
BK 2/98 National Dock Labour Board. Transfers of Labour 
 
BK 2/119 Port Medical Services, Industrial Accidents, London. 
 
BK 2/202 National Dock Labour Board Size of the Work Force: Ineffectives 
 
BK 2/362 National Dock Labour Board Head Office: Dock Labour Schemes. Amendments  
 
BK 2/363 National Dock Labour Board, Head Office: Dock Labour Schemes. Amendments, 
further inquiry 
 
BK 2/1022 National Dock Labour Board: Head Office. Report of Inquiry into London Docks 
Dispute 1945 (Ammon Report)  
 
BK 2/1084 National Dock Labour Board Head Office Strikes: London. General  
 





BK 2/1086:  National Dock Labour Board London Dock Strike 1950: Expulsion of Three 
dockers from TGWU 
 
BK 2/1088 National Dock Labour Board: Discipline, Strikes: Ocean Shipowners' Tally Clerks. 
 
BK 2/1091 National Dock Labour Board: Discipline, Strikes: Supporting Smithfield strikers 
and use of non-registered labour 
 
BK 2/1120 National Dock Labour Board. Size of the Labour Force: Ineffectives  
 
BK 2/1231 National Dock Labour Board. Joint Special Committee on the Ports Industry 
(Jones/Aldington Committee): Report, May 1974 
 
BK2/1252: National Dock Labour Board. Strikes: statistics 1947-61 
 
BK2/1254: National Dock Labour Board. Strikes: statistics 1975-89 
 
BK2/1266, National Dock Labour Board. Reports of the Ports Efficiency Committee: Second 
report of Port Efficiency Committee 
 
BK2/1530 National Dock Labour Board. National Modernisation Committee 
 
BK2/1535 National Dock Labour Board. Dock Labour Schemes: further decasualisation 
 
BK 3/3 National Dock Labour Board Annual report for 1950 
 
BK 3/11 National Dock Labour Board Annual report for 1956 
 
BK 3/25 National Dock Labour Board Annual Report for 1970 
 
BK 3/42 National Dock Labour Board Annual Reports 1947-1956 
 
BK 3/43 National Dock Labour Board Annual Reports for 1957-61  
 
BK3/44 National Dock Labour Board Annual Reports for 1962-66 
 
BK 5/30 National Dock Labour Board Welfare Committee: Agenda and Papers 1947-1951 
 
BK 5/31 National Dock Labour Board Welfare Committee: Agenda and Papers 1951-1952 
 
BK 16/1 National Dock Labour Board. Surveys and Reports of Dock Amenities 1948-49 
Tyne to the Medway 
 
BK16/19, National Dock Labour Board. Survey of Dock Amenities 1966: Port of London - 
Survey  
 
BK16/20, National Dock Labour Board. Survey of Dock Amenities 1966: Port of London - 
Appendices  
 
BK16/21, National Dock Labour Board. Survey of Dock Amenities 1966: Port of London - 
Schedules 
 
BK 29/8, National Dock Labour Board Report of a Fact-Finding Committee on the Dock 





BK 29/11, National Dock Labour Board Inquiry into a claim by the National Amalgamated 
Stevedores and Dockers: recruitment (Doughty Inquiry) 
 
BK 32/14 National Dock Labour Board. London Dock Labour Board: Establishment and 
Administration of the Scheme 
 
CAB 65 Cabinet Minutes 1939-1945 
 
CAB 66/23/48 Cabinet Memorandum: 24 April 1942: The Communist Party by Herbert 
Morrison 
 
CAB 66/35/9 Cabinet Memorandum: 13 March 1943: The Communist Party of Great Britain 
by Herbert Morrison 
 
CAB 128/1/24 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 15 October 1945. 
 
CAB 128/8/48 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet 8 July 1946 
 
CAB 128/13/5 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 29 June 
1948  
 
CAB 128/15/27 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 13 April 
1949 
 
CAB 128/16/3 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet on 18 July 1949 
 
CAB 128/17/23 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet on 21 April 1950  
 
CAB 128/17/26 Cabinet Office: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet on 27 April 1950  
 
CAB 128/42/74 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 21 December 1967  
 
CAB 128/44/3 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 14 January 1969 
 
CAB 128/44/28 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 17 June 1969 
 
CAB 128/50/38 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 20 July 1972 
 
CAB 128/50/39 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 27 July 1972 
 
CAB 128/50/40 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 1 August 1972  
 
CAB 128/50/41 Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 8 August 1972 
 
CAB/129/34/18 Cabinet Office: Cabinet Paper CP (49) 88 Memorandum: The London Dock 
Strike by James Chuter Ede 
 
CAB 129/35/35 Cabinet Office: Cabinet Paper CP (49) 145 Memorandum: The Dock Labour 
Industry and the National Dock Labour Board. By Alfred Barnes 
 
CAB 129/36/1 Cabinet Office: Cabinet Paper CP (49) 151 Memorandum: The Dock Labour 
Industry and the National Dock Labour Board by George a Isaacs 
 




by the Attorney General (Hartley Shawcross) 
 
CAB 129/39/34 Cabinet Office: Memorandum: The London Dock Strike by the Home 
Secretary (James Chuter Ede) 
 
CAB 134/447 Cabinet Office:  Investment Programmes Committee Working Party, paper  
IPC (WP) 48, dated 16 September 1948 
 
DK1/218, National Ports Council – DoE – PLA working group.  
 
HLG 7/608 Ministry of Housing and Local Government: Evacuation and Homeless 
Population statistics for the London Region 
 
HO 45/25539 Home Office: Threatened Strike at the London Docks April 1950 
 
HO 186/952 Ministry of Home Security: Air Raids: London region: Report Number 28 (28 
January 1942) 
 
HO 193/1 Series: Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Department. Bomb 
Census Maps, London Area 7 to 21 October 1940 
 
HO 198/273 Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Department: Chief 
Regional Officer's daily confidential reports: air raid damage and casualty reports; 
London, 11 September 1940 to 1 November 1940. 
 
LAB 8/1707 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments Informal inter-departmental 
enquiry into the provisions of the National Dock Labour Scheme  
 
LAB 8/2614 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments Dock Workers (Regulation of 
Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961: background notes on previous reports of 
enquiries. Appendix III of submission to Rochdale Inquiry May 1961 
 
LAB 9/548 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. Jones-Aldington Committee on 
the Ports Industry; interim and final reports, correspondence on the funding of a special 
voluntary severance agreement 
 
LAB 10/173 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. Prosecution of strikes under 
Order 1305 
 
LAB 10/567 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. Report of Committee of Enquiry 
into the London Dock Dispute of March 1945 (The Ammon Report) (includes Dock Labour 
Scheme for the Port of London version 3/42) 
 
LAB 10/580 Department of Employment and its predecessors: Report of a strike at the 
London Docks involving the Transport and General Workers Union and the Stevedores 
Union. 
 
LAB 10/783 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. London Dock Labour Board 
and Transport and General Workers' Union: strike caused by disciplinary action taken 
against eleven men who refused to load zinc oxide. 
 
LAB 10/831 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Dispute regarding discharge of 





LAB 10/940 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Embargo on overtime in protest 
against the Unions summoning eight men before the Special Committee in connection 
with the Canadian Dock Strike of last May. 
 
LAB 10/955 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Stoppage at work at London 
Docks over expulsion of three members of the TGWU 
 
LAB 10/1019 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: National strike of docks in 
Great Britain in protest against wage increase  
 
LAB 10/1039 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Leggett Committee on 
Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks: report. 
 
LAB 10/1041 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Leggett Committee on 
Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks: correspondence with individuals and 
organisations who may give evidence. 
 
LAB 10/1046, Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Dispute between London 
Docks and the Transport and General Workers' Union and National Amalgamated 
Stevedores and Dockers: threatened strike by tally clerks over decision to increase clerical 
register. 
 
LAB 10/2617 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. National Modernisation 
Committee for the Port Transport Industry: minutes and Committee papers.  
 
LAB 10/2737 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. National Modernisation 
Committee: investigation into pay of dock workers by Management Consultants Association. 
 
LAB 10/3514 Department of Employment. Definition of dock work: joint committee chaired 
by Peter Bristow  
 
LAB 10/3515 to 10/3529 Department of Employment. Definition of Dock Work - 
Representations by the timber trade (/3515) to /3529 Representations from individual freight 
forwarders and their association.  
 
LAB 10/3629 Department of Employment: Port Transport Industry: Devlin agreement stage 
2; follow-up with Port of London Authority.  
 
LAB 10/3764 Department of Employment Port transport industry: Docks Bill.  
 
LAB 34/56   }    Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments:  
to         }  Trade Disputes  
LAB 34/110 }    Records books 1941 to 1978 
 
LAB 43/355 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Private Office Papers: Selected 
Case files:  Strike of Tally Clerks at London Docks 1960 
 
LAB 77/44 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. Private Office Papers: 
Employment in docks; dock labour 
 
LAB 100/1 Port of London Registration Committee Minutes and Agendas 1925 to 1927  
 





LAB 100/3 Port of London Registration Committee Minutes and Agendas 1930 to 1933  
 
LAB 100/4 Port of London Registration Committee Minutes and Agendas 1933 to 1935 
 
LAB 100/5 Port of London Registration Committee Minutes and Agendas 1935 to 1940  
 
LAB 101/6 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: NJC agreements 1920-1964  
 
LAB 101/35 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. Docks Industry: Summary of 
Principal Stoppages 1945-58 
 
LAB 101/43 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: London Docks, a Framework 
for Study: memorandum on the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme  
 
LAB 101/73: Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: The National Association of 
Port Employers. Report of the Executive Committee for the year ended 31 December 1950. 
 
LAB 101/74 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Report of a working party of 
officials from the Ministries of Labour and Transport 
 
LAB 101/99 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments: Evidence by three Tally Clerks 
to Devlin Committee of Inquiry 1956. 
 
LAB 107/117 Ministry of Labour and Successor Departments. National Modernisation 
Committee for the Port Transport Industry: minutes of meetings and papers. Paper 
presented by G H B Cattell to Thurrock Technical College, January 1970: Devlin Stage II – a 
tragedy in the modern style. 
 
MAF 394/4 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food. Docks decasualisation: unofficial 
strikes, September 1967 
 
MT 81/718 Ministry of Transport. Dock labour: weekly payments following decasualisation; 
negotiations: includes Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP) Report of a Court 
of Inquiry under The Rt Hon The Lord Pearson, CBE into a dispute between the parties 
represented on the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry, July 1970 (national 
dock dispute) 
 
MT81/839 Ministry of Transport. Government emergency financial assistance to Port of 
London Authority (PLA): proposals for survival;  
 
MT 81/847 Ministry of Transport. Government emergency financial assistance to Port of 
London Authority: proposals for survival; risk of industrial action;  
 
MT 81/853 Ministry of Transport. Government emergency financial assistance to Port of 
London Authority: consideration of PLA corporate plan proposals 1979-1983; Price 
Waterhouse report  
 
MT 81/875 Ministry of Transport. Proposed development of deep water port facilities and a 
third London airport at Foulness/Maplin Sands by a consortium including Port of London 
Authority (PLA) 
 
MT81/918 Ministry of Transport. Ports Reorganisation Bill: consideration of proposal by Port 





PREM 8/1085 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers – material relating to the 
“Ineffectives” strike. 
 
PREM 8/1534 Prime Minister’s Office: Reorganisation of National Dock Labour Board: 
proposal to appoint a working party to review Dock Labour Scheme; investigation into labour 
conditions in the docks; report of Committee of Inquiry 
 
PREM 11/4001 Prime Minister’s Office: correspondence and papers 1951-64. Strikes and 
Industrial disputes unofficial strike of Tally Clerks in Port of London. 
 
T 224/1753 H M Treasury. Docks National Modernisation Committee 
 
T 319/2279 H M Treasury. Port of London Authority: development of the Thames Estuary; 
'Thames Trumpet' project 
 
T 370/96 H M Treasury. Public Expenditure sector. Port of London Authority: financial 
difficulties and arrangements. 
 
T 370/357 H M Treasury. Port of London Authority: financial difficulties and arrangements (1 
January 1976 to 31 December 1976)  
 
T 370/359 H M Treasury. Port of London Authority: financial difficulties and arrangements (1 
January  to  31 December 1977) 
 




London Borough of Newham Archives 
 
County Borough of West Ham Report of the Medical Officer of Health for 1937 (West Ham: 
1937) 
 
Minutes of the meetings of West Ham Borough Council and Committees 1937-39; Minutes 
of the Public Assistance Committee 
 




London Borough of Tower Hamlets Local History Library and Archives 
 
File L/PMB/CB/4/2, ARP records: night of 7/8 September 1940,  
 
Press cuttings folders 964.5 (London dock) and 964.6 (St Katharine dock)  
 
Hook, John. The Air Raids on the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1940-45: a 
chronological listing of the fatal casualties. Monograph in the Archives 
 
Lemmerman, Mick. The Isle of Dogs During World War II (Privately published, 2015). Copy 
in the Archives 
 
 





LCC CL/CD/2/1 London Civil Defence Region Situation reports 25 August to  
24 September 1940 
 
GLC/DG/PUB/01/156/1514, GLC: Director General’s Office: The Changing Population of the 
London Boroughs: Statistical series no. 39 
 
GLC/DG/PUB/01/149/1428. GLC: Director General’s Office: Economic statistics from the 
1981 census:  Statistical series no. 31 
 
 
London School of Economics Archives 
 
Llewellyn Smith Archives:  New Survey of London Life and Labour (NSOL) files:  
 
NSOL 1/4/8 Dock Labour - Employment and Earnings 
 
NSOL 1/4/10 Dock Labour - Tables 
 
NSOL 2/33 Working Class Survey Cards 200-891 (Record Cards, Poplar) 
 
NSOL 2/45 Working Class Survey Cards 0-800 (Record Cards, West Ham) 
 




Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick 
 
 
MSS/126/TG/447/G/4/1 NMC Minutes of 41st meeting on 24 April 1969 
 
MSS.126/TG/RES/D/27/2 TGWU (London Docks, 1928-1969) 
 




Museum of London Docklands 
 
 
Oral History archives: 
 
DK87.42 Laura Evans 
 
DK87.63 Kathleen Ralphs 
 




Port of London Authority Archives at the Museum of London Docklands 
 
Port of London Authority Annual Reports and Accounts 
 




Year Ended 31st March 1911 (House of Commons Paper 341) 
Year Ended 31st March 1914 (House of Commons Paper 422) 
Year Ended 31st March 1924 (London: PLA, 1924) 
Year Ended 31st March 1925 (London: PLA 1925) 
Year Ended 31st March 1927 (London: PLA, 1927) 
Year Ended 31st March 1933 (London: PLA 1933) 
Year Ended 31st March 1935 (London: PLA, 1935)  
Year Ended 31st March 1938 (London: PLA, 1938) 
Year Ended 31st March 1939 (London: PLA, 1939)  
Year Ended 31st March 1947 (London: PLA, 1947)  
Year Ended 31st March 1960 (London: PLA, 1960) 
Year Ended 31st December 1969 (London: PLA, 1970) 
Year Ended 31st December 1970 (London: PLA, 1971) 
Year Ended 31st December 1971 (London: PLA, 1972) 
Year Ended 31st December 1972 (London: PLA, 1973) 
Year Ended 31st December 1973 (London: PLA, 1974) 
Year Ended 31st December 1974 (London: PLA, 1975) 
Year Ended 31st December 1975 (London: PLA, 1976) 
Year Ended 31st December 1976 (London: PLA, 1978) 
Year Ended 31st December 1977 (London: PLA, 1978) 
Year Ended 31st December 1978 (London: PLA, 1979) 
Year Ended 31st December 1979 (London: PLA, 1980) 
Year Ended 31st December 1980 (London: PLA, 1981) 
Year Ended 31st December 1981 (London: PLA, 1982) 
 
Minutes of the Port of London Authority: 
 
11 May 1939 
19 January 1976  
15 March 1976 
12 April 1976 
  5 July 1976 
28 February 1977  
26 September 1977 
24 October 1977 
  8 December 1977 
17 April 1978 
22 January 1979 
  9 June 1980  
 
Minutes of the PLA Staff Committee  
 
16 April 1946 
  6 June 1946 
  4 July 1946.  
 
Polanews (PLA External Affairs Department 1977) 
 
PLA Information paper No 1: the Challenge for the Future (London: PLA, 1978)  
PLA Information paper No 2 the Challenge of Decision Now (London: PLA, 1978) 
PLA Information paper No 3 Planning for the Next Five Years (London: PLA, 1979) 
PLA Information paper No 4: A Port on Probation (London: PLA, 1979) 
 
 





Volume 6, (1931) p.120 ‘Nurses’ pp. 207-213. ‘Mechanisation: mechanical handling of 
materials’. 
Volume 19 (1944) p.24 ‘A quite unique person’ 
Volume 21, (1946) p. 43 ‘Girls “Demob” Thames Barges’ (Riveters)  
Volume 37, (1962) pp. 126-129 ‘London’s Softwood Timber Trade’ 
Volume 38, (1963) p.86, ‘Packaged Lumber’, p.114, ‘New Ford [cars] method of loading’, 
pp.167-170 ‘Training London’s Dockers’ and pp 362-363 ‘Timber: palletised loads’ 
Volume 39, (1964) pp 44-45, ‘Timber: old and new’ pp. 158-164, ‘The Timber Industry’, 
pp.204-207, ‘Exports – via London’ and pp. 321-2 ‘Mechanised meat discharge’. 
Volume 40, (1965) pp. 48-52,’PLA in the News’; pp 168-171, ‘Mechanised Discharge of 
Meat Cargoes’; pp. 288-290, ‘PLA’s Unique Accident Prevention Scheme’; p.317; 
‘Modernisation of King George V dock’, and pp. 414-419, ‘The Tilbury Modernisation Plan 
Takes Shape’. 
Volume 41, (1966) pp.2-7,’Modernisation at Millwall Dock’; pp. 232-239; ‘The Role of the 
Port Authority in the Container Age’, and pp. 453-456 ‘Acquiring New Skills’  
Volume 42 (1967) p.228 ‘Modern methods at Millwall Docks’ and pp. 466-469 ‘”M” shed at 
West India Dock’. 
Volume 43 (1968) pp.33-37 ‘Tilbury - London’s Container Port’; pp. 96-100 ‘History and 
Closure of London Dock’; pp.134-138 ‘A woman in the hold’ and pp.218-222 ‘A woman’s 
work is never done’ (Patricia O’Driscoll); p. 232 ‘The First of Many’, p.362 ‘Container 
handling speeds boosted’ and p.365 ‘Dockland send-off for severance men’ 
 
PLA Monthly Staff Supplement  231 (1946) p.4 ‘Demobilised staff’ 
 
Other Archive Materials 
 
Box 172 Piecework Rates 1946-1949 initials B, C and D: unindexed folder “Contingency 
Payments”. 
 
Folder: ‘PLA Plans’: 
 Port of London Authority Business Plan 1967  
 PLA Strategic Plan 1979-83 
 
Folder Q2378, “Awkward Cargoes” 
 
MLD Photograph 000002 “Blood Alley c.1930” 
 
Tull, C.J.D., The Port of London Authority 1909-1959 (Index to, and Minutes of, the Authority 
meetings 1909-1959) (London: PLA, printed for private circulation, 1959) 
 
TUC Archives at the London Metropolitan University,  
 
Folder HE 551-559 Harbours and Docks General to 1969 
 




Official Publications and Papers 
 
 
House of Commons Hansard:  
 




16 June 1933, Col. 456 
  8 March 1945, Col. 2197 
19 November 1945, Cols 34-39. 
13 February 1946, Col 399 
26 July 1949, Col 2279  
26 July 1949 Cols 2263-2335 
21 April 1955, col 15 
28 July 1955, cols 218-9 
18 December 1957, cols 424-428 
18 December 1969, cols 1568-1689 
  2 February 1972, col 446 
19 June 1972, cols 30-31 
15 July 1975, cols 32-37 
31 July 1978, Written Answers: cols 169-170 
 
House of Lords Hansard,  
 
13 May 1942 Col. 997  
11 March 1952, Cols 608-658 
16 November 1954, cols 1550-1570 
6 June 1957, col 233 
 
White Papers:  
 
Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices (Cmd 7321) (London: HMSO, 
1948) 
 
Prices and Incomes Standstill (Cmnd 3073, 1966) 
 
Prices and Incomes Policy: Period of Severe Restraint (Cmnd 3150, 1966) 
 
Prices and Incomes Policy after June 1967 (Cmnd 3235, 1967)  
 
Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969 (Cmnd 3590, 1968) 
 
In Place of Strife (Cmnd 3888, 1969) 
 
Reorganisation of the Ports (Cmnd 3903, 1969) 
 
Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy after 1969 (Cmnd 4237, 1969)  
 






Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System 
together with Minutes of Evidence (House of Commons Paper 448, 1888) 
 
Royal Commission on the Port of London Report (Cd 1151, 1902) 
 





Royal Commission on the Port of London Appendices to Minutes of Evidence (Cd.1153, 
1902) 
 
Report of the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on 
the Port of London Bill together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence 
and Appendices (House of Commons Paper 288, 1908)  
 
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress 1909 Report (Cd 4499, 1909) 
 
Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Transport Workers Wages and Conditions of 
Employment of Dock Labour Report and Minutes of Evidence (Shaw Report, 1920, Cmd. 
936) 
 
Report of the Committee on Port Labour, (Maclean report) (London: HMSO, 1931) 
 
Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance Final Report (Cmd. 4185, 1932)  
 
Report by Sir William Henry Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services. (Cmd 6404, 
1942) 
 
London Docks Dispute 1945. Report of Committee of Inquiry (Ammon Report) (London: 
HMSO, 1945) 
 
Port Transport Industry. Report of a Committee of Investigation on a Difference Between 
Employers and Workpeople Regarding the National Minimum Wage and the Piece-workers’ 
Minimum Guarantee (Evershed Report 1945) (London: HMSO, 1945) 
 
Port Transport Industry: Report of Inquiry held under Paragraph 1(4) of the Schedule to the 
Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946 (Forster Report 1946) (London: 
HMSO, 1946)  
 
Port Transport Industry: Report of Inquiry held under paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the 
Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946 (Cameron Report 1947) (London: 
HMSO, 1947) 
 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for the Years 1939-1946 (Cmd. 7225, 1947) 
 
Port Transport Industry Report of Committee of Inquiry into the amount and basis of 
calculation of the guaranteed wage to be made to Dock Workers under the Dock Workers 
(Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1947 (Hetherington Report) (London: HMSO, 1947)  
 
Report of the Working Party on Turn-Round of Shipping in UK ports. (London: HMSO, 
1948), 
 
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry: Report of the Committee for the  
Review of Industrial Arrangements under the Chairmanship of Sir Charles Doughty KC 
(Doughty Report, 1948) (NJCPTI: London, 1948)  
 
Review of the British Docks Strikes 1949 (Isaacs Report, Cmd 7851, 1949) 
 
Unofficial Stoppages in the London docks. Report of a Committee of Inquiry (Leggett Report, 
Cmd 8236, 1951). 
 
Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and Power First and Second 





Interim Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks (Evershed Interim 
Report, Cmd 9302, 1954)  
 
Final Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks (Evershed Final 
Report, Cmd 9310,1954)  
 
Port Transport industry. Report of a Committee to inquire into the Operation of the Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) scheme, 1947 (Devlin Report 1956, Cmd 9813,1956),  
 
Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute between employers who are members of the 
employers’ side and workpeople who are represented on the workpeople’s side of the  
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry (Cameron Report 1958, Cmnd 
510,1958). 
 
Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, First Report, (London: HMSO, 1958) 
 
Ocean Shipowners’ Tally Clerks. Report of a Committee appointed by the Minister of Labour 
to consider the difficulties which have arisen in the Port of London (Lloyd Williams Report) 
(London: HMSO, 1960)  
 
Port Transport Industry. Objections made to the Draft Dock Workers (Regulation of 
Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961. Report of Inquiry held under paragraph 5 of the 
Schedule to the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. (Forster Report 1961) 
(London, HMSO, 1961) 
 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of Great Britain) (Rochdale Report, 
Cmnd 1824, 1962),  
 
First report of the Committee of Inquiry into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport 
Industry (Devlin Report 1964, Cmnd. 2523, 1964) 
 
Final report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters 
Concerning the Port Transport Industry (Devlin Report 1965, Cmnd. 2734, 1965) 
 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry under Lord Devlin into the Wage Structure and Level of 
Pay for Dock Workers. (Devlin Report on Wages, Cmnd 3104, 1966)  
 
Port Transport Industry - Report of Inquiry under paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. (Honeyman Report 1966) (London: HMSO, 
1966)  
 
Report of a Court of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of a Strike by Members of 
the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers in the Port of London and into Practices 
Relevant thereto. (Wilson Report, Cmnd 3146, 1966). 
 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965-1968 (Donovan 
Report, Cmnd 3623, 1968) 
 
Report of a Court of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon. The Lord Pearson, C.B.E., into a dispute 
between the parties represented on the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry 
(Pearson report, Cmnd 4429 HMSO, 1970) 
 








Public Acts, Statutory Rules and Orders and Statutory Instruments 
 
 
1 Elizabeth c.11, An Act Limiting the Times for Laying on Land Merchandize from Beyond 
the Seas, and Touching Customs for Sweet Wines (1558) 
 
39 Geo. 3 c.69, An Act for Rendering more Commodious, and for Better Regulating, the Port 
of London (1799) 
 
7 & 8 Vict. c.84 The Metropolis Building Act 1844  
 
16 and 17 Vict c.107, The Customs Consolidation Act (1853). 
 
43 and 44 Vict. c.42 An Act to Extend and Regulate the Liability of Employers to make  
Compensation for Personal Injuries Suffered by Workmen in their Service (1880). 
 
8 Edw. VII c.68 The Port of London Act 1908  
 
17 and 18 Geo V c.22 The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 
 
19 Geo V c.17. The Local Government Act of 1929  
 
26 Geo V and I Edw 8, c.51 The Housing Act 1936,  
 
2 and 3 Geo VI c. 62 The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939,  
 
3 and 4 Geo VI c.20 The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940  
 
7 and 8 Geo VI c.15. The Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act of 1944  
 
7 and 8 Geo VI c. 3 The Education Act 1944 
 
9 and 10 Geo VI, c. 22 The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946 
 
9 and 10 Geo VI c. 52. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946  
 
9 and 10 Geo VI c. 67 The National Insurance Act, 1946 
 
9 and 10 Geo VI c.81 The National Health Service Act 1946  
 
Elizabeth II Ch.28, Docks and Harbours Act 1966 
 
Elizabeth II Ch. 33, Prices and Incomes Act 1966  
 
Elizabeth II Ch.53, Prices and Incomes Act 1967 
 
Elizabeth II Ch.32 Port of London Act 1968,  
 
Elizabeth II Ch. 42 Prices and Incomes Act, 1968.  
 





Elizabeth II Ch. 77 The Community Land Act 1975 
 




Statutory Rules and Orders (S&RO) and Statutory Instruments (SI): 
 
 
SR&O 1922 no. 3, Metropolitan Common Poor Fund (Outdoor Relief) Regulations 1922 
 
SR&O 1939 no. 927 Defence (General) Regulations 1939 
 
SR&O 1940 no.781 Defence Regulation 58A 
 
SR&O 1940 no.1013 Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order 1940 
 
SR&O 1940 no.1217 Defence Regulation 58AA 
 
SR&O 1940 no.1305 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 (‘Order 
1305’) 
 
SR&O 1941 no.202, Docks (Provision of Canteens) Order 1941 
 
SR&O 1941 no.1440, Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order 1941 
 
SR&O 1947 no. 1189, Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order 1947.  
 
SI 1951/1376, Industrial Disputes Order 1951  
 
SI 1960/2029, Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order, 1960 
 
SI 1961/2107, Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order 1961. 
 
SI 1967/1197, Port of London Authority Revision Order 1967 
 
SI 1967/1252, Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order 1967 
 
SI 1975/1890 Port of London Authority (Constitution) Revision Order, 1975 
 
 
Primary Sources: Printed Documents 
 
Chester, Norman, The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-51 (London: HMSO, 1975) 
 
Collier, Basil, History of the Second World War: Defence of the United Kingdom. (London, 
HMSO, 1957)  
 
Hancock W. K., and Gowing M. M., History of the Second World War: The British War 
Economy (London: HMSO, 1949)  
 
Howarth, E.G., and King, M., West Ham: a study of Industrial Problems; being the Report of 





Llewellyn Smith, H., The New Survey of London Life and Labour Volume I: Forty Years of 
Change (London: P S King, 1930)  
 
Llewellyn Smith, H., The New Survey of London Life and Labour Volume II: London 
Industries (London: P S King, 1931) 
 
Llewellyn Smith H., The New Survey of London Life and Labour Volume III: Survey of Social 
Conditions: Eastern Area (London: P S King, 1932) 
 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Explanatory Memorandum on Dock Labour 
Schemes (London: HMSO, 1941)  
 
Ministry of Labour Gazette Vols. 43 (1935), 44, (1936), 45, (1937) 46, (1938) and 47, (1939) 
 
London County Council, London Statistics 1936-1938 Volume XLI (London: LCC, 1939) 
 
Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England and Wales for the year 1937 (HMSO, 
London, 1937)  
 





Secondary Sources: Books 
 
 
Adams, George, ‘Cargo Handling’ in al Naib, S K. (ed.). Dockland: An Illustrated Historical 
Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 1988)  
 
Adams, J., Organisation of the British Port Transport Industry (London: National Ports 
Council, 1973)  
 
Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: 
Quartet Books, 1977) 
 
Allen, V.L., Trade Union Leadership Based on a Study of Arthur Deakin (London: Longman, 
Green, 1957)  
 
Allen, V. L., Trade Unions and the Government. (London: Longmans, 1960) 
 
Allport, Alan, Demobbed: Coming Home after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009) 
 
al Naib, S.K., (ed.) Dockland: An Illustrated Historical Survey of Life and Work in East 
London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 1988) 
 
Ball, M., and Sunderland, D., An Economic History of London 1800-1914. (London: 
Routledge, 2001) 
 
Beck, Earl R., Under the Bombs: the German Home Front 1942-45 (Kentucky: The 
University Press, 1986)  
 
Beckhard, R, Organization Development: Strategies and models. (Reading, Massachusetts: 





Beveridge, W. H., Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (1909 and 1930) (London: 
Longmans Green, 1930)  
 
Bird, J. H., The Major Seaports of Great Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1963) p.366. 
 
Bloomberg, Joe Looking Back: a Docker’s Life (London: Stepney Books, 1979)  
 
Bowen, Frank C., The Port of London, 1949 (London: Dryden, 1949)  
 
Bradford, Henry T., Tales of London Docklands (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007) 
 
Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain1927-1941 (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart 1985)  
 
Broodbank, J G. History of the Port of London Vols I and II. (London: Daniel O’Connor, 
1921)  
 
Brown, William, Piecework Bargaining. (London: Heinemann, 1973)  
 
Brown, William, Explorations in Management (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960)  
 
Bryant, Arthur, Liquid History: to Commemorate Fifty Years of the Port of London Authority 
(London: privately printed, 1960). 
 
Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Vol. 1 (London: Heinemann, 1960)  
 
Calder, Angus, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969) 
 
Calder, Ritchie, The Lessons of London (London: Secker and Warburg,1941) 
 
Castle, Barbara, Fighting all the Way (London: Macmillan,1993) 
 
Capper, C., The Port and Trade of London: Historical, Statistical, Local, and General   
(London: Smith Elder, 1862) 
 
Champion, Tony, ‘Internal Migration and Spatial Distribution of Migration’ in H. Joshi (ed.) 
The Changing population of Britain (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989)  
 
Clegg, H.A., The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford: Bsil 
Blackwell, 1979) 
 
Clegg, W. Paul, Docks and Ports 2: London (London: Ian Allen, 1987) 
 
Dash, Jack, Good Morning Brothers.  (London: Mayflower, 1970) 
 
Davis, Colin J., Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers 1946-1961 
(Chicago: Illinois University Press, 2003)  
 
Davis Smith, Justin, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest 1945-55 
(London: Pinter, 1990) 
 
Dench, Geoff, Gavron, Kate, and Young, Michael. The New East End: Kinship, Race and 





Dorey, Peter, Wage Politics in Britain: the Rise and Fall of Incomes Policies since 1945 
(Sussex: Academic Press, 2001) 
 
Douglas Brown, R., The Port of London. (Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton, 1978)  
 
Durcan, J.W. McCarthy, W. E. J., and Redman, G. P., Strikes in Post-War Britain. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 
 
Fishman, Nina, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 1939-45 (Aldershot, 
Hants, Scolar Press, 1995)  
 
Ford, P. Incomes, Means Tests, and Personal Responsibility (London: P S King, 1939) 
 
Goldstein, Joseph, The Government of British Trade Unions: a Study of Apathy and the 
Democratic Processes in the Transport and General Workers Union (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1952) 
 
Gosling, Harry, Up and Down Stream (London: Methuen, 1927)  
 
Harris, Nigel, Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives the State and 
Industry 1945-1964 (London: Methuen, 1972). 
 
Hill, Stephen, The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1979) 
 
Hodson, J.L., Home Front (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944) 
 
Hunter, Bill, They Knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and the Leadership on the 
Docks 1945-1989 (London, Index Books: 1994) 
 
Idle, E Doreen, War Over West Ham (London: Faber and Faber, 1943) 
 
Inwood, Stephen, A History of London. (London: Macmillan, 1998) 
 
Jackson, Gordon, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworth, Surrey: World’s Works, 
1983) 
 
Jackson, Michael, Labour Relations on the Docks. (Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 
1973) 
 
Jeffery, A. E., The history of Scruttons: shipbrokers and shipowners 1802-1926: stevedores, 
master porters and cargo superintendents 1890-1967 (London: privately published, 1971)  
 
Jensen, Vernon, Hiring of Dock Workers, (Harvard: University Press, 1964)  
 
Jupp, John, ‘Some Personal Reflections in London’s Lighterage Industry’ in S.K. al Naib, 
(ed.) Dockland: An Illustrated Historical Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: 
North East London Polytechnic, 1988) 
 
Kerr, Clark, and Siegel, Abraham, ‘The Interindustry Propensity to Strike – an International 
Comparison’ in Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur Ross (eds.) Industrial Conflict 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1954) 
 






Knowles, K., Strikes, a Study in Industrial Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952) 
 
Lascelles, E C P., and Bullock, S.S., Dock Labour and Decasualisation (London: P S King, 
1924) 
 
Levinson, Marc, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. (Princeton: University Press, 2006) 
 
Liverpool University. The Dock Worker: an Analysis of Conditions of Employment and 
Industrial Relations in the Port of Manchester. (Liverpool: University Press, 1956) 
 
Lovell, John, Stevedores and Dockers. (London: Macmillan, 1969) 
 
Lynch, Anthony, Weathering the Storm: the Mersey Docks Financial Crisis 1970-74. 
(Liverpool: University Press, 1994)  
 
McCarthy, Terry, The Great Dock Strike 1889 (London: Weidenfeld and 
 
Mackay, Robert, The Test of War: Inside Britain 1939-1945 (London: Routledge, 1999)  
 
McKibbin, Ross, Parties and People: England 1914-1951 (Oxford: University Press, 2010)  
 
McIlory, John, ‘Notes on the Communist Party and Industrial Politics’ in John McIlroy, Nina 
Fishman and Alan Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Polices: the High 
Tide of Trade Unions, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 
 
Maier, N.R., Psychology in Industry,  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946)  
 
Makepeace, Margaret, The East India Company's London Workers: Management of the 
Warehouse Labourers, 1800-1858 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2010) 
 
Mankelow, Roy, ‘The Port of London 1790-1970’.  In S. Davies (ed.) Dock workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000)  
 
Marriott, John, Beyond the Tower: a History of East London (New Haven: Yale University, 
2011). 
 
Marwick, Arthur, The Home Front: The British and the Second World War (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1976) 
 
Meissner, Martin, Technology and the Worker, Technical Demands and Social Processes in 
Industry (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1969) 
 
Mellish, Michael, The Docks after Devlin (London: Heinemann,1972)  
 
Mowat, C. L., Britain between the Wars 1918-1940 (Chicago: The University Press, 1955) 
 
Oram, R.B., The Dockers’ Tragedy. (London: Hutchinson, 1970)  
  





Pearsall, Alan ‘The Development of the Ship’ in S K al Naib (ed.) Dockland: An Illustrated 
Historical Survey of Life and Work in East London, (London: North East London Polytechnic, 
1988)  
 
Phillips, G. A., and Whiteside, N., Casual Labour: the Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985)  
 
Phillips, Jim, ‘Decasualisation and Disruption: Industrial Relations in the Docks 1945-79’. In 
Chris Wrigley (ed.) A History of British Industrial Relations 1939-79: Industrial Relations in a 
Declining Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,1996). 
 
Phillips, Jim, The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems of Power, 1945-
1951 (London: Pluto Press, 1996) 
 
Porter, Roy, London: a Social History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) 
 
Pudney, John, London’s Docks (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975) 
 
Ramsden, John, The Age of Churchill and Eden (London: Longman, 1995)  
 
Ross, A. M., and Hartman P.T., Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (London: Wiley, 
1960)  
 
Ross, Colin, Death in the Docks (Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse, 2010) 
 
Rule, Fiona, London’s Docklands: a History of the Lost Quarter (London: Ian Allan, 2009) 
Sheppard, Francis, London: a History (Oxford: University Press,1998) 
 
Saunders, Ann L, The London County Council Bomb Damage Maps 1939-1945 (London: 
London Topographical Society and London Metropolitan Archives, 2005) 
 
Sheppard, Francis, London: a History, (Oxford: University Press,1998)  
 
Sked, Alan and Cook, Chris, Post-War Britain: A Political History (4thEdn) (London, Penguin 
Books, 1993) 
 
Smith, C.T.B., Clifton, Richard, Makeham, Peter, Creigh, S.W., and Burn, R.V., Strikes in 
Britain: a Research Study of Industrial Stoppages, (London: Department of Employment 
Manpower Paper No.15, 1978). 
 
Stansky, Peter, The First Day of the Blitz (Yale: University Press, 2007) 
 
Takel, R. E., Industrial Port Development (Bristol: Scientechnica,1974)  
 
Taylor, Robert, The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and Unions since 
1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)  
 
Thompson, Willie, The Good Old Cause: British Communism 1920-1991 (London: Pluto 
Press, 1992)   
 
Thorpe, Andrew, ‘The Labour Party and the Trade Unions’ in John McIlroy, Nina Fishman 
and Alan Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Polices: the High Tide of Trade 





Vernon, H.M., Accidents and Their Prevention, (Cambridge: University Press, 1936)  
 
Watkin, Brian, The National Health Service: the First Phase 1945-1974 and After (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1978) 
 
Watson, Nigel, The Port of London Authority: a Century of Service 1909-2009 (London: Port 
of London Authority 2009)  
 
Watt, Paul, Millington, Gareth, and Huq, Rupa, ‘East London Mobilities: the ‘Cockney 
Diaspora’ and the remaking of the Essex Ethnoscape’ in Paul Watt and Peer Smets (eds.) 
Mobilities and Neighbourhood Belonging in Cities and Suburbs (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014)  
 
Weightman, Gavin, and Humphries, Stephen, The Making of Modern London (London: 
Ebury Press, 2007) 
 
Weiler, Peter, ‘British Labour and the Cold War: the London Dock Strike of 1949’. In James  
E Cronin and Jonathan Schneer (eds.) Social Conflict and the Modern Order in Britain. 
(London: Croon Helm, 1982)  
 
Wheeler Bennet, John, John Anderson, Viscount Waverley, (London: Macmillan, 1962),  
 
White, Jerry, London in the 20th Century (London: Vintage Books, 2008)  
 
Wigham, Eric, Strikes and the Government 1893-1974 (London: Macmillan, 1976)  
 
Williams, Francis, Ernest Bevin: a Portrait of a Great Englishman. (London; Hutchinson, 
1952 
 
Wilson, David F., Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana Books, 1972). 
 
 
Secondary Sources: Periodicals etc. 
 
 
Abernethy, Simon T., ‘Deceptive data? The New Survey of London Life and Labour 1928 – 
31’ University of Cambridge: Working Papers in Economic and Social History, 16 (2013), 
 
Beenstock, M., and Warburton, P., ‘Wages and Unemployment in lnterwar Britain’ 
Explorations in Economic History, 23, (1986) pp.153-172 
 
Binns, Asa, ‘Mechanisation: Mechanical Handling of Materials’ PLA Monthly, 6, (1931) pp. 
207-213 
 
Bird, James  ‘Seaports and the European Economic Community’, The Geographical Journal, 
133, 3 (1967), pp. 302-322  
  
Bird, J.H., and Pollock, E.E., ‘The Future of Seaports in the European Communities’ The 
Geographical Journal 144,1 (1978) pp. 23-41 
 
Bundy, Colin, and Healy, Dermot, ‘Aspects of Urban Poverty’ Oral History, 6,1 (1978), pp. 
79-97 
 






Chaline, C., ‘Les “New Towns” comme type de villes industrielles’ Annales de Géographie  
391 (1963), pp. 350-354  
 
Champion, Tony, and Congdon, Peter, ‘An Analysis of the Recovery of London's Population 
Change Rate’ Built Environment, 13, 4 (1987), pp. 193-211 
 
Cronin, James E., ‘Theories of Strikes: Why Can't They Explain the British Experience?’ 
Journal of Social History, 12, 2 (1978), pp. 194-220 
 
Cronin, James E., ‘The Peculiar Pattern of British Strikes since 1888’ Journal of British 
Studies, 18, 2 (1979), pp. 118-141 
 
Davies, P.L., ‘In Search of Jobs and Defendants’ Modern Law Review 36, (1973) pp. 78-89  
 
Davies, Sam, ‘“Three on the Hook and Three on the Book”: Dock Labourers and 
Unemployment Insurance Between the Wars’ Labour History Review 59, 3 (1994) pp. 34-43 
 
Evans, E.W., and Creigh, S. W., ‘The Natural History of the Strike in Britain’ Labour History, 
39 (1980), pp. 47-61  
 
Fekete, Liz, and Torrel, Josep, ‘Racismo y declive industrial: el caso del East End de 
Londres’ Mientras Tanto 55 (1993), pp. 91-98 
 
Field, Geoffrey, ‘“Civilians in Uniform”’: Class and Politics in the British Armed Forces, 1939-
1945’ International Labor and Working-Class History, 80 (2011), pp. 121-147 
 
Forbes, Hugh H V,  ‘Environmental Problems and the Agency Process: An English View’ 
Administrative Law Review, 26, 2 (1974), pp. 155-163 
 
Ford, Leslie, ‘The Development of the Port of London’ Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 
107, 5040 (1959), pp. 821-835 
 
Gelman, Andrew, Katz, Jonathan N., and Bafumi, Joseph, ‘Standard Voting Power Indexes 
Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis’ British Journal of Political Science, 34, 4 (2004), pp. 
657-674  
 
Haralambides, Hercules and Acciaro, Michele, ‘The New European Port Policy Proposals: 
too much ado about nothing?’ Maritime Economics & Logistics (2015) 17, (2015) pp. 127–
141 
 
Henderson, Anthony, and Palmer, Sarah, ‘The Early Nineteenth Century Port of London: 
Management and Labour in Three Dock Companies 1800-1825’, in Ville, Simon, and 
Williams, David, (eds.) ‘Management, Finance and Industrial Relations in Maritime Histories: 
Essays in International Maritime and Business History’ Research in Maritime History 6 
(1994) pp.31-50 
Kahn-Freund, Otto. ‘The Industrial Relations Act 1971-Some retrospective reflections.’ 
Industrial Law Journal 3 1, (1974): pp 186-200 
Kidron, Michael, ‘Interview with Dick Barrett’ Socialist Review 4 5 (1955) pp. 1-2 &4 
 






Knowles, K., ‘The Post War Dock Strikes’ Political Quarterly 22, 3 (1951) pp. 266-290. 
 
Konvitz, Josef W., ‘The Crises of Atlantic Port Cities 1880 to 1920 ’ Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 36, 2 (1994), pp. 293-318 
 
Kreukels, Ton, and Wever, Egbert, ‘Dealing with Competition: the Port of Rotterdam’ in 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie: 87, 4 (1996) pp. 293-309 
 
Llewellyn Smith, H., ‘Chapters in the History of London Waterside Labour’ The Economic 
Journal, 2, 8 (1892), pp. 593-607 
 
Lichfield, Nathaniel and Wendt, Paul F., ‘Six English New Towns: A Financial Analysis’ The 
Town Planning Review 40, 3 (1969), pp. 283-314   
 
Lindop, F. ‘Unofficial militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67’ Oral History and 
Labour History 11, 2 (1983) pp. 21-33 
 
Lindop, Fred, ‘The Dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, Part 2: the Arrest and 
Release of the ‘Pentonville Five’ Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 6 (1998) pp. 65-
100, p.66 
 
Lindop, Fred, ‘Racism and the working class: strikes in support of Enoch Powell in 1968’ 
Labour History Review, 66,1 (2001) pp 79-100 
 
McGuire, Joseph W., ‘Review of Meissner’s Technology and the Worker’ Administrative 
Science Quarterly 15, 2 (1970) pp.265-266 
 
McIlroy, John ‘Reds at Work: Communist Factory Organisation in the Cold War, 1947-56’ 
Labour History Review 65, 2, pp.181-201 
 
McKelvey, Jean Trepp, ‘Trade Union Wage Policy in Post-war Britain’ Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 6, 1 (1952) pp. 3-19 
 
Maizels. A., ‘The Sources and Nature of Statistical Information in Special Fields of Statistics: 
The Oversea Trade Statistics of the United Kingdom’ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
Srs. A 112, (1949), pp. 207-223 
 
Marriott, J., ‘West Ham: London’s Industrial Centre and Gateway to the World Part I: 
Industrialisation, 1840-1910.’The London Journal, 13, 2 (1988) pp. 122-142 
 
Marriott, J., ‘West Ham: London's Industrial Centre and Gateway to the World Part II 
Stabilization and Decline 1910-1939.’ London Journal 14, 1 (1989) pp.43-58 
 
Meyer, Marshall W., ‘Review of Meissner’s Technology and the Worker’ Social Forces 50, 2 
(1971) pp. 272-273 
 
Miller, Frederic R., ‘National Assistance or Unemployment Assistance? The British Cabinet 
and Relief Policy, 1932-33’ Journal of Contemporary History, 9, (1974) pp.163-184 
 
Morgan, F. W., ‘Rotterdam and Waterway Approaches to the Rhine’ Economic Geography, 





Nicholson, Nigel, and Kelly, John, ‘The Psychology of Strikes’ Journal of Occupational 
Behaviour, 1, 4 (1980), pp. 275-284  
 
O’Donoghue, J. Goulding, L., and Allen, G., ‘Consumer Price Inflation Since 1750’ Economic 
Trends, 604, (2004) pp. 38-46  
 
Owen, David, ‘Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain: Patterns of population change, 1981-91’ 
1991 Census Statistical Paper no. 10 (University of Warwick National Ethnic Minority Data 
Archive, 1995) 
 
Penrose, L.S., ‘The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting’ Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, 109, 1 (1946), pp. 53-57  
 
Phillips, J., ‘The Postwar Political Consensus and Industrial Unrest in the Docks, 1945-55’ 
Twentieth Century British History, 6, 3 (1995), pp. 302-19 
 
Phillips, Jim ‘Inter-Union Conflict in the Docks, 1954-55’. Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations 1 (1996) pp. 107-130  
 
Phillips J., ‘Class and Industrial relations in Britain: the ‘long’ mid-century and the case of 
Port Transport c. 1920-70’. Twentieth Century British History 16, 1 (2005) pp. 52-73 
 
Posthuma, Frans, ‘Rotterdam Europort’ Ekistics, 28, 168 (1969), pp. 345-347 
Richardson, H. W., ‘The Economic Significance of the Depression in Britain’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 4, 4, (1969), pp. 3-19 
Rose, Gillian, ‘Locality-Studies and Waged Labour: An Historical Critique’ Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 14, 3 (1989), pp. 317-328 
Sandison, Hamish R., ‘A Rejected Transplant: The British Industrial Relations Act (1971-
1974)’ Industrial Relations Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1979), pp. 247-320 
Shaw, W.J., ‘A survey of Dock Labour Accidents in the Port of London’ British Journal of 
Industrial Medicine, 13, 1 (1956) pp. 59-69   
 
Shaw, W.J., ‘A survey of Dock Labour Accidents in the Port of London’ International Cargo 
Handling Coordination Association Symposium on Accident Incidence and Multiplicity of 
Markings, 28 October 1958.  
 
Sibley, Richard, ‘The swing to Labour during the Second World War: When and Why?’ 
Labour History Review, 55, l, (1990). Pp. 23-34 
 
Stray, S. J., and Silver, M. S., ‘The Measurement of Change in the Popularity of 
Governments in United Kingdom By-Elections’ Political Methodology 8, 4 (1982), pp. 93-106 
 
Summerfield, Penny ‘Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social Movement?’ Journal of 
Contemporary History 20, 3, (1985) pp.439-452 
 
Thorpe, Keir, ‘“Rendering the Strike Innocuous” the British Government’s Response to 






Tomlinson, J. D., ‘The Iron Quadrilateral: Political Obstacles to Economic Reform under the 
Attlee Government’ Journal of British Studies, 34, 1 (1995), pp. 90 -111 
 
Trist, E. L., and Bamforth, K.W., ‘Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the 
Longwall Method of Coal-Getting’ Human Relations 1951 4: 3 (1951), pp 3-38 
 
Turnbull, P., ‘Contesting Globalization on the Waterfront’. Politics & Society, 28, 3 (2000) pp. 
367-391 
 
Turnbull, P., and Sapsford, D., ‘A Sea of Discontent: The Tides of Organised and 
“Unorganised” Conflict on the Docks’, Sociology, 26, 2 (1992), pp. 291-309 
 
Turnbull, P., and Weston, S., ‘The British Port Transport Industry: part 2. Employment, 
Working Practices and Productivity’.  Maritime Policy and Management 20, 3 (1993) pp. 181-
95 
 
Turnbull, P., and Wass, V., 'The Great Dock and Dole Swindle; Accounting for the Costs and 
Benefits of Port Transport Deregulation and the Dock Labour Compensation Scheme’. 
Public Administration, 73, 4 (1995), pp. 513-534. 
 
Turnbull, Peter, Morris, Julia, and Sapsford, David  ‘Persistent Militants and Quiescent 
Comrades: intra-industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89’ The Sociological Review 44, 
4 (1996) pp 710-745 
 
Turner, Robert, ‘The Contribution of Oral Evidence to Labour History’ Oral History, 4, 1 
(1976), pp. 23-40  
 
Wedderburn, K. W., ‘Nuisance, Intimidation, Picketing in a Trade Dispute’ The Cambridge 




Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Internet Access)  
 
Ammon, Charles George, Baron Ammon (1873-1960) by Alan Clinton.  
 
Anderson, John, Viscount Waverley (1882-1958) by G C Peden. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Attlee, Clement, Earl Attlee (1883-1967): by R C Whiting. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Bevin, Ernest (1881-1951) by Chris Wrigley. Accessed 10 June 2019  
 
Callaghan, (Leonard) James, Baron Callaghan of Cardiff (1912-2005), article by Roy 
Hattersley. Accessed 10 June 2019 
 
Castle, Barbara Anne, Baroness Castle of Blackburn, (1910-2002), by Anthony Howard.  
Accessed 10 June 2019 
 
Cohen, Lionel Leonard, Baron Cohen (1888-1973) Unsigned article. Accessed 10 June 2019 
 
Cousins, Frank, (1904-1968) by Geoffrey Goodman. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 






Deakin, Arthur (1890-1955) by V L Allen. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Eden, (Robert) Anthony, Earl of Avon (1897-1977) by D R Thorpe. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Gosling, Harry (1861–1930) by W. S. Sanders, revised by Marc Brodie 
 
Heath, Sir Edward (1916-2005) by Douglas Hurd. Accessed 10 June 2019 
 
Isaacs, George (1883-1979) by Hugh Pemberton. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Leggett, Sir Frederick (1884-1983) by Rodney Lowe Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Low, Austin Richard William [Toby], Baron Aldington (1914–2000), article by John Ure. 
Accessed 10 June 2019. Accessed 10 June 2019 
 
Mcleod, Iain (1913-1970) by David Goldsworthy Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold, Earl of Stockton (1894-1986) by H D C Matthew. Accessed 11 
June 2019 
 
Monckton, Walter, Viscount Monckton of Brenchley (1891-1965) by Martin Pugh. Accessed 
11 June 2019 
 
Morrison, Herbert, Baron Morrison of Lambeth (1888-1965), by David Howell. Accessed 11 
June 2019 
 
Robens, Alf, Lord Robens (1910-1999) by Geoffrey Tweedale. Accessed 11 June 2019 
 
Wilson, (James) Harold, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx (1916-1995), by Roy Jenkins. Accessed 





Calculation of regression lines: 
http://www.real-statistics.com/regression/least-squares-method 
 








Cohen, P., ‘Not coasting but taking a new tack’: 
http://www.uel.ac.uk/risingeast/archive03/entertainment.htm 
 

















Mark Brown’s Wharf:  
https://www.flickr.com/photos/londonmetropolitanarchives/9815408485 
 
Marxist Internet Archive: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1973/01/1972.htm 
 
Marx, Karl, Manifesto of the Communist Party 1848:  
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf 
 










http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge35/i15.htm (1935)  
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge45/ge45index.htm (1945) 
 
Port of Antwerp website: 
https://www.portofantwerp.com/en/publications/brochures-cards/public-map-port  
 
Port of Bremen website: https://bremenports.de/en 
 
Port of Hamburg Website: https://www.hafen-hamburg.de 
 
Port of Rotterdam website: 
https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/see-do-and-experience.   
 
Ships Gear and cargo handling: 
http://generalcargoship.com/cargo-handling-gears.html 
 
Trades Union Congress: 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/DPP_2016.pdf 
 
Tyne Built Ships:  
http://www.tynebuiltships.co.uk/P-Ships/provence1951.html 
 





UK National Poisons information service: 
(www.inchem.org/documents/ukpids/ukpids/ukpid87.htm 
 
Webster, John, The White Devil (Internet: Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004)  
 
 
The Wellcome Library: 
 
Report of the Medical Officer of Health for Poplar for 1938:  
http://wellcomelibrary.org/moh/report/b18246102#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0, 
 





Other Material  
 
Barram, Michael, Was the Decasualisation of the London Docks after the Second World War 
the Holy Grail or a False God? (unpublished MA dissertation, Birkbeck University of London, 
2014)’ 
 
el Sahli, Zouheir, Estimating the Effects of Containerisation on World Trade (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2013) 
 
English Law reports: Heaton’s Transport (St. Helens) Ltd vs Transport and General Workers 
Unions (1972) ICR 308 
 
Jensen, Vernon, Decasualisation and Modernisation of Dock Work in London. (ILR 
Paperback no. 9 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1971). 
 
Lampman, Archibald, ‘The City of the End of Things” in E C Stedman (ed.) A Victorian 
Anthology, 1837–1895 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1895) 
 
McKelvey, Jean Trepp, Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: a Study in the Persistence of 
Industrial Unrest. Booklet No.23. New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1953),  
 
McKinsey and Co. Containerization: the key to low-cost transport; a report by McKinsey & 
Company, Inc. for the British Transport Docks Board, June 1967 
 
Smith, A.E., London’s Royal Docks in the 1950s: a Memory of the Docks at Work. (Amazon: 
Privately Published, 2008) 
 
United Nations World Economic Survey, 1975: Fluctuations and Development in the World 











17 October 1922, p.13 ‘Port of London, a Great Public Building’ 
 
18 October 1922, p.9 ‘The Port of London, Opening of New Headquarters’ 
 
16 June 1933, p.11 ‘London Dock Strike settled’ 
 
16 May 1934, p.13 ‘Spread of London Dock Strike’ 
 
21 May 1934, p.10 ‘London Dock Strike’ 
 
23 May 1934, p.12 ‘London Dock Strike, negotiations for settlement’ 
 
9 May 1935, p.18 ‘London Dock strike settled’ 
   
30 November 1944 p. 2 ‘Inside the Gates or Outside’ 
 
27 April 1945, p. 2 ‘London Dock Strike Unwarranted’ 
 
4 January 1946, p.6 ‘PLA Appointments: Sir John Anderson as Chairman’ 
 
13 June 1949, p.4 ‘Appeal to Strikers’ 
 
11 July 1949, p.2 ‘Communist Aim in Strikes’ and ‘Malignant Forces’  
 
10 February 1951, p.6 ‘6,700 London men join dock strikers’ 
 
21 February 1951, ‘Seven dockers in court’ 
 
19 April 1951, p.3: ‘Seven Dockers Discharged’  
 
11 May 1951, p.6 ‘Strike Threat by Tally Clerks’  
 
19 May 1951, p.6 ‘Report on Dock Strikes’  
 
9 June 1951, p.7 ‘Another Dock Strike’ 
 
18 February 1954, p.8 ‘Meat Rationing ends in July’ 
 
27 July 1956, p. 7 ‘Principle of Dual Control in the Docks Upheld’  
 
27 July 1956, p.11 ‘Dock Labour’ 
 
6 December 1956, p. 2 ‘System of Dismissing Dock Labourers Illegal’ 
 
16 August 1957, p.8 ‘Over 12,000 dockers out and 100 ships idle’ 
 
19 June 1958, p.10 ‘Meat Drivers Vote to Go Back’ 
 





20 August 1958, p.8 ‘Court suggests 7s 6d rise for Dockers’ 
 
26 September 1966, p.11 ‘Preservation difficulty over docks scheme’ 
 
17 November 1967 p. 8 ‘Dockland’s Trusted Orator without Fireworks’  
 
28 November 1967, p.2 ‘Dockers Vote to go Back to Work’ 
 
23 January 1968 p.15 ‘PLA planning to close two docks’  
 
8 May 1969, p.23 ‘Container ships: UK’s loss Rotterdam’s gain’ 
 
19 June 1969. p.1 ‘Anti-strike Bill abandoned by Wilson: agreement heals breach in 
the Labour movement’ 
 
9 Jan 1970, p.19 ‘Dockers will get fresh pay offer’ 
 
14 January 1970, p.189 ‘Cutback in Dock Labour Forecast’ 
 
15 January 1970, p.18 ‘Industry to fight dockers’ preserve’  
 
17 March 1970, p.11 ‘When a strike IS an abuse’.  
 
June 1 1970, p.20 ‘The first phase of the rundown of the Surrey Commercial docks’ 
 
31 July 1970, p. 23 ‘Rising Pressure’ 
 
22 January 1971, p.15 ‘The Balance of Argument Goes Against Cublington’. 
 
4 March 1971, p. 21 ‘Foulness, Britain’s alternative Europort? 
 
17 March 1972 p.17 ‘Severance pay hope to stave off dock strike’  
 
29 April 1972, p.15 ‘The Container Wrangle’. 
 
5 May 1972 p.1 ‘Docks unions give strike notice’ 
 
15 June 1972, p.10 ‘Three Committed for contempt’  
 
28 July 1972, p.6 ‘Unregistered union liable for its shop stewards’ 
 
28 July 1972, p.7 ‘Why the five dockers were released from jail’ 
 
17 August 1972, p.2 ‘Angry dockers shout down Mr Jack Jones and pursue union 
delegates who voted for calling off the strike’ 
 
3 October 1972 p.5 ‘Success of docks scheme causing labour shortage’  
 
30 November 1972, p.5 ‘Fresh offer by Port of London Authority to solve Midland 
Storage dispute’.  
 
30 October 1974, p.19 ‘Ports nationalisation appears to be shelved’ 
 





22 January 1975 p.4 ‘Government blamed for decline in London industrial area’ 
 
23 January 1975, p.5 ‘Redeveloping docklands requires government aid on scale of 
new town, councillors tell MPs’ 
 
19 February 1975, p.21 ‘Perils in the Unresolved Conflict over Container Handling’. 
 
1 March 1975 p.1 ‘Port of London shuts as Dockers strike’ 
 
29 April 1975, p.1 ‘London dockers likely to accept 30% rise’ 
 
5 January 1976, p.13 ‘PLA wants limit on borrowing raised after a big loss last year’ 
 
5 May 1978, p.19 ‘Turning the tide in London’s docklands’  
 
2 June 1978 p.15 ‘Seeking reality in Dockland’ 
 
4 July 1978 p.23 ‘Threat of National Dock strike as Unions resist port cutback’ 
 
7 July 1978, p.15 ‘Union Leader resist dock strike call’ 
 
1 August 1978, p.15 ‘Backing down on the docks’ 
 
4 March 1980 p.17 ‘Port of London to close docks after failure to reach agreement on 
restrictive practices’ 
 
27 March 1985, p.18 Obituary: ‘Lord Brown’  
 
3 November 2008, p.54 Obituary ‘Lord Cuckney’  
 
15 May 2012 p.49 Obituary ‘Victor Paige’ 
 
 
 
 
